




Gall. rev.

104^f-1

Bonaparte

<36637022680013

<36637022680013

Bayer. Staatsbibliothek

THE

BONAPARTE LETTERS

DESPATCHES

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL AND OFFICIAL

FROM THE ORIGINALS

IN HIS OWN HANDS

VOLUME I

LONDON

FRANCIS & CO. 25, ABchurch Lane, Strand

1814

THE
BONAPARTE LETTERS

AND

DESPATCHES,

SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL, AND OFFICIAL;

FROM THE ORIGINALS


IN HIS PRIVATE CABINET.

VOLUME I.

LONDON:

SAUNDERS AND OTLEY, CONDUIT STREET.

1846.



F. SHOBERL, JUNIOR,
To His Royal Highness
51, RUPERT STREET,



PRINTER
Prince Albert,
HAYMARKET, LONDON.

INTRODUCTION.

It would certainly be held to argue either extreme affectation or the grossest ignorance to deny, at this time of day, that one of the most extraordinary personages of the eventful age in which he lived, if not the most extraordinary of them all, was Napoleon Bonaparte. The glory with which he surrounded himself in so superlative a degree was of that nature which is most apt to dazzle the great mass of mankind, to captivate contemporaries, and to win the admiration of posterity. But such were the powers and resources of his mind that, had any other combination of circumstances thrown him into a different career, it can scarcely be doubted that, whatever it might have been, he would have acquired the highest distinction to which it was capable of leading. He would have shone, had he been a statesman, a diplomatist, an actor, and nothing more. History has industriously deduced the prominent features of his character from his actions, but many minute traits have escaped its observation. Both are sketched by his own hand unreservedly in this work,

which contains the Secret and Official Correspondence of this remarkable man during what may be termed his apprenticeship to power, the years between his appointment to the command of an army and his usurpation of the government to the heads of which he had ever professed the greatest deference.

In these Letters, not intended to meet the public eye, he has laid bare the sentiments and motives which influenced his actions during the busy years over which they extend, and thus raised a *monumentum ære perennius*—a monument more imperishable than that designed to cover his ashes in the capital of what was once his mighty empire. They display his unrivalled judgment, sagacity, foresight, and discrimination—his indefatigable perseverance, activity, industry, and that attention to the minutest circumstances, without which the success of the most ably combined plans may be endangered. But the monument, like a medal, has its reverse: There we discover the recklessness of the means employed for accomplishing ends—the duplicity, fraud, hypocrisy, perfidy, rapacity, cruelty, which cast a shade over those higher qualities that would excite unmixed admiration but for the purposes to which they were applied.

It is not the design of these introductory remarks to give an analysis of the work here presented to the public; it is, in fact, of so miscellaneous a nature, as not to be susceptible of analysis: their object is simply to refer, in a desultory manner, to a few of the

subjects which it embraces, so as to enable the reader to form some idea of the pre-eminent importance, value, and interest of this collection. They shall commence with some brief notices of that instrument by which the mighty events recorded in it were achieved — the Army.

In the various wars which have carried French armies into almost every country of Europe, they have invariably contrived to earn universal execration, not merely by the most oppressive exactions and requisitions, but also by the wanton destruction of all that they could not consume or carry away. This barbarous spirit seems to have been first called forth by the inhuman devastation of the Palatinate of the Rhine, by the express command of Louvois, minister of Louis XIV., in 1689. To ensure the safety of the French frontier in that quarter, the neighbouring provinces, some of the most flourishing in Germany, were converted into a desert; and to prevent the enemy from turning the towns into fortresses, Heidelberg, Mannheim, Worms, Spire, and many other cities, together with a great number of villages, were plundered and burned. In Spire, the French soldiers, ferocious as their republican successors a century later, broke open the tombs of the Salic emperors, strewed their ashes to the winds, made footballs of their skulls, and carried off their silver coffins. Madame de Maintenon called the attention of the King to these abominations, and Louis forbade the minister to burn Triers, as he had already determined to do. Two

days afterwards, Louvois reverted to this measure, adding that, to spare his Majesty's conscience any uneasiness, he had taken the whole upon himself, and sent off a courier with orders for its execution. Irritated at this pertinacity, the King snatched up the tongs, and would have struck Louvois, had not Madame de Maintenon stepped between them. The minister left the apartment in great perturbation. Louis called him back. "Send off a courier immediately," said he, with flashing eyes, "and take care that he arrives in time; for, if a single house is burned, your head shall answer for it." Soon afterwards Louvois provoked the King by some new contradiction to such a degree that he grasped his cane to chastise him. Still Louis had not the resolution to dismiss his troublesome minister, whose pride was so hurt by these humiliations that he survived them only two years.

Ever since the time of Louvois, pillage and devastation appear to have been almost considered as part of the duty required of the French soldier. Nor is this wonderful, prescribed as such conduct has been by the government and practised by the officers. In the Seven Years' War, when Great Britain formed an alliance with Prussia, and France, of course, ranged herself on the side of Austria, the commander of the French forces sent to invade Hanover was directed by his government to leave nothing in the electorate, but to cut down every growing tree level with the ground. Such was the rapacity of the Duke de

Richelieu during the six months in which he held the command there, that his own soldiers called him by no other name but *le petit Père la Maraude*; and so far was he from wishing to conceal his numberless extortions, that he built with them a splendid palace in Paris, which was denominated by the people, as it possibly may be to this day, *le Pavillon d'Hannovre*. Their conduct in the other countries of Germany was perfectly consistent with these directions and conduct. Hence, the victory of Rossbach was universally hailed as a national triumph over foreign hordes, which proved themselves, whether among friends or foes, more destructive than a cloud of locusts, more savage than the most ravenous beasts. "It is not the Prussians," says a Saxon memoir of that time, "who have laid waste our fields, our vineyards, and our gardens; it is not the Prussians who have trampled down our growing crops, who have robbed on the highway, who have plundered our houses, who have carried off and destroyed our provisions; it is not the Prussians who have desecrated our churches and made a mock of all that is sacred. No—it is our *friends*, the French and the troops of the Empire, our so ardently wished-for deliverers, who have plunged us into these miseries."

In continuation of these grievances, it is recorded that whatever they could not consume or carry away was destroyed or rendered useless. They broke in pieces household furniture, casks, and other vessels, tore up papers and books, ripped open beds, and

strewed the feathers over the fields, and slaughtered cattle which they could not remove, and left them to putrify in the deserted farm-yards. Twenty villages around Freiburg were rendered desolate because the French had sojourned in them. Nor were the private soldiers alone to blame for these wanton excesses, of which their officers set them the example. Thus it is related that the Marquis d'Argenson, who commanded the French in Halberstadt, whenever he was about to leave a house in which he had lodged, was accustomed to break in pieces the furniture, and to destroy the looking-glasses with a diamond.

These complaints, preferred by Germans, are fully confirmed by the testimony of Count St. Germain, who commanded a division of the French army at the battle of Rossbach. Writing to a friend, he says: "I head a band of robbers, of murderers, who deserve to be broke upon the wheel, who ran away at the first musket-shot, who are always ready to mutiny." Again: "The country is plundered and laid waste for thirty leagues round, as if fire from heaven had fallen upon it: our marauders have scarcely left the very houses standing.....They plundered, murdered, violated women, and committed all possible abominations."

To characterize the conduct of the troops of the *great nation* in Germany during subsequent wars, in the time of the Republic and the Empire, would require a mere repetition of the circumstances detailed above; while the wholesale destruction and pillage

carried on in Portugal and Spain by every man, from the highest to the lowest, belonging to the French armies which successively visited those countries, is too well known to need animadversion. Our business at present is with the army of Italy, while commanded by Napoleon Bonaparte.

In the very first instructions given by the Directory to the young General, they impress upon him to “make a point of maintaining rigid discipline, and sparing the inhabitants all the vexations and disasters which the scourge of war so frequently brings with it, and which order and well-regulated administrations are alone capable of repressing.” (Vol. i., p. 8.) The same injunction is repeated on several subsequent occasions, on one of which Carnot, writing in the name of the Directory, refers to a severe order which Bonaparte is supposed to have given, and an extraordinary power which he had been obliged to confer on the Generals of Division. (Vol. i., p. 51.) This passage affords undeniable evidence that the government had invested him with sufficient authority to repress the excesses of the troops, and the incessant complaints in the letters of his Generals furnish evidence equally undeniable that they could not wring from him any power whatever for that purpose.

Meanwhile, the soldiers of the army of Italy proved themselves to be genuine Frenchmen, clinging most tenaciously to the traditional custom of their profession: and if the General-in-chief thought fit to wink at their outrages, it was perhaps for fear of compro-

mising his popularity among them. Before he had been a month at the head of the army, we find Laharpe, an honest Swiss, who commanded one of its divisions, remonstrating on this subject in very energetic terms. "The boundless licentiousness," he says, "to which the troops give themselves up, and which cannot be remedied, because we have not a right to order a scoundrel to be shot, is hurrying us into ruin, dishonouring us, and preparing for us the most cruel reverses. As my character for firmness will not permit me to witness such things, much less to tolerate them, there is but one course for me to take—that of retiring. In consequence, General, I beg you to accept my resignation, and to send an officer to take the command entrusted to me; for I would rather dig the ground for a livelihood than be at the head of men who are worse than were the Vandals of old." (Vol. i., p. 36.)

This letter of Laharpe's is dated the 17th of April: and on the 20th two other superior officers, Chambarlhac, chief of the 70th demi-brigade, and Maugras, whose rank is not mentioned, write to tender their resignation for the same cause. To such a length was the propensity to pillage carried, as to thwart even the military operations. Serrurier's division had taken the village, castle, and heights of St. Michael, near Ceva, when his troops "fell to plundering, in spite of all his efforts to restrain them. The enemy took advantage of this stupidity to return to the charge, and in an instant the conquerors lost

everything." — On the following day, April 20th, Serrurier himself reports : " Several corps have been without bread for these three days : the troops abused this pretext to abandon themselves to the most horrible pillage. The corps have somewhat rallied, but there are still wanting a considerable number of men, who have gone off to get provisions in all possible ways. I am ill seconded by the officers, who pillage too : they were drunk yesterday, like the others..... If bread does not reach us, the soldiers will not march." He adds : " We are still in want of a great many muskets ; there were two thousand deficient before the affair."

" Unless we receive bread to-night," writes Laharpe on the same day, " we shall be without an ounce to-morrow, and, should it even arrive, there would not be sufficient to give a quarter of a ration to the three brigades and to the cavalry. All the agents, store-keepers, and others, in all the administrations, are making requisitions at random : the peasants of the these parts are absolutely ruined : the soldiers are destitute and their leaders disconsolate : rogues only are enriching themselves. There is not a moment to be lost, General, if you would save the army, if you would not have us be considered in Piedmont as men worse than the Goths and Vandals It cannot be doubted that the inhabitants, driven to despair, will arm and slaughter every French straggler. Above all, it is urgent to put a stop to that host of illegal requisitions ; or, if they must continue, it would be

better to assemble the inhabitants, shoot them, and then finish plundering; for it comes to the same point. Bread! bread! and again bread!" (Vol. i., p. 38-41.)

One more passage from a letter of the same General's, two days later, presents so frightful a picture of the state of troops belonging to a nation calling itself civilized, as makes one shudder. "The soldiers are more busily engaged than ever in theft and plunder: peasants have been murdered by our men, and soldiers have been killed by the peasants. Words cannot adequately describe the horrors that have been committed. The camps are almost deserted, the soldiers roaming over the country more like ferocious beasts than men; those who do not join in the atrocities patrolling the while, with superior officers at their head; it is of no use to drive them from one place, they only run to murder at another. The soldiers are culpable, but those who reduce them to the alternative of plundering or starving are much more guilty. In the name of humanity, in the name of liberty, which wretches are assassinating, rescue us from this situation! Send us wherewithal to prolong our miserable existence without committing crimes. Who would have thought that the brave fellows of the army of Italy, after making so many sacrifices, would have no other reward but the cruel alternative of being famished to death or turning robbers! The contributions which, judiciously levied, would have enabled us to live, are become impracticable; the

soldier destroying in a moment what we could have lived upon for a week without ruining the inhabitant." And he winds up with the indignant apostrophe, "Can there exist a Providence, since its avenging bolts do not crush all the villains who are at the head of the administrations!" (Vol. i., p. 42, 3.)

It was not many days afterwards that, in a night-attack of the Austrians on his division, Laharpe was shot by his own soldiers, by *mistake*, as it is alleged; but his zeal in repressing their outrages seems to render it questionable whether that mistake may not have been wilful.

There were other officers of high rank in the Italian army whose minds revolted at the atrocities which they could not prevent. On the 9th of May, General Dallemagne writes: "Up to this day, I have been making vain attempts to check pillage: the guards which I have stationed are of no use. Terrible examples are required; but I know not whether I have the power to make those examples. An honest and humane man suffers and feels himself dishonoured in marching at the head of a corps in which wretches are so numerous. Were I not at the most advanced post, I would beg you to send as my successor a man whose health and talents might enable him to obtain greater success; but I must forget self, when the point is to labour for the glory of my country." (Vol. i., p. 83.)

It will be seen by the preceding extracts from Laharpe's letters to the General-in-Chief, that the

licentiousness, insubordination, and excesses of the soldiers, were certainly not excused but palliated in some degree by the extreme inattention shown to their most urgent necessities. Numberless are the complaints scattered throughout these Volumes of the destitute state in which they were left, without clothing, without provisions, without bread, even in some instances without arms. It is not surprising that, under such circumstances, examples of a mutinous spirit, of cowardice, and of desertion, should have occurred: the only wonder is that an army so neglected could be kept together at all. General Despinois, writing from Brescia on the 4th of August, says, "The division of which you have given me the command cannot exist in the state of disorganization in which it is at present. It is in want of everything, and not a creature to furnish it with supplies, no commissary of war, no agent, not even a medical officer, or an hospital for the wounded. It is always the case that, when a prey to distresses and suffering all sorts of privations, the soldier is disheartened, and it is this mischievous impression too that we ought to hasten to destroy." (Vol. i., p. 265.)

Augereau, in a letter dated August 23rd, draws this deplorable picture of a brigade which had just joined his division: "Indeed, the condition of that 29th is pitiable: it has at most a hundred bayonets; it has no clothes, no shoes; I found in it volunteers under arms without any covering but a shirt and linen trowsers. These troops must necessarily be

armed, equipped, and clothed, or left in the rear: for they cannot be brought before the enemy in this state, occasioned by the carelessness of the chief.” (Vol. i., p. 315.)

Massena makes, on the 1st of September, still more grievous complaints. “The soldiers,” he says, “suffer cruelly: two-thirds of my division, at least, are in want of coats, waistcoats, breeches, shirts, &c., and absolutely barefoot. This deficiency of clothing gives us a great many sick, and will give us a great many more, if people never do anything but promise without sending us necessaries. I give you notice, General,”—it is Berthier, Chief of the Staff, to whom he is writing—“that, if the movement of the General-in-chief takes place, the soldiers whom I command cannot march in any way whatever; it is physically impossible, unless one would choose to leave half of them half-way. I have no hesitation to tell you that if the same attentions are not paid to my division as to the others, I will give in my resignation and renounce the profession. Let it not be supposed that I am swayed by ill humour; it is as a free man and fond of what is right that I thus express myself.—I have long been applying at Verona for flour, for the purpose of setting to work the ovens that are within reach of my division. I know not from what diabolical speculation it is that they will never send anything but bread ready-baked at Verona, which, when it arrives here, is always mouldy, at least two-thirds of it. When liquids are sent to us, it is always

in musty casks; and, before they are landed and delivered at the magazine, half the quantity is always gone." (Vol. i., p. 336.)

General Kilmaine, writing on the 4th of October, says, "Everything that comes from the magazines of Cremona is of such execrable quality that the soldiers had as lieve drink water as the wine, which they call, and justly, poison; and they care so little for what is dignified with the name of brandy as to leave it. I am afraid that all this causes us to have a great number of sick. All the demons conspire against our poor army of Italy. I know of no better way to put an end to these abuses than to give up the contractors to the justice of the soldiery." Towards the conclusion, he gives this significant hint, "Cloaks begin to be indispensably necessary for the cavalry: there ought to be at least a hundred to each regiment." (Vol. ii., p. 43, 4).

On the 25th of October, General Chabot writes, "The destitute state of the troops, who are in want of every kind of clothing, is certainly liable to occasion some discouragement. Almost all the men are naked, without shoes, and with little covering for the winter which is approaching."

Louis Bonaparte, brother of the General-in-Chief, to whom he had recently come in quality of his aide-camp, having been sent to General Vaubois at Lavis, thus describes the state of his division on the 3rd of November: "The troops are without shoes, without coats — in short, they are naked, and are

beginning to be daunted : they looked yesterday with respect at the fine appearance of the Austrians in order of battle : they are in the snow ; their state ought to be taken into most serious consideration. With what consequences would not our defeat be attended ! The officers in general are worn out : there were some who amidst the fire talked only of retiring to their homes." The Austrians, he remarks, "fight as they never did before : it is a rancour, a fury, that borders on despair." (Vol. ii., p. 105.)

If such was the pitiable condition of the acting soldier, we may be prepared to expect that those in hospitals did not fare very sumptuously. Kellermann Junior, who, it would appear, was commissioned to inspect those at Brescia, describes them in these terms : "The hospitals are not so bad as those of Verona, but, with the exception of the wounded, the others are absolutely destitute of things and medicines. A wretched, filthy paillasse, swarming with vermin, one coarse sheet for each bed, seldom washed, no blankets, considerable crowding—such is the spectacle presented by the fever hospitals of Brescia : it is heart-rending. The soldiers justly complain that, after conquering the wealth of Italy at the expense of their blood, they are debarred not only from the enjoyment of comforts, but from receiving that care and those attentions which their situation requires. Bread and rice are the only tolerable articles of food." The lodgings of the soldiers are represented as surpassing

in wretchedness those of the sick. "They are totally out of repair. The most excessive filthiness prevails in the rooms, in the corridors, and in the courts. The soldiers are in want of straw; they have nothing but the refuse of the prisons of the city: the unfortunate sick on their passage are sent to the fort to sleep: they ascend to it, and these hapless conquerors of Italy, in recompence for all their hardships and their wounds, find none but damp, unwholesome lodgings, rotten straw, full of devouring insects, no accommodation whatever, not even wood for cooking their meat. These most severe privations, which they endure here, they endured yesterday, and they will again endure to-morrow as they pursue their route: nevertheless, M. le Commissaire will forsooth provide for their wants!" (Vol. ii., p. 4, 5.)

If, as this whole Correspondence seems to prove, the General-in-Chief possessed the most ample authority for restraining the licentiousness and the spirit of plunder which prevailed among his troops, but neglected to exert it, it appears equally certain that the commissaries, agents, and civil officers of his army, were wholly independent of his control; though, it is true, these Letters furnish arguments for a totally different conclusion. "No pity," writes Carnot, in the name of the Directory, on the 16th of May, "for dishonest administrators, who devour the subsistence and dilapidate the resources of the republican armies! Point them out to the Directory, citizen-general; bring them to trial; you are on the

spot; you are well acquainted with their infamous conduct and scandalous robberies; make necessary examples of them, examples capable of deterring those who may be tempted to imitate them in future: it is the only way to extirpate that mania for rapine which impunity and connivance have so disastrously spread over almost the whole surface of the Republic. On these shameless vampires ought to fall the first and the just punishment reserved for audacious guilt." (Vol. i., p. 104, 5.) From this language but one inference can be drawn—that the General was invested with ample authority for the correction of the abuses of the civil administration of his army: but let the reader turn to his letter of the 12th of October, filled with energetic denunciations, and it will be impossible to doubt his willingness to punish. "Ever since I have been at Milan," he says, "I have been engaged in making war upon knaves. I have had several tried and punished, and I must denounce others to you. In making open war upon them, it is clear that I interest against myself a thousand voices, which will not fail to exert themselves to convert public opinion. I can conceive that, if, two months ago, I aspired to be Duke of Milan, I should now want to be King of Italy; but so long as I have strength and your confidence"—he is addressing the Directory—"I will make merciless war on rogues and Austrians."

Commencing with the administrators general of the finances of the army, rogues on a great scale, he de-

scends to the commissaries, who, with few exceptions, are also "nothing but rogues; they ought to watch, and they furnish the means of robbing by signing everything." Among the delinquencies of this class, he says that a commissary named Flack was accused of having sold a chest of bark, sent as a present to his army by the King of Spain. He then proceeds, "You have, no doubt, calculated that your administrators would rob, but that they would perform their duty and have a little shame: they rob in so ridiculous and impudent a manner, that if I had a month's time there should not be one of them who would not be liable to be shot. I am continually having them arrested and brought before a council of war; but the judges are bought; there is a fair here; everything is sold. An *employé* accused of having laid a contribution of eighteen thousand francs on Salo has been sentenced to merely two months' imprisonment. And then how would you set about proving? They all hang together The denunciations which I make are denunciations in soul and conscience, as if upon a jury. You are aware that it is not in my place and with my character that I should denounce them to you, if I had time to collect material proofs against each of them; they all cover one another . . . But I am obliged to set out to-morrow for the army: great joy for all the rascals, whom a glance at the administration has made me acquainted with.

"In short," he thus winds up, "we want for agents, not the tools of stockjobbers, but men pos-

sessing large fortune and a certain character. I have none but spies. There is not an agent in the army but wishes for our defeat, not one but corresponds with our enemies: almost all have emigrated on some pretext or other: it is they who make known our number and dissolve the spell: accordingly, I am more upon my guard against them than against Wurmser; I never have any of them with me; I feed my army during its expeditions without them, but that does not prevent them from hatching tales after their manner." (Vol. ii., 26-29.)

Reverting to the peculations of the army agents, the General, writing on the 6th of January, 1797, repeats that "everything is sold," adding, "the army consumes five times as much as it needs, because the storekeepers forge orders and go halves with the commissaries of war. The principal actresses of Italy are kept by the *employés* of the French army: luxury, licentiousness, and speculation, are at their height. The laws are insufficient." He then recommends a remedy, arbitrary enough it must be confessed—the appointment of one or three syndics to be sent yearly to the army, whose authority should last only three or five days, and who during that time should have power to cause any administrator of the army to be shot. "Such magistrates," he says, "would make everybody respect public opinion, and observe a certain decency not only in manner and expences, but also in the daily service. Marshal Berwick," he proceeds, "caused an intendant of the

army to be hung, because he was in want of provisions; and we, in the midst of Italy, having everything in abundance, spending in a month five times as much as we need do, are frequently in want. Imagine not, however, that I am soft, and that I betray the country in this essential portion of my functions. I have *employés* arrested every day; I have their papers examined, their chests inspected; but I have none to second me, and the laws do not grant sufficient authority to the General to strike a salutary terror into that host of rogues. However, the evil is diminishing, and, by dint of scolding, punishing, and putting myself into a passion, things will, I hope, go on with a little more decency." (Vol. ii., p. 205, 6.)

In truth, all the orders of the Directory at home, all the proceedings of its instrument, the army in Italy, exhibit a system of rapine, robbery, and spoliation, so monstrous as scarcely to be paralleled in the history of civilized nations. Practised with *éclat* by the heads of the government and their able and willing agent, the General, and with all but impunity by the civil officers of the army, there would have been too striking an inconsistency in calling the naked and starving soldiers to a rigid account for their outrages. The wretched inhabitants of the countries occupied by the French troops, victims of this threefold extortion, were encouraged by revolutionary artifices to seek a melioration of their fate by forming themselves into republics independent of

their late rulers, but under the influence and protection of France, which failed not to exact an exorbitant recompence for the favour; while others rose to exterminate their oppressors, and drew upon themselves a cruel vengeance, for that most heinous of offences against their invaders.

In this Correspondence, we find the Directory, so far from approving the formation of republics in the conquered provinces, with far-sighted policy discouraging any measures which would be liable to obstruct the free disposal of them on the conclusion of peace; though at the same time urging the expediency of sowing revolutionary ideas in the Sardinian and Austrian dominions.

The extent to which these introductory remarks are necessarily limited, forbids even a rapid sketch of the political convulsions of the period which these Volumes embrace: indeed it would not be necessary, as every historical reader must be familiar with those events. On one point, however, a few observations may not be inadmissible.

The conquest of Upper Italy brought the Gallic invaders in contact with the States of the Pope. An army marched against Rome; but the treaty of Tolentino, acceding to all the demands of the French, stopped its progress. The Directory having wrung from the old pontiff Pius VI. thirty millions (of francs) in money, bullion, diamonds, and necessaries for the army, and an unknown value in pictures, statues, and manuscripts, had, we find, serious in-

tentions of extinguishing not only the temporal power of his Holiness, but the very religion of which he was the head. Rewbell, writing in the name of the Directory on the 4th of February, 1797, recommends to Bonaparte to do all that shall appear possible "to destroy the papal government, either by establishing there a form of internal government which should render the government of priests odious and contemptible, so that the Pope and the Sacred College should not have the least hope left of ever seating themselves again in Rome, and should be obliged to seek an asylum in some other place, or at least should have no temporal power whatever." (Vol. ii., p. 249.)

This was no new or exclusive idea. Cacault, the French minister at Rome, had some months previously suggested the formation of three republics out of the States of the Church. The establishment of the Transalpine, Cispadane, and Ligurian, had produced an absolute mania for republics. "This may take place," continues the writer, "and yet the Pope, the head of the universal Church, be suffered to reside as priest, with his court of priests, and as pontiff, wherever he pleases, in the same manner as he resided at Rome, before any donation of the French had rendered him sovereign of a territory."

General Clarke coincides in these sentiments, but objects to the time, as unseasonable for the execution of such a plan. "France," he says, "is again become Roman Catholic, and we are perhaps on the

point of needing the Pope himself for causing the revolution to be seconded among us by the priests, and consequently by the country, which they have found means to govern again. If one could have annihilated the Pope three years ago, it would have been the regeneration of Europe: by overthrowing him at the present moment, should we not run the risk of separating for ever from our government a great number of French submissive to the Pope, and whom he can rally round him. I firmly believe that it is for the interest of almost all States to reduce his power, still almost colossal, to an absolute cipher; but the prejudices of kings and nations are adverse to that interest. It requires thirty years' liberty of the press in Italy and France to bring about that moment, and to break down the spiritual power of the Bishop of Rome. Spain, Naples, Sardinia, and all Italy, would join our enemies, rendered irreconcilable, and would never forgive us for having destroyed a power which subjugates and shackles them, but which the authority of time and that of absurdity, inculcated from principle, causes them to respect and cherish."

The guardian angel whose interposition and protection saved the Holy See from the destruction then meditated was Bonaparte, who, aware of the boundless influence of the Pope and the popish clergy over all Catholics, had for some time taken pains to gain their good will—perhaps foreseeing, in those prophetic visions which might already have begun to float before

his imagination, to what advantage that influence might some day be employed. Thus, in October, 1796, he charged the French minister at Rome to assure his Holiness that he was "more ambitious to be the saviour of the Holy See than its destroyer." (Vol. ii., p. 81.)

Another of these efforts displays the master in the art of cajoling. The French troops having possessed themselves by stratagem of Bergamo, he writes on the 1st of January, 1797, to a high functionary of the Venetian republic, "It is with pleasure that I seize this opportunity to do justice to the desire of public tranquillity manifested by the Bishop of Bergamo and his respectable clergy. I am convinced of a truth which is daily demonstrated to my sight, that, if the clergy of France had been as discreet, as moderate, as attached to the principles of the Gospel, the Romish religion would not have undergone any change in France; but the corruption of the monarchy had infected even the class of the ministers of religion: there were no longer to be seen in them men of exemplary life and of pure morals, like Cardinal Mattei, the Cardinal Archbishop of Bologna, the Bishop of Modena, the Bishop of Pavia, the Archbishop of Pisa: in conversing with these venerable personages, I have sometimes fancied myself carried back to the first ages of the Church." (Vol. ii., p. 189, 190.)

These demonstrations were just then thrown away, for the Pope, at the instigation of Austria, was engaged in hostile preparations, and, when threatened with a

visit from the French, he even ventured to launch a proclamation against them to this effect: "The disturbers of the public tranquillity, the unjust oppressors of justice, of religion, of all laws, are advancing. They burn to make their vices and their villany triumphant; deaf to the remorse of their consciences, they despise God himself, who can blast and annihilate them in a moment: people, you to have to defend religion, your country, and your livelihood! Swear, every one of you, to save religion, to defend the country, the State, and the sovereign—or to die!" (Vol. ii., p. 237.)

This spirit, however, evaporated as soon as it was known that a French corps was on march for Rome; his Holiness then wrote immediately to his *dear son*, General Bonaparte, informing him that, "desiring to put an end *of his own accord* to the differences existing between us and the French Republic," he had appointed plenipotentiaries to settle them. He adds, "Assured of the sentiments of kindness which you have manifested for us, we have abstained from any removal from Rome, and you will thereby be persuaded how great is our confidence in you." (Vol. ii., p. 256.) The General found the papal negociators at Tolentino: the result of their conferences was a treaty, acceding to all the demands of the French; and there he replied to the letter of his Holiness, in which he congratulates himself on having had it in his power to contribute to the personal tranquillity of the pontiff. "All Europe," he says, "knows the

peaceful inclinations and the conciliatory virtues of your Holiness. The French Republic will be, I hope, one of the truest friends of Rome"—(Vol. ii., p. 263.) compliments dearly paid for by the increased penalty extorted from the Pope.

It is evident from these Letters that there was no scheme too base to be entertained by the Directory. After the reduction of the Castle of Milan, they gave orders for its demolition. "It is useful," they say, "to cause this demolition and that of the barracks at the parade to be regarded as that of another Bastille, which Austrian despotism had hitherto employed to keep under its yoke those flourishing countries which seem peculiarly formed for liberty. By favour of this idea, which you will accredit among the people, excite a generous enthusiasm for the fall of that citadel: it will awaken the ancient hatred of Lombardy against the emperor, and make it dread the return of his domination." (Vol. i., p. 224.)

The following scheme is of a much more treacherous character. The Grand-duke of Tuscany was not only at peace with France, but observed a strict neutrality; the rapacity of the Directory was, nevertheless, excited by the property in Leghorn belonging to English merchants, and by their orders an expedition was sent to secure that prize. Soon afterwards, they wrote to Bonaparte, through Carnot, to this effect: "Reports are in circulation that the emperor, according to the probabilities of a health always precarious, is approaching his end. To take advantage

of this event, it is necessary that you should be informed of it with the utmost possible celerity when it has taken place. Keep up for this purpose secret correspondence with Vienna. The Grand-duke of Tuscany, heir to the imperial throne, will not hesitate to repair to his capital immediately after the death of his brother. The point will then be to prevent him, to seize him as an enemy of the Republic, and to occupy Tuscany militarily." (Vol. i., p. 244.) The Emperor (the late Emperor of Austria) lived to disappoint this notable scheme of his adversaries.

Impatient to gain possession of Mantua, in which Marshal Wurmser had shut himself with the remains of his army, these petty schemers made a decree designed to frighten him into a surrender. This decree was transmitted to Bonaparte; but, surmising that it might produce a precisely contrary effect to that which they intended, they left him to judge whether it was advisable to communicate it to the gallant old soldier. Their notion was "to induce him to surrender Mantua, by exciting in him a dread of being sent to Paris and there tried as an emigrant, if he holds out to the last extremity, and by offering him an honourable capitulation, if he consents to deliver up that place to you.—We ought not," adds the writer, "to neglect any of the legitimate means which can be useful against an obstinate enemy."—*Legitimate* means!—yes! with the unprincipled all means are legitimate! Wurmser, however, though born in Alsace, was no emigrant: but it was easy to

put any construction upon the laws against emigrants. Bonaparte had delicacy enough not to insult Wurms, or to expose the malignity of his masters by sending him this decree. (Vol. i., p. 366.)

Another of those mean, sneaking artifices, which can be entertained only by men without honour or conscience, relates to a person to whose name we have no clue. It is thus detailed by Delacroix, minister for foreign affairs, to General Clarke, under date of December 30, 1796. "I am aware, like you, how important it is to the interests of the Republic not to give up to the personal sentiments of a man, or to a more enterprising enemy, a secret which may have an influence on the destiny of one of our national allies: but it seems to me that you have in your hand a surer and easier expedient for attaining this end. Supposing it were possible to induce Count de M..... to come to France, his apprehension here would inevitably make a great noise, and might produce serious inconveniences. He might conceive suspicions and find means to conceal his papers from us. He is now in a country subject to military government: but, just arrived from Tuscany, he must feel perfectly secure; he must have his papers at hand; it would be easy to seize them by causing him to be arrested on the slightest pretext. As soon as we had possessed ourselves of the papers, he might be set at liberty. The government would be in possession of a mighty means of influence over the power to which those papers relate; the momentary detention of the

Count de M. would not compromise us in the least, and could only be considered as a mistake. Such, General, is the way in which I think that affair ought to be conducted." (Vol. ii., p. 192.)

Numberless traits scattered through these Volumes serve to confirm the homely adage, "Like master, like man." If the conduct of the Directory was marked by rapacity, hypocrisy, duplicity, cunning, and even low cunning, that of their willing tool Bonaparte rivalled it in those odious qualities; and, on points to which his own knowledge did not extend, he found no want of prompters. Thus the French minister at Venice instigated him to attempt to intercept the Archduke, who had been governor of Lombardy before the invasion of the French, and who was retiring from Venice with all his treasures to the Austrian dominions. (Vol. i., p. 137.) Thus, too, Faipoult, the republican minister at Genoa, suggested the means of facilitating any enterprise which might be meditated against that city. (Vol. i., p. 190.)

The dawning manifestations of a naturally ambitious spirit, elevated by extraordinary success and unbounded flattery, could not escape the notice or fail to excite the jealousy of the Directory. They formed, in consequence, the plan of dividing the army of Italy, and associating General Kellermann with Bonaparte in the conduct of the military operations in Lombardy and the more eastern provinces of the Peninsula. In this early part of his career, however, he could no more suffer a rival in authority than he would have

endured one when seated, a few years afterwards, on the imperial throne of France. The Letters in which he urges his objections to this plan are extremely interesting, and they were forcible enough to induce the Directory to forego the intention. Differing afterwards in opinion with the Directory respecting the treatment of the Pope, he expressed his sentiments without scruple, and tendered his resignation on the plea of impaired health. (Vol. i., p. 387.) Being indulged like a spoiled child with permission to follow his own judgment on the matter in question, we hear no more of complaints of ill health, or offers to resign.

General Clarke was the person appointed by the Directory to negotiate a peace with Austria. Thiers roundly asserts that he had another mission—to watch Bonaparte: and he has so ably summed up the grounds for the implied jealousy of the Directory, that his exposition will not be thought misplaced here.

“The genius of that young man,” says this historian of the Revolution, “had appeared so extraordinary, his character so absolute and so energetic, that without any precise motive he was supposed to have ambition. He had insisted on conducting the war as he pleased, and had tendered his resignation when a plan that was not his own had been marked out for him; he had acted like a sovereign in Italy, granting to princes peace or war under the name of armistices; he had loudly complained because the negotiations with the Pope were not conducted by

him alone, and had required that they should be left to his management; he had treated Garrau and Salicetti, the commissioners, very harshly when they ventured upon measures of which he disapproved, and had obliged them to leave the head-quarters; he had taken the liberty to transmit funds to the different armies without any authority from the government, and without having recourse to the indispensable channel of the treasury. All these circumstances indicated a man who liked to do himself all that he thought himself alone capable of doing properly On seeing him excite Upper Italy against its old masters and create or destroy States, people would have supposed that he meant to make himself Duke of Milan. They had a foreboding of his ambition, and he had himself a presentiment of the reproach. He complained of being accused, and then justified himself, though not a single word of the Directory furnished him occasion to do so.

“Clarke, then, was sent not only to negotiate but also to watch him. Bonaparte was aware of his errand, and, acting with his habitual haughtiness and address, suffered him to perceive that he was acquainted with the object of his mission, but subdued him in a short time by his ascendancy and his fascinating manner, and converted him into a devoted adherent.”

Bonaparte, being appointed joint plenipotentiary for treating with Austria, conceived that the negotiations ought to be deferred till the reduction

of Mantua ; while Clarke urged the expediency of their immediate commencement. This subject is discussed in the Note addressed to his colleague which has already been quoted ; and one argument by which he supports his opinion is the deplorable state of France at home, notwithstanding the glory and the enormous plunder acquired abroad. It is instructive to contemplate this picture, which is sufficient authority for assuming that peace was not less needful for the Republic than for her adversary.

“What,” he says, “is our position at the moment that I am writing ?—The lassitude of war is felt in all parts of the interior of the Republic. The people ardently wish for peace ; the armies murmur loudly because it is not made ; that of Italy, and even the bravest of that army, talk of and desire it. The legislative body wills, nay, commands it, as it were, no matter on what conditions, and its prolonged refusal to furnish the Directory with funds for continuing the war is a proof of this. Your finances are null ; agriculture claims, entices, or recalls the hands which it sent to protect it from the foreigner ; war would have, every day, an almost universal immorality, which might in the sequel overthrow the Republic : in short, all parties, harassed, wish for the end of the revolution ; and if our state of internal misery is prolonged, the wearied people, not finding benefit in that which is, will be disposed to seek it in another order of things, which will give rise to new revolutions, and we shall have for twenty or thirty years all

the calamities which these convulsions bring in their train. In the course of this winter, whether there is fighting, or whether things continue undecided, great part of our soldiers will return to their homes, from which nothing will be able to draw them : for, from want of money, we have neither internal police nor gendarmerie, and our constituted authorities are far from being all pure and proof against seduction. We must, therefore, have peace ; and, for recovering the enthusiasm which has enabled us to conquer, it is necessary that our enemies defer the conclusion of it, and that there be not a creature in France who is not convinced that the government has been desirous of a reasonable peace, and that it has been rejected from ambition or from hatred of our principles." (Vol. ii., p. 201.)

The fall of Mantua soon reconciled the difference of opinion between the two negociators.

The English reader will smile at the absurd notions entertained by the French on all subjects connected with our country and nation. Carnot, writing on the 18th of May in the name of the Directory to Bonaparte, acquaints him that they have reserved for him the conduct of the marauding expedition against Leghorn "to chastise the English ; because they consider that operation as of superior importance ; because the fate of the island of Corsica depends upon it in some measure ; because *it will make London tremble, and give a mortal blow to the English.*" (Vol. i, p. 119.) A few days later, Carnot again writes : "The

expedition to Leghorn is the first thing to be undertaken after the defeat of Beaulieu : it [the Directory] leaves to you the choice of the time and the means of execution, and it will learn with warm satisfaction the news of this *triumph over the perfidious English*." (Vol. i., p. 123.) A glorious achievement, truly—the seizure by a buccaneering army of unresisting mercantile establishments, in the dominions of a prince at perfect peace with the rapacious republicans !

The instructions prescribing the conduct to be pursued towards Leghorn and Tuscany, from the pen of Carnot, are well worthy of the statesmen from whom they emanated, and the occasion on which they were given (Vol. i., p. 88) : indeed, that whole letter is a most interesting study for all who would wish to learn to what base and sordid arts the *republican* rulers of great nations can stoop in pursuit of their schemes of rapine and robbery.

The simplicity of Carnot, expressing surprise at the daring attacks of our Tars upon shipping on the French coast, and requesting Bonaparte, in the name of the Directory, “not to suffer the approach of these pirates to the coasts of the Mediterranean,” is truly laughable. (Vol. i., p. 192). Equally preposterous is the representation of Gentili, whom Bonaparte had sent to command in Corsica, which the English were then evacuating, that our fleet was “in infinite dread of the Spanish squadron, which,” he says, ‘must by this time have joined ours. It would be most fortunate,’ he adds, “if they could but get out

and go to meet them : the superiority of our force and the *fears* of the enemy would ensure us the victory, and those gentry would not escape unscathed out of the Mediterranean." (Vol. ii., p. 89.) General Gentili had not very long to wait for the gratification of his wish. The fleets did meet, and the fight off St. Vincent's showed in what way the fears of English sailors are expressed.

Of the character of the Italians the French government seems to have formed the most contemptuous opinion. After it had plundered them by its agents, military and civil, of everything that could possibly be extracted from them, it is not likely that they would rise in its estimation. Thus the minister for foreign affairs characterizes them as "destitute of energy, the slaves of the most degrading prejudices, who would ill support the part of a free people:" and Bonaparte himself seems to have valued them no higher. (Vol. ii., p. 403.) The pacification of the Continent permitted him to direct his views to the invasion of this country, and he has the candour to admit "the people of England are of more worth than the Venetian people, and their *liberation* will for ever consolidate the liberty and happiness of France ; or, if we force that government to peace, our commerce, the advantages which we shall procure for it in the two worlds, will be a great step towards the consolidation of liberty and public prosperity." (Vol. ii., p. 408.)

When, at a later period, he seriously applied him-

self to the execution of this benevolent design, he certainly acquired an ample confirmation of his idea that the English character is indeed of a different stamp from the Italian, or that of any other nation which he had ever encountered.

In the month of August, 1796, after that series of obstinate actions in which, according to the admission of an accomplished French officer, "if despair had not forced us to fight for the preservation of our lives, the republican army would have been destroyed without resource;" and when "Bonaparte killed seven horses in two days," so excessive were the fatigues, the General makes a rather humorous report to the Directory of the cowardice shown by the commissaries and other civil functionaries. "It was indispensable," he says, "to allow the troops a few days' rest, to rally the scattered corps after so violent a shock, and to reorganize the service of the administrations, absolutely broken up. Some of those gentlemen ran all the way to the Gulf of Spezzia without stopping. — The commissary of war Salva leaves the army; panic-struck, he beholds enemies every where; he crosses the Po, and communicates to all he meets the terrors that bewilder him; he fancies that the Hulans are at his heels. In vain he scampers away for two days and two nights; nothing can raise his spirits; writing to all quarters, Run for your lives! he arrives within two leagues of Genoa, and — dies in twenty-four hours of a violent fever, in the delirium of which he fancies himself wounded by a

hundred swords, and still those of the terrible Hulans. Many commissaries of war have not shown more bravery.

“Such, citizens directors, is the inconvenience of the law which requires that the commissaries of war should be civil agents, when they need courage and military habits to a greater degree than the officers themselves: the courage which is necessary for them is wholly moral; it is never the fruit of the habit of dangers. I have therefore felt on this occasion how essential it is to appoint to the office of commissaries of war none but men who have served in the line for several campaigns and given proofs of courage. Any man who values life higher than the national glory and the esteem of his comrades ought not to form part of the French army. It is revolting to hear every day persons of the different administrations confessing, and almost boasting of it, that they were afraid.” (Vol. i., 319, 320).

In Volume ii., p. 61, General Baraguay d’Hilliers relates that he had to encounter an engine of superstition, so frequently employed in Catholic countries, and capable of being converted into a more mischievous instrument than even the weapons of war. “I found at Lodi,” he writes to the General-in-Chief, on the 20th of October, 1796, “sparks of a religious fanaticism which was seeking to burst forth: they were performing miracles there; priests certified them, devotees circulated them, and idiots believed them. I thought it right, under these circumstances, to take

a double measure : the first was to send for the bishop. I spoke to him with firmness ; I declared that, if another miracle was wrought in his diocese, and the priests continued to abuse the tribunal of penitence, to calumniate the French and to arm the superstitious credulity of the people against them, he should be personally responsible to me for it ; that I would bring him, as well as the higher clergy, before a military commission as an agent, a spy, of the court of Rome, and an apostle of maxims contrary to the public tranquillity, and to the ministry of peace which was his vocation. On the other hand, being informed that, in the Lodisan, the people complained of a prohibition, issued I know not at what period, to ring the bells for the service of the Catholic worship, I authorized them to be rung in each parish three times a day at necessary and useful hours."

It will be seen (vol. i., p. 31) that the attention of the Directory had early been turned to the wonder-working image of the Virgin Mary at Loretto and the treasures accumulated there, "estimated at ten millions sterling." This appeared too rich a prize not to tempt the rapacity of the needy rulers of France, and an expedition for securing it was suggested by them to their General. By him, however, the attempt was judged to be too hazardous at that time ; and it was not till his invasion of the Roman States in February, 1797, that he could conveniently rifle the Casa Santa. "Loretto," he reports to his employers, "contained treasure to the amount of nearly 3,000,000

livres tournois; they have left us the worth of nearly one million; I send you the Madona with all the relics into the bargain. That chest shall be addressed direct to you, and you will make what use of it you think fit: the Madona is of wood." (Vol. ii., p. 259).

In the Letters from the pen of Bonaparte himself there are incessantly occurring passages strikingly characteristic, and some almost oracular.

He writes to the Directory, "I should be glad if you would send me two or three adjutant-generals, who have been in the cavalry, who have fire and a firm resolution never to make *scientific retreats*." (Vol. i., p. 81.)

On another occasion he says, "Here all is going on tolerably well: but the dog-days are coming on at a gallop, and there is no remedy against their pernicious influence. Miserable beings that we are, *we can only observe nature, not overcome it!*" (Vol. i., p. 149.) On how many subsequent occasions did his experience confirm this observation!

"As for generals of division," he tells the Directory, "unless they are distinguished officers, I beg you not to send me any; for our mode of making war here is so different from the others that I cannot trust a division till I have tried in two or three affairs the General who is to command it. . . . It is most essential for the army and for the Republic to send hither to me young men to learn to carry on a war of movement and manœuvres; it is that which has enabled

us to obtain great successes in this army." (Vol. ii., p. 230.)

Again, writing to the Directory, he applies for "some good officers of artillery," for those that he has, with two exceptions, "are not capable of drawing a *flèche*, and only play stupid tricks: yet there is no want of officers of engineers and artillery; but these are peace officers, fit only for the desk, who never see fire: accordingly, the works of the engineers are universally complained of in the army." (Vol. ii., p. 229.)

About the same time that this was written, Augereau reports that he has ordered an officer of engineers superintending works at the tête de pont of Ronco "to be watched, and to be prevented from slipping away before the bridge is finished." (Vol. ii., p. 210.)

On the 16th of April, 1797, Bonaparte writes from Judenburg, the limit of his march into the Emperor's German dominions, "The best Generals and the best troops are before me.—When you enter heartily upon a campaign, there is nothing that stops you, and never, since history has recorded military operations, has a river proved a real obstacle. If Moreau is determined to pass the Rhine, he will pass it, and if he had passed it already, we should be in a condition to dictate terms of peace in an imperative manner, and without incurring any risk; but *he who is fearful of losing his glory is sure to lose it*. I have crossed the Julian and the Noric Alps upon ice three feet

deep ; I passed my artillery by roads which carriages had never travelled, and everybody believed the thing to be impossible. If I had had nothing in view but the repose of the army and my personal interest, I should have stopped short beyond the Isonzo. I flung myself into Germany, to extricate the armies of the Rhine and to prevent the enemy from taking the offensive there. I am at the gates of Vienna, and that insolent and haughty court has its plenipotentiaries at my head-quarters. The armies of the Rhine cannot have any blood in their veins if they leave me alone : then I shall return to Italy. Entire Europe shall judge of the different conduct of the two armies : they will then have the whole force of the Emperor on their hands ; they will be overwhelmed, and it will be their own fault." (Vol. ii., p. 299, 300.)

Indeed, all his Letters relating to himself personally are peculiarly interesting. It is unnecessary to particularize ; but there is one of so extraordinary a tenour that it must not pass unnoticed here.

It is dated November 14, 1796, amidst that series of hard-contested fights which preceded the sanguinary battle of Arcole. In these affairs, the "spoiled child of Fortune," as it became customary to call the French General, was not always victorious, and his army of course suffered severely. "The wounded," he writes, reporting to the Directory, "are the flower of the army : all our superior officers, all our best generals, are *hors de combat* : all that come to me

are so silly, and they have not the confidence of the soldiers. The army of Italy, reduced to a handful of men, is worn out. The heroes of Lodi, of Millesimo, of Castiglione, and of Bassano, have died for their country, or are in the hospital: the corps have nothing left but their reputation and their pride. Joubert, Lannes, Lanusse, Victor, Murat, Charlot, Dupuis, Rampon, Pigeon, Menard, Chabrand, are wounded; we are abandoned at the furthest extremity of Italy. The presumption of my strength would be beneficial to us; and they are publishing in Paris, in official speeches, that we are but 30,000 men.

“ In this war I have lost few men, but all the superior men, whom it is impossible to replace. The brave men who are left me have before their eyes inevitable death, amidst such continual chances and with forces so inferior. Perhaps the last hour of the brave Augereau, of the intrepid Massena, of Berthier, of is at hand; then, *then*, what will become of these brave fellows! This idea makes me cautious: I dare no longer confront death, which would be a subject of discouragement and disaster for that which is the object of my anxiety. In a few days, we shall try a last effort: if Fortune smiles upon us, Mantua will be taken, and Italy along with it.”

It is to be observed, however, that this apparently desponding letter, in which, by the by, the writer has not displayed the most scrupulous adherence to truth, was really designed to move the Directory to send him further reinforcements. His

employers must no doubt have been aware of this propensity to distort or falsify facts to suit a particular purpose—a propensity manifested alike in his reports, his proclamations, and his addresses to his soldiers, in this early part of his career, and later in those too famous imperial compositions, which gave rise to the proverbial saying of the sarcastic Parisians concerning any person who dealt too freely in hyperbole—“He lies like a bulletin.”

But wherefore extend these remarks? Surely sufficient evidence has been furnished that this Correspondence conveys the fresh and living impressions made by transactions of the moment, and a vivid reflection of those disgraceful schemes, artifices, and manœuvres, which could originate only in minds thoroughly imbued with the atrocious principles of the revolution—that it was designed to be what it professes to be, secret and confidential—to meet no eyes but those of the persons addressed — unlike the *Memoirs* written or dictated at St. Helena, from recollection, after the lapse of twenty years, for the purpose of exculpation or of producing effect.

In the last of the General's letters to the Directory, announcing the conclusion of the treaty of Campo Formio, he places himself by the closing declaration in a singularly awkward dilemma. After recapitulating the motives which had influenced him in this important transaction, he proceeds:—“If I am mistaken in all these calculations, my heart is pure, my intentions are upright: I have silenced the interest of my glory,

of my vanity, of my ambition; I have kept in view the country and the government alone; I have answered in a manner worthy of myself the unlimited confidence which the Directory has been pleased to grant me for these two years. I have merited by my services the approbation of the government and of the nation; I have received repeated marks of its esteem. *I have now no more to do but to mingle again with the crowd, to grasp once more the plough of Cincinnatus, and to set an example of respect for magistrates and aversion for military rule, which has destroyed so many republics and ruined several States.*"—(Vol. ii., p. 389.)

Was this declaration sincere, or was it a piece of acting, in which, as these Volumes will show, the General was an adept? If the former, never was a more decided self-condemnation pronounced—if the latter, a more consummate political charlatan never lived.

CONTENTS
OF
THE FIRST VOLUME.

PART I.	PAGE
FROM THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY IN 1796 TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE WITH THE KING OF SARDINIA	1

PART II.	
FROM THE OCCUPATION OF TORTONA TO THE INVEST- MENT OF MANTUA	79

PART III.	
FROM THE TAKING OF BOLOGNA TO THE SECOND BLOCKADE OF MANTUA	167

PART IV.	
FROM THE BATTLE OF ROVEREDO TO THE RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES BY A NEW AUSTRIAN ARMY .	328

THE FIRST VOLUME

PART I

FROM THE ORIGIN OF THE COUNTRY IN PART I
TO THE ORIGIN OF THE COUNTRY IN PART II
THE COUNTRY OF THE COUNTRY IN PART III

PART II

FROM THE ORIGIN OF THE COUNTRY IN PART II
TO THE ORIGIN OF THE COUNTRY IN PART III
THE COUNTRY OF THE COUNTRY IN PART IV

PART III

FROM THE ORIGIN OF THE COUNTRY IN PART III
TO THE ORIGIN OF THE COUNTRY IN PART IV
THE COUNTRY OF THE COUNTRY IN PART V

PART IV

FROM THE ORIGIN OF THE COUNTRY IN PART IV
TO THE ORIGIN OF THE COUNTRY IN PART V
THE COUNTRY OF THE COUNTRY IN PART VI

LETTERS AND DESPATCHES.

PART I.

FROM THE OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN IN ITALY IN 1796 TO
THE CONCLUSION OF THE ARMISTICE WITH THE
KING OF SARDINIA.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

Paris, 16 Ventose, year 4 [March 6, 1796].

The Executive Directory addresses to you herewith, citizen-general, the instructions which it has drawn up for the conduct of the ensuing campaign in Italy. It has thought it right to add the authorization which it gives you by the present to possess yourself of the fortress of Savona, in case circumstances should render that measure useful for the security of the army of Italy; and it recommends to you, in this case, to treat the republic of Genoa with all the consideration which our political situation in regard to it requires.

LETOURNEUR, *President.*

Instructions for the General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

The French Republic has two principal enemies to contend with in Italy—the Piedmontese and the Austrians. The latter, though the less numerous, are formidable, as well from their hatred to France, and their infinitely superior resources of all kinds, as from their more intimate connexion with our natural enemies the English, and above all from the power which their possessions in Italy enable them to exercise over the court of Turin, which is obliged to yield to almost all their demands, and even to their caprices. From this state of things it results that the more immediate interest of the French government ought to be to direct its

principal efforts against the Austrian army and possessions in Italy.

It is easy to conceive, in fact, that any military movement against the Piedmontese and their territory is in some measure indifferent to the Austrians, who, as we have seen in the last campaign, seem to care very little for the disasters of their allies, and who, in moments of danger, instead of seeking to protect them efficaciously, immediately separate from them, and strive only to cover the country belonging to themselves, which furnishes abundantly the resources they stand in need of.

Great as have hitherto been our successes in Italy, we have not advanced far enough into that country to withdraw Piedmont from the yoke of the Austrian army, which has always remained master of its fate by the positions which it has taken.

When we consider the true interests of the court of Turin, we find them, in some measure, essentially connected with our own, and we have no doubt whatever of the desire which that court must feel to see the ambitious Austrian driven out of Italy, and to obtain the Milanese as an indemnification for the countries irrevocably united to France by the first article of the republican constitution.

This conjecture, the probability of which needs not to be supported by the arguments that the subject itself suggests, seems to give rise to the following question :

If it is to the interest of the Piedmontese to unite with the French to drive the Germans from Italy, why is not the court of Turin solicitous to join its arms to those of the Republic to accomplish as speedily as possible an object at once profitable and glorious ?

The solution of this question must tend to enlighten us on our political position in regard to Italy, and also on the best course to be pursued for conquering our enemies, and more particularly the satellites of Austria in that country. Placed between the provinces subject to the latter and to the French Republic, Piedmont is forced to act a part in the present war ; and, if she had resolved to remain in a state of neutrality, she would have had to suffer all the evils of war without being able to enjoy a valuable prerogative for a state of moderate strength in comparison with her neighbours, that is, the respect which the troops that she can join to those of one of the belligerent parties, and the

danger of a defection on their part and of their going over to the side of the enemy, necessarily ensure to her ; which guarantees to her the certainty of experiencing the least possible annoyance at any rate from the power to which she allies herself.

Without absolutely rejecting the idea that the King of Sardinia may have been urged by family considerations into the coalition against France, it may be asserted with truth, that our position at the commencement of the present war, and the necessity under which we found ourselves to gain possession of the *ci-devant* Savoy, and the *ci-devant* county of Nice, as well to attack the Austrians with advantage as to incorporate them with France, for the security of our frontier in that quarter, have, in some measure, forced the court of Turin to join the party of our enemies in order to oppose our efforts ; but, since our successes in Frimaire, the hope of an indemnification out of the Austrian possessions in Italy, in case of a junction with us, would no doubt have induced the court of Turin to change sides, if France, scarcely out of the storms of the Revolution, had had it in her power to offer it the subsidies ensured to it by England and Austria.

The King of Sardinia, certain that France would not grant him a peace which would place Piedmont in a state of neutrality, which, in the hypothesis of success on the part of the Austrians, would evidently become null and even dangerous to the Republic ; forced to continue the war, was obliged to secure the means of carrying it on at the least possible cost, and could find them nowhere but in the subsidies and aids of all kinds, which his present allies alone could afford him, Piedmont, crushed by the weight of taxes, cannot furnish him with the facility of acting in a manner more independent and more analogous to the views upon the Milanese which it is natural to attribute to him ; and, from this state of things, we must conclude that the court of Turin will not sincerely consent to a defensive and offensive alliance with us till we can furnish it with the same succours that it receives from its present allies.

The Republic, then, not being in a condition to furnish these succours, must not reckon upon an alliance of this kind, until Piedmont shall be forced by the overthrow of the Austrians, or the presence of our armies in her territory, to turn her arms against our common enemy.

If circumstances should bring about this propitious event, we might expect that the Piedmontese, in obtaining the object of their desires, and a considerable indemnification, (the Milanese, &c.) will purchase it by all the sacrifices which an already exhausted State is capable of supporting; for not only will they have to provide their own army with all that it has need of, but the armies of the Republic will have to be principally fed and maintained by them; and, if the state of things should force us to act in that country as in a conquered country, we should, it is true, do it as little harm as possible; but we should do a great deal, since it would be indispensable to secure our march by the provisional possession, and until the peace, of the principal fortresses of Piedmont situated on our side, and the demolition of which would guarantee to us for the future a solid peace and alliance with the court of Sardinia. It results from what has been said that the sole attack of Piedmont would not fulfil the object which the Executive Directory ought to keep in view—that of driving the Austrians out of Italy, and bringing about as speedily as possible a glorious and durable peace; instead of terminating, it would be prolonging the war, since the Austrians, remaining intact, would have no reason for putting an end to it; and, England having it in her power at any time to transmit subsidies to the Piedmontese army, things would continue upon nearly the same footing that they were at the conclusion of the last campaign.

The continuous and sole attack of Piedmont presents, moreover, greater obstacles from the number of sieges which it would be necessary to undertake at the very opening of the campaign; and it has behoved the Directory to fix its views particularly upon a system of offensive warfare, principally directed against the Austrian forces in Italy, and so combined as to afford to the French army not only the possibility of securing itself, by the defeat of the Piedmontese at the very commencement of the military operations, against any enterprise on their part during the remainder of the campaign; but at the same time that of bringing the court of Turin into a compulsory alliance with France; and lastly, the means of accelerating the conclusion of an advantageous peace for us by the total overthrow of the Austrians in Italy.

The first military operations which this system commands

are comprised within a narrow circle, and require few developments. The Directory must confine itself to the indication of them; the details of execution will belong to the general-in-chief, in whom it places its confidence. They will be submitted to the Directory, whenever circumstances admit of that being done, and in extraordinary cases, when its opinion will become absolutely necessary for determining military movements of higher importance which have not been foreseen. Everything commands us to strive by all the means in our power to make the enemy cross the Po, and to direct our most strenuous efforts towards the Milanese. It appears that this essential operation cannot take place until the French army has first gained possession of Ceva.

The Directory leaves the general-in-chief at liberty to commence the operations by the attack of the enemy at that point; and, whether he gains a complete victory over them, or they retire towards Turin, the Directory authorizes him to follow them, to fight them again, and even to bombard that capital, if circumstances render it necessary.

After he has made himself master of Ceva, and drawn the left of the army of Italy towards Coni, in order to threaten and overawe the garrison of that place, the general-in-chief will provide as speedily as possible for the wants of the army by means of the resources which he will find in Piedmont; he will then direct his forces towards the Milanese, and principally against the Austrians; he will drive back the enemy beyond the Po, turn his attention to the means of crossing that river, and endeavour to secure the fortresses of Asti and Valenza.

The general-in-chief must not lose sight of this, that it is the Austrians whom it is most important to cripple, and that one of the measures capable of bringing about peace in Italy is to intimidate them by advancing as far as possible on the right and towards Tortona, the wretched state of which induces the Directory to believe that it will be easily taken.

This essential movement of the troops towards our right—which the general-in-chief will probably not be able to make till he has reduced Ceva, and gained a signal victory over the Piedmontese—will place us in a situation to awe the Genoese republic, and to facilitate to the agent whom the government keeps at Genoa negotiations which may be

advantageous to us, and even a loan, which private persons of that city might be able to make us.

More wealthy than their government, it must be expected that they will not consent to supply us till the latter gives them security for our punctuality in fulfilling the conditions of this loan, which the favourable circumstances of the war may authorize us to demand. The entry of the republican army into Piedmont must be considered as merely a preliminary disposition, which enables us to attack the Austrian forces with greater advantage; it must pause there as little as possible, and then push on briskly to fight the latter, whom the defeat of the Piedmontese cannot but intimidate, and render easier to conquer.

While the movements which the right of the French will have to make towards Alexandria and Tortona are going forward, it will be indispensable, in order to secure the further operations, that it should gain possession of Gavi, whether the Genoese consent with a good grace to give it up to us during the war, or we are obliged to compel them to do so by threatening demonstrations of the force destined to be employed for extorting their compliance.

The Directory, persuaded that the general-in-chief, in the execution of this particular measure, will exercise all the prudence which circumstances and our political situation in regard to the Genoese republic enjoin, leaves entirely to him the conduct of this delicate affair, with the necessity, the difficulties, and the advantage of which his presence on the spot will make him acquainted.

By throwing the principal force of the republican army in Italy on the right and in the direction of the Milanese, we shall gain several important advantages: we shall oblige Piedmont, already shaken, to range herself on our side; and the first victory that we shall obtain over the Austrians will be a certain pledge of the total ruin of their forces in that quarter. We shall intimidate all Italy, and dissolve the coalition of all those petty powers in favour of the Austrian cause.

The course which the Directory has pointed out to the general-in-chief must be considered as the principal, and, as it were, the only one to be pursued; it is a fixed basis to which all the secondary movements that circumstances and events may induce it to order must be referred. It is, in short, the object towards which everything must tend, and

any operation that would positively deviate from it must be absolutely rejected.

The Directory is quite aware that these great operations cannot be attempted by the right or the centre of the army of Italy, without being supported and prepared by the rest of that brave army ; neither can they be, unless the general-in-chief has first assured himself that one part of the army will not be cut off and separated from the other, and thus exposed to a total defeat. He will, therefore, pay scrupulous attention to the left, and by his good dispositions put it out of the power of the Piedmontese troops at Coni to injure or to attempt anything against him.

The Directory, therefore, must here explain its intentions relative to the sieges which the events of the campaign that is about to open may render it expedient to undertake. Its resolution is that no siege shall be undertaken, before the enemy capable of disturbing it shall be totally routed and unable to make any attempt ; and, at any rate, the general-in-chief must beware of sending his heavy artillery to any point whatever where it might be endangered by any slight success of the enemy. The Directory insists particularly on this essential precaution.

Though it is to the interest of France to direct her principal efforts against the Austrians, and to induce the Piedmontese, by our success against the former, to contract an advantageous alliance for us, still the Piedmontese must not be spared, so long as they shall be our enemies.

The general-in-chief will seek by all the means in his power to inflame the discontents in Piedmont, and to make them break forth against the court of Turin in a general or a partial manner.

It would be superfluous to insist on the utility of a diversion of this kind, and of which the enemy have been the first to set us an example : it may facilitate to the army of the Alps, acting in concert with the left of the army of Italy, the rapid conquest of Piedmont, the possession of which during the war would ensure us advantageous conditions at the peace.

Such are the principal bases of the plan of campaign which the Directory has adopted. Before it closes the present instructions, it must insist on the necessity of subsisting the army in and upon the hostile countries, and of supplying it with all that it needs by means of the resources which the localities afford.

The general-in-chief will make a point of maintaining rigid discipline and sparing the inhabitants all the vexations and disasters which the scourge of war so frequently brings with it, and which order and well regulated administrations are alone capable of repressing.

He will cause heavy contributions to be levied, half to be placed in the chests destined for the service of the various administrations, and the other half to furnish ready money for the pay of the army.

As the Executive Directory reserves to itself the faculty of making peace, the general-in-chief will not grant any suspension of arms, or slacken in any manner his military operations. He will receive all proposals tending to pacification, and transmit them immediately to the Directory.

The Directory relies on the zeal, activity, and talents of the general-in-chief of the army of Italy, and recommends to him with confidence the precise execution of the dispositions contained in the present instructions, to which the Directory will add when the events of the war shall render it necessary.

LETOURNEUR, CARNOT, L. M. LAREVEILLERE-
LEPAUX, REWBELL.

Bonaparte, General-in-Chief, to the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Nice, 8 Germinal, year 4 [March 28, 1796].

I have been several days in the bosom of the army, the command of which I assumed yesterday.

I must give you an account of three essential things:—1, of the departments of Vaucluse, Bouches du Rhone, the Var, and the Lower Alps; 2, of the state of the army, of what I have done and what I hope to do; 3, of our political position in regard to Genoa.

The four departments of the arrondissement of the army have not paid either forced loan or contributions in corn, nor supplied the forage required by the law of the 7th Vendemiaire, nor begun to furnish the third horse. These administrations are extremely slow in their proceedings; I have written to them, I have seen them, and I am led to hope for more activity in matters so essential to the army.

The administrative situation of the army is deplorable, but not desperate. The army will henceforth eat good

bread, and will have butcher's meat, and it has already received some advances on its arrears of pay.

The magazines on the road of the Rhone and the Var are provisioned, and my cavalry, carriages, and artillery began to move five days ago. I shall march very shortly. One battalion has mutinied; it refused to leave Nice, upon pretext that it had neither shoes nor money. I directed all the grenadiers to be arrested, made the battalion march off, and, when it was in the heart of the town, I sent a counter-order, and made it go to the rear. I intend to break up that corps, and to incorporate the soldiers in the other battalions; the officers not having shown sufficient zeal. This battalion consists of no more than 200 men; it is known for its mutinous spirit.

I have been received by this army with confidence, and particularly gratified by the welcome of General Scherer. By his straightforward conduct, and his readiness to give me all the information that can be serviceable to me, he has acquired a claim to my gratitude. His health really appears to be somewhat impaired. With great fluency of speech he unites an acquaintance with moral and military subjects which might render him useful in some important post.

Our position in regard to Genoa is extremely critical. Things have been ill managed; we have done either too much or not enough; but fortunately no harm will result from it.

The government of Genoa has more ability and energy than is imagined: there are but two courses to be pursued with it—either to take Genoa by a *coup de main*, but that is contrary to your intentions and to the law of nations; or to live in close amity, and not strive to extract their money from them, which is the only thing they care about.

BONAPARTE.

*To the Chief of the Staff.*¹

Head-quarters, Nice, 9 Germinal, year 4 [March 29, 1796].

The third battalion of the 29th demi-brigade has been guilty of disobedience; it has disgraced itself by its spirit of mutiny, by refusing to march to the active divisions; the officers have behaved ill. The commandant, Captain Duverney, has shown bad intentions. You will cause him to be arrested and sent before a council of war at Toulon, whi-

¹ General Alexandre Berthier, afterwards Prince of Neufchatel.

ther you will address the charges, which will be preferred by the commandant of the place.

You will cause the grenadiers accused of being the ring-leaders of the mutiny to be tried by a council of war at Nice. Let the other grenadiers be sent off and distributed by fives among the battalions of the army.

The officers and subalterns, having remained in the ranks without speaking, instead of setting an example to the men, are all guilty: they must be immediately dismissed and sent to their homes.

The soldiers of the battalion shall be incorporated at Marseilles with the 83rd demi-brigade. This letter shall be entered in the order of the day.

BONAPARTE.

To the Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Nice, 9 Germinal, year 4 [March 29, 1796].

I wrote to you this morning relative to the third battalion of the 29th demi-brigade. The officers of the grenadiers of that corps have behaved well. I request you to make mention of this in the order of the day, to investigate the general conduct of all the officers and subalterns of that corps, to communicate to me the result, and to let me know what you think the best way to dispose of such of them as have not taken any part in that mutiny.

BONAPARTE.

To the Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Nice, 9 Germinal, year 4 [March 29, 1796].

You will order the general of the engineers to let the company of miners, with the requisite equipments, proceed to Finale. Let it start on the 13th.

You will order it to form a workshop of 110 workmen, with directions for them to set out on the 13th for Finale. Let there be an officer of engineers at the head of these workmen; let them be furnished with all requisite implements; and let the workmen in the different branches be in proportion.

The commandant of the engineers, the director of the park, and all the officers of the engineers at Nice, must repair to the head-quarters. There must be left at Nice only

an officer as commandant of the place, and an officer charged with the direction of the workshop at Nice.

BONAPARTE.

To the Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Nice, 10 Germinal, year 4 [March 30, 1796].

Fresh meat shall be given out five times in a decade. The battalions which have had salt meat to-day shall have fresh to-morrow; and those which have had fresh meat one day shall have salt the next.

The administrations of the army and the workmen of the shops shall take meat all together.

BONAPARTE.

To the Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Nice, 11 Germinal, year 4 [March 31, 1796].

The general-in-chief is informed that several commissaries of war and officers have in their chests sums arising from various sales, from contributions, and from the revenues of conquered countries. This being contrary to the good of the service, to order, and to the constitution, he directs that these different sums be remitted without delay to the chest of the paymaster of the army or his superiors, in order that they may be disposed of by the warrants of the paymaster-in-chief for the good of the service, and for supplying the soldier with what is due to him.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

Savona, 9 Germinal, year 4 [March 29, 1796].

I have received your letter of yesterday. I heartily congratulate you on the chief command of the army of Italy which has been given to you. You know that I have long done justice to your military talents. I shall act so as to deserve your confidence, as I have obtained that of all the generals who have hitherto commanded.

I am come from Voltri, whither I have been with Salicetti, the commissioner, to inspect our new positions. Hopes are given us of cash; all means are set to work to obtain it.

To-morrow I shall give you an account of the positions of

the troops of the advanced guard, and of those of the enemy. I shall not fail to inform you of everything that concerns the service.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Oneglia, 10 Germinal, year 4 [March 30, 1796].

I have inspected all the points and the coast about Oneglia, and have found that they are susceptible of a good defence.

The batteries of Oneglia are in good condition; their position is good; they are serviceable but not sufficient. I must first observe that there are two distinct roadsteads: that of port Maurice, and that of Oneglia. The one affords shelter against the east-north-east wind, the other against the west and south-west.

As these winds blow alternately, it will be requisite to occupy both roadsteads, and, of course, to make ourselves masters of them.

The roadstead of Oneglia is defended firstly by the batteries of the fortress; secondly, by those of Cape Oneglia, and by that called the battery of the road.

That of port Maurice is defended by the battery of the road and by the Genoese battery of port Maurice. The battery of Cape Oneglia is important; it affords a good appui, but mounts only one 36-pounder. In my opinion, it ought to have four pieces of that calibre.

The battery of the roadstead is not armed: the intention is to mount two 13-pounders there; but they will be insufficient—I even think it necessary that it should have four 36-pounders, because that battery answers two purposes; for, being situated between the two roadsteads, it defends both.

The Genoese battery of port Maurice is armed. It appears to me indispensable that we should take possession of it, and send artillerymen to work it: it is a good *point d'appui*, the loss of which would entail that of the others, consequently I think it would be dangerous to neglect it.

The guns of the present batteries are provided with five rounds only: I think they ought to be increased to one hundred.

By means of the proposed increase of guns, amounting to

no more than seven 36-pounders, I think that a convoy of 200 sail would find protection and safety. I am just starting for Ormea, whence I shall give you a report of my further observations.

MARMONT.

To the General-in-Chief.

La Pietra, 10 Germinal, year 4 [March 30, 1796].

I have received your letter of the 8th instant, from which I learn that you have just assumed the command of the army. I congratulate myself on serving under you, knowing your civism and your military talents. I will do my utmost to fulfil your intentions in all the orders that you shall give me: rely upon my zeal, my activity, and my devotedness to the public welfare.

Your predecessor, General Scherer, ordered the 99th demi-brigade, which ought to belong to my division, to be transferred to General Massena for the expedition that is to take place. As soon as that demi-brigade is of no further service to the advanced guard, I request you to let it return to my division.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.

Savona, Germinal 10, year 4 [March 30, 1796].

The snow is melting fast; our line needs reinforcement. The 99th demi-brigade, which belongs, according to the last distribution made by General Scherer, to the division of General Augereau, is become absolutely indispensable to me. Obligated, by the re-organization of the demi-brigades, to transfer many battalions and demi-brigades to the divisions of the line, my two advanced guard divisions have been much weakened, forming in all but 13,000 men, and having to guard from Melogno to Montelezino and Madona de la Savona. General Augereau, with 10,000 men, is only charged with the defence of the gorges of Bardinetto and Spinardo.

I hope, general, that you will comply with my request, and permit me to keep that demi-brigade, which is at this moment with the advanced guard, of which it has always formed part. If, however, reasons that I cannot foresee

induce you to withdraw it from me, I will beg you to give me another demi-brigade of nearly the same force.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Savona, 11 Germinal, year 4 [March 31, 1796].

I send you a copy of a letter which I have just received from Salicetti, commissioner of the government. You see that he will not explain himself in a positive manner respecting the 3,000 men at Voltri.

I await your ulterior orders, and shall meanwhile secure the communication with Savona.

The 84th demi-brigade sets out to-morrow on its return to Finale. The troops of General Augereau's division, who are there at this moment, will return to their first position.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Savona, Germinal 12, year 4 [April 1, 1796].

Nothing new at the advanced guard. I have received your letter of the 9th, and apprized them that they must conform to your intentions, and that on no account whatever is any one to meddle with the brigades of the artillery carriages, which are on the road to Finale and Vado.

I have long been applying for the muskets and bayonets of which the two divisions of the advanced guard are deficient. We want at least 2,000 muskets: have the goodness to order them to be sent to us.

The snow is melting, and the communications with Piedmont are beginning to be opened. The enemy is approaching our positions. I am reinforcing my line. General Augereau asks me for the 99th demi-brigade; I am in absolute need of it, as I have mentioned to you. That general can dispense with this demi-brigade, having a few days since received a corps of Allobroges. I hope it will be left with me.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Loano, 12 Germinal, year 4 [April 1, 1796].

I saw General Serrurier yesterday. He has given me all the particulars you desire, and I will transmit them to you.

The Col de Terme is an excellent post: it perfectly covers Ormea, and there is no taking that town till we have made ourselves masters of it.

It may be turned: 1, by the gorges of Viosena; 2, by the heights of l'Arbre; 3, by the Col de l'Inferno.

The Col de Terme, though easy of defence, is of great extent. General Serrurier thinks that it requires 2,400 men and six pieces of cannon. However, when it was attacked last year, it was guarded by no more than 1,600 men.

The gorges of Viosena are of great importance: if they were to be forced, not only would the Col de Terme and Ormea be turned, but the enemy would drop without difficulty into the valley of the Oneglia. They cannot be duly guarded with fewer than 2,000 men.

General Serrurier thinks also that 200 men would be required for the defence of the heights of l'Arbre; 1,500 for the Col de l'Inferno; and 1,200 for the gorge of Garessio. Then his line of defence, extending from Viosena to Garessio, would be occupied by 7500 men.

The Col de Terme is still impassable on account of the snow: as soon as that obstacle is removed, General Serrurier will cause it to be occupied. It is clearer on our side than on that of the enemy; so we may be quite easy.

I could not make observations on the different roads which you charged me to inspect, because they are all occupied by the enemy; our advanced posts extending no further than a league from Garessio; but I have collected the following particulars from the country-people and from officers who have traversed some of them.

From the uniformity of their reports, they are no doubt accurate.

1. From Ponte Nocetto to Ceva, there is an hour and a half of good road practicable for carriages. There are two rises. The descent of the second is within sight of the fort, in reach of cannon, but somewhat covered by chestnut-trees.

2. From Nocetto to Calisano, two leagues and a half of mountain road, and scarcely passable for mules.

3. From Garessio to the Carthusian convent, an hour and a half, and from the Carthusians to Mendovi, five hours and a half. This is a good road, but for mules only.

4. From Bagnasco to Batifolo, one hour; the road is good and passable for field artillery.

I know not which is the Frabosa that you meant; but, as there are two, I have noticed both.

5. From Frabosa to Breuves, four hours; roads for mules; and from Frabosa Fontana to Breuves, five hours; mule roads.

Such, general, is the information for which you have applied to me. I am just starting for Finale and Savona.

I forgot, in my last letter, to tell you that it is not off Oneglia that the enemy have taken some vessels, but off Alassio. But Alassio was not then armed, and this accident bespeaks nothing unfavourable for Oneglia, and they are there taking the precautions which you have pointed out

MARMONT.

To the General-in-Chief.

La Pietra, 30 Germinal, year 4 [April 2, 1796].

You must have seen by the report of General Rusca, which I sent you the day before yesterday, that the enemy was seeking to make himself master of the positions which we occupy at Bardinetto.

You will see by that which I have just received, a copy of which I send you, that the enemy was striving to gain the positions: the troops which he is pushing on towards that point, and the reconnaissances directed to that quarter, bespeak some design on his part.

In order to prevent his attempts and to be provisioned, we are at this moment on half rations and no fresh meat; it being better to reserve the little that we can procure for the hospitals.

According to the statement of our situation yesterday, we had here and at Garessio no more than 80 quintals of corn and flour; I have nevertheless been obliged to draw together all the troops, as the enemy are making movements.

Some days ago, we lost a piece of cannon, one and a half pounder: it was probably sold by the artillerymen on guard:

this affair is in the hands of a council of war. I forgot to report it to you.

General Rusca has just written to me from Galissano that he is supporting my right. I am also writing to him, that I may obtain an exact account of his positions and of his communications with me.

SERRURIER.

To the General-in-Chief.

Savona, 13 Germinal, year 4 [April 2, 1796].

Nothing new at the advanced guard. An express has just brought General Laharpe information that the enemy has made some movements on the heights of Voltri: he is even assured that some troops have arrived at San Pietro d'Arena, with a small detachment of cavalry.

I shall immediately reinforce Voltri with 500 men. I shall act in consequence of further information that I may receive of the movements of the enemy.

We have now 4000 men between this place and Voltri.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Savona, 14 Germinal, year 4 [April 3, 1796].

The movements of the enemy are not what they were at first taken for. Yesterday 80 Austrians came on a reconnaissance to San Pietro d'Arena. Descending from Campo di Marona, they spread alarm over the whole country, so that it was believed that the whole Austro-Sardinian army was at the gates of Genoa.

Having resolved, on account of the magazines of corn and flour which we have at Voltri and Pegoli, to reinforce the troops that are at Voltri, I sent off, last night, 500 men with General Laharpe, making in all 4500 that we have from Savona to Voltri.

Reconnaissances have been made this morning along the whole line of the two divisions of the advanced guard, but only a few Barbets were met with. A most vigilant lookout is everywhere kept up.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Savona, 13 Germinal, year 4 [April 3, 1796].

I arrived here yesterday. I have seen the port of Finale, and it appeared to me to be ill defended. The whole of its artillery consists of two 12-pounders and an 8; but they are of no consequence, and in the most inefficient state. It would be necessary to establish two good batteries of large calibre. For the rest, the port of Finale is of little interest. Seamen have assured me that it was impossible to lie there if the sea was at all rough.

I took the road from Finale to St. Jaques; it is superb for mountain artillery; but, I think, not passable for field-pieces: in some places it is too narrow, in others too rugged, and all the turnings are too short. The road from St. Jaques to Vado is better made, and, with slight repairs, might be made passable for 12-pounder field-pieces.

The Austrian carriages which were at Finale are now at Loano: they can be employed only for the works of an arsenal and a great fort: twelve or fifteen, in particular, might serve for the forage of the horse artillery; they are like those which are used for that purpose in the North.

The Austrians have made movements towards Genoa; they have come to the number of 4000 men to the Bochetta, and sent 100 men as far as San Pietro d'Arena. I suppose this movement to be the result of those which we have made in advance of Voltri, and that they meant to show the Genoese by it that they were there. Salicetti was apprehensive that they designed to carry off our magazines from Voltri, and has determined to send a few battalions to support the 3000 men who are there: he has gone thither himself this morning with General Laharpe. Massena is very quiet: he thinks that nothing serious can occur there.

MARMONT.

To the General-in-Chief.

Savona, 15 Germinal, year 4 [April 4, 1796].

All is very quiet towards Voltri: our men are labouring to-day at the evacuation of the magazines. When this operation is finished, I will send back the troops to their former positions, and repair to Albenga, to have the sweet pleasure (*doux plaisir*) of embracing you.

MASSENA.

Order of the General-in-Chief.

Head-quarters, Oneglia, 15 Germinal, year 4 [April 4, 1796].

The general-in-chief orders a contribution of 400 sacks, the assessment to be made in the valley of Oneglia, and a contribution of 200 in the *ci-devant* marquisate of Dolce-Aqua. He charges General Casalta with the levy of the said contribution, orders such villages as shall not have obeyed the requisition within twenty-four hours to be fined 100 francs in cash for each sack not furnished.

BONAPARTE.

To the General Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Albenga, 16 Germinal, year 4 [April 5, 1796].

You will be pleased to assemble a military commission for the purpose of trying Moulin, the emigrant, taken at Ormea, and sent to Nice by order of General Serrurier.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Savona, 16 Germinal, year 4 [April 5, 1796].

I have returned from Voltri. The flourish of the enemy in coming to San Pietro d'Arena has ended in nothing: he has even retired from Camporosso.

Between Novi, the Bochetta, Voltagio, and Ovado, there are about 3000 men; they have some pieces of cannon at the Bochetta, and they are entrenching themselves there: they have 50 men at Campofredo: this is, on the left, their most advanced post towards Voltri.

There are 5000 men at Dego, 500 of whom they are detaching to Ponzzone: these are to send 200 to the camp of Giana di Castagna, two leagues from Sacello, and 100 to the mountain of Simaferro. According to all my reports, the enemy is not in such force as the Genoese think fit to represent; and I have no doubt that, if we open the campaign shortly, it will be in a very victorious manner.

I received yesterday your letter of the 11th instant; your promises are extremely consolatory, and I am impatient to see the execution of them. The fortitude of the troops under their sufferings can be compared only with their bravery. We are in need of many articles of equipment. I have myself made a strict scrutiny to ascertain the extent

of our wants of that kind ; and it is very essential that you should get supplies from Nice before we take the field. We are likewise in want of arms, and especially of cartouch-boxes and swords. The *commissaire ordonnateur* gives us hopes of shoes, which we are in the utmost need of.

You will perhaps think, general, that I am asking for a great deal ; but I am as solicitous to obtain for my brothers in arms what is necessary for them, as I am to make them clever at their business and to lead them to victory.

I have already told you, general, and I repeat that the establishment at Voltri is extremely burdensome to us. It is not military, and it obliges us to occupy a line far too extensive, and which is liable to expose us to reverses. Savona and Vado have mills which can make amends for those of Voltri. The only objection in favour of the latter place is that it ensures the arrival of cattle.

LAHARPE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Ormea, 17 Germinal, year 4 [April 6, 1796].

I have received your letters of the 10th, 11th, and 15th instant. I have made known to the soldiers of my division, through the order of the day, the means which you are about to employ to procure necessaries for them.

If the supplies of provisions for these divisions are to be sent direct from Loano to Garessio, 200 mules would be sufficient ; but if from Oneglia, they would fall short.

In order to be able to observe Batifolo, I must necessarily be master of the height of Preconda ; I have ordered General Guyeux to set at work the peasants and the sappers to open the necessary roads for us. If I were obliged to proceed to Batifolo, I should not be in sufficient force ; I should consequently be compromised, since my left would have to guard Carlino and Visona, and precisely at that time we must observe the Col de Terme, which, I think, the enemy would be very glad to have ; but, if I can make myself master of the Preconda and the Col de Casolto, that will be all the same to me : I even believe that in this case they will not risk the attempt.

Citizen Barthelemy, chief of the 10th demi-brigade, resolved, without orders, to endeavour to dislodge the enemy from a post which they have at St. Jaques-Viola. He had

probably made no disposition and taken no military precaution. He was driven back to his cantonments, and himself wounded and made prisoner. It has not yet been ascertained how many men this foolish affair has cost us. It took place in the afternoon of the 15th. Part of the soldiers returned laden with booty. If an example is not made, things will go on ill; many soldiers would fain rob only and not fight.

I shall not venture to the Carthusian convent at Casolto, without having possession of the heights.

SERRURIER.

To General Augereau.

Souvelti, 18 Germinal, year 4 [April 7, 1796].

The enemy is seeking to make himself master of the positions which we occupy: he expects 2000 men at Bagnasco, and, according to several reports, he has already received a reinforcement.

I must inform you that I shall be in the greatest danger if my right is not guarded by the division of Finale; for I may be cut off from Galissano and taken in rear on the Spinardo: I should then have no retreat but upon the troops of General Serrurier.

I am obliged, for my own security, to leave two battalions at Galissano and one at Bardinetto: this force I shall need to guard the positions of Solta, Rovigni, Souvelti, Serboulera, and Maramasa, on account of the great extent of the ground. The redoubt of Maramasa is not occupied by us: the enemy came thither this morning on a reconnaissance, but was driven out by the carabineers.

I have absolute need of my brigade for occupying the four above mentioned positions; so make haste, and order the troops at Tuirano to come and occupy Bardinetto and Galissano.

I am under apprehension about to-night: those troops, therefore, ought to be this evening at Bardinetto and Galissano, and to bring with them two days' provisions.

I have few cartridges at Bardinetto: some ought to be sent, as well as brandy, the troops being in bivouac, without covering and without shoes, and the cold very sharp.

We can have at Bardinetto 3000 rations of bread per day, ovens and mills, including Galissano.

I have this instant learned that the enemy has many troops at Berno. RUSCA.

The General-in-Chief to the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Albenga, 17 Germinal, year 4 [April 6, 1796].

I have removed the head-quarters to Albenga. The movement which I found commenced against Genoa has drawn the enemy from his winter-quarters; he has crossed the Po and pushed forward advanced posts to Dego, following the Bormida and the Bochetta, leaving Gavi in his rear. Beaulieu has published a manifesto, which I send you, and which I will answer the day after the battle. I have been extremely vexed and annoyed by this movement upon Genoa, the more unseasonable as it has obliged that republic to assume an hostile attitude, and awakened the enemy whom I should have caught napping: our loss in men will be so much the greater.

The King of Sardinia, on his part, is in the greatest bustle: he has made a requisition of young men of the age of 15 years and upwards.

I have found at Oneglia marbles which are worth some money. I have ordered them to be valued and put up for sale in the Riviera of Genoa: these may produce the sum of thirty or forty thousand livres.

The house of Flachat, which has the contract for corn, and that of Collot for meat, behave well; they supply us with very good corn, and the troops are beginning to have fresh meat.

The army is in a state of frightful destitution. I have still great obstacles to surmount, but they are surmountable. Want has authorized indiscipline, and without discipline there is no victory. I hope that this will speedily be set to rights; the aspect of things is already changing: in a few days we shall be engaged with the enemy.

The day before yesterday I directed a reconnaissance to be made towards Cairo: the advanced posts of the enemy were driven back, and we took some prisoners.

The Piedmontese army is about 50,000 strong in infantry and 5000 in cavalry: I have but about 45,000 disposable in all. A great many troops have been kept back on my rear and beyond the Rhone.

Chauvet, paymaster-in-chief, is dead at Genoa: this is a real loss for the army; he was active and enterprising. The army has dropped a tear to his memory.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Albenga, 9 Germinal, year 4 [April 8, 1796].

You will find enclosed the letter written to me by General Colli, who commands the army of the King of Sardinia, and my answer to him: I hope that it will be conformable to your intentions. The treasury frequently sends us bills of exchange which are protested; as one for 162,800 livres on Cadiz has just been; and this increases our embarrassments.

I have found this army not only destitute of everything, but without discipline, and in a state of perpetual insubordination. The discontent was such, that evil-disposed persons took advantage of it: a company, called the Dauphin's, was formed, and counter-revolutionary songs were sung. I have directed two officers, charged with having shouted *Vive le roi!* to be tried by a council of war. I conjecture that the mission of citizen Moulin, as a flag of truce, was connected with plots of this kind, the clue to which I am assiduously seeking. Be assured that peace and order will be re-established; everything is in a fair way for it here. I have just caused the important position of —— to be occupied.

Before you read this letter we shall have had a battle. The treasury has not kept its word; instead of 500,000 livres, it has sent but 300,000; and we have heard nothing of a sum of 600,000 which was promised us; but in spite of all this we are going on.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Savona, 18 Germinal, year 4 [April 7, 1796].

The enemy yesterday attacked one of the posts of Voltri, the mountain called Campo del Mello. Our troops, after expending all their cartridges, fell back on a second post. On the arrival of the reinforcement sent by General Cervoni, the enemy retired, and the post was retaken. The firing lasted above two hours. We had only four men wounded.

Citizen Picot has reported to me, as he says he has also done to you, the arrival of 3000 Austrians at Sacello. General Laharpe starts at three to-morrow morning, to place a post of 100 men at Stella and at Mozammaran, which is on the road descending to Arbrisolla: he will then inspect the whole line as far as Voltri. If it is your intention, general, to leave any longer the 4,500 men that there are from Savona to Voltri, it will be necessary to send forward to us some other troops, as well for that division as for the division of Finale. The débouchés of Piedmont are all open: we must therefore take care of ourselves.

I went this morning to reconnoitre Montenotte very minutely, and even pushed on three quarters of a league beyond it. I convinced myself that we ought not to occupy that post; it would scatter our troops too much; it is too wooded, and offers no point of defence for its too great extent: to clear it would require the labour of a hundred men at least for above a month, in felling trees—an impracticable thing. We shall confine ourselves then, if you approve it, to supporting our right at St. George, half musket-shot from Montenotte, the centre in the plain of Revel and La Gallina, and the left at St. Bartholomew; and our second line will be at Montelegino. The line is good, and the only one that can be taken at the moment, with the number of troops that we have.

Cadibona and Baracon shall be reinforced to-morrow.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Savona, 18 Germinal, year 4 [April 7, 1796].

We are assured by advices from Genoa that the enemy is preparing to attack us at St. Jacques. Though I do not give absolute credit to them, still I must beg you to send me troops to reinforce the second division, if it consists with your operations to leave the troops at Voltri for some time longer. You know as well as myself the importance of the post of St. Jacques, and the necessity there is for reinforcing it sufficiently to enable it to resist a superior force.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Savona, 18 Germinal, year 4 [April 7, 1796].

General Cervoni wrote to me yesterday, at three in the afternoon, that the enemy was attacking his posts on the mountain. The affair could not have produced any result, as I have no intelligence of it.

If it is your intention to retain Voltri, materials for encamping are indispensable, that we may establish ourselves in a more military manner, by occupying the heights, where it is impossible to remain in bivouac: otherwise, we shall be obliged to make troops ascend them every day, which will fatigue them much.

I think it necessary that we should occupy Montenotte as speedily as possible. This position has the advantage of annoying the enemy by the facility which it affords of proceeding either upon Dego or Batello. If the enemy were to occupy it, our advanced posts of La Madona would be continually disturbed, and we should be commanded.

The salt meat causes many disorders: it is time for this unwholesome food to be discontinued. We are in urgent need of shoes. We are in want of arms. Notwithstanding all these wants, the troops are well disposed, and I doubt not for a moment that you will make a brilliant campaign. I will contribute to it with all my might.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Savona, 19 Germinal, year 4 [April 8, 1796].

I forward to you a letter which I have just received from General Laharpe. I have desired him not to suffer himself to be reduced to the last extremity before he makes his retreat, and to abandon the positions occupied by his troops, if he thinks that he cannot hold them without danger.

I shall immediately reinforce the post of Stella with 150 men, and I am giving orders to the commandant of La Madona to make a movement upon Sassello, by Montenotte, in order to alarm the force which the enemy appears to be collecting towards Sassello.

I know not what are your intentions in regard to leaving troops any longer at Voltri. I cannot help remarking to

you that our line is too extensive to be guarded by so few men. Give me your orders, and in a positive manner.

I am forwarding the cartridges for which General Laharpe applies.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Ormea, 19 Germinal, year 4 [April 8, 1796].

The general of brigade Guieux, commanding the advanced guard of the division entrusted to me, informs me that the enemy appear desirous to possess themselves of Casolto. This point is of the utmost importance to cover my right; I have in consequence recommended to that general to protect it with all his means, but without endangering himself. I recommend to him to place a post at Casale in an advantageous position. In the allotment of the divisions, Casolto was destined for the division of General Augereau. I have not a force sufficiently strong to risk prolonging myself towards the right. I think that the plan of the enemy must be to make the first cut at me, to oblige me to abandon the environs of Preconda, which they must covet, in order to delay or to suspend our operations: my plan, therefore, is to reinforce my right as much as I can.

Corn arrives very slowly: I have difficulty to provision Garessio, whither I must nevertheless march the greater part of my troops: by the statement of to-day there are in that place but seven quintals of flour; this makes me uneasy. There is meat for a few days for the hospitals—that is all. There are to-day but eight quintals of hay in the magazine of Ormea; so that horses as well as men are reduced to half allowance.

SERRURIER.

To General Massena.

Voltri, 19 Germinal, year 4 [April 8, 1796].

The firing has ceased; the enemy is retiring; the troops are worn out; we have no cartridges left. If the enemy attacks this evening, or by daybreak to morrow, I shall be obliged, in case none arrive, to retreat without resistance. For the sake of the common weal

Your letter for Giacomoni is gone by sea. Suchet is the bearer of it.

It is impossible to delude one's self any longer. The soldier ill-fed, and without shoes, cannot resist new fatigues if he is attacked. All are under arms, and all will be so for the night. Under this circumstance, I shall not return to Savona, but I recommend to you the gorge which runs down to Albisola: if not watched, we might all be culpable. I think the troops at Stella too weak.

I learn this moment that the enemy is again making a movement: he appears to be assembling for a fresh attack. We are just out of cartridges: if an attack is made, our resistance cannot be long.

LAHARPE.

To General Massena.

Voltri, 20 Germinal, year 4 [April 9, 1796].

The night has been quiet. The enemy has not yet made his appearance, which causes me to presume that he does not design to disturb us to-day.

Last night, I received a communication from the minister; he promises me shoes: it will be the coming of the Messiah. Most of the troops, absolutely barefoot, could no longer ascend the mountain: they are all there, nevertheless, with the exception of six companies which are here.

The troops murmur bitterly; I smoothed them down, and I hope things will go on well. Though several fought ill yesterday, saying that they would fight as they were paid, be not uneasy. If anything new occurs, you shall have immediate notice of it.

I have received 60,000 cartridges. It would not be amiss to make them up 100,000.

LAHARPE.

General Mesnard to Massena, General of Division.

Cadibona, 20 Germinal, year 4 [April 9, 1796].

I have just been informed, and you may take it as quite certain, that the enemy has for these three days past been despatching about 10,000 men towards Sacello; and 1200 Pandours are leaving Dego to-day, to join those 10,000 men. General Roccavina commands this armed force. His

intention is to cut off the retreat of our troops to Voltri, or to make them prisoners.

There has been a firing of small arms towards Melogno, but I have not been able to learn the result.

It is the intention of the enemy to cut off the right and the left of the army; and the troops of Piedmont, with the auxiliaries in her pay, are to make an effort towards the Col de Tende: they reckon also upon forcing the two important posts of Melogno and St. Jacques, and upon leaving the environs of Cairo with few troops, in the hope of enticing us into that valley.

MESNARD.

The Minister of the French Republic at Venice to the General-in-Chief.

Venice, 20 Germinal, year 4 [April 9, 1796].

With the letter which you were pleased to write to me on the 7th instant, I received that of the minister for foreign affairs, which accompanied it. Be assured that I will not neglect any means in my power to procure the information which you desire, and which must contribute to the success of your operations.

I have from time to time acquainted the minister of the Republic at Genoa with all that was passing within my observation. The result is that, since the defeat of General Devins, there have entered Lombardy, by the Venetian territory, from 17,000 to 18,000 men, 2000 of which are light cavalry, and 60 pieces of cannon of different calibres; that in this number are comprised two regiments of emigrants in the pay of England, which crossed the States of the Pope to embark at Civita Vecchia; and that 900 men, Neapolitan cavalry, which have likewise passed through the March of Ancona, have just arrived at Milan. The general rendezvous is at Pavia. We are assured also that there is, between Inspruck and Trent, in the Tyrol, a reserve of 20,000 men, 6000 of them regular troops, and 14,000 militia.

The Austrian troops, according to the report of the Milanese themselves, are in bad condition, excepting the cavalry. They consist chiefly of elderly men, boys of fifteen or sixteen, Polish recruits raised in Galicia, who march by compulsion, and desert in platoons: those, whom I have seen arriving here, have assured me that all their countrymen will endeavour to do the same when they shall be

ordered against the French. They have even suggested to me this stratagem, which had also occurred to myself, to place at the head of our columns Poles dressed in the Polish fashion, and who would be immediately recognized as such. You have some at Savona, among others, Major Stratzkowski, whom you might employ in this manner with success.

As for the spirit of the inhabitants, especially of the Milanese, they are tired of their archduke, whom they despise; they are desirous of a change of government, and they expect it from the arrival of the French among them; but it is not to be supposed that they will make the least movement in their favour till the moment they feel certain that the latter will be able to secure them for ever from the return of the Austrian domination. It will, therefore, be necessary, on coming among them, to inspire them with confidence by rigid discipline, by scrupulous respect for private property and for their religion and manners. They are afraid of us now, because the priests and our enemies have always misrepresented us to them: they will learn by and by to esteem us, and you will dictate to them such laws as you shall think proper to ensure the triumph and the glory of the Republic.

LALLEMANT.

To the General-in-Chief.

Verachio, 22 Germinal, year 4 [April 11, 1796].

I arrived yesterday evening at Voltri; but my stay there was not long. The enemy, 4000 strong and with four pieces of cannon, appeared along our front about three in the afternoon. The greater part of his troops came by Campo Vado, and their artillery, with 200 horse, along the sea-coast. Our troops have fought well; but, scattered in many different points and guarding an extensive and an easy country, on account of its numerous gorges, they were forced at several points; and at night the enemy found himself master of all the heights of Voltri. Very fortunately he had attacked late, for, had there been a few hours more daylight, our situation might have been very disastrous. General Cervoni, therefore, wisely resolved to retreat.

Every thing has been evacuated—the magazines of all sorts—and we have sustained no loss.

We are at Verachio, where there are very good positions to take; among others that of the mountain of Lafourche.

The left of the new line would be at Stella, where we have one battalion.

I have not been able, as you perceive, to inspect the positions which you specified. If you order the movement of retreat, I shall return immediately to Savona: if you order a new line to be taken, I will visit it and then rejoin you.

MARMONT.

To the General-in-Chief.

Between Cairo and Bochetta, 23 Germinal, year 4 [April 12, 1796]

I arrived at six o'clock upon the heights on the right, between Cairo and Bochetta: my advanced guard covers this village. I have not yet any intelligence of General Mesnard, who has with him the 8th demi-brigade of light infantry. I believe he occupies the bridge and heights of Carcaro.

The enemy occupies the heights facing us which cover Cairo: he is said to have six battalions of grenadiers and 1200 Croats.

It is said that at Dego there are the battalions of Beljoso and Caprara and two Piedmontese battalions.

I inform you that all the forces I have here amount to no more than 1200 men.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Montenotte, 23 Germinal, year 4 [April 12, 1796].

We have just driven the enemy from the positions which he occupied at Montenotte. His loss is very considerable; an officer, who is a prisoner, estimates it at 400 men; ours is but about a score wounded and five or six killed.

I am withdrawing my troops from the positions of Montenotte. I have sent a superior officer with 100 men to ascertain where General Laharpe is. If his operation is not yet finished, I will march to his assistance, and we will proceed together to Carcaro and Sacello, as you direct in the letter which my aide-de-camp has just brought me.

My troops have received no bread: I know not whether any has been found at Vado.

I owe the warmest thanks to the brave fellows whom I command.

MASSENA.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

Paris, 23 Germinal, year 4 [April 12, 1796].

The Executive Directory sends you, citizen-general, an extract from a memorial which has just been presented to it, and from which, it conceives, you may derive some advantage.

The Directory is far from intending to propose to you the silly plan of exposing 10,000 men to a march of forty-five leagues in an enemy's country, leaving behind them an army and fortresses, and destitute of the means of carrying with them necessaries for their subsistence; but it has been thought that it might be possible to attain the proposed end by confiding the execution of the plan to a corps of partisans commanded by a daring and enterprising leader. It begs you to make the attempt, if you agree in its opinion, and if you know a man in the army capable of executing it.

LETOURNEUR.

Extract annexed to the preceding.

Genoa cannot be more than forty-five leagues distant from Loretto: might it not be possible to seize the Casa Santa and the immense treasures which superstition has been amassing there for fifteen centuries? They are estimated at ten millions sterling. Ten thousand men, secretly despatched, cleverly conducted, would accomplish such an undertaking with the greatest facility. There is one difficulty—the road is not direct, or it will be necessary to cross the Appenines.

Nevertheless, with daring, not in the execution, which requires little or none, but in the plan, you will effect a most admirable financial operation, and which would do no harm but to a few monks.

Ten thousand men are sufficient for this enterprise. Their unknown march will ensure their success. In case of need, the army will second them.

To the General in-Chief.

Millesimo, 25 Germinal, year 4 [April 14, 1796].

Agreeably to your orders, I sent off this morning the brigade of General Victor. That of General Joubert is at

its destination. Thus I have only the 39th demi-brigade left, and with that I must furnish a garrison for Cossaria, and the force requisite for the service of Carcaro, so that I have but 1000 or 1200 men disposable. With these, you will admit, it is scarcely possible to occupy positions and to form an attack. I am going, nevertheless, to make a diversion, to harass the enemy incessantly, and, in order to do it effectively, to concert with General Joubert, who has just informed me that the Piedmontese have retired to Montesemo.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.

Millesimo, 25 Germinal, year 4 [April 14, 1796].

I inform you that I intend to attack Montesemo tomorrow morning. To this end I shall make General Be-grand's brigade file along the heights of Rocavignano; General Joubert's shall start from Biestro, and proceed to the same point; and lastly, General Rusca's, master of St. Giovanne de Murialto, will turn the enemy by his left and cut off his retreat upon Ceva. I shall give you an account of the result of this expedition.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.

Cossaria, 25 Germinal, year 4 [April 14, 1796].

The troops which defended the castle of Cossaria have at length capitulated, at the moment when I was preparing to cannonade them in the republican fashion. Adjutant-General Verdier will deliver the capitulation to you.

It were to be wished that this capitulation had taken place before the attack, and then we should not have to regret the brave generals Banel and Quenin and many other gallant officers and soldiers who have perished under the walls of that castle.

I will march off the division for the attack which you have just ordered.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.

On the heights of the Castle of Cairo, 25 Germinal, year 4
[April 14, 1796].

The enemy, to the number of 1500 or 2000 men, is this moment arriving on the heights facing the position which I occupy. I shall be able to resist and to attack him as soon as the battalion which I sent this morning for the second time to General Augereau comes back.

I have this moment received two orders from General Massena to march to La Bochetta with the two battalions of the 84th demi-brigade. I am letting him know that, having received contrary orders from you, and being on the point of having the enemy upon my hands, I cannot abandon my position.

DOMMARTIN.

To the General-in-Chief.

Cairo, 26 Germinal, year 4 [April 15, 1796].

Brilliant actions ought to be known. I have two to mention to you which deserve your attention.

In the glorious fight of yesterday, I received orders to throw myself with my battalion on the front of the enemy: this order I executed with impetuosity. Adjutant-General Palezzini and citizen Guiabega, captain in the first demi-brigade of light infantry, which was with me, were the first to dash into the enemy's entrenchments. The first was aimed at by two Austrians who missed him: he disarmed and took them prisoners. He advanced and disarmed four officers, who defended themselves sword in hand.

This adjutant-general, dismissed at the time of the changes made by Aubry, and provisionally placed in activity on the application of General Scherer, has no letters of service; he deserves, by the trait which I have just related, and by the intrepidity which he has displayed in the affair of Voltri, in the attack of Montenotte, and on several other occasions, that you, general, should solicit the grant of his commission.

The second, keeping ahead of the column, amidst a shower of balls, threw himself into the redoubt, and engaged with the sword two officers and a sergeant; the latter he killed, and disarmed and took prisoners the two others. This

officer, distinguished for his talents and his valour, who has been a captain for three months, deserves to be promoted to the rank of chief of battalion on the field of battle.

CERVONI.

To the General-in-Chief.

Meridano, 26 Germinal, year 4 [April 15, 1796].

I learn, through the medium of the order of the day, that shoes are to be delivered to the divisions of General Massena and Laharpe. Nothing is said about mine, which is in extreme want of them. I beg you to send me the shoes I am in need of as speedily as possible.

The convoys of provisions destined for my division reach me with difficulty, because there is allowed an escort of two men only, who are unacquainted with the roads and lose their way.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.

La Bochetta, 26 Germinal, year 4 [April 15, 1796].

Notwithstanding your promises, general, the troops are without bread; they are sinking under fatigue and inanition. Send us something—at least, some bread and a little brandy; for I am fearful of being a prophet of disaster; but, if we are attacked to-morrow, the troops will fight ill, for want of physical strength.

LAHARPE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Camp of Dego, 27 Germinal, year 4 [April 16, 1796].

The fight of yesterday was very hot, very fatiguing, but very glorious for the arms of the Republic.

Before daylight, the enemy, who had received numerous reinforcements, attacked all the posts of Dego, of which we had made ourselves masters the day before. The resistance was most obstinate: our troops, notwithstanding their extreme valour, were obliged, after a combat of five hours, to give way and to abandon all the positions which they occupied: they made their retreat along the line which we had taken on the first day.

I made dispositions for a new attack, and meanwhile occupied the enemy by a great number of tirailleurs. The reinforcement for which I applied to you having arrived, the attack became general. The fire was terrible on both sides: never was battle more obstinate. At length the enemy, charged in all quarters, was obliged to yield to republican valour, and to abandon, in his turn, all the redoubts of which he had made himself master. His rout was complete. In his flight he was charged with impetuosity by the cavalry; all who refused to surrender were cut down. His loss is very considerable, in killed and wounded as well as prisoners. The number of these last exceeds 3000. Ours is small in comparison. We have to regret the death of General Causse, Adjutant Poyré, and several other gallant officers. The chiefs of brigade Rondeau and Dupuis are wounded, the first in the leg, the other in the arm.

The greatest praise is due to the troops: they have everywhere displayed heroic courage. The general of brigade Beaumont, commanding the cavalry, your aide-de-camp Murat, and adjutant-general Vignolles, sub-chief of the staff, particularly distinguished themselves by being the first to attack the enemy and with vigour.

The success of this engagement is owing to the intrepidity of the troops and the reinforcement which you sent me.

I will communicate to you, general, the brilliant deeds which do honour to that fight and to our republicans, and immortalize those who are dead: their memory ought to be recorded in the annals of history.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Heights of Ceva, 28 Germinal, year 4 [April 17, 1796].

I have this instant received your different orders, but cannot put them in execution, being master of the enemy's lines. I shall send immediately to occupy the Tête Noire and other positions which overlook the fort: if, nevertheless, you persist in the changes which you prescribe, I request you to let me know it.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.

Bagnasco, 26 Germinal, year 4 [April 17, 1796].

There are no provisions in the magazines of Ormea and Garessio : we are living from hand to mouth. It is the same in regard to forage. I have been told that a small quantity of oats has arrived, but with orders that none should be delivered.

My right column arrived at Nocetta too late to form the attack of it, which took place this morning ; we carried at once the redoubt of Terra Bianca. I am certain of these facts, though I have not yet received the report of General Pelletier, who directs that party.

I wrote to you yesterday, to give you an account of our establishment at Batifolo, where we have taken prisoners 51 men and five officers, one of them a lieutenant-colonel, Count d'Ison. I have to commend general of brigade Guieux, as he does highly the chief of battalion Dallons.

I have just received intelligence from general of brigade Pelletier, whose affair is as I have told you above : he has taken five or six prisoners. I have sent General Miollis with 1000 or 1200 men towards Pampara, as much to cover me on that side as to annoy the enemy. The snow renders the roads extremely toilsome.

SERRURIER.

To the General-in-Chief.

Mioglia, 28 Germinal, year 4 [April 17, 1796].

The boundless licentiousness to which the troops give themselves up, and which cannot be remedied, because we have not a right to order a scoundrel to be shot, is hurrying us into ruin, dishonouring us, and preparing for us the most cruel reverses. As my character for firmness will not permit me to witness such things, much less to tolerate them, there is but one course for me to take, that of retiring. In consequence, general, I beg you to accept my resignation, and to send an officer to take the command entrusted to me ; for I would rather dig the ground for a livelihood than be at the head of men who are worse than were the Vandals of old.

LAHARPE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Savona, 29 Germinal, year 4 [April 18, 1799].

In consequence, general, of your order of the 28th, I have halted at Savona. I have communicated your intentions to the commandant of the artillery and to the commissaries of war at Savona and Vado. You may depend upon your orders being punctually executed, as well in regard to the artillery as to the provisions. The field-artillery shall be landed to-day, and to-morrow it shall be all sent off.

The commissaries of war have given orders that there shall be nothing in their magazines but what is necessary for daily consumption. To-morrow, a detachment of 100 horse shall go to Voltri, agreeably to the order of the chief of the staff to the commandant of Savona. We are assured that this country is entirely evacuated by the enemy.

The English squadron has been the whole day off Savona. I have recommended the most active vigilance to the forts of Vado and to the vessels in that harbour.

CERVONI.

To the General-in-Chief.

Castellino, 30 Germinal, year 4 [April 19, 1796].

I set out, agreeably to your orders, at the precise hour this morning for Castellino, where I arrived without striking a stroke, not having met with the enemy till I was beyond the Tanaro, where he was encamped and awaiting me in order of battle. As General Serrurier had not yet made his appearance, I determined to make myself master of all the heights which border the river by extending myself a great deal on the right, in order to turn him by his left, and to be enabled to cut off his retreat at the first movement that he should make.

General Serrurier having appeared and commenced his attack, I have sent down a great number of tirailleurs to occupy the enemy and to make a diversion. If a favourable moment presents itself, I will cross the river, which it is very difficult to do, since the enemy has broken down the bridge, and the opposite bank is lined with artillery.

As soon as I appeared, the enemy broke up the camp which is in the plain and that which is on the heights that cover St. Michael.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.

Ceva, 30 Germinal, year 4 [April 19, 1796].

We were masters of St. Michael, of the castle, and of the heights. The enemy had blown up part of his ammunition; his cannon, abandoned in the rout of the centre, had been overturned by some of the chasseurs whom I had with me, and who had crossed the Tanaro; in short, we were on the point of the most complete victory. Part of Serrurier's division unfortunately fell to plundering in the village of St. Michael, in spite of all the efforts of that officer to restrain them. The enemy took advantage of this stupidity to return to the charge, and in an instant the conquerors lost everything. The general fell back upon the heights in front of St. Michael, whither I went to rejoin him, with some companies that I had taken from the troops under the command of General Fiorella. He had a mind to retire into his first positions; I have strongly dissuaded him from it, and he will await your orders. There is nothing desperate. Let General Augereau closely press the centre of the enemy; let his attack commence even before that of General Serrurier, that concert may be necessarily established between them, a concert indispensable for success: let all our cavalry assemble, pour down into the valley, and fall upon the enemy in his retreat, and I think I may be answerable to you for certain success. The enemy has but little artillery, and his countenance, through the whole action, has been not so much that of an adversary bent on maintaining his ground as of one who contemplates retreat, merely taking the time necessary for the evacuation of his magazines. It is essential above all things that you should give speedy orders to General Serrurier, and invite him to take his revenge.

Your brother will hand you this letter, written in haste. I should have rejoined you, but my horse is knocked up, and I am very little better myself. Return hither; I think your presence would be more useful here than at Salicetto.

DESPINOIS.

To the General-in-Chief.

Dego, 30 Germinal, year 4 [April 19, 1796].

According to the reports that reach me, the enemy has evacuated the fortress of Voltri and the Bochetta, and is

collecting in the environs of Acqui. At Spigno, there is only a piquet of fifty hussars. He appears disturbed this morning: whether this arises from movements made on your part, I cannot tell. It is two months since the troops received any pay, as I am told by an officer with a flag of truce that brought despatches.

We received last night bread and spirits, so that we have been enabled to give out a whole ration for to-day.

In collecting the muskets and cartouch-boxes, we found some more unfortunate wounded Austrians. More than 500 have been conveyed to Cairo, but they are all lost men, mortification having already taken place in most of them.

LAHARPE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Heights of St. Michael, 1 Floreal, year 4 [April 20, 1796].

I am ready, for my part, general, to attack to-day, but the circumstance exhibits no appearance of a probability that would be favourable to us.

Several corps have been without bread for these three days: the soldiers abused this pretext to abandon themselves to the most horrible pillage. The corps have somewhat rallied, but there are still wanting a considerable number of men, who have gone off to get provisions in all possible ways. I am ill seconded by the officers, who pillage too: they were drunk yesterday, like the others.

For the attack of the village, I should need at least two 8-pounders to answer the heavy pieces which the enemy has placed for the defence of the bridge which he has cut down. I should want an engineer of more ability than the one I have, to rebuild that bridge under the fire of my cannon.

The means for the reconstruction of the bridge being prepared—for the river cannot be forded without great danger—those means, I say, being prepared, it would be necessary to defer that attack till to-morrow, and not to commence it too early, because I have great movements to make.

To obtain success, it is necessary that General Augereau should attack with a force sufficient to enable him to penetrate; should he not succeed, and I enter St. Michael, I run the risk of being taken there with my troops, because

the enemy will correct the blunders which they committed yesterday.

If bread does not reach us, the soldiers will not march. We are still in want of a great many muskets ; there were nearly 2000 deficient before the affair.

SERRURIER.

To the General-in-Chief.

Savona, 1 Floreal, year 4 [April 20, 1796].

The detachment of 100 horse chasseurs sent on a reconnaissance to Voltri has returned this morning. The commanding officer informs me that this place is evacuated by the enemy, who has effected his retreat by the Bochetta. Nothing new.

CERVONI.

To the General-in-Chief.

Castellino, 1 Floreal, year 4 [April 20, 1796].

I send you herewith two letters, one from general of brigade Rusca, and the other from a Piedmontese, who informs him that a corps of enemy's troops has passed the Tanaro in face of him. I have just inspected that ground, and have remarked that this is really the place by which we may be turned. If I am attacked, I shall make a proper resistance ; but, in case of necessity, I shall fall back upon the entrenched camp, unless you give me contrary orders.

Numerous patrols, which I shall immediately send out, will learn what truth there is in this statement ; and the scouts whom I shall despatch early this morning will prevent any surprise in that quarter.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.

Cairo, 1 Floreal, year 1 [April 20, 1796].

I have come hither, general, to ascertain the state of our provisions ; there is the same penury everywhere. Unless we receive bread to-night, we shall be without an ounce to-morrow, and, should it even arrive, there would not be sufficient to give a quarter of a ration to the three brigades and to the cavalry.

All the agents, store-keepers, and others, in all the administrations, are making requisitions at random: the peasants of these parts are absolutely ruined: the soldiers are destitute and their leaders disconsolate: rogues only are enriching themselves. There is not a moment to be lost, general, if you would save the army, if you would not have us be considered in Piedmont as men worse than the Goths and Vandals. Punish the knaves severely; reduce the number of those public bloodsuckers; whom one never sees exerting themselves for the benefit of the army, but is sure to find wherever they can profit by disorder.

Since the 23rd of last month, the 69th has received but two rations and a half; and the others have suffered in like manner. It is not possible to repress the men in this miserable state: your army is about to be worn down by disease, and, whenever we march, by the Barbets:¹ for it cannot be doubted that the inhabitants, driven to despair, will arm and slaughter every French straggler. Above all, general, it is urgent that you should put a stop to that host of illegal requisitions; or, if they must continue, it would be better to assemble the inhabitants, shoot them, and then finish plundering, for it comes to the same point; they must be starved to death.

Bread! bread! and again bread!

LAHARPE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Camp of Dego, 1 Floreal, year 4 [April 20, 1796].

Indiscipline has reached the highest pitch. I am using all possible means to maintain order, but they are of no avail. There is no kind of excess which the soldiers do not indulge in, and all that I can do is useless. I therefore request you, general, to be pleased to accept my resignation; for I cannot serve with soldiers, who know neither subordination, nor obedience, nor law, and who are every moment threatening their officers and their commanders.

CHAMBARLHAC,
Chief of the 70th demi-brigade.

¹ Piedmontese guerillas.

To the General-in-Chief.

Dego, 1 Floreal, year 4 [April 20, 1796].

Indiscipline and insubordination are at their height: the excesses perpetrated by the soldiers cannot be checked. For several days past, I have been employing all the means in my power to bring them back to obedience and subordination; all my efforts having proved unavailing, and finding myself wholly unable to reduce them to order, I request you, general, to accept my resignation.

I observe to you, general, that two chiefs of battalions without appointments are with the demi-brigade, and one of these citizens might readily supply my place, since their military talents are superior to mine.

MAUGRAS.

To the General-in-Chief.

Monte Barcaro, 3 Floreal, year 4 [April 22, 1796].

It is two o'clock and nothing has arrived; the soldiers are more busily engaged than ever in theft and plunder: peasants have been murdered by our men, and soldiers have been killed by the peasants. Words cannot adequately describe the horrors that are committed. The camps are almost deserted, the soldiers roaming over the country more like ferocious beasts than men; those who do not join in the atrocities patrolling the while, with superior officers at their head; it is to no purpose to drive them from one place; they only run to murder at another. The officers are in despair.

The soldiers are culpable, but those who reduce them to the alternative of plundering or starving are much more guilty. In the name of humanity, in the name of liberty, which wretches are assassinating, rescue us from this situation! Send us wherewithal to prolong our miserable existence without committing crimes. Who would ever have thought that the brave fellows of the army of Italy, after making so many sacrifices, would have no other reward but the cruel alternative of being famished to death or turning robbers! The contributions which, judiciously levied, would have enabled us to live, are become impracticable; the soldier destroying in a moment what we could have lived upon for a week, without ruining the inhabitant.

Can there then exist a Providence, since its avenging bolts do not crush all the villains who are at the head of the administration !

LAHARPE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Castellino, 4 Floreal, year 4 [April 23, 1796].

This morning, at seven o'clock precisely, I received your order to set off at that hour, which it was impossible for me to do. I shall, however, make the utmost efforts to set my columns in motion without delay.

The force of General Beyrand will proceed direct for Dogliani, by way of Marsaglia. The column of General Rusca will take the high road and escort the artillery.

I have just written to General Victor to set out immediately on receiving the orders of the staff, and to rejoin me at Dogliani. As soon as I have arrived and taken positions, I will report to you.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.

Monte Barcaro, 4 Floreal, year 4 [April 23, 1796].

I have received your two letters, my dear general: your promises are very cheering—may they be fulfilled !

General Mesnard has just sent back the company of grenadiers of the second battalion of the 99th demi-brigade. It was directed to protect property, and by its language encouraged the plunder of it: it shall be broken and sent to the rear of the division. One man is before a council of war, and I hope that he will be shot to-day. The officers have determined to second me to-day. Let us have bread, and, by dint of exertions, I will answer for restoring discipline.

LAHARPE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Dogliani, 4 Floreal, year 4 [April 23, 1796].

It is seven o'clock, and I have just arrived here with the 39th demi-brigade: I am expecting the brigades of generals Rusca and Victor, as well as the artillery. I entered

amidst a concourse of people, who came to offer the scanty resources which this little country affords. I accepted nothing but wine.

The enemy passed through this place eight days ago, on the 28th ult., in his retreat, to the number of 4000 men: he came from Mutassano, and first marched to Marsoglio, whence, after several movements, he proceeded to Mondovi. When Mondovi was taken, he retired upon Cherasco, where he is at present. He has cut off all the communications on the Tanaro, which were nothing but bridges of boats.

To-morrow at daybreak I shall start myself, to make a strict reconnoissance towards Novella, and I shall establish myself there, if the country presents any advantageous positions. I will report to you on the subject, and give you all the information that I can pick up.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.

Brealongo, 5 Floreal, year 4 [April 24, 1796]

I have been informed that the enemy were at Coni, to the number of 4000 men, and that they had totally evacuated Fossano. I have sent a peasant to the latter place to make sure of the matter; otherwise I could not guarantee the truth of these two statements. Supposing that of Coni to be true, the position which I at present occupy would not appear to me to be a very good one; I should actually be exposing my left flank to him.

I bivouacked last night with my troops on the position which you pointed out in your last order of yesterday. Not having received orders to march this morning as I expected, I have placed myself personally in this village.

SERRURIER.

To the General-in-Chief.

In advance of Brealongo, 5 Floreal, year 4 [April 24, 1796].

All night my patrols were unable to discover the advanced posts of General Massena. It was not till near daybreak that they discovered three posts, which were all asleep. They report to me that they found nobody in Carru, and that they pushed on to your head-quarters, which I do not know the name of.

We have bivouacked, as your last order directs, on the left bank of the Gezzio. The artillery is not yet arrived. It appears certain that all is quiet, and that the enemy is at a great distance from this place. I shall, nevertheless, send out fresh patrols to Rocca and Morozzo.

SERRURIER.

To the General-in-Chief.

Paris, 6 Floreal, year 4 [April 25, 1796].

Accept my congratulations on the brilliant actions of Montenotte and Millesimo: at this moment, perhaps, you have still more important ones to report to us. All France, all Europe, have their eyes fixed on you. Your triumphs are those of liberty; and assuredly you will not only half perform the glorious task which you have imposed upon yourself.

The Executive Directory will give orders for officers of artillery and engineers to be sent as speedily as possible to the army of Italy, and likewise one or two companies of light artillery. It replies by the present courier to your official letters.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

Paris, 4 Floreal, year 4 [April 23, 1796].

The Directory has received with the highest satisfaction, citizen-general, the news of the victory gained in Italy over the Austrians. In appreciating advantages so brilliant at the opening of a campaign which the aversion to peace on the part of the enemies of the Republic has forced us to undertake, it is satisfactory to it to see the choice which it has made of you to conduct the army of Italy to victory justified by the laurels which you have just gathered. Receive to-day, general, the tribute of the national gratitude; deserve it more and more; and prove to Europe that Beaulieu, in changing the field of battle, has not changed enemies; that, beaten in the north, he will be constantly beaten by the brave army of Italy; and that, with such defenders, liberty will triumph over the impotent efforts of the enemies of the Republic.

LETOURNEUR.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 4 Floreal, year 4 [April 23, 1796].

The Executive Directory has received, citizen-general, your letter of the 17th Germinal, as well as a copy of that written to you by General Colli, and of your answer, relative to the apprehension of Moulin. The insult offered to the national dignity by this hostile general, in sending to you an emigrant with a flag of truce, justifies the resolution which you have taken to detain him, and the Directory approves it; but you must only keep him in a place of safety, and not bring him to trial, in consideration of the character with which he is invested.

You know, citizen-general, the high importance attached by the Directory to the campaign in Italy, and it is convinced that, on this theatre of war most especially, it is essential to commence with important successes.

You have fulfilled its hopes in the brilliant victory of Montenotte; and it sees with an interest equal to its confidence in you those which you express respecting your further operations.

LETOURNEUR.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 6 Floreal, year 4 [April 25, 1796].

The Executive Directory has received, citizen-general, by a second courier, the news of the victory of Millesimo. The glorious testimonies of the national gratitude which the legislative body has just given to the brave army of Italy for this success and that of Montenotte, which paved the way to it, dispense the Directory from expatiating further in the praises which it has merited: it confines itself to congratulating the general, to whose talents and activity these victories are principally owing, on the dispositions which he has made and the success which has crowned them. It desires him to communicate to the French generals who have so happily seconded him, and to the brave men who have conquered under their command, the testimony of its satisfaction and that of all the true friends of liberty.

A republican government knows how to gratify those who render important services to their country. It is its

duty to encourage the man whom patriotic sentiments and the intrepidity inherent in the French soldier stimulate to actions which reflect honour on their country.

The Directory informs you that it cheerfully complies with the application which you have made for the rank of general of brigade in behalf of citizen Rampon, chief of the 21st demi-brigade. It has sent him a letter expressing its satisfaction, which you will find herewith inclosed, as well as his commission, which the Directory begs you to deliver to him.

The Directory has thought fit, in like manner, to confirm the nomination which you have made of citizen Lasnes to the rank of chief of brigade of the 39th demi-brigade instead of the officer who commanded it and fell on the field of honour.

One more effort, citizen-general, and nothing will be able to stop the triumphant march of the army which you command. Ceva has no doubt been attacked at the moment when the Directory is writing to you, and the valour of the French troops will have carried the entrenched camp of the Piedmontese near that fortress. A vast career is opening before you ; the Directory has measured its full extent : the instructions which it has given you, the developments which it adds to them by the present, and which circumstances command it to address to you, your military talents, as well as the valour of the troops that are under you, will enable you to pass through it with glory and in a manner worthy of the Republic for which you are fighting.

The instructions which the Directory transmitted to you, at the moment when you apprised it that you had assumed the command of the army of Italy, have already laid down the bases to which the Directory refers. To-day it will give a rapid sketch of the conduct which you have to pursue in the different circumstances in which it is natural to suppose that military events may place you.

The first hypothesis which it is fair to form is that which is more closely connected with the hopes held out to the Directory by the army of Italy and the talents and zeal of the general who commands it. Everything induces a belief that, after having obtained success at Ceva, after you have gained possession of that fort, universal terror will be diffused over all Piedmont ; that the court of Turin will

be obliged to abandon Coni, Mondovi, and its other fortresses to their own strength ; to collect its troops to cover Turin ; and to strive, by efforts which your activity and the military dispositions made by you will find means to thwart, further to oppose the march which part of the French army will direct towards that capital. Perhaps even the King of Sardinia, astounded at your success, alarmed at the movements which may take place in Turin itself, will at last renounce the coalition, into which he has been drawn to his misfortune. And it is not improbable that, in the present circumstance, he will seek with ardour a peace which he has rejected with obstinacy, and to the obtaining of which French generosity alone can permit him to revert.

The Executive Directory has reserved to itself exclusively the faculty conferred on it by the constitution of negotiating peace ; but it thinks that it may be useful to communicate to you, citizen-general, some of the bases on which it will insist for its establishment.

An alliance offensive and defensive with the King of Sardinia is, without doubt, what would be most advantageous to the court of Turin. It would secure to the latter not only Sardinia, where the disturbances appear to be fed solely by the hope of being seconded by us : it would procure for the Sardinian troops, by an attack combined with the movements of the French troops towards Tortona, Alexandria, and Valenza, the important invasion of the Milanese. This alliance, in short, would guarantee to us the entire and for us advantageous expulsion of the house of Austria out of Italy ; but the want of money in Piedmont, the little confidence which the court of Turin enjoys, and the exhaustion of the country after several campaigns, forbid the idea of the possibility of an alliance so desirable, and which would suddenly turn the forces of Piedmont against our implacable enemies the Austrians. It would perhaps, at most, be possible to require that part of the troops of the court of Turin should join the republican troops, while the rest of the troops of the King of Sardinia should be prudently reduced to a state that would give us nothing to fear during the remainder of this war, in case even of a reverse on our part, and if the advantages gained by the Austrians should force the Piedmontese again to join them. If, however, the court of Turin, induced by

the hope of being enabled to send its troops into the Milanese (the possession of which France would guarantee to it) were suddenly to turn its forces against the soldiers of Austria, it would then become necessary to have some important fortresses as a pledge of its fidelity to us. Tortona or Alexandria, Coni, Suza, and the fort of Exiles, might answer for the fidelity of the King of Sardinia in observing the alliance which would be concluded with him by the Executive Directory. The reasons deduced above, citizen-general, leading us to think that the court of Turin, at the moment when it is compelled to demand peace, will find itself utterly incapable of continuing the war, have arrested the attention of the Directory. Here are some of the bases that it will adopt for the establishment of that peace, if it is forced to renounce the hope of an alliance offensive and defensive, advantageous to both States.

1. The general disarming of Piedmont ;
2. The reduction of the Piedmontese troops to such a state as would leave us nothing to apprehend during the course of the present war ;
3. The transport to the island of Sardinia of the greater part and of the best corps which shall be retained ;
4. The occupation of the citadels and fortresses of Alexandria or Tortona, those of Ceva and Coni, and lastly those of Exiles and Suza, with a stipulation for the demolition of the fortifications of the last three, either at the general peace, or at a particular peace with the court of Turin ;
5. Lastly, the supply of all sorts of commodities in kind which the troops of the Republic shall have need of during the present war, and that of the means of transport, as well as the establishment in Piedmont of military hospitals and workshops necessary for the army of Italy.

The second hypothesis entertained by the Directory is that in which the King of Sardinia, either from obstinacy or from continuing to reckon upon foreign subsidies, shall persist in continuing the war. Your first instructions furnish you with a plan of conduct in this state of things ; and then it will become essential to strive more especially to excite insurrection in Piedmont, to second the desire which is there manifesting itself for the establishment of a republican government, and to draw from that country all the resources which the army of Italy shall have need of ; but it would be imprudent to advance too far into Piedmont

and to direct attention to it exclusively: this would be giving the Austrians the means of repairing their losses and hopes of some success.

It will then be requisite—and you could, in a manner, prepare beforehand for this movement, citizen-general—it will be requisite to act upon your right, to drive the Austrians beyond the Po, and to turn your most strenuous efforts in the direction of the Milanese. Genoa, after the rout of the Austrian army, will cease to refuse the succours that are indispensable to us. The firmness and energy of the French envoys to that republic, and their conduct, prudent, circumspect, and worthy in everything of that which employs them, will bring back the Genoese to the sentiments from which they ought never to have swerved. They will no longer refuse to let you occupy Gavi, in the same manner and on the same conditions as at the time of the taking of Vado; and, if they should so misunderstand their interests as to oppose our successes which ensure their existence, force would soon make us masters of that fortress. For the rest, the Directory relies upon your prudence, and it is convinced that your conduct in these delicate transactions, which the distance prevents us from determining in a more precise manner, will be in every respect prudent and judicious.

Such are the developments which your successes have determined the Directory to add to the instructions which it had given you. It doubts not for a moment that you will follow up the victories which the army has just won. It knows that it is not you, citizen-general, whom it will ever have to reproach with the disgraceful repose of Capua.

LETOURNEUR.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 6 Floreal, year 4 [April 25, 1796].

The Directory had signed the despatches which it addresses to you to-day by the return of your first courier, when your letter of the 27th Germinal arrived. Honour to the army of Italy and to the chief who commands it! You have had the skill to retrieve what a fatal security at Dego had well nigh wrested from us. Honour to the brave General Causse, who fell in the field of glory! Honour to all the French who defend and uphold the Republic!

Be particularly upon your guard against the movements of the Austrians. May the successor of Devins soon go back to Vienna, like him, to mourn over fresh losses! No repose till our enemies are totally dispersed.

The Directory will write to you very shortly, and will be solicitous to reward the republicans who have distinguished themselves. Send it the typographical plans of the battles of Montenotte and Millesimo and the affair of Dego, with an accurate description of the movements. The Directory strongly insists on these plans, necessary to the history of the triumphs of the Republic, being made and sent to it punctually and without delay.

Annexed are some interesting papers. Orders shall be given to the army of the Alps to second you; but, unfortunately, it is in a state of frightful destitution and not strong.

LETOURNEUR.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 9 Floreal, year 4 [April 28, 1796].

By a courier who set out on the morning of the 7th, the Directory acknowledged the receipt of the letters, informing it of the success of the army of Italy at Dego. It has learned with equal satisfaction the advantages gained near Coraglia and Mondovi, and the news of the taking of that place.

These victories are owing, citizen-general, to your judicious dispositions and activity: they confirm the Directory in the opinion which it entertains of your prudence and your military talents. But, while praising the valour and intrepidity of the army which you command, it bitterly regrets to see the laurels which it has gathered stained by the disorders and the pillage to which they have given themselves up.

This disastrous state of things, and the excesses which tarnish the glory of the defenders of the Republic, have probably been by this time repressed by the severe order which you have given, and which is fully justified by the imperious circumstances in which you have found yourself.

The Directory hopes that the ulterior conduct of the army will soon allow you to recall it, and speedily to revoke the extraordinary power which you have been obliged to confer on the generals of division who second you. A commencement of Vendée in La Lozère, the Ardèche, the frontiers of the Gard, &c. has prevented the Directory

from ordering Chateauneuf-Randon to retain no longer the two demi-brigades mentioned in your letter dated from Cairo on the 27th of Germinal last, and which will be sent to you by and by.

It is with extreme pain that the Directory, convinced of the urgent necessity of the case, has authorized the retaining of those corps under the command of General Chateauneuf-Randon. It will give orders for sending off immediately to the army of Italy a reinforcement of several thousand men, which, unluckily, will not arrive so speedily as the Directory wishes, but which will not on that account be the less useful. Rely upon it, General, that the Directory will not lose sight for a single moment of the brave army which you command; and the authority which the Directory has conferred on citizens Salicetti and Garreau to require movements of troops upon the application of the generals-in-chief, or of one of them, cannot fail to produce harmony in the operations of the two armies.

The Directory sends you herewith a copy of the despatch which it addressed to General Kellermann on the 9th instant, in which you will remark that it has adopted the principal bases of the plan presented by the general of division Berthier, which had probably been communicated to you, and which determines, for the right of the army of the Alps, a close connexion with the left of that of Italy, and movements absolutely dependent upon it. You will see by the same letter how strongly the Directory has recommended union between the two armies and the generals who command them. The Directory considers it as superfluous to enlarge with you on the necessity of that concord: it knows that it needs not recommend to you to pay your colleague the attentions which his long services and military talents demand, and without which there might arise such disharmony as would compromise the success of our arms.

The courier who left on the 7th Floreal will have brought you details respecting the officers of engineers and artillery who have received orders to join the army of Italy. The Directory does not lose sight of this interesting object.

The confidence which the Directory has in your energy and prudence silences the fears which might be raised by the statement of the hostile forces opposed to you. Your successes have brought about a highly interesting event, and one to which the Directory attached the greatest im-

portance—the separation of the Piedmontese and Austrian armies; but our advantages cannot be truly consolidated without extreme promptitude in the operations which you shall command. Act, therefore, with the rapidity of lightning, and successively against the Austrian and the Piedmontese: beware, above all, of throwing yourself with too much precipitation upon your left. How advantageous soever might be an immediate junction with the right of the army of the Alps, it is to be feared that Beaulieu would suddenly take advantage of the removal of great part of your forces towards Saluzzo. As you very justly observe, the campaign is not yet decided. Beaulieu is the more to be feared, as he is obstinate, daring, and enterprising; his attack at Dego after a defeat is a proof of this, and we must take it as a warning: beat the Austrians again, and you will thenceforward be master of the campaign; and you will have nothing more to fight but the heat and disease, which must be kept off by the precautions which the climate enjoins. Those scourges have always annihilated our successes where you are: they must be provided against; and, unpleasant as may be the details which must be followed up for this purpose, the Directory deems it a duty to call your attention beforehand to the necessity of keeping an eye upon them.

Compliment, on the part of the Directory, the general of division Augereau, and the generals of brigade Beyrand and Joubert, on their conduct in the attack of the redoubts defending the approach to the entrenched camp of Ceva; the general of division, Serrurier, on that which he displayed at the attack of St. Michael and the passage of the Corsaglia; the general of division Massena, and the generals of brigade Guieux, Fiorella, and Dammartin, on their behaviour in the engagements of the 3rd and 4th Floreal; lastly, the chief of brigade, Murat, your aide-de-camp, who, has, in like manner, distinguished himself.

As for yourself, hope every thing from the genius of the Republic, from the valour of the soldiers, from the union of the chiefs, and the confidence which is placed in you: the Directory expects everything from the general who commands the intrepid army of Italy, and from the holiness of the cause for which the French are fighting, and which they will never abandon.

CARNOT.

Bonaparte, General-in-Chief, to the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Cherasco, 9 Floreal, year 4 [April 28, 1796].

Enclosed you will find, citizens directors—

1. Copy of the letter written to me by General Colli ;
2. Copy of my answer ;
3. Copy of his second letter ;
4. The conditions of the suspension of arms concluded last night between the Commandant-general Latour, commanding the Piedmontese army, and myself.

Ceva, Coni, and Alexandria, are in the hands of your army, as well as all the posts in Piedmont beyond the Stura and the Tanaro.

If you will not come to an accommodation with the King of Sardinia, I will keep those places and march upon Turin ; my siege equipage is going off to Coni, and to proceed thence to Cherasco.

Meanwhile, I shall march to-morrow to meet Beaulieu ; I shall oblige him to repass the Po ; I shall cross it immediately afterwards, make myself master of all Lombardy, and in less than a month I hope to be on the mountains of Tyrol, to find the army of the Rhine, and in concert with it to carry the war into Bavaria. This plan is worthy of you, of the army, and of the destinies of France.

If you will not grant peace to the King of Sardinia, let me know beforehand, that, if I am still in Lombardy, I may fall back and take measures.

As for the conditions of peace with Sardinia, you can dictate what you please, since I have the principal fortresses in my power.

Order 15,000 men of the army of the Alps to be placed at my disposal and to join me : that will make me an army of 45,000 men, part of which it might be possible to send to Rome. If you continue to give me your confidence and approve these projects, I am certain of success : Italy is yours.

You must not reckon upon a revolution in Piedmont ; it will come, but it is requisite that the minds of those people should be ripe for the purpose.

I have justified your confidence and the advantageous opinion which you have conceived of me ; I shall constantly strive to give you proofs of my zeal, and of the desire I feel to deserve your esteem and that of the country.

Send me, 1, twelve companies of light artillery—I have but one; 2, cavalry, and a commissary-general, able, distinguished, and a man of genius. I have but pigmies, who starve me amidst abundance, for I am in the richest country in the world.

BONAPARTE.

To the General Commanding in Chief the French Army in Italy.

Head-quarters of the Piedmontese army,
April 26, 1796 [7 Floreal, year 4].

Having learned that His Majesty the King of Sardinia is about to send plenipotentiaries to Genoa to treat there for peace under the mediation of the court of Spain, I think, general, that the interest of humanity would require that hostilities be suspended on both sides during the time that the negotiations last.

I propose to you, therefore, an armistice, either unlimited or for a fixed term, at your option, with a view to spare the useless effusion of human blood.

COLLI.

The General in Chief of the Army of Italy to General Colli, Commanding in Chief the Army of the King of Sardinia.

Head-quarters, Carru, 5 Floreal, year 4 [April 24, 1796].

The Executive Directory, sir, has reserved to itself the right of treating for peace. The plenipotentiaries of the king, your master, must therefore repair to Paris, or wait at Genoa for the plenipotentiaries whom the French government may send thither.

The military and moral position of the two armies renders any pure and simple suspension impossible. Though I am particularly convinced that the government will grant honourable conditions of peace to your king, yet I cannot suspend my march upon mere presumptions: there is, however, a way to attain your object, conformably with the true interests of your court, and which would spare an effusion of blood useless, and thenceforth contrary to reason and the laws of war; that is, to place in my hands two of the three fortresses of Coni, Alexandria, and Tortona, at your option: we might then wait without hostilities the

end of the negotiations that should be opened. This proposal is very moderate : the mutual interests which ought to exist between Piedmont and the French Republic make me anxiously desire to see the calamities of all kinds which threaten your country averted from it.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief of the French Army in Italy.

Head-quarters of the Piedmontese army,
April 26, 1796 [7 Floreal, year 4].

I have communicated to the court of Sardinia, general, the letter which you have written me, in answer to that which I addressed to you, to notify the mission of a plenipotentiary on the part of the king to Genoa, for the purpose of making overtures of peace, and to invite you, while awaiting their result, to spare the effusion of human blood by a suspension of arms.

I am authorized by his majesty to tell you now that the French minister at Genoa, to whom the plenipotentiary of the king addressed himself for the said overtures of peace, has declared to him that neither he, nor any person at Genoa, has authority to enter into such negotiations, but that he must address himself to the Executive Directory in Paris, which alone has the right to do so.

Whereupon the plenipotentiary said that he should direct his further applications to that quarter for the object in view. Till however we can, in this way, which is liable to some delay, arrive at the hoped-for conclusion of the salutary work of peace between the two States, the king, wishing to spare both sides the calamities of all kinds incident to hostilities, has not hesitated to give his consent that the proposed suspension of arms, which you have shown yourself disposed to accept on certain conditions, shall take place and be concluded without delay.

In consequence, his majesty orders me to declare to you that he consents to put into your power two of his fortresses, namely Coni and Tortona, as you have demanded, during the continuance of the negotiations about to be opened, and according to the mode that shall be agreed upon : in consequence of which all hostility shall cease from the present time till the end of the said negotiations ; and in case that, owing to the difficulties that might arise

from the then situation of the allied army, the fortress of Tortona could not be given up, as above mentioned, his Majesty is determined to offer instead of it the fortress of Demont ; that, excepting the delivery of these two places, things shall remain *in statu quo* as far as relates to the country occupied by the respective armies, without their having a right to pass the boundary line fixed for them respectively ; and the whole in the manner that shall be more specifically arranged between us.

COLLI.

To General Latour.

Head-quarters, Cherasco, 7 Floreal, year 7 [April 26, 1796].

I have received, sir, the order of the king, addressed to the commandant of Coni, which you have taken the trouble to transmit to me. I shall be here to-morrow to wait for the order for one of the fortresses of Tortona and Alexandria. You know, sir, that the distance between this and either of those places renders it necessary that the order of the king should be despatched to-morrow, if it is to arrive by the 16th Floreal, [April 30th.] One division of my army is already in this quarter. I am assured to-day that Beaulieu is evacuating your territory. I am delighted, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To General Latour.

Head-quarters, Cherasco, 8 Floreal, year 4 [April 27, 1796].

This instant, sir, I have received, with your letter, the two orders of the king for Ceva and Tortona.

At this moment there is but a small detachment at Fossano, which shall withdraw immediately. On the day after to-morrow, there will not be an individual at Bra, and I shall have the honour to apprise you of it.

Beyond the Stura, I shall keep only a *corps de garde* for the bridge of Cherasco. I have applied to the general commanding at Coni for an account of the state of the magazine of Notre Dame de l'Oulina. As soon as I get his answer, I shall have the honour to write to you.

My aide-de-camp is setting out for Paris. You have had the kindness to undertake to obtain him a passport, and to direct that he shall be furnished with post-horses.

I shall want 1000 draught horses. I should like to buy some in Piedmont. I shall be obliged to you to accept what will be proposed on the subject by citizen Thevenin, agent in chief of military transports.

Your aide-de-camp will deliver to you a note from the officers prisoners of war. The moment you let me know which you desire to have, I will order them to be sent either to Coni or Cherasco; you will do me a service by sending ours to Tortona or Cherasco.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Carmagnola, April 28, 1796 [9 Floreal, year 4].

I hasten to address to you, my dear general, the order of the king to the governor of Coni to deliver that place to you. I hope that the celerity which I have used in this affair will be a proof of my veracity in all the engagements which I have contracted by the convention which we have concluded.

I have, moreover, to intimate to you that, in the course of to-morrow at latest, the governor of Ceva will receive the official order to deliver the fort to the officer whom you shall appoint.

I eagerly seize this occasion of repeating to you, my dear general, that I have every reason to flatter myself that our convention is an approach to a speedy and advantageous peace to both empires.

Be pleased to accept my homage and the assurance of the highest consideration.

DELATOUR.

PS. I have just informed myself of the present state of the magazines of this town, and ascertained that there are left about fifty sacks of wheat and other grain: as I promised to send you them if you require it, I offer to fulfil my promise immediately, and wait to learn your intentions.

To the General-in-Chief.

Carmagnola, April 29, 1796 [10 Floreal, year 4].

My anxiety, my dear general, in scrupulously fulfilling all the articles of the convention which I have had the honour to conclude with you, affording a new proof of my

veracity, I will cut short assurances, to submit to you a highly interesting circumstance, and on which its execution depends : the few moments that I had the pleasure of passing with you did not permit me then to advert to it. It is the article relative to the delivery of Coni, in which it is stipulated that the stores of provisions for the garrison of that place should be exclusively delivered to you, and that the magazines of La Madona de l'Oulina, which, at the time of the occupation of Mondovi by the French, had been removed to Coni, should remain at the disposal of the king.

As thoroughly convinced of your probity as of your merits, I lay before you with confidence this fact, my dear general, entreating you to attend to this just demand.—I mean, to be pleased, either verbally or in writing, to apprise the general commanding in Coni that, the said magazines of provisions never having formed part of those judged necessary for that place, we shall be at liberty to remove them with such precautions as you will please to agree upon with my aide-de-camp, the Chevalier de Fabri, who will have the honour to deliver to you this letter.

That annexed, for the Governor of Tortona, decides the delivery that will be made to you of that place conformably with the articles stipulated on that head, which determine also the line of demarcation : I transmit to you, at the same time, the orders of the king to the governor of Ceva.

With the assurance of all my confidence in a general who inspires it so much as you do, be pleased to accept that of the sentiments which accompany the esteem and the consideration with which I have the honour to be,

DELATOUR.

To the General-in-Chief.

Crevenzano, 10 Floreal, year 4 [April 29, 1796].

News of the enemy has this instant reached me : there are none left either in Santo-Stephano di Belbo or Canelli ; all have retired towards Valenza, with the exception of six or seven thousand frightened men, who are incessantly inquiring whether the French are coming. All are scattered by the positions which they occupy to cover themselves : there are no more assembled in a body than 2000 at Tezzo, with six pieces of cannon and two howitzers, and from six to seven thousand Austrian and Neapolitan cavalry between Tezzo and Acqui, with four or six pieces of cannon. In Acqui

there are only some militia, who are working hard at evacuating the magazines: we must endeavour to make an advantage by it.

The division is cleaning its arms. If the cartridges arrive to-day, though without bread, I shall march without hesitation. The soldier asks for nothing better than to get out of the state of misery in which he is.

I shall separate the division into two columns. The 69th and 70th, at the head of which I shall be, will proceed by Santo-Stephano and Canelli, to take the enemy in the rear; the 99th will march by Corteniglia, Bure, and Monastero, to attack in front; this attack will be but a feint till I attack seriously: then it will be serious too. The column of Canelli will have three-pounders, and that of Corteniglia fours, the roads being better.

I consider the taking of Acqui and the retreat or defeat of the Austrians as highly essential to our campaign; for then our Piedmontese friends would take courage, seeing themselves rid of the Austrians, and our Piedmontese enemies be cast down, seeing themselves abandoned by them.

Adieu, general: cartridges, if possible, shoes and bread, and my first letter shall inform you that the first division is behaving as well as the others; I give you notice, however, that, if cartridges do not arrive to-day, I shall be obliged to wait twenty-four hours; which would be a great misfortune and occasion us considerable loss.

LAHARPE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Crevenzano, 10 Floreal, year 4 [April 29, 1796].

One ration of bread has arrived in the space of four days. The bivouacs are hard. This position is good: it connects me with Alba, and brings me nearer to it: but if it were not so good as Nielle, I should be forced to come to it, for the sake of having some slight succours for the support of the soldiers. The smallness of the ovens and the distance of the mills render it impossible for us to provide a sufficiency for our subsistence, let us be as industrious as we will. Have pity on us, general—I ask for nothing but biscuit, cartridges, and shoes. I am expecting news of the Austrians every instant; I tremble for fear they are evacuating. If that is the case, I shall endeavour at least to

pursue them, were it only to prevent, if I can, the destruction of their magazines.

I thank you, my dear general, for having recalled General Charton. That general does not think as we do, and has scandalized my staff by the language which he has used. I could not have confidence in him, and the 10th intended to send you a memorial on the subject.

LAHARPE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Boves, 9 Floreal, year 4 [April 28, 1796].

The detachment which I sent off yesterday, agreeably to your orders, having fallen in by the way with several Piedmontese posts, was not able to continue its route, being too inferior in number to hazard a battle. In consequence, the captain commanding that detachment, and bearer at the same time of your letter, came to report that circumstance to me, which obliged me to place a sufficient number of troops at his disposal. Your despatch must be delivered by this time.

I have ordered the speedy formation at all the passes of a company of national guards, for the apprehension of all malefactors, as well French as Piedmontese. I think this measure will obtain your approbation.

The enemy has abandoned the suburb of Santo Dalmazzo, and retired into Coni. I have but this moment learned these particulars, and I shall set out in an hour on a reconnaissance towards the fort. If there is any thing new I will apprise you of it.

The Piedmontese, on retiring into Coni, authorized the inhabitants of the suburb of Santo Dalmazzo to plunder the magazines which could not be evacuated. Being instantly informed of this fact, I sent orders to the commune to take out of the hands of individuals whatever they might have carried off.

FIGURELLA.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Cherasco, 10 Floreal, year 4 [April 29, 1796].

The city of Coni has just been occupied by our troops: there was in it a garrison of 5000 men.

I cannot doubt that you will approve my conduct, since it is one wing of an army that agrees to a suspension of arms to give me time to beat the other; it is a king who puts himself absolutely into my power by giving me three of his strongest fortresses and the richest half of his dominions.

You may dictate, like a master, peace to the King of Sardinia. I beg of you not to forget the little island of St. Pierre, which will be more useful to us by and by than Corsica and Sardinia put together.

If you grant him the portion of the Milanese which I am about to conquer, it must be upon condition that he shall send 15,000 men to second us, and to guard that country after we have made ourselves masters of it. Meanwhile, I shall cross the Adige with your army, and enter Germany by the Tyrol. In this hypothesis, we must hold in deposit till the general peace the places and country that we now occupy; to these it must be added that, on the day that 15,000 Piedmontese cross the Po, the city of Valenza shall be delivered up to us.

My columns are in march; Beaulieu in flight: I hope to catch him. I will impose some millions of contributions on the Duke of Parma; he shall be forced to make propositions of peace to you. Be not in a hurry, that I may be in time to make him pay the costs of the campaign, provision our magazines, and rehorse our carriages at his expense.

If you will not make peace with the King of Sardinia, if your intention is to dethrone him, you must amuse him for a few decades, and give me notice immediately; I will get possession of Valenza and march upon Turin.

I will send 12,000 men upon Rome, when I have beaten Beaulieu and obliged him to recross the Adige; when I shall be sure that you grant peace to the King of Sardinia, and you send me part of the army of the Alps.

As for Genoa, I think you ought to demand of it 15,000,000 as indemnities for frigates and vessels taken in its ports, and insist that those who caused the *Modeste* to be burned and called in the Austrians, shall be tried as traitors to the country. If you charge me with these matters, which you will keep profoundly secret, I will find means to do all that you can desire.

If I have any risks to run in Lombardy, it is on account of the enemy's cavalry. I have been joined by forty horse

artillerymen, who have seen no service and are dismounted. Send me then twelve companies, and do not entrust the execution of this measure to the men of the offices (*hommes des bureaux*), for it takes them ten days to despatch an order, and they may perhaps be silly enough to get them from Holland, so as not to arrive before the month of October.

Our troops have just entered the citadel of Ceva, and I have this moment received the King of Sardinia's order for the delivery of the city and citadel of Tortona.

. BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Carnot.

Head-quarters, Cherasco, 10 Floreal, year 4 [April 29, 1796].

The suspension of arms concluded between the King of Sardinia and us permits me to communicate by Turin, that is to say, to save half the distance: I might then receive your orders, and learn your intentions relative to the direction to be given to the army. I am master of Coni, Ceva, and Tortona. I am about to cross the Po, and to enter the Milanese: on the way, I calculate upon fleecing the Duke of Parma, and making him pay dearly for his infatuation.

My plan would be, to overtake the Austrians and to beat them before the arrival of your answer; that I may be ready to march upon Turin, Naples, or Austria, by way of the Tyrol.

If the King of Sardinia were to suspect, before I knew it, that you would not make peace, he might play me a sad trick. If you will not make peace with Sardinia, let that be communicated to him through me, that I may have it in my power to take my own time, and that his plenipotentiaries in Paris may know nothing about the matter.

If you do make peace with the King of Sardinia, order what you would have done in regard to Genoa, Parma, and Rome.

Beaulieu has still with him 26,000 men well equipped; he had 38,000 at the beginning of the campaign. I march with 28,000. He has 5000 cavalry; I have but 3600, and in a bad state.

The court of Turin and that of Vienna reckoned with certainty upon success in this campaign: the combined armies amounted to 75,000 men: I have beaten them with 35,000. I have need of reinforcement: the army of the

Alps might furnish me with 15,000 men. General Cha-teaneuf-Randon ought to send me the 3000 destined for this army, detained by him at Nimes. With these reinforcements, Italy is yours, and I could at one and the same time march for Naples and Mantua, especially if I contrive to beat the enemy shortly.

An officer of engineers has just arrived; pray send me light artillery. I should like to have General Baraguay d'Hilliers, to serve in his rank in the army: he has proposed it to me himself.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Faipoult.

Head-quarters, Acqui, 12 Floreal, year 4 [May 1, 1796].

You will find annexed, my dear minister, a copy of the suspension of arms which I have concluded with the King of Sardinia. Our troops have entered Coni and Ceva; to-morrow they will enter Tortona. We found at Coni, besides the ammunition of the city, all the magazines of the Sardinian army.

Beaulieu is crossing the Po, and seeking in the furthest extremity of Lombardy a refuge from the French army. He told the King of Sardinia that he would not pull off his boots till he was at Lyons, but he is not taking the road for it.

There is not in Piedmont the first idea of a revolution, and France, I should think, would not choose to effect one at her own cost.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Faipoult.

Head-quarters, Acqui, 12 Floreal, year 4 [May 1, 1796].

We arrived yesterday at Acqui. Beaulieu's flight is so swift that we cannot catch him. To-morrow, Laharpe will be in Tortona, where I much desire to have a conference with you on important matters.

Send me a note, geographical, historical, political, and topographical, respecting the imperial fiefs bordering upon Genoa, that I may derive from them all the advantage possible. Send me a note concerning the dukes of Parma, Placentia, and Modena, the forces they have on foot, the for-

tresses they possess, and wherein the riches of those countries consist. Above all, send me a note of the pictures, statues, cabinets, and curiosities, which are at Milan, Parma, Placentia, Modena, and Bologna. When we made peace with Spain, the Duke of Parma ought to have concurred in it: why did he not?

Send off immediately 6000 pair of shoes for Tortona.

As for citizen Giacomoni, let him go, covered with disgrace and ignominy, where he likes. I have informed the government of his conduct, that he may never again be admitted to serve with Frenchmen.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief of the Piedmontese Army.

Head-quarters, Bosco, 13 Floreal, year 4 [May 2, 1796].

I am informed, sir, that the Neapolitans have taken possession of Valenza. The interest of the king and that of the Republic alike require that you should speedily drive those troops out of Valenza.

The courage which animates your army, and which I have had occasion to appreciate, leaves me no doubt that you will speedily re-occupy Valenza: you know, besides, that it is one of the clauses of the suspension which we have concluded. If you are in need of any assistance, I offer you that of a division of the army which I command.

The general chief of the staff will have the honour to transmit to you to-morrow a statement of the Piedmontese prisoners taken by us during the campaign. I shall have great pleasure in sending to you as soon as possible such of them as you would wish to have in preference.

BONAPARTE.

To the Chevalier Solari, Governor of Alexandria.

Head-quarters, Bosco, 14 Floreal, year 4 [May 3, 1796].

I have received, sir, the letter, which you have taken the trouble to write to me; and I am much obliged to you for particulars which you have had the complaisance to give me. I congratulate you on the evacuation of your territory by the Austrian army. I sincerely wish to learn soon that they have also evacuated the territory of his Majesty beyond the Po.

A division of the army will very shortly arrive at Valenza, for the purpose of crossing the Po there ; I beg of you to let the boats necessary for them be procured. You will feel that it is for the interest of the king that the Austrians should make a short stay in your territory. I shall have need also of some contractors, to procure for us the means of transport. I beg of you to authorize the different subjects of the king to make bargains with the army.

I am, sir, with esteem, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Acqui, 11 Floreal, year 4 [April 30, 1796].

The reports relative to the Austrian army state that, on the 15th of April (O. S.), the day on which a great part of that army was beaten for the second time at Dego, it fell back in the greatest disorder upon Tezzo, one part passing through the valley of Bormida, and the other through that of Tero. On the 20th, one corps of these same troops, of about 2000 men, was encamped at Acqui, in the environs of the church of Madona Alta, where it united with a reinforcement from Alexandria of 2000 infantry and three or 4000 cavalry. On the 24th the whole corps of Acqui moved to Nizza with Beaulieu.

On the 25th, that Austrian general remained at Nizza with his troops, and marched on the 26th for Incisse, whence, after refreshing his troops, he proceeded to Oviglio, where he established his head-quarters. The day before yesterday, the 29th, he sent to Alexandria a corps of 2000 men, with the intention, it is said, to make himself master of the citadel ; but I am assured that the governor opposed this design in the most energetic manner. Letters from Alexandria and the report of an inhabitant of that city, who left it at six this morning, assert that there were still about 2000 infantry there, and that the Neapolitan cavalry, about 1000 strong, had encamped beyond the Bormida, on the road leading to Tortona. The remainder of Beaulieu's army was encamped at Solera, near Oviglio, with the exception of his cavalry, which had been encamped beyond the river Bormida with the Neapolitan cavalry.

One thousand hussars of this cavalry set out this morning for Valenza, with some pieces of artillery ; the rest of the

artillery was left with the cavalry beyond the Bormida, in the territory of Alexandria, on the road leading to Tortona: that cavalry was expecting every moment orders for its departure; the artillery consisted of twenty-four pieces. The rest of the troops which had remained encamped at Tezzo, about 4,000 men, marched on the 28th to Acqui, under the command of General Liptay, and set out yesterday afternoon, the 29th, for Oviglio, where they joined the corps of Beaulieu.

The strength of the Austrian army is 15,000 infantry and from three to 4,000 cavalry, including 1,000 Neapolitan cavalry. The Austrians have built a bridge over the Po at Valenza.

On the 15th of April, the day of the battle of Dego, Beaulieu was at Dego awaiting the result.

VIGNOLLE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Bestagno, 12 Floreal, year 4 [May 1, 1796].

The general of division Augereau directs me to inform you, general, that he set out this morning from Santo Stephano with the division which he commands, for Bestagno, where he is at present awaiting your orders. He directs me also to report that this morning, before leaving Santo Stephano, a corporal of the carabineers and a carabineer of the 6th light demi-brigade were executed agreeably to a military sentence for committing robbery with violence.

VERDIER, *adjutant-general*.

To the General-in-Chief.

Nizza, 12 Floreal, year 4 [May 1, 1796].

The troops which I command arrived last night very late with rain. More than half of the division was left behind, but nearly all are together again this morning: there is only General Joubert's brigade which has not arrived. He has sent me word that General Serrurier had neglected to cause his posts to be relieved, which has delayed him.

The march yesterday was very long and very laborious, on account of the great ravines which it was necessary to

cross. The troops are extremely fatigued, and entirely barefoot.

I advanced yesterday with the regiment of dragoons under my command. As soon as I arrived, I sent out reconnaissances in all directions: they saw nothing but a few hussars, who were put to flight.

According to the report of this morning, the Austrians left Alexandria yesterday evening: they crossed the Po over two bridges which they had got built, not venturing to trust themselves on that of the Piedmontese. They directed their march towards the Lumellina and the Novaresa. The cavalry was left at Montbaresso Gannelero; but the greater part of it is at Frascaro.

I have a piquet of fifty dragoons out. I should like to have another regiment of hussars, to be enabled to have reconnaissances made in greater force.

I have this morning sent three natives of the country to gain intelligence of the movement of the enemy, and shall lose no time in reporting it to you.

I must ask you for shoes: the troops are in great need of them.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Carmagnola, May 2, 1796, [13 Floreal, year 4].

Fully assured, general, that you are solicitous to fulfil the engagements contracted by the armistice, the conditions of which we have jointly fixed and stipulated, I address you, with all the confidence that I owe to your merits, to observe that one Bonnafons, whose misconduct I had the honour to lay before you in my letter of yesterday, has, under the designation of mayor of Alba, enjoined different communities on the banks of the Stura and the Tanaro, (formerly belonging to the province of the Langhes, but united to that of Turin on the day that the armistice was signed) to sequester all the feudal and domainal property, both moveable and immoveable, which you will find in the list that my aide-de-camp will have the honour to deliver to you.

Assured, I say, that, so far from authorizing upon any pretext the proceedings of the said Bonnafons, your firm intention is scrupulously to observe all the conditions of the

armistice, I shall merely, my dear general, apprise you of the fact, and beg you to order speedy reparation.

I apprise you also that I have complied as far as possible with your demand relative to the Sieur Thevenin. I leave himself to inform you of the result of his researches.

I leave, in like manner, to the Chevalier Fabri the duty of proposing to you all the arrangements which appear to me as beneficial to both armies as adapted to circumstances, and I authorize him to do everything to testify to you more strongly our sincerity and to receive the testimonies of yours.

I reserve to myself only the satisfaction of assuring you, &c.

DELATOUR.

To the General-in-Chief.

Alexandria, May 2, 1796 [23 Floreal, year 4].

Though I am not the commander of the army of my master, the King of Sardinia, but the oldest general-officer of that department, I have thought that I should do an agreeable and a useful thing for the interests of the king and of the French Republic, in opening your letter, to see if I could employ myself in any way that could do you pleasure; and, on perusing its contents, I am glad I did so, since I have it in my power to inform you that not only the Neapolitan troops, but the whole imperial army, with the exception of a very small rear-guard which followed it, have evacuated the city of Valenza and crossed the Po, having commenced their march about midnight; and that the commandant himself saw them file off and cross the Po at ten in the morning. Of this I can assure you, since I have the information from the commissary-general of the king, who was present there, and who never quitted the commandant-general till the moment when he himself crossed the Po.

I am gratified to be able to give you this information, in consequence of which I shall merely present my thanks to you, sir, for the expressions which you have been pleased to use in speaking of the troops of the king, and for the offer which you have made of French troops for carrying into effect one of the clauses of the suspension of arms which has just been concluded.

On receiving the list of the prisoners of war taken by the French army from that of the king, I shall transmit it direct to the war-office at Turin, that it may be communicated to the commander-in-chief of the said army, who will inform the king of it, and he will assuredly be gratified by the solicitude which you manifest to send to us as speedily as possible those whom they may desire to have in preference.

SOLARI, *governor of Alexandria.*

To the General-in-Chief.

Castellano, 13 Floreal, year 4 [May 2, 1796].

It is two hours since I arrived here. The cavalry has crossed the ferry; but I am sadly afraid that I shall not be able to get the infantry over before night: the utmost efforts are, nevertheless, making.

The enemy has totally evacuated Alexandria and retired to Valenza: the Neapolitans are there too.

I send you a statement of the boats which there are on both rivers, and if I had here one of the officers of engineers, I would get a bridge constructed in less than two hours with the boats that are upon the river.

We found a Piedmontese cavalry officer here on our arrival: I send him to you that you may extract information from him.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Castellano, 13 Floreal, year 4 [May 2, 1796].

The enemy has abandoned Alexandria, and retreated to Valenza. The Austrians yesterday sold the magazines of hay, oats, and maize, which they had in Alexandria, for 8000 francs: they are said to be considerable.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Rivalto, 13 Floreal, year 4 [May 2, 1796].

It is four in the morning, and I have not yet heard from you. I am without cavalry, and one of my brigades has

not been able to cross the water : it is impossible that I can set off yet, though the troops are assembled, at least such of them as have crossed the river. A corps of the enemy's hussars is two leagues off, which may slacken our march. We have had an ounce and three quarters of bread ; I shall direct my course to Castel Novo to try to get as much there ; but there I decidedly expect your orders for the march, being unwilling to risk the safety of the troops entrusted to me.

We have still the river Orba to pass, and it seems to me physically impossible that we can reach Tortona to-day.

LAHARPE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Rivalto, 13 Floreal, year 4 [May 2, 1796].

I have this moment, general, received your order to send to Tortona a battalion, which is to remain there till fresh orders. General Meynier has sent his flag of truce. The moment the governor fixes the hour for entry, the battalion will be ready.

Nothing is easier than to remain at Rivalto, nothing more difficult than to live there without bread. We are in a country which cannot furnish us with any on account of its smallness.

LAHARPE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Carmagnola, May 3, 1796 [14 Floreal, year 4].

The king, my master, anxious that an answer should be given to an application which I have made to him on your behalf to be permitted to buy horses in Piedmont, has determined to send to you, my dear general, the Marquis de St. Marsan, lieutenant-colonel of cavalry, an officer of his staff, who will have the honour to hand you this letter, and is charged to communicate to you the intentions of his Majesty respecting the said purchase, as well as the various precautions which he has thought it fit to take for the safety of his dominions.

In consequence, I recommend to you the said Marquis de St. Marsan, and inform you that he is authorized to settle with you, my dear general, all the arrangements

which may be of reciprocal convenience, in case further information should be necessary.

Be pleased to let the annexed letter be delivered to Count de Massan, colonel of the regiment of guards ; and be pleased also never to doubt all the sentiments, &c.

DELATOUR.

To the General-in-Chief.

Alexandria, May 3, 1796 [14 Floreal, year 4].

In reply, sir, to the letter which your aide-de-camp has just delivered to me, I am sorry to be obliged to tell you that it is absolutely impossible to furnish you with boats to form a bridge across the Po, since General Baron Beaulieu, as soon as his army had marched, caused the bridge to be destroyed ; and all the boats which had been used in the construction of the said bridge of Valenza, and for which there had been employed all the boats that had been taken this way along the Tanaro, and those on the Po, which had been brought from Casale, and even to the number of twenty-five from Turin, to be carried off to Pavia. By his orders, moreover, all the small boats in the environs of Valenza, there being absolutely no others, were sunk. It is true that he promised an indemnification for the seizure of the said boats and all the materials of construction ; reserving to me to speak to you hereafter of the article relative to the carriages which you have need of, and which will be furnished you by some contractor, whom they are seeking to provide for you. Permit me, general, to recommend to you the subjects of the king, and I beg you to exercise more and more your good intentions, which are well known to me, in order to prevent mischief being done by the troops both in the fields and in the houses, especially those in lonely situations ; several complaints having already been preferred on this subject.

To return to the subject of carriages—not only have I explained that I was authorizing the subjects of the king to make contracts with the French army, but I have given orders for seeking out such as I thought fit to be employed in that way ; referring you on this subject to what your aide-de-camp will tell you.

SOLARI, *governor of Alexandria.*

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Carmagnola, May 5, 1796 [16 Floreal, year 4].

I must tell you, general, that, notwithstanding our desire to satisfy you in all that depends upon us, and to facilitate to you the supply of your army, it is utterly impossible for us to furnish you with the draught and cavalry horses which you want: I must, nevertheless, observe that those who are commissioned to make purchases for your army would succeed in procuring them; and His Majesty has, moreover, approved of the permission which the governor of Alexandria has granted to different contractors to conclude bargains with you for the means of transport.

Besides, having every reason to believe that M. de Beaulieu is preparing to evacuate the territories of the king, and his Majesty even making a formal application to him to that purpose, as he did for the evacuation of Valenza, I hope, in consequence, that there will be no occasion for your demand, as you have yourself intimated in your explanation with M. de St. Marsan. In case, however, that the army should refuse entirely to evacuate the territories of the king, I shall march my troops towards Novara, Mortara, and Vigerano, to secure those towns. Those troops will be conveyed to Valenza in all the boats that can be picked up, since there now exist none belonging to the king; and these same boats will afterwards be at your disposal.

The Marquis de St. Marsan, the bearer of this letter, is authorized to take ulterior determinations with you relative to the demarcation, and I have given him my orders.

The result is that the subjects of the king, evil-disposed on the frontier of the demarcation, boasting of your protection, redouble their efforts to excite internal revolutions. This appears totally contrary to the law of nations, especially in time of truce, and on this subject I renew the remonstrances already made to you by the Marquis de St. Marsan, in stedfast reliance on the civilities that are known to me.

VICTOR EMMANUEL.¹

¹ This was the Duke of Acosta and brother of the king, who resigned the crown to him in 1802, and died a Jesuit at Rome. The internal disturbances in 1821 induced Victor Emmanuel to abdicate in favour of his younger brother, Charles Felix, the present King of Sardinia.

To the General-in-Chief of the Army of Piedmont.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 15 Floreal, year 4 [May 4, 1795].

In a few days, sir, I shall be master of the territories of the king beyond the Po; if the fortune of war continues to be favourable to the army which I command, I shall oblige M. Beaulieu to evacuate these countries, which will be conquered from the Austrian army, and belong by right to the Republic. Still I feel how hard it is for the king to see almost all his dominions overrun by our troops. I propose to you, in consequence, to unite a division of 6000 infantry and 1500 horse to the army which I command, to assist in driving out the Austrians. I will put them in garrison in the States of the king beyond the Po.

This is so urgent, sir, that it is necessary for me to have an answer as speedily as possible. The desire which I feel to conciliate the interests of the king with those of the Republic and the army, induces me, sir, to make you these overtures, which, no doubt, you will consider very reasonable. I am with consideration, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief of the Army of the King of Sardinia.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 15 Floreal, year 4 [May 4, 1796].

The troops of the Republic have this morning occupied the fort of Tortona: in consequence, dating from this day, there is a suspension of arms between the two armies. I shall place it in the order of the day; and I hope you will find the French officers disposed to give you proofs of the esteem which they entertain for your army.

I am giving orders to the end that you should occupy the town of Fossano and Bra. I will adapt to the line of demarcation all the changes that you shall deem necessary, adhering, however, to the spirit of the suspension which we have concluded.

I have ordered 400 prisoners to be sent hither, in exchange for the 400 which you have had the goodness to despatch to Cherasco. The chief of the staff will transmit to you the list of the officers of your army whom the fortune of arms has made prisoners. I shall lose no time in sending to you those about whom you interest yourself.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief of the Army of Piedmont.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 16 Floreal, year 4 [May 5, 1796].

The Marquis de St. Marsan, whom I had the honour to see yesterday, sir, will have delivered to you several letters, by which you will see that all you desire relative to several matters concerning the suspension of arms has been executed. I have ordered protections to be given to all those who could have occasion for them.

I am authorizing the different generals to give passports to the officers of your army who wish to go into the country occupied by the army. I shall be too happy, in all circumstances, to have it in my power to give you marks of the distinguished esteem and consideration with which I am, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief of the Army of the King of Sardinia.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 17 Floreal, year 4 [May 6, 1796].

In consequence of the suspension of arms which the king has concluded with the two armies of the Alps and Italy, and the probability of peace, of which I have new assurances, I am marching 17,000 men from the army of the Alps to the army of Italy. Nine thousand will pass by the Col d'Argentières and proceed to Coni, where they will cross the Stura to come and join me. Eight thousand will pass the St. Bernard by the valley of Aosta, and come and cross the Tanaro at Alexandria.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Sali, 17 Floreal, year 4 [May 6, 1796].

I was informed yesterday that Piedmontese deserters, to the number of 200, have armed, and are stopping indiscriminately all the French going and coming between Alexandria and Tortona: they yesterday killed two of our men at the gates of the former city, and a third on the Tortona road, and wounded five or six. I immediately sent off 200 cavalry, and nearly the same number of infantry, to give chase to them. These troops returned very late last night, and brought about a score of peasants, some of whom were found armed, and others with cartridges. When I have examined them I will report to you.

I took a survey yesterday of the Tanaro and the Po, and saw but two boats. An officer of artillery arrived yesterday, with orders to construct flying bridges; I know not precisely what means he employs, but I will assist him with all my power.

The enemy occupies the left bank of the Po; but, I think, not in any force. My advanced guard set out this morning for Girola; I have replaced it this morning by other troops.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Turin, May 7, 1796 [18 Floreal, year 4].

In reply to the letter which you have transmitted to me through the medium of your aide-de-camp, I begin by saying that, notwithstanding the burden which the passage of so large a body of troops will throw upon the poor inhabitants of the districts through which they are to pass, I nevertheless do myself the pleasure to consent, seconding the intentions of the king, that you should march the column which you propose by Argentières and Coni, for the purpose of joining your army: I will appoint an officer to accompany it conformably with your desire. As for the column which you wish to bring by the St. Bernard, I must make some observations on that head: in the first place, that it would appear not at all conformable with the armistice, with the line of demarcation, and with the pacific intentions which you have been pleased to profess, and of which I am thoroughly persuaded, to demand a passage for troops in so many different points; which cannot but be very burdensome to the States of the king. Besides, the valley of Aosta, through which they would have to pass, is a country destitute of every thing, which would have great difficulty to furnish provisions for these troops; the Canavesar also is a district equally incapable of supplying the wants of such a body of troops, especially as I too should be obliged to send troops thither to escort yours, because the inhabitants are very intolerant, and easily excited to take up arms, which might occasion quarrels, and even serious ones, with your troops; secondly, because both the Canavesar and the Versalois are intersected by a very great number of rivers, which, when ever so little swollen, are impassable, and would be liable to place your troops in

the most awkward predicament, by enclosing them between two, and reducing them to famine, which would oblige them to have recourse to pillage, and raise the inhabitants of the said countries. It behoves me to set before you all these reflexions, and to observe moreover that, in making your troops take the Argentières road, this, according to the natural order, would lengthen their march some days; that, nevertheless, they might run the risk of a still longer delay in the valley of Aosta, owing to the accidents which may be occasioned by the swelling of the waters. I am, besides, fully persuaded that, if you desist from that passage, you will do a thing highly agreeable to the king, and which he will take very kindly.

On my arrival at Turin I was told that, on the way to Tortona, persons in the train of your army seized chests belonging to the king, and gave orders in that city as in a conquered place. I must observe to you that, having been placed in your hands by way of deposit, just like Coni, where your troops have behaved like real friends, I flatter myself, knowing your honour and your love of order, that you will be pleased to issue orders for preventing all that is likely to be injurious to his Majesty or to his people, and that can possibly be avoided. The Marquis de St. Marsan will have already delivered to you my first letter, and furnished a better explanation of some complaints of the disorders which soldiers, and more particularly Piedmontese, have occasioned, by striving to excite revolutions in Piedmont, with the intention, probably, of producing a rupture of the suspension of arms which has been concluded, and which, I hope, will be followed by a good and solid peace between the French and us. I am, sir, &c.

VICTOR EMMANUEL.

Extracts from different Notes of the Governor of Alexandria.

Note 1.

The governor of Alexandria demands—

1. That the sequestration ordered at Cherasco, on the 7th Floreal, of the property of persons employed about the King of Sardinia, be not carried into execution.
2. That a *tête de pont* be not constructed on the left of the Stura, opposite to Cherasco.

3. He reclaims the royal moneys confiscated at Acqui, Tortona, and Voghera.

Note 2.

The governor of Alexandria demands—

1. That the King of Sardinia be permitted to remove a magazine existing at Coni, which was destined for the supply of the army. A commissary of his majesty was to have had it transported to Notre Dame de l'Orme, but General Maquart opposed it.

2. He reclaims the forage collected long ago at the hamlet of St. Dalmas, that place not having been occupied by the French army till posterior to the armistice.

3. He demands, on behalf of certain purveyors of the army, the authorization to remove from the valley of Vermeguenta forage which they have purchased there.

Note 3.

The governor of Alexandria demands that, conformably with verbal conventions between the general-in-chief and the Marquis de St. Marsan, from Alba to Nizza de la Paglia, the limit of the demarcation be the boundary itself of the provinces of Alba and Acqui; so that all the lands and villages dependent on the province of Asti, on the right of the Tanaro, and, for a still stronger reason, those dependent on the province of Alexandria which is on the left of the Bormida, as far as Cassina exclusively, be not subject to military contributions.

He intimates that, by means of piquets and by detachments posted on the left banks of the Tanaro and the Bormida, the straggling soldiers of the French army are prevented from deviating from the routes indicated and the line of demarcation fixed by the armistice.

Note 4.

The governor of Alexandria begs the general-in-chief to give the necessary orders for suppressing the movements which are manifesting themselves at Coni and at the village of St. Dalmas, where there has been a tumult against the priests. His majesty has seen with satisfaction that tranquillity, threatened by evil designing persons, has been restored at Alba: he has the greatest confidence in the good faith and integrity of the general-in-chief.

PART II.

FROM THE OCCUPATION OF TORTONA TO THE INVESTMENT
OF MANTUA.*Bonaparte, General-in-Chief, to the Executive Directory.*

Head-quarters, Tortona, 17 Floreal, year 4 [May 6, 1796].

The army of Italy yesterday took possession of Tortona, where we have found a very fine fortress, which has cost the King of Sardinia more than 15,000,000 livres.

I have informed you, through my aid-de-camp Murat, that we have occupied Coni and Ceva, which we found in a respectable state of defence, and provisioned with every thing. The day after the signature of the suspension of arms, General Laharpe marched with his division by way of Bossogno to Acqui; General Augerau by Stefano; and General Massena by Nizza de la Paglia. Beaulieu evacuated this country, and took refuge in Valenza, where he crossed the Po with his whole army. General Massena arrived with his whole division at Alexandria, in time to secure the magazines which the Austrians, unable to carry off, had sold to the city. On the 13th, the German army recrossed the Po, cutting the boats, and burning those which it found on the shore.

The Neapolitans, who in general are not enterprising, have taken Valenza.¹

To the Governor of the Duchy of Parma, at Placentia.

Head-quarters, San Giovanni, 17 Floreal, year 4 [May 6, 1796].

Having to confer with you, sir, on matters of the highest importance, you will be pleased to come immediately to Castel-San-Giovanni.

It would be necessary that you should be here before two in the morning, as I must be on horseback by that hour.

BONAPARTE.

¹ This letter was left unfinished.

To the Minister of Spain at Parma.

Head-quarters, Placentia, 17 Floreal, year 4 [May 6, 1796].

I have received your letter, sir; as it is not in my heart nor in the intention of the French people to do harm without object, or to injure the people in any way, I consent to suspend all hostility against the Duke of Parma and the march of my troops for Parma; but the duke must to-night send plenipotentiaries to conclude the suspension.

I am marching some regiments of cavalry with one brigade to within three leagues of Placentia: that need not give any uneasiness to the Duke of Parma from the moment that he accepts the conditions which we have agreed upon.

I am delighted that this occasion enables me to prove to you the sentiments of esteem and consideration with which, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Carnot.

Head-quarters, Placentia, 20 Floreal, year 4 [May 9, 1796].

We have at length crossed the Po. The second campaign is begun. Beaulieu is disconcerted. He calculates very ill, and constantly falls into the snares that are laid for him. Perhaps he meant to give battle: for that man has the daring of madness and not that of genius: but the 6000 men who were forced yesterday to cross the Adda, and who were defeated, will weaken him much: another victory and we are masters of Italy.

I have granted a suspension of arms to the Duke of Parma; the Duke of Modena is sending me plenipotentiaries. If we had an able *ordonnateur*, we should be as well off as it is possible to imagine. We are going to establish considerable magazines of corn, with folds for 600 bullocks in the rear. The moment we cease our movements, we shall new-clothe the army; it is still in a frightful state: but all are getting fat. The soldiers eat nothing but Gonesse bread, good meat and in quantity, good wine, &c. Discipline is becoming re-established from day to day; but it is often necessary to shoot, for there are intractable men who cannot command themselves.

What we have taken from the enemy is incalculable. We have the effects of hospitals for 15,000 sick, several

magazines of corn, flour, &c. The more men you send me, the more easily I shall be able to feed them.

I am despatching to you twenty pictures by the first masters, Correggio and Michael Angelo.

I owe you particular thanks for the attentions which you are pleased to pay to my wife: I recommend her to you; she is a sincere patriot, and I love her to distraction.

I hope if things go on well to be able to send you a dozen millions to Paris: that will not come amiss for the army of the Rhine.

Send me 4000 dismounted cavalry; I will endeavour to remount them here.

I will not disguise from you that, since the death of Stengel, I have no superior officer of cavalry who is a fighting man. I should be glad if you would send me two or three adjutant-generals, who have been in the cavalry, who have fire and a firm resolution never to make scientific retreats.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Bruni, Floreal 18, year 4 [May 7, 1796].

I inform you of the arrival of the artillery at the division which I command. It is in the worst condition: the number of horses is daily diminishing from the mortality.

BEYRAND.

To the General-in-Chief.

Maleo, 18 Floreal, year 4 [May 7, 1796].

Some enemies of the Republic have just reported to the troops under my command that the quarters of General Laharpe are cut off, and that he himself is killed. I have directed my aide-de-camp to go and verify these reports. If the facts are as represented, it is my intention to order a charge by two battalions of grenadiers and by the cavalry on anything capable of opposing a retreat, and so make a vigorous resistance in the village which I occupy, while awaiting your orders.

DALLEMAGNE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Codogno, 20 Floreal, year 4 [May 9, 1796].

Adjutant-general Boyer reported to you yesterday evening the death of General Laharpe.¹ I lose no time in apprizing you of the events of the night and of the present moment.

The troops, terrified last night, were in the greatest disorder in the village: unable to rally them, on account of the darkness, I put good officers at the head of some picked men, and sent them out to explore, while I proceeded myself towards the point occupied by the enemy; that was Codogno.

Night, which magnifies objects, had increased the disorder, so that it was impossible to collect the troops and to do anything with them. In this circumstance, I resolved to keep in the village itself, and, after making useful military dispositions, to wait there till daylight. The rest of the night passed off quietly.

Towards daybreak, my patrols discovered the enemy, who was making dispositions apparently with the intention of surrounding us. I then sent two battalions to cut them off, but, perceiving that manœuvre, they instantly retreated upon Casale, leaving behind them three pieces of cannon, which they had taken from us. They were pursued as far as possible.

At this present moment, I have collected the whole corps, and am making the dispositions enjoined me by General Laharpe, in establishing my forces on the Casale road, which is the essential point to be guarded, where I shall await your orders.

Nothing has happened at the advanced guard stationed

¹ Laharpe was a native of the Swiss canton of Vaud, who had left his country on account of the vassalage in which it was held by the aristocracy of Berne. In the French service, he had eminently distinguished himself by intelligence and intrepidity, and also, as we have seen, by his indignant denunciations of the horrors which the soldiers of the French army generally were urged by necessity and a spirit of plunder to commit. Those men are described by their own officers as capable of any atrocity. Liptai's division of Beaulieu's army, after its defeat at Fombio, fell in at night with the French advanced posts; and we are told that, in the mêlée which ensued, Laharpe was shot in the dark by his own soldiers. Is it uncharitable to surmise that, in revenge for his pointed condemnation of their predatory habits, their arms may have been wilfully turned against their gallant and honourable leader?

at Maleo : I heard of it by the chief of brigade Lannes, who came to our assistance with two battalions.

I take the enemy who attacked us to be about 3000 strong : he must have been cut off from the army yesterday : for I cannot imagine that so small a force would have the audacity to place itself wilfully between two bodies of troops.

I will have the guns which the enemy has thrown into the ditches got out. I will likewise have that body of isolated troops further pursued by infantry and cavalry, and, if I learn that its number increases, I will give you advice of it.

MESNARD.

To the General-in-Chief.

Maleo, 20 Floreal, year 4 [May 9, 1796].

The enemy still occupies the town of Pizzigitone. This morning at daybreak, I reconnoitred my centre and my right, and it did not appear to me that the enemy was making any evacuation, from the fire which he opened upon us and the troops that he had on the ramparts.

The river Adda is broad and deep. I do not think that it can be crossed without boats, and all those which might be serviceable for that purpose are detained on the other side.

The chief of the staff having sent me word that General Augereau occupies Casale, I shall send off a detachment of cavalry to form my junction with him.

Up to this day, general, I have been making vain efforts to check pillage. The guards which I have stationed are of no use : the excesses committed cannot be surpassed. Terrible examples are required ; but I know not whether I have the power to make those examples. An honest and humane man suffers and feels himself dishonoured in marching at the head of a corps in which wretches are so numerous. Were I not at the most advanced post, I would beg you to send as my successor a man whose health and talents might enable him to obtain greater success ; but I must forget self, when the point is to labour for the glory of my country.

DALLEMAGNE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Codogno, 20 Floreal, year 4 [May 9, 1796].

I am come this instant from visiting the positions of the advanced guard, in which I have made some changes. I have placed the 70th and the 99th demi-brigades between the village of Maleo, occupied by the advanced guard, and that of Codogno, where I have established my headquarters. The horse-artillery is in advance of those two brigades, for the purpose of marching to the advanced guard, if it should be necessary. Your brother has given orders, in your name, to General Dallemagne, to fire upon the town of Pizzigitone, which he has set about executing. Here are but two pieces of cannon and a howitzer. I have ordered three large barks, which the enemy has quite close to the town, and which he keeps, no doubt, for evacuating by the Adda, if forced to it, to be sunk. The two four-pounders are provided with only 40 rounds each, and the howitzer with but thirty. Be pleased to send us immediately ammunition for those pieces, as well as cartridges for the infantry. According to the report of some peasants, the enemy has six pieces of artillery of different calibres, and his number in the place amounts to 6000.

I hope, general, that, in confiding to me the right of your army, you will leave me the division which I had before: I am acquainted with the generals and the troops which compose it, and this is a great advantage for me.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Maleo, 21 Floreal, year 4 [May 10, 1796].

I shall immediately execute the orders which you communicate to me, to send labourers and to cannonade Pizzigitone. I keep about 900 men firing with small arms at the town. There will be two 8-pounders and one howitzer; but I must observe to you that many shots cannot be fired by the latter, because we have but thirty-five rounds: the 8-pounders are provided with only sixty rounds each. As there is a causeway leading to Casale by way of Caneva, I am sending troops thither to reconnoitre.

By my scouts this morning, I learned that the enemy still had cannon at Pizzigitone: he continues to guard the

left bank of the Adda by a number of tirailleurs, and all his movements are governed by those which he sees us make.

MESNARD.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

Paris, 18 Floreal, year 4 [May 7, 1796].

The Directory has received, citizen-general, your interesting communications of the 8th, 9th, and 10th Floreal, and the duplicate of that of the 7th, apprizing it of the taking of Mondovi, &c. What glorious successes! The general joy and hopes are immense: another victory over the Austrians, and Italy is ours.

You have rendered signal services to the country: you will find, citizen-general, the most gratifying reward for them in the esteem of all the friends of the Republic and in that of the Directory. Again it congratulates you, and desires you to congratulate, in its name, the brave army, which, by its daring and intrepidity, successfully executes your happy plans. Glory to all the French who, by victories and respectable conduct, contribute to seat the Republic on bases that cannot be shaken!

The Directory approves the provisional armistice which you have concluded with the plenipotentiaries of the King of Sardinia: it is advantageous in all respects, and the Directory cannot but praise the vigorous measures which you have taken in granting it, and in having the most essential conditions carried into immediate execution.

It has seen with pleasure that citizen Salicetti, its commissioner with the army of Italy, was consulted before the conclusion of the armistice. Negotiations of this kind, in urgent cases, and when the Directory itself cannot be consulted, fall particularly within the province of the commissioners of the government with the armies. The French generals ought, nevertheless, to be the only direct agents recognized by the enemy's generals: but it is proper that the former should not have power to conclude any transaction or negotiation, under the circumstances mentioned above, unless according to the orders of the Directory, or the conditions which the commissioners of the government shall transmit to them.

At the moment that the Directory is writing, you are, no doubt, in the Milanese. May the lucky destinies of the Republic have carried thither some French columns before the Austrian has been able to recross the Po ! may they place you in a situation to cut off his direct communication with Milan and the court of Vienna ! Your letter of the 9th expresses the intention of marching on the 10th against Beaulieu : you will have driven him before you. Do not lose sight of him for a moment : your activity and the utmost celerity in your marches can alone annihilate the Austrian army, which must be destroyed. March ! no fatal repose ! there are yet laurels left for you to gather ; and it will be all over with the remnants of the perfidious coalition, if you follow up, as you declare it to be your intention to do, the advantages given to us by the splendid victories of the Republican army which you command.

The plan of campaign which you have sketched in your letter of the 9th is worthy of the French and of the army which you command and lead to victory ; but it presents formidable obstacles and difficulties that may be said to be insurmountable. Believe, nevertheless, that the Directory knows how to appreciate every thing grand and profitable to the Republic that is submitted to it. Still, it must confine itself to a narrower circle than that which you propose that it should traverse, and to which it is urged by the imperative necessity for terminating the war with this campaign : it cannot but dread the disasters that might result from one miscarriage. It reckons upon the victories of the army of Italy, but what might not be the consequences of entering Bavaria by the mountains of the Tyrol, and what hope could one conceive of an honourable retreat in case of reverses ! How, moreover, curb, with the forces which you command, and the few thousand men whom the Directory might be able to add, so many countries subjected by our arms, and impatient to withdraw themselves from the vicinity and the action of war ! And what would be our means of resistance, if the court of Turin, which we are forcing to make peace, should allow itself to be again cozened, and resume arms to cut off your communications ?

The powers of Italy call us towards your right, citizen-general, and this course must rid us of the perfidious English, so long masters of the Mediterranean. It must likewise enable us to recover Corsica, and to wrest those

French departments from the ambitious house of Brunswick-Lüneburg, which has so proudly established itself in them : such are the sentiments of the Directory on this head.

First, effect the conquest of the Milanese, whether it be destined to return to the house of Austria as a necessary cession for securing our peace with it, whether it may be expedient to give it in the sequel to the Piedmontese, either as a reward for the efforts which we may have induced it to make for assisting us in that conquest, or as an indemnity for the departments of Mont Blanc and the Maritime Alps, constitutionally incorporated with the French Republic. Drive back the enemy to the mountains of the Tyrol, and put him in dread of finding himself forced there.

Then divide the army of Italy into two : let the weaker half remain in the Milanese and ensure the possession of it by its presence ; it will be seconded there by the Piedmontese troops, if the King of Sardinia accepts the offensive and defensive alliance, for which we shall immediately treat with his agents ; and those troops will be specially charged with keeping the gorges of the Tyrol and following up any advantages which circumstances may afford them. Our interest commands us to let them act, and even to lead them to be daring ; but the Republican troops will remain in the Milanese, levy contributions, and live in that fertile country, the possession of which has been so valuable to the Austrians during this war. You will arrive there at the moment of the harvest : manage so that the army of Italy shall have no need of supplies from the interior. The Directory destines for General Kellermann the command of the French forces in the Milanese, when you have divided the army of Italy, augmented by that of the Alps : and its intention is to leave in force, in this new state of things, the decree which it enacted on the 9th Floreal, conferring on the commissioners Garreau and Salicetti a right to require movements of troops, &c. These dispositions would ensure union between the two generals, if the love of the Republic and a desire to render our arms triumphant did not bind them still more closely.

The second column, made as strong as possible, will in part proceed along the coast. After you have secured a free passage through Gavi, if necessary, or even occupied that place, it will first proceed to Leghorn, and then threaten Rome and Naples.

The conduct to be pursued towards Leghorn and Tuscany is this: you must arrive there secondarily, and at a moment when you will be least expected. The Republic is not at war with the grand-duke, and it is important to keep up our connexion with him: his minister at Paris has not disguised the constraint in which the English held his country, and the tyranny which they exercised in the port of Leghorn. It is worthy of the Republic to deliver it from that subjection; and it is of particular consequence that the national colours be respected in the ports of Tuscany. Let the French troops arrive at Leghorn with that order which commands confidence, and which is indispensable in neutral countries. Send to inform the grand-duke of the necessity under which we find ourselves to enter his territory and to put a garrison into Leghorn. Time the despatch of this courier and the arrival of the Republican troops in that city so that the courier may enter Florence at the moment, or very little before, the French troops enter Leghorn: take possession of it with the same formalities as were observed in occupying Vado; make yourself master of the English, Neapolitan, Portuguese, and other enemies' ships that you find in the port; seize, in short, all that belongs to the different States which are at war with us, and even sequester whatever belongs to individuals of those States; let inventories be immediately taken, and beware, above all, citizen-general, beware lest this wealth fall a prey to rapacity and speculators. The grand-duke cannot refuse his countenance to rigorous measures; the Directory does not presume that he will be disposed to throw in the way obstacles which could be raised only by a perfidy that it is to our interest to annihilate. You will declare to him, citizen-general, in the name of the Executive Directory, that he must immediately issue orders for every thing in his dominions belonging to our enemies to be forthwith put into our hands, and that he must guarantee the sequestration; otherwise the French Republic would be obliged to treat Tuscany as an ally of England and Austria.

The grand-duke shall be responsible for the success and the accomplishment of these measures. You will, moreover, require in that country the supplies necessary for the army you command, and State bonds or bills payable after the general peace shall be delivered in payment of provisions and other commodities with which we shall have been fur-

nished. The reports that you will have adroitly disseminated respecting the number, which you will exaggerate, of the French troops in Italy, will increase the terror of our enemies, and double in a manner your means of acting.

On entering the territory of the republic of Lucca, you will declare to it, in the name of the Executive Directory, that the French Republic has no hostile intention towards it.

It will be convenient to defer our discussions with Genoa till after the expedition to Leghorn: let us at first be content to draw from it, upon receipts given, the provisions and means of transport which the French army has need of, leaving the mode of reimbursement to be settled afterwards; but the directions given respecting Leghorn may apply to the republic of Genoa, though it is to our interest not to drive it to despair, and to make sure that its neutrality will become as beneficial to us as it has hitherto been to our enemies.

The conduct which it has recently pursued towards us is not calculated to make us forget the act of treachery to which the *Modeste* frigate fell a victim in times that were less favourable to us. The time will come, when we shall demand a formal reparation, and that those who caused the *Modeste* to be burned and the Austrians to be called in shall be tried as traitors to the country.

The Genoese, in fact, might be thus addressed: Either you suffered that frigate to be taken and her crew murdered, out of enmity to France, or you sacrificed it through weakness. In the first case, we claim a legitimate vengeance; in the second, we have a right to require of you to treat our enemies as you have treated ourselves. The indemnity granted must be sufficient: the relations of the Frenchmen who perished on board the *Modeste* must participate in it; the reparation for so gross an injury must be signal, must be solemn.

It is likewise after the expedition to Leghorn that we shall endeavour to raise a loan in the city of Genoa, but we must beware of harassing it: we will make it sensible that we are more generous than our enemies, who proposed to deliver it up to the King of Sardinia; we will demand, in such a manner as not to be refused, that every thing belonging to our enemies, especially the English, as well in the port and city of Genoa, as in the rest of the territories of that repub-

lic, shall be immediately put into our hands ; we will insist on the sequestration of the property and funds of the merchants and the private persons of the country who make war upon us, and the Genoese government shall answer for the fidelity of the sequestration ; we will continue to give, in exchange for what Genoa shall supply us with, bonds of redemption, to be treated of at the general peace ; lastly, we shall require all emigrants, without exception, to be expelled from the territories of Genoa and Tuscany, as you have no doubt caused them to be expelled from the part of Piedmont which you occupy, in case they have been bold enough to remain there.

As for the course to be pursued in regard to the Duke of Parma, it is just that he should pay for his infatuation in not detaching himself from the coalition ; his territories must supply us with all that we have need of and with money into the bargain ; but our connexion with Spain enjoins us not to make any useless devastation there and to spare his country much more than the other possessions of our enemies. It is the Milanese most especially that we must not spare ; raise there contributions in specie immediately, and during the first panic which the approach of our arms will excite ; and let the eye of economy superintend the application of them. The canals and the great public establishments of this country, which we shall not keep up, must feel somewhat of the effect of war : but be prudent.

You will find in No. 1 an interesting note, and which will enable you to take some wholesome measures : omit nothing that can contribute to the health of the defenders of the Republic.

Venice shall be treated as a neutral power, but it must not expect to be treated as a friendly power : it has done nothing to deserve our kindness.

If Rome makes advances, the first thing to be required is that the Pope shall immediately order public prayers for the success and prosperity of the French Republic. Some of his beautiful monuments, his statues, his pictures, his medals, his libraries, his bronzes, his Madonas of silver, and even his bells, will indemnify us for the expense occasioned by the visit that you will have paid him. In case the court of Naples, alarmed at your approach, should cause proposals to be made to France, it must be required

to deliver up to us immediately the ships and everything belonging to the nations at war with us. It must answer to us for the immediate execution of these measures; it must solemnly engage not to admit, during this war, any vessels belonging to the English or to enemies of the Republic into its ports, and, above all, not to allow any to enter under a neutral flag.

The army of the Alps has orders to furnish you immediately with four demi-brigades, and you will see by the annexed statement what dispositions have been made by the minister at war for marching several companies of light artillery to that of Italy by the shortest road. It was necessary to take them where they were, and the Directory perceives with regret that some of them will be a long time before they reach you.

The minister at war has likewise ordered a fourth *commissaire ordonnateur*, citizen Foullet, who was with the army of the Alps, to join that which you command; you will have, besides, the citizens Lambert, Sucy, and Gosselin. In case one of these latter or citizen Foullet should be more suitable for the appointment of commissary-general, the Directory authorizes citizen Salicetti to nominate such one of the three as you shall point out to that post.

If the army of the coasts of the Ocean can furnish you with any cavalry, the Directory will order it to be sent off for the army of Italy, and endeavour to procure you some. It is going to treat for peace with Sardinia, and will make you acquainted with the course of the negotiations. The French Republic will be generous and strive to make an ally, who, from interest and friendship, will always be attached to it.

The Directory awaits with impatience the news of your success against the Austrian army. Strike, and strike hard.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 18 Floreal, year 4 [May 7, 1796].

The Executive Directory is persuaded, citizen-general, that you consider the glory of the fine arts as attached to that of the army which you command. To them Italy owes, in a great measure, its wealth and its fame; but the

time is come when their reign must be transferred to France, in order to establish and embellish that of liberty. The National Museum must contain the most celebrated productions of all the arts, and you will not neglect to enrich it with those which await the present conquests of the army of Italy, and the future ones which are yet reserved for it. This glorious campaign, while placing the Republic in a condition to give peace to its enemies, must also repair the ravages of Vandalism in its own bosom, and combine with the splendour of military trophies the charm of the beneficent and cheering arts.

The Executive Directory, therefore, invites you, citizen-general, to choose one or several artists, to select and transmit to Paris the most valuable objects of this kind, and to give precise orders for the enlightened execution of these dispositions, concerning which it wishes you to report.

CARNOT.

To Citizen Carnot.

Head-quarters, Lodi, 22 Floreal, year 4 [May 11, 1796].

The battle of Lodi, my dear Director, gives the Republic all Lombardy. The enemy has left 2000 men in the castle of Milan, which I shall immediately invest. You may reckon, in your calculations, as if I were in Milan: I shall not go thither to-morrow, because I wish to pursue Beaulieu and to take advantage of his delirium to beat him again.

It will soon be possible for me to attack Mantua. If I take that place, there is nothing more to prevent me from entering Bavaria: in two decades I may be in the heart of Germany. Could you not combine my movements with the operations of those two armies? I suppose that by this time they are fighting on the Rhine; were the armistice to continue, the army of Italy would be crushed. If the two armies of the Rhine take the field, I beg of you to let me know their position and what you hope they will be able to do, that this may serve me as a guide either for entering the Tyrol or confining myself to the Adige. It would be worthy of the Republic for the three united armies to go and sign the treaty of peace in the heart of Bavaria or of astonished Austria. As for me, if it is consistent with your plans for the two armies of the Rhine to move forward, I will have

crossed Tyrol before the emperor has any serious suspicion of the matter. If it were possible to find a good commissary, the one who is here might be fit as second, but he has not spirit and brains enough for commissary general.

BONAPARTE.

To M. Fernandi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Duke of Parma.

Head-quarters, Lodi, 24 Floreal, year 4 [May 13, 1796].

I have received, sir, the ratification of the suspension of arms which you have accepted on the part of the Duke of Parma. I send to you General Cervoni, that you may settle with him all the details of the said suspension.

You will give directions for delivering to him, in the course of to-morrow, the 500,000 francs, which, according to the terms of the suspension, are to be paid within five days: he will also receive the horses, and take the measures necessary for the execution of the said suspension.

I rejoice, sir, that this circumstance affords me opportunity to express the consideration, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Faipoult, Minister of the Republic at Genoa.

Head-quarters, Lodi, 24 Floreal, year 4 [May 13, 1796].

I am much obliged to you for the engravings which you have sent me, and which will afford the greatest pleasure to the army. I beg you to send from me twenty-five louis to the young man who made them, and desire him to get the astonishing passage of the bridge of Lodi engraved.

As the fief of Montegio is not an imperial fief, it is not comprised in the order which I gave for impositions on the said fiefs.

We yesterday took Pizzigitone, with 300 prisoners and three pieces of cannon. Beaulieu is running away as fast as he can. Cremona belongs to the Republic.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Lodi, 25 Floreal, year 4 [May 14, 1796].

After the battle of Fiombio, we pursued the enemy to Pizzi-

gitone, but could not cross the Adda. After the battle of Lodi, Beaulieu retreated upon Pizzigitone; we proceeded thither on the 22nd, but he had already retired beyond Cremona. We immediately invested and attacked the town of Pizzigitone, which, after a brisk cannonade, was obliged to open its gates: in it we took 300 prisoners and five pieces of brass cannon.

Our cavalry has set out in pursuit of the enemy. The city of Cremona has opened its gates: all Lombardy belongs to the Republic.

It is said that the suspension of arms on the Rhine still continues. I should imagine that by this time you have turned your attention to so essential a matter. It appears even that the enemy have emphatically published in their camp that this suspension is for three months, and that in consequence they are about to receive large reinforcements.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Carnot.

Head-quarters, Lodi, 26 Floreal, year 4 [May 14, 1796].

On the receipt of the Directory's letter of the 18th your intentions were fulfilled, and the Milanese is ours. I shall soon march to execute your plans respecting Leghorn and Rome: that will all be done in a short time.

I am writing to the Directory relative to the idea of dividing the army: I protest to you that in this I have nothing in view but the country. For the rest, you will always find me in the straight line. I owe to the Republic the sacrifice of all my ideas. If attempts are making to lower me in your good opinion, my answer is in my heart and in my conscience.

As it is possible that this letter to the Directory may be misconstrued, and that you have shown me friendship, I have determined to address it to you, requesting you to make such use of it as your prudence and your attachment to me shall suggest.

Kellermann will command the army as well as I, for nobody is more convinced than myself that the victories are owing to the courage and daring of the army; but I cannot help thinking that to unite Kellermann with me in Italy would ruin everything. I should not like to serve with a man who deems himself the first general in Europe; and I

think, besides, that it is better to have one bad general than two good ones. War is like government—it is an affair of tact.

I cannot be useful to you unless invested with the same esteem that you testified for me in Paris. Whether I am making war here or elsewhere is to me a matter of indifference: to serve the country, to deserve from posterity a page in our history, to give the government proofs of my attachment and devotedness—that is all my ambition. But I have it much at heart not to throw away in a week two months' fatigues, toils, and dangers, and not to find myself shackled. I have begun with some glory; I desire to continue to be worthy of you. Believe, besides, that nothing shall weaken the esteem which you excite in those who know you.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Lodi, 25 Floreal, year 4 [May 14, 1796].

I have this moment received the courier who left Paris on the 18th. Your hopes are realised, since, by this time, all Lombardy belongs to the Republic. Yesterday I despatched a division to invest the castle of Milan. Beaulieu is at Mantua with his army; he has flooded the whole surrounding country: he will find death there, for it is the most unwholesome place in Italy.

Beaulieu still has a numerous army: he began the campaign with a superior force; the emperor is sending him a reinforcement of 10,000 men, who are on their march. I think it highly impolitic to split the army of Italy into two; it is equally contrary to the interests of the Republic to put two different generals into it.

The expedition to Leghorn, Rome, and Naples, is a very trifling matter; it ought to be performed by divisions *en echelons*, so that one might, by a retrograde march, find one's self in force against the Austrians, and threaten to enclose them on the slightest movement they should make. For this there is required not only a single general, but it is also necessary that there should be nothing to cramp him in his march and his operations. I have made the campaign without consulting any one: I should have done no good had I been obliged to reconcile my views with those of

another. I have gained some advantages over superior forces, and in absolute want of everything, because, knowing that your confidence reposed upon me, my progress was rapid as my thought.

If you impose fetters of all kinds upon me ; if I must refer at every step to the commissioners of the government ; if they have a right to change my movements, to take from me or to send me troops, expect no more good. If you weaken your means by dividing your forces ; if you break the unity of military conception in Italy ; I tell you with grief, you will have thrown away the fairest occasion for imposing laws upon Italy.

In the position of the affairs of the Republic in Italy, it is indispensable that you should have a general who possesses your entire confidence : if it were not to be myself, I should not complain, but I would strive to redouble my zeal to deserve your esteem in the post that you should confer upon me. Every one has his own method of making war. General Kellermann has more experience, and will do better than I : but, both together there, we should do nothing but mischief.

I cannot render essential services to the country, unless invested entirely and absolutely with your confidence. I am aware that it requires great courage to write you this letter ; how easy it would be to accuse me of pride and ambition !—but I owe to you the expression of all my sentiments, to you, who have given me at all times testimonies of esteem which I must not forget.

The different divisions of Italy are taking possession of Lombardy. When you read this letter, we shall be upon our march, and your answer will probably find us near Leghorn. The course which you will take in this circumstance is more decisive for the operations of the campaign than 15,000 men sent by the emperor as a reinforcement to Beaulieu.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

At the Bivouac of Cadelano, 22 Floreal, year 4 [May 11, 1796].

I have returned with 500 men to the positions which I occupied last night. General Beaumont, with the cavalry, has remained at Crema : we have picked up from 100 to

150 stragglers, whom I will send to head-quarters. General Beaumont had despatched 50 men upon the road from Crema to Mantua, to endeavour to overtake the equipages of the enemy; this detachment has returned without having seen anything. A detachment of infantry, which kept to the left of the former, fell in with 200 infantry, retreating in good order.

The inhabitants of Crema told us that General Beaulieu had marched troops upon Pizzigitone, and that the rest of the army had taken the road to Mantua. The prisoners and deserters all agree in saying that the enemy has no corps rallied, and that the road from Lodi to Cremona was covered with wounded from yesterday's fight.

BEYRAND.

To the General-in-Chief.

Melegnano, 22 Floreal, year 4 [May 11, 1796].

I have just received orders to proceed to Cassano with the cavalry that I have with me, to stop the troops or equipages of the enemy, which are seeking to pass that way. I shall set out immediately, but I suspect that it will be too late, as the whole passed in the course of yesterday.

KILMAINE.

To the General-in-Chief.

On the road, a league from Melegnano, 22 Floreal, year 4 [May 11, 1796].

At ten o'clock yesterday morning, the whole of the Austrian troops had already passed Santo Angelo: the last division was composed of the regiment of Belgioso, and a garrison battalion of another regiment of about 1000 horse. It was into this division that a detachment of cavalry of the advanced guard fell, and it appears to have suffered severely, for want of caution and for want of infantry.

I could overtake only about forty stragglers, whom I have sent to Borghetto. I heard in the night that, as usual, you have beaten the Austrians, and that you were master of Lodi.

The Austrians who were to defend the Upper Tesino, at Buffarola, passed yesterday through Milan, directing their march towards Cassano, for the purpose of crossing the Adda there, and joining Beaulieu.

The castle of Milan is provisioned for 4000 men for a month, at least orders were given to that effect, and the citadel of Mantua for 12,000 men for five months. The flour in the magazines of Pavia was distributed among the inhabitants. There is still hay left there. I await your orders at Melegnano.

KILMAINE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Milan, 25 Floreal, year 4 [May 14, 1796].

I have not thought it right to invest the castle, not having a sufficient force : I have, therefore, decided to make the troops encamp outside the city, occupying the avenues of the glacis. The cavalry is placed on the rampart, at a little distance from the gate. I have frequent patrols sent out. To-morrow, on the arrival of the rest of the troops of my division, I will surround the castle, agreeably to your orders ; the two pieces of light artillery are pointed at the gate.

I have been received in the city with the warmest acclamations. On all sides were heard shouts of " The Republic for ever ! Hatred to tyrants ! Liberty ! liberty ! "

All reports agree in saying that the number of the enemy in the castle amounts to from 15 to 1800 men, and 2 to 300 cavalry.

MASSENA.

General Augereau to the Municipality of Pavia.

Pavia, 26 Floreal, year 4 [May 15, 1796].

The divisionary General Augereau orders the municipality of Pavia as follows :—

1. To proceed without delay to the general disarming of all the inhabitants of the city of Pavia without exception.
2. All these arms shall be deposited in a place of safety, and, in the course of the day, placed at the disposal of the commandant of the city.
3. All inhabitants having effects taken from the magazines of the emperor are enjoined to give them up forthwith, upon pain of military execution.
4. The municipality is required to collect all these effects and to make a declaration of them to the commissary of war.

5. All the workmen and sailors that are in the city are put in requisition, and shall be immediately assembled to go and build, under the direction of officers and engineers, a bridge of boats over the Po, opposite to Cervesina.

6. All the workmen or sailors who, on the requisition of the municipality, do not instantly obey shall be compelled to do so by force.

7. All the cordage and other materials fit for the construction of the said bridge, which shall be found to exist in Pavia, shall be immediately put in requisition and collected by the municipality, which shall render an account to the general of what it shall have produced.

8. The municipality is charged with the execution of the present in its fullest extent, and is responsible for the least negligence which may be committed. It shall cause it to be posted and published by sound of trumpet, and translated into the language of the country.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Pavia, 27 Floreal, year 4 [May 16, 1796].

According to information received, both from officers of the engineers and from inhabitants of the country, the establishment of a bridge at Cervesina, as you have ordered, cannot be carried into effect, since, in this part, the river Po has the least depth of water, extends above a league inland, and, besides, the roads leading to this bank are wretched in the extreme. From all that I can learn, the only place where a bridge could be constructed with confidence is at Mezzano de Corti, where the Austrians formerly had one. I await your orders on this subject.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.

Venice, 25 Floreal, year 4 [May 14, 1796].

The minister of the Republic at Genoa ought to have forwarded to you several letters from me. I neglect no means for procuring all the details that may contribute to the success of the army which you command. I leave it to your wisdom to separate them from such as shall appear useless to you.

The government had an intention of marching considerable reinforcements from Hungary for Trieste, where they were to embark for the Po. An embargo was, in consequence, laid upon all vessels, but more were wanted than there are. These troops are taking the route through the Tyrol; their number is said to amount to 20,000 men; the barks are to carry only provisions and ammunition for Mantua; they will have on board, divided among them, 400 men of the artillery and 1000 infantry. It would, perhaps, be necessary to make some detachments advance speedily to the frontiers of the Bolognese and the Ferrarese, to intercept them; but, if this detachment is at a distance from the column, it ought to be rather strong and to have two to four pieces of light artillery: the station ought to be on the bank of the Po, below the place where that river divides into two branches, one running up to Bologna, the other to Mantua.

Mantua is destitute of provisions and ammunition. Since the battle which you have recently fought, and which has forced Beaulieu to a precipitate retreat to Crema, the wrecks of his army seem to be directing their course towards this last place in Lombardy, to wait there for reinforcements: but this resolution, if it is executing, can only hasten its utter ruin: all must perish by famine. For the rest, general, I must beg you not to let our brave brethren make any long stay there: the air is pestiferous, and for that reason the emperor kept no garrison there. Would it not be more advisable to follow the Roveredo road through the territory of Venice, on which parties of the troops debouching from the Tyrol would be met with, that is to say, if the intention of bringing them up is persisted in, which I cannot believe?

A merchant of Venice has been to offer me 150 barrels of good powder, which is at this moment at Ancona: it would be an affair of about 1000 louis; and, if it suited you, it might be carried to Ferrara in two days, and thence by the Po to your first posts.

I ardently long for the communication between the Venetian States and Milan to be free, that I may soon be able to correspond directly with you, and to receive your orders; I charge an excellent French merchant to forward this letter to the first advanced post, where the messenger will await your answer.

The Duke of Modena arrived here three days ago, with considerable treasures; he is avaricious. His only heir is a daughter, married to the Archduke of Milan: the more you extract from him, the more you will take from the house of Austria. It is from him that you must extort, and you will get so much the more out of his country. I know indirectly that he expects it: give me your instructions, and he will perhaps come down the more freely.

According to certain information which has this moment reached me, terror pervades the city of Mantua. Most of the wealthy inhabitants have fled, carrying off their money and their most valuable effects; it is computed that not above one-third of its population is left.

The ammunition which was at Cremona and Pavia, the flour, the military horses, as well as 600 bullocks, which had been despatched on the 8th of May for Cremona, have been removed thither. All the provisions that could be found in other parts have likewise been collected. At Pavia, there are cannon and balls which the Austrians were forced to leave behind, for want of the means of conveyance.

In consequence of these arrangements, it is computed that the city contains corn, forage, wood, wine, and provisions for six months, and munitions of war for a very long time. The number of soldiers in the place is said to amount to 3000, but most of them are unfit for service. They have fetched the orphans and bastards from Pavia and Cremona and put them into uniform.

A camp composed of about 9,300 men, both infantry and cavalry, had been formed at Goito, and thither were sent the fugitives and a small number who reached Mantua. In the evening of the 12th, a report was circulated in Mantua itself that the French had dispersed that camp. Nevertheless, in the night between the 12th and 13th, 3,200 men were to proceed thither: orders were given to that effect. The soldiers are very ill fed and ill paid.

On Monday the 9th, cannon were planted at the Pradela gate leading to the camp. On the 12th, orders were issued that the gates should remain closed, and that no person should be allowed to go out, without permission of the commandant. The archives of Milan have been sent off for Trieste.

LALLEMANT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 26 Floreal, year 4 [May 15, 1796].

Your despatch of the 17th Floreal, citizen-general, has reached the Executive Directory. The possession of the fortress of Tortona gives it a new degree of confidence in the success of your dispositions for the passage of the Po: it has enabled you to take in rear the line of defence of the Austrians, after having concealed from them a daring and ably-conceived movement, if they persist in guarding the banks of the river toward Valenza.

The Directory appreciates, like yourself, the obstacles which forbid the entry of the Milanese; but the talents and valour which gain battles are also capable of surmounting obstacles of all kinds; and the triumphant army which you command ought to consider the Milanese as a certain conquest, and which is necessary to the glorious political denouement that the Republic expects from its victories.

The conduct of Tuscany towards France is not deserving of further forbearance; and the Directory authorizes you, as soon as circumstances shall appear favourable to you, to direct upon Leghorn a corps, the force of which you will determine, and by means of which you will carry into execution the dispositions contained in the last despatches of the Directory relative to the grand-duke. The reinforcements which you are to receive from the army of the Alps will very soon enable you to arrange that operation; but at the same time you will be aware that your principal object in your present situation is to complete the overthrow of Beaulieu.

The Directory reminds you, citizen-general, that the maintenance of discipline can alone secure to an army the conquests of its courage, and that its observance tends always to relax in the intoxication of success. You are deeply impressed with this truth, and will never cease to make a rigorous application of it, which is at once required by the interest of the Republic and that of your personal glory.

CARNOT.

*The Executive Directory to the General Commanding in
Chief the Army of Italy.*

Paris, 27 Floreal, year 4 [May 16, 1796].

Good news from the army of the coasts of the Ocean, the submission of the rebel Scépeaux and the Chouans who obeyed him, and the certainty that the inhabitants of the theatre of war in La Vendée are submitting in good earnest to the laws of the Republic, had given great joy to the Directory, when it was augmented by the information contained in your letter of the 20th current, concerning the passage of the Po and the successes at Fombio and Casale.

The Directory is not afraid to repeat the praises which it has already given to the victorious army of Italy, and it esteems itself happy to have to congratulate it anew, through your medium, in the name of the French people, on its intrepid and gallant conduct. It will not tarnish its laurels by a conduct unworthy of the brilliant actions which it has recently achieved, and pillage will be repressed with that severity which respect for property and the welfare of the army itself imperatively command and require. Let all the efforts of the generals and officers be exerted to put an end to this disorganizing scourge, and let Italy behold in her conquerors none but Republicans, friends of order, and worthy of the admiration of all nations !

It appears from the letters of the commissioner of the government, Salicetti, that the army of Beaulieu is retiring towards Mantua, and that you hope soon to be master of Milan. The Directory reckons upon this success, and congratulates the army of Italy beforehand upon it. If the Austrians are thrown into the Mantuan, delay not a moment to pursue them. Beaulieu is concentrating himself: the briskness of his retreat, the extent of ground which he has traversed, oblige you to scatter your troops ; it is necessary to annihilate as soon as possible this nucleus of an Austrian army, which might take advantage of this dispersion to return with the rapidity of lightning against the army of Italy. Beaulieu is vanquished, but he has not, perhaps, renounced the offensive ; and, as he cannot exercise it with success but against separate divisions of your army, it is requisite to prevent all his enterprises, to watch his proceedings, and never to lose sight of him. Defer, if necessary, citizen-general, till after the total rout and dis-

persion of the Austrian army all the particular petty enterprises which would be liable to weaken the main body of the army under your command. A vast career of glory is yet open before you, but the first step taken in it ought to be to destroy entirely the army commanded by the successor of Devins. Your successes will soon place you in a situation to cut off all direct communication between it and Vienna. This interesting object once accomplished, its defeat is certain. In order to bring it about, it is necessary above all things to harass the enemy incessantly, and to reduce the Austrian soldiers to that state of fatigue which disorganizes the most formidable armies, and which occasions desertion, apathy, and frequently disobedience and rebellion. Beaulieu once annihilated, the house of Austria will at length think of peace, which the perfidious counsels of England have induced it to reject. It will find itself forced to accept such conditions as the Republic shall think fit to impose.

Venice, as the Directory observed to you in its despatch of the 18th Floreal, ought to be treated as a neutral, not as a friendly power. Seek, above all, without changing this disposition, to prevent the wrecks of the Austrian army from finding a safe asylum in the territories of that republic. If they penetrate into them without the consent of the Venetian government, pursue them without hesitation.

The Directory refers you to its letter of the 18th current: it contains developments explanatory of our mode of acting towards the different powers of Italy, to which it deems it superfluous to add any thing under present circumstances.

All republicans will drop a tear for Generals Laharpe and Stengel; the Directory has felt as it ought for their loss, and the laurels of their companions in arms can alone mingle some gratification with their sincere regrets. It will not fail shortly to testify to the brave men who have anew distinguished themselves at the passage of the Po how highly satisfied it is with their devotedness, their intelligence, and that valour which makes them confront all dangers.

No pity for dishonest administrators, who devour the subsistence and dilapidate the resources of the Republican armies! Point them out to the Directory, citizen-general; bring them to trial; you are on the spot; you are well

acquainted with their infamous conduct and scandalous robberies; make necessary examples of them, examples capable of deterring those who may be tempted to imitate them in future: it is the only way to extirpate that mania for rapine, which impunity and connivance have so disastrously spread over almost the whole surface of the Republic. On these shameless vampires ought to fall the first and the just punishment reserved for audacious guilt.

The army of the Alps is in need of funds: the Directory addresses itself to you; strive to procure it some, and to revive the public credit by payments long due in the departments which it occupied: furnish it also with some means of transport, and remount all its services, which are in the greatest want of it. The Directory recommends to you to concert on this subject with the general-in-chief Kellermann.

The Directory approves the armistice which you have concluded with the Duke of Parma; it accepts the present which that prince is pleased to make us of some fine pictures to adorn the national Museum.

I recommend to you to visit and notice the eminent men of science and artists in the countries where you are; and, when you are in possession of Milan, to honour and protect particularly Oriani,¹ the astronomer, so celebrated for the services which he is incessantly rendering to the sciences.

The Directory will write to you forthwith, on the return of your aide-de-camp, citizen Murat.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 27 Floreal, year 4 [May 16, 1796].

The Directory loses no time in transmitting to you, citizen-general, a copy of the treaty of peace concluded between the minister for foreign affairs, authorized by the Directory and the plenipotentiaries sent by the court of

¹ Barnabé Oriani, a native of Garignano in the Milanese, early acquired high reputation as an astronomer for the great accuracy of his observations. In 1786, he was sent by the government to London, with a commission to Ramsden for a mural quadrant and other instruments, for the Milan Observatory. Here he contracted a friendship with Herschel, and continued in correspondence with him while he lived. On the erection of the Italian Institute, he was one of the first thirty members, and afterwards made by Napoleon a count and senator of the kingdom of Italy. He died at Milan in 1832, and left very considerable property for scientific purposes.

Turin. There is every reason to believe that the legislative body, after examining, will ratify it, as Article 333 of the Republican constitution prescribes.

Thus the brave army of Italy, which you have so skillfully led on to victory, will have reason to applaud itself for having brought about this glorious peace, the fruit of its valour, and which becomes the pledge of its future success against the Austrians. Continue to direct it with that rapidity and that perseverance which thwart and annihilate all the combinations of hostile powers, and force them, in spite of themselves, into that general peace, from which they so obstinately kept aloof, and of the imperative and irresistible necessity of which our victorious armies will soon make them sensible.

CARNOT.

To Citizen Lallemant, Minister at Venice.

Head-quarters, Milan, 28 Floreal, year 4 [May 17, 1796].

I thank you infinitely, citizen minister, for the interesting particulars you give me respecting the position of the enemy. I send you 6000 livres, to defray the expense of spies at Trent, Mantua, and on the whole route of Tyrol, and let me know the day on which the Trieste vessels left for Mantua. Spare neither money nor pains; the interest of the country requires it. I will repay you punctually all that you lay out. Send me an accurate and very detailed map of the Venetian States.

There is at Milan a strong disposition to create a revolution there. If citizens Jacob and Alliod are not indispensable at Venice, send them hither; I will employ them in the Milanese, for the administration of that country. You must have received a letter from Lodi, from the commissioner of the government. Contrive to let your letters be frequent and instructive: it is upon you I rely for news; fix a price for the couriers, so that when they arrive before such an hour they shall have a gratuity.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief of the Army of the King of Sardinia.

Head-quarters, Milan, Floreal 29, year 4 [May 18, 1796].

I have just given orders, sir, for the two vessels with salt, stopped at Placentia, to continue their route to Valenza.

Perhaps you will think proper to send either a military or civil officer to Placentia to take care that vessels and other convoys belonging to the king are not intercepted by the army. As soon as you have acquainted me with your intentions on this subject, I shall be anxious to furnish that officer with the necessary facilities to enable him to fulfil his mission. He might also be directed to visit the different banks of the Po, to obtain restitution of any effects belonging to the king which we may have seized.

The chief of the staff is despatching orders to the troops that will arrive at Casale to set out immediately for Milan. I have directed my attention to the different remonstrances relative to the province of Alba. I wish, sir, that you may be convinced of the anxiety which I feel to do something that would be agreeable to you.

I request you to send me a list of the officers whom you desire that I should send you in exchange for those whom you have had the complaisance to release on parole.

I am sending an officer of engineers to Valenza, to select a spot for the construction of a bridge there ; but, as I leave to the king the enjoyment of his territories on this side of the Po, which M. Beaulieu evacuated only on my passage of the Po at Placentia, I think it would be but fair that you should yourself give orders for the construction of the said bridge, which it would be useful to me to have before the end of eight days.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 29 Floreal, year 4 [May 18, 1796].

The Duke of Parma is paying his contribution ; he has already paid 500,000 livres, and is providing for the rest. Faipoult would fain have had that prince excused from paying any thing ; but the ambassador of Spain at Turin, who has come to see me, admitted that we had been very moderate. I dare say, however, that the Duke of Parma complains ; but why did he not accept the mediation of Spain ?

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief of the Army of the King of Sardinia.

I have just been informed, sir, that the different military agents in the conquered countries had sequestered the possessions of gentlemen belonging to the court. I have given orders that the sequestrations be immediately taken off, and that no difference be made between the subjects of the king, whether resident in Turin or in the various towns subject to the Republic.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Barthelemy, Ambassador of the Republic at Basle.

Head-quarters, Milan, 1 Prairial, year 4 [May 20, 1796].

We are masters of Lombardy. The troops of the Republic, though in small number and destitute of every thing, have surmounted all obstacles: the enemy has retired to Mantua; to-morrow our corps of troops will be here. I am in haste to be off, and beg you to acquaint me with the movements of the imperial army in Bavaria and Suabia.

Can the emperor weaken his army on the Rhine to reinforce that of Italy? What troops could he still send into the Tyrol? I request you, citizen minister, to communicate to me all the information you possess on that subject, and to send out agents on all sides, that you may be able to let me know with precision what troops would be marched to Italy.

I am extremely flattered that this circumstance has procured me the pleasure of assuring you, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To the Minister of the Finances.

Head-quarters, Milan, 2 Prairial, year 4 [May 21, 1796].

The army of Italy is suffering severe want: it is in the utmost penury and the most deplorable destitution of the most essential necessities: the number of its men is daily increasing, and its wants are increasing in proportion.

The Executive Directory, which has appointed me to the command of that army, has decided upon a plan of offensive

warfare, which requires prompt measures and extraordinary resources.

The allowance of two sous in specie for the private soldier, and eight livres for the officers, has not been received, and this has discontented and discouraged the army. I request you to inform yourself, and to let me know if I am to reckon that the treasury alone will provide, so that the pay may not fail. Of all expenses, this is the most sacred: the army of Italy is the only one which has gone without it.

The minister at war has given orders for the service of Pluviose and part of that of Ventose at different times, according to the annexed account, the sum of; and for the service of the artillery, on the 23rd of the month, 10,000 livres in specie, and 500,000 livres in assignats; and on the 19th Ventose, 30,000 livres in cash, and 1,500,000 livres in assignats.

They complain at the army of having received only a very small portion of that sum. I beg you to cause an account to be delivered to you of what remains to be sent according to the above orders, and to let me know what you hope to do for effecting the entire payment.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Bonelli, Chief of Battalion.

Head-quarters, Milan, 21 Prairial, year 4 [May 21, 1796].

You will go to Corsica, with eighteen men of your own choice. Citizen Sapey is directed to procure you a passage, and to deliver to you supplies of powder and arms. There will be paid to you at your departure 24,000 livres in cash, which you will lay out for encouraging the patriots. Citizen Brassini will remain at Genoa, and transmit to you the supplies that you have need of: he will deliver to you 100 muskets, 300 pair of pistols, 600 pounds of powder, and 10,000 pounds of lead. As soon as more precise information arrives, further supplies will be sent, and officers' commissions for raising battalions on account of the French Republic.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizens Braccini and Paraviccini.

Head-quarters, Milan, 2 Prairial, year 4 [May 21, 1796].

You will remain at Genoa to correspond with the Corsican patriots, to inform me of all that is passing in that department, and to forward supplies to him. Citizen Balbi, banker of the Republic, will remit to you 15,000 livres. With that sum you will buy 100 muskets, 300 pair of pistols, 3000 gun-flints, 5000 to 6000 pounds of powder, and 10,000 pounds of lead, which you will deliver to citizen Bonelli. I am giving orders that there be sent to you from Nice 600 fowling-pieces, which you will forward successively.

The minister of the Republic at Genoa is informed of your mission. You will call upon him, that he may give you whatever you are in need of. You will receive a salary of 300 francs per month while your mission lasts.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Sapey.

Head-quarters, Milan, 2 Prairial, year 4 [May 21, 1796].

I am sending off citizen Bonelli with 30 men and 100 muskets, 300 pair of pistols, 6000 pounds of powder, and 10,000 pounds of lead, to assist the patriots of Corsica.

I have directed citizens Braccini and Paraviccini to remain at Genoa, and to carry on a correspondence with the Corsican patriots. Your zeal being known to me, I desire you to procure citizen Bonelli all the means necessary for passing over to Corsica. I will reimburse the expense you are at on this account.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Faipoult.

Head-quarters, Milan, 2 Prairial, year 4 [May 21, 1796].

Herewith I send you an intercepted letter: you will see that you have spies about you.

Peace is concluded with the King of Sardinia on very advantageous terms; it was signed on the 26th of this month. All is quiet in Paris, and the revolutionists of 1793 are still kept in order and thwarted.

You will find annexed a proclamation to the army. I

prefer that method to addressing the people. The armistice with the Duke of Parma has been approved. The Directory has not thought it too ignominious for that duke.

We have laid an imposition of 20,000,000 francs on the Milanese. I shall choose two fine horses for you out of those which we shall require at Milan: they will help to dispel the ennui and vexations of the country where you are. I shall also make you a present of a sword.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 3 Prairial, year 4 [May 22, 1796].

I have just received, citizens directors, the courier who left Paris on the 26th. He has brought us the articles of the glorious peace which you have concluded with the King of Sardinia. I beg you to accept my congratulations upon it.

The commissioner Salicetti will transmit to you a statement of the contributions that we have imposed. You may at this moment reckon upon six to eight millions of money, in gold or silver, in bullion or jewels, which are at your disposal in Genoa at one of the principal bankers'. You can dispose of that sum, it not being needed for the wants of the army. If you wish it, I will remit a million to Basle for the army of the Rhine.

I have sent General Kellermann 10,000 livres in cash, and to-morrow I shall transmit 200,000 livres to him.

The troops are satisfied; they receive half their pay in money; pillage is repressed, and discipline is reviving with abundance in this glorious army. Nine thousand men of the army of the Alps will arrive in ten days. I shall not wait for them, for the troops are already in motion to march for the gorges of the Tyrol.

The Austrian army is daily receiving reinforcements; but I imagine that our army of the Rhine will not permit the emperor to weaken himself too much in that quarter.

You will find annexed some letters of the highest importance, among the rest one which makes mention of conversations between Louis XVIII. and several of our posts at the army of the Rhine. The intelligence of these parleys is repeated in all the letters of emigrants. I think it important that this should be inquired into.

You will find annexed a statement of what we have taken at Pavia: it is very considerable. We have magazines at Tortona, Coni, Ceva, and Mondovi. The Duke of Parma having neither muskets, nor cannon, nor fortresses, nothing of this kind could be demanded of him.

You will find annexed an address to the army. You will also find the suspension which I have concluded with the Duke of Modena: there, you will see, are 10,000,000 more for the Republic. As he has neither fortresses nor muskets, it was not possible to demand any of him.

BONAPARTE.

PS. Among the letters of emigrants annexed, you will find one from a priest, who writes from Paris to Cardinal Zelada; though not signed, it would be easy to discover the writer, since he says that he supped with General Dumuy the evening before his departure. When once the minister of the police has found out this correspondent of monseigneur the cardinal, it will be easy for him, by causing him to be dogged for some days, to discover others. You will also find the name of a merchant of Lyons, who transmits funds to emigrants.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Parma, 28 Floreal, year 4 [May 17, 1796].

You must have received, general, my despatch by the extraordinary courier: I lose no time in sending back your courier, and replying to your letter of the 27th.

The celebrated picture of St. Jerome, by Correggio, with the four best that could be found here, will be packed tomorrow, and sent to Tortona. As for the others, I repeat to you that it is indispensable, if you would make a good selection, that you should send me some connoisseur from Milan, for I might be deceived, knowing nothing of painting, and having no one to consult.

I am going to send an express to Mantua, and I shall transmit to you the report he will bring me of the position and number of the enemy. The general who commands towards Cremona would, however, have been able to do better service, being nearer to Mantua, and on the other side of the Po: you would at any rate have received his report more speedily.

I am also sending a man to Reggio, though I am assured by persons who have come from the town this morning that all is quiet in that part.

Guastalla belongs to the Duke of Parma: that town is neither fortified nor defended by any troops: there are but a few old invalids of the duke's.

There is a stone bridge over the Secchia, two miles from Reggio, on the Modena road; there are bridges over all the rivers that are met with on the road to Bologna.

It is fifteen miles from this city to Reggio; from Reggio to the bridge over the Secchia, two miles. I await your answer with impatience.

CERVONI.

To the General-in-Chief.

Lodi, 29 Floreal, year 4 [May 18, 1796].

It has been determined that the division of General Massena shall furnish the horse-artillery with three 8-pounders and two six-inch howitzers. If you will order these five pieces to be delivered to-morrow at Lodi, I can assure you that, by the 3rd of next month, you shall have at your disposal the horse-artillery with twelve pieces, provisioned with 150 rounds each, 100 of them grape.

DOMMARTIN.

To the General-in-Chief.

Parma, 30 Floreal, year 4 [May 19, 1796].

I have this instant received, general, the reports of the trusty persons whom I sent to Mantua by different roads, and neither knowing of the mission of the other. Both agree in assuring me that three days ago reinforcements of troops, coming from the Tyrol, entered Mantua: one represents them as amounting to 5000, the other to 7000 men. They are labouring very hard to repair the fortifications of Mantua, and to establish new batteries: in these works, they employ not only the troops but the people of the country and city: there is an incessant bustle, and a mortal agitation prevails among the troops, as well as the inhabitants. General Beaulieu declares unreservedly that the emperor ought to make peace or to send him 60,000 men.

A line has been formed for defending the dikes of the lakes Mincio and Garda, which supply the ditches of Mantua with water; it is in the defence of this line that nearly all the wrecks of his army are employed: he is constructing camps and entrenching himself everywhere outside: he does not reside himself in Mantua, but is fortifying himself at Marcheria, and has broken down the bridge of the Oglio, twelve miles distant from Mantua.

My spies assert that the Austrians have not considerable magazines: want is beginning to be felt, and discouragement is at its height among them. There is not an Austrian on this side of the Po.

In order to obtain these particulars the more speedily, I made these expresses travel by post: I shall do the same with those whom I shall send to the mouth of the Po, that you may be promptly apprized of whatever there may be new in that quarter.

It is sixty miles from Parma to Sarzana: there is a well-beaten road, but not passable for carriages; the rivers that you meet with are all fordable.

I told you in my last that it is impossible for the Duke of Parma, notwithstanding his good will, to furnish us with the oats that he has promised us. Instead of oats, I have authorized the inspector of forage to receive beans and Turkey corn, on the understanding of a just augmentation. When all the resources of this kind in the duchy are exhausted, I shall have what has not been furnished in kind levied in money.

I have likewise told you that there are no studs in the territories of Parma: there is no good breed of horses in the country, consequently there are but very few horses, and those very bad. Yesterday, out of seven or eight hundred that were brought to us, we were obliged to reject nearly half, as being unfit for any kind of service in the army. I see no possibility of extracting 500 good saddle-horses from this duchy, and it will be very difficult for it to furnish us with 200 for draught: you know that in these parts the people use bullocks for transport. When I have despatched all the horses that can be supplied, and am convinced of the impossibility of levying more, I will render you an account, that you may fix the sum which I ought to demand in lieu of those not furnished.

One hundred saddle-horses, the best of the bad, will start

to-morrow for Milan, under the conduct of Captain Fresnel, whom I have ordered to leave ten with General Serrurier. Among these hundred horses, there are sixteen out of the duke's stables, eight of them saddle and eight coach-horses. The captain has orders to deliver them to none but you: they may serve for yourself, Salicetti, and the chief of the staff. Besides these, Captain Fresnel has selected some other good ones. The inspector of carriages will forward those destined for the artillery to the Adda.

The famous St. Jerome, the Madona della Scudella, the Taking down from the Cross, the Martyr, forming a companion to that picture, and St. John preaching in the Wilderness—these five pictures are the best in the country, are already packed, and will go off to-night. I will have the others which you have pointed out to me secured, and forward them to Tortona as speedily as possible.

CERVONI.

To the General-in-Chief.

Pizzigitone, 1 Prairial, year 4 [May 20, 1796].

Annexed, I forward to you two reports, one by a spy whom I had sent to Cremona, the other by a captain of the 10th regiment of horse chasseurs, whom I had sent with a flag of truce. It is almost impossible to get well served by the people of the country as spies: they dare not venture upon ground occupied by an enemy's army, and what they report is but vague.

According to the report of the spy, the enemy is entirely on the other side of the Oglio; he has his advanced posts on the left bank of that river, and his cavalry in advance of the infantry: the bulk of his army is encamped in the rear of Mantua. He has few troops in that city, a considerable camp at Basega, nobody on the banks of the Oglio, ascending towards Rhina; but there are troops at Marlaria: he knows not the total force of the enemy, and that of his different positions.

The report of Captain Allico is as follows:—"On the 28th I pushed on to Marlaria, passing through Bossolo; the enemy allowed me to approach to the bank of the Oglio, where I had time to reconnoitre his position. I remarked three pieces of cannon, one placed at the end of a bridge, and sweeping that as well as the road leading to

Bossolo: the other two are placed about fifty or sixty fathoms to the right and left of the first: that on the right plays upon a dike running diagonally towards the Oglio; that on the left is masked by some trees, and plays upon a field of wheat on the left of the road leading from Marlaria to Bossolo. I remarked, moreover, that the bridge had been half burned; but the piles and the framework were left. I think it would be easy to repair it."

DALLEMAGNE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Pizzigitone, 2 Prairial, year 4 [May 21, 1796].

A countryman whom I despatched from Bina to ascertain the force and the position of the enemy, has returned this morning. He reports that he descended the right bank of the Oglio to Marlaria; that the enemy has sunk all the ferry-boats as far as that place; that he saw nobody on the left bank; and that, from the information which he obtained, the enemy has 6000 infantry at Marlaria and very few cavalry.

DALLEMAGNE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Turin, May 21, 1796 [2 Prairial, year 4].

The boats necessary for the construction of the bridge are all at the appointed place. I have already had advice that the column coming by way of Argentières has arrived in the valley of the Stura; that of the valley of Aosta will likewise have entered it on the 19th; but on this occasion I must tell you that General Kellermann announces a second passage through that valley, which we had not agreed upon, and which would be extremely prejudicial to the country through which this second column would pass. My brother, who commands at the valley of Aosta, has written on this subject to General Kellermann, to apprise him that this would not be conformable with the conventions; so that I flatter myself there will still be time to give orders that this second column shall pursue the route of Argentières instead of that of the St. Bernard.

I have thought to write you this, that you may be in-

formed of all our proceedings, having the greatest confidence in your manner of acting towards me, and the strongest desire to do everything that can be agreeable to you.

I have also resolved to address myself directly to you, to beg of you to give orders that the peasants in the country occupied by the French armies may be allowed the possibility of tilling their lands and sowing for a second crop ; which, I think, will be as beneficial for the French army as even for the country where produce is more abundant. As it is just about the time when they ought to begin, I have been anxious to press the subject upon you ; and with great pleasure I seize this occasion to testify the distinguished sentiments which I have for you, monsieur le general.

VICTOR EMMANUEL.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

Paris, 26 Floreal, year 4 [May 18, 1796].

The Directory has received, citizen-general, your letter dated Lodi, the 22nd instant. You know how to follow up victory, and this rapid and uninterrupted series of successes promises France the conquest of nearly all Italy, and the immense resources possessed by that great and rich peninsula.

Immortal glory to the victors of Lodi ! Honour to the general-in-chief, who prepared for the daring attack on the bridge of that town, by going through the ranks of the French warriors, and exposing himself to the most murderous fire of the enemy, and disposing everything for victory ! Honour to the intrepid Berthier, who rushed on at the head of that fierce and formidable republican column which overturned and overthrew the enemy ! Honour to generals Massena, Cervoni, Dallemagne, to the chiefs of brigade Saluce, Dupas, and Sugni, to adjutant-major Toiret, of the third battalion of the grenadiers ! Glory to the gallant second battalion of the carabineers, to those victorious grenadiers who decided the issue of that battle ! Glory to the brave division commanded by General Augereau and to its leader ! Glory to the commissioner of the government Salicetti !

Ye have conquered, French Republicans, ye have saved your country, ye are consolidating the Republic, ye are an-

nihilating that monstrous coalition, which would have swallowed us up ; ye are making peace by inflicting redoubled blows on those senseless Austrians, who, with an obstinacy which is fatal to them, have hitherto refused to accept it. The Directory becomes with pleasure the organ of all the friends of the Republic, and it is never tired of giving you the praises which are due to your courage and to the daring intrepidity which characterizes you.

Yes, general, you know how to follow up victory : what signifies it on what day you will be in Milan, since that city belongs to the Republic, and you have caused the castle to be invested ! Your plan is the only one to pursue : Beaulieu must be followed up till he is annihilated, till you have so dispersed him that he finds it utterly impossible to undertake anything, or even to show himself during this campaign. Continue then to pursue him, wherever he may be, with that perseverance which you have hitherto displayed, and desist not till the Austrian army is utterly destroyed.

The despatches which the Directory has addressed to you on the 18th, 26th, and 27th Floreal, contain the bases of the movements which will be left for you to make, after the entire overthrow of Beaulieu and the conquest of the Milanese. As soon as that important operation is finished, and the conditions of the peace concluded with Sardinia have been ratified by the Legislative Body and the Court of Turin, you will divide the troops under your command into two parts. You will command those which are to secure the whole of Italy, and General Kellermann, required by the commissioner of the government Salicetti, will command that of the Milanese by the name of the army of the Alps, and will despatch, if the forces which you leave him permit, some divisions and parties to the gorges of the Tyrol, &c.

One part of the numerous troops at present composing the army of the Alps, augmented by the reinforcements which the situation of Lyons shall permit us to draw from that city, will be able to advance into Piedmont, and contribute to the execution of the treaty of peace, by occupying the places which are to be delivered up to us, in conformity with Art. 12 ; and in Mont Blanc, the Upper and Lower Alps, and Faussigni, there must be left only the forces indispensable for maintaining tranquillity, which evil disposed persons might attempt to disturb.

For these essential operations you will concert with the commissioner of the government Salicetti and the general-in-chief Kellermann, with whom you will fix the demarcations between the two armies and the arrondissements assigned to the service of each of them.

The Directory has reserved for you the conduct of the columns that are to go to Leghorn to chastise the English, because it considers that operation as of superior importance ; because the fate of the island of Corsica depends upon it, in some measure ; because it will make London tremble, and give a mortal blow to the English, the sole supporters and conductors of the coalition, which seems at length ready to crumble to pieces. It attaches to the immediate execution of this plan a much greater interest than to the dangerous expedition into the Tyrol ; in executing it, you will make the tiara of the self-styled head of the universal Church totter, and you will impose on the King of Naples conditions of peace, as advantageous to France as they will be disastrous to the perfidious English and their allies.

The march which you propose towards Tyrol is grand, no doubt, but it is environed with obstacles difficult to surmount. The Directory has partly developed the dangers of it in its despatch of the 18th of Floreal, to which it refers ; besides, it considers that enterprise as absolutely dependent on your future successes in Italy. The way in which it might be advisable to prepare for it would be this : For your march upon Leghorn and the States of the Church, you will take with you no more troops than are indispensably necessary to ensure your success at Leghorn, Rome, and Naples ; the rest, as we have observed, will be transferred to the general-in-chief Kellermann, who will closely pursue the wrecks of the Austrians into the mountains of the Tyrol, and push strong parties into Germany as far as he can, as well to levy contributions as to disturb the communications of the Austrian armies on the Rhine. If the army which you will command needs reinforcements, they shall be immediately drawn from that under General Kellermann, upon the requisition made for that purpose by the commissioners of the government. You will leave, conjointly with that general, in the Milanese, and to secure your communications with France, no more troops than are strictly indispensable for the fulfilment of that object ; and General Kellermann will dispose militarily in the moun-

tains of the Tyrol the greater part of those under his orders, so as to screen them from the heats of the plain, and the diseases which they cannot fail to occasion.

Your marches towards the south of Italy ought to be sharp and rapid: the immense resources which they will afford you will be forwarded without delay to France. Leave nothing in Italy that our political situation permits us to carry off, and that may be useful to us. If this plan is executed as the Directory hopes, it will then be the more possible to resume towards autumn the enterprise of penetrating into the heart of Germany, inasmuch as our armies of the Rhine will by that time have been able to strike vigorous blows. That of Italy has not only shown them the way to victory; it has facilitated it to them. The Austrian, dismayed at your successes, has probably already given orders for drawing from his armies on the Rhine numerous reinforcements to oppose your progress; and hence arises the necessity for giving to General Kellermann the greatest possible force, that he may find himself at all times in the situation of the offensive in the quarter of the Tyrol.

They are not yet fighting on the Rhine. The army of the Sambre and Meuse is forming its magazines with difficulty. It has not, like the brave army of Italy, a fertile plain before it, and it is obliged to secure for itself beforehand the means of subsistence in the sterile country of Berg and in northern Wetteravia. That of the Rhine and Moselle is in extreme destitution: its cavalry is an absolute cipher for want of horses: it is also in want of money for its services. It is, moreover, beset and undermined by abuses and peculations of every kind. The foot carabineers of the army of Italy have by their valour furnished the means for remounting the horse carabineers of that of the Rhine and Moselle; if you can send horses to them and to the other cavalry troops of that army, hesitate not to do so, and concert with the General-in-Chief Moreau to arrange for their reception: and the same in regard to the means of transport and the distress for cash in which it finds itself.

The moment when the enemy shall draw forces from his armies on the Rhine to oppose them to ours in Italy, is that which the Directory would choose for breaking the armistice in the north: it is employing all its means to accomplish

this, but fears that the campaign cannot be opened before the harvest, which will supply the French troops with the means of subsistence that they are in want of.

If your general officers of cavalry fail to do their duty, bring them to trial without mercy, turn them out, send them to the rear, purge that arm and make it worthy of the army of Italy. The Directory has just given orders for general-officers of cavalry, of high reputation, general of division Sahuguet and general of brigade Beaurevoir, to start by post to join it. You will soon furnish the latter with occasion to earn the rank of general of division, to which his distinguished services already give him some claim.

If your commissaries of war are not good, get some appointed by the commissioner of government Salicetti. The Directory knows that you will not put into office any but men of probity, intelligence, and activity.

The Republic of Venice will perhaps be able to furnish us with money: you may even raise a loan at Verona, where the pretended Louis XVIII. resided. The Directory suggests this idea for your consideration, and commits the execution of it to the commissioner of the government Salicetti and yourself.

It is writing fresh letters of congratulation to the brave men of the army of Italy: it is waiting for the plans of your battles and of your marches; you cannot be in want of draughtsmen in Italy. What are your young officers of engineers about, eh?

The Directory will immediately grant promotion to the officers for whom you solicit it; and it will give new tokens of satisfaction to those who have distinguished themselves.

It applauds the perfect harmony which prevails between you, General Kellermann, the commissioner of government Salicetti, and the general of division chief of the staff Berthier. It will sincerely rejoice to hear of the entire defeat of the army of Beaulieu and the taking of Milan.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 2 Prairial, year 4 [May 21, 1796].

The Directory has received, citizen-general, your letter

of the 25th Floreal, apprising it of the taking of Pizzigione and the possession of Cremona and all Lombardy: it congratulates afresh the army of Italy and him who commands it. It has made a glorious preparation for the festival of victory which the entire Republic will celebrate on the 10th of Prairial.

The Directory deems it superfluous to repeat to-day what it has said to you in its last despatches, concerning the necessity of watching all the movements of Beaulieu and not losing sight of him for a single moment. If you are apprehensive that he will receive reinforcements, attack him before they join him, and neglect nothing to prevent that junction. The enemy must not be allowed time to recruit himself; we must not weaken ourselves in his presence, and, above all, not furnish him, by a disastrous frittering away of our force, with the means of beating us in detail and recovering the ground that he has lost.

The separation of the army of Italy into two parts must not take place till Beaulieu is absolutely incapable of undertaking anything. Your first object therefore, general, is to destroy his army and to disperse it entirely: it would take advantage of the moments of rest which you should grant it to recover from the terror which the arms of the Republic have struck into it, and it would soon try to become daring.

Defer the expedition to Leghorn, Rome, and Naples, till what you conceive to be a favourable moment; but let it be rapid, and let its complete success, especially against the English, permit your speedy return to make head against the troops which the court of Vienna might be able to send.

You appear desirous, citizen-general, to continue to conduct the whole series of the military operations of the present campaign in Italy. The Directory has maturely considered of this proposition, and *the confidence which it has in your talents and your republican zeal have decided this question in favour of the affirmative.* The General-in-Chief Kellermann will remain at Chambery, and merely attend to the occupation of the places that are to be given up to us by the treaty of peace. The army of Italy will continue to keep garrison in those which it entered in virtue of the armistice, as well as in Valenza or Alexandria, which that treaty grants us provisionally.

The expedition to Leghorn is the first thing to be undertaken after the defeat of Beaulieu: the Directory has explained the reasons in its late despatches; it leaves to you the choice of the time and of the means of execution, and it will learn, with warm satisfaction, the news of this triumph over the perfidious English.

The rest of the military operations towards Germany and in the Mantuan are absolutely dependent on your success against Beaulieu. The Directory is sensible how difficult it would be to direct them from Paris; on this point, therefore, it leaves you the greatest latitude, recommending to you extreme prudence. Its decided intention, however, is that the army should not proceed beyond the Tyrol till after the expedition to the south of Italy.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 3 Prairial, year 4 [May 22, 1796].

The Directory sends you, citizen-general, twelve swords destined for the officers who have distinguished themselves in the passage of the Po and the battle of Lodi, as well as in the actions which took place previously. You will find the names of the officers annexed. The Directory requests you to deliver publicly these testimonies of the satisfaction that it has felt at their conduct.

CARNOT.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Crema, 5 Prairial, year 4 [May 24, 1796].

On my arrival at Crema, I set out immediately for Soncino, where I found the advanced guard. I then proceeded to the Oglio, where there is no bridge, nor even a boat, the little one which was there having been sunk. This river is very inconsiderable at this season; it is about twenty fathoms wide at most, and is fordable in several places, especially at the passage of Soncino, where the water reaches no higher than a man's knees in the deepest parts. I ordered General Kilmaine to get a small bridge upon trestles constructed in the night, that the infantry might pass on the morrow dry-shod. I sent him twenty louis for the construction of this bridge, not having received the

twenty-five which you had directed General Dallemagne to give him: he told me that Augereau and Serrurier had arrived in their new positions. I have given orders to generals Massena, Augereau, Serrurier, and Kilmaine, to execute the movement which you have directed, in order that the divisions of the army may take a position at Brescia.

The scouts have been as far as two leagues in advance of Soncino, and not met with the enemy. All accounts agree in stating that he has his advanced posts between the Mincio and the Chiesa, at Castiglione delle Stiviere, with about 1200 horse. The body of the army is encamped, it is said, behind the Mincio.

On my return, I met with an adjutant of the staff, who brought me your orders in pencil to march off in the night for Milan two regiments of horse, two battalions of the 21st, a battalion of grenadiers, and four pieces of light artillery, which I hope will reach you before daylight.

I did think that on account of these movements the march of the divisions for Brescia ought to be suspended: but, having closely examined your pencil-notes, and found nothing to that effect, I have made no change in your dispositions, and the troops will execute the general movement which you have ordered on Brescia. If this was an oversight on your part, be pleased to send me a courier, and I will stop the troops upon march. Till the receipt of your orders, the troops, I apprise you, will execute the movement that you have directed.

I am much grieved at the disturbances which have taken place at Pavia, but I hope that you will do strict justice, and that the example will serve to prevent any other insurrection, and to intimidate the nobles and the priests.

A. BERTHIER.¹

To the General-in-Chief.

Pavia, 5 Floreal, year 4 [April 24, 1796].

I, the undersigned, divisionary general of the armies of the French Republic, certify that, being yesterday on my way to Pavia and thence to head-quarters, whither I had orders to repair, and having with me an aide-de-camp, citizen

¹ General Alexandre Berthier, then chief of the staff of the army, afterwards prince of Neufchâtel.

Dutaillis, aide-de-camp of General Berthier, a chief of battalion, and another officer, we remarked the terrified looks of the persons we met coming from Pavia: we heard the alarm-bell ring, and several musket-shots fired, and a peasant told us that the enemy was in the city; that, not believing this news, but not suspecting that there was any disturbance, we continued to advance towards the city, where we were persuaded that the division of General Augereau still was; that, on reaching the gates, we were not a little surprised not to find there either posts or sentinels, and to see consternation upon every countenance; that, on arriving in the Place of the municipality, we there found a great number of men armed with muskets, pistols, swords, &c., and many country-people, with arms and tools of all kinds; that a considerable party of volunteers on the steps of the Town-house called out to us, that the people had disarmed all the posts and wanted to kill them; that, thinking to overawe this assemblage, I advanced on horseback; that those who had retired on our arrival again making their appearance and aiming at us on all sides, with frightful shouts, I thought it advisable to alight; that, no sooner had the other officers and myself set foot on the ground, than the people seized all our horses; that we found the commandant of the place, who assured us that the concourse was immense; that I ordered him to go to the castle, to send out strong patrols, and to try all means for restoring order; that, having endeavoured to execute this order, he found it impossible; that, meanwhile, the people, with loud shouts, furiously demanded the disarming of the garrison, promising to respect it and to disperse as soon as it had delivered up its arms; that for two hours I refused to accede to this proposal; that, at length, the furious populace broke into the Town-house, entered the room where I was, and dragged me from it; that the municipal officers who were about me covered me with their bodies; that, unable to prevent my being dragged to the Place, they kept by me, and exerted all their efforts to restrain the people, some of whom rushed upon me, while others took aim at me, and at length, thanks to their interference, I came off with a wound from a bayonet between the shoulders, which, though it well nigh prostrated me, did not enter far; that, led by the people from street to street, these municipal officers never left me for a moment; that, during this time, their col-

leagues placed in safety the guard which had been disarmed, and the officers who had come with me, and provided for their wants; that others strove to pacify the people, and had recourse for that purpose to persuasion, which was the only means they had, since they had not a single armed man at their disposal; that, not having succeeded in making the people listen to reason, they did contrive by great exertions to save us all from their fury; that to their anxious care we are indebted for our lives; that in every respect their conduct has been that of good magistrates, of virtuous men, in whom crime excites abhorrence, and who, from the impulse of their hearts, have done every thing in the world to render us service, and exposed themselves to the danger of perishing with us.

In faith of which, I have delivered to them these presents.

HAQUIN.

To the General-in-Chief.

Head-quarters, Crema, 6 Prairial, year 4 [May 25, 1796].

I have just received, general, your letter of the 6th Prairial, and am glad to see that tranquillity is restored in Milan. The example which you have made on the way to Pavia will intimidate the evil-disposed. Pavia appears even to deserve extremely rigorous measures. The army expects from your energy and your wisdom the dispositions necessary to make us respected, but it wishes for you with impatience.

I think, for my own part, that it is very necessary for you to repair to the army, which is near the enemy. All that part between Cremona and the position now occupied by General Serrurier uncovers our right, but, as the enemy is on the defensive, we ought not to presume that he is seeking to attack us. I have, therefore, given General Serrurier all the instructions necessary to keep him from compromising himself.

Hereto I annex an extract of the dispositions that I have ordered: you will there see that the army is collected into a space of eight or nine miles, from left to right, but this position can be but momentary, and your presence is absolutely necessary to determine our march upon the enemy. I have found the head-quarters, remaining at Crema, too far in the rear of Brescia; I am moving them to Soncino,

where we expect you this evening. I shall go forward myself, and take care to apprise you of all the news I receive of the enemy.

I have left the paymaster and the park of artillery at Crema till your arrival.

AL. BERTHIER.

Extracts of the Orders given for the Execution of the Movement directed by the General-in-Chief.

Crema, 6 Prairial, year 4 [May 25, 1796].

Orders were given yesterday to General Kilmaine to set out very early this morning with all the troops of the advanced guard from the position which he occupied at Soncino, for the purpose of taking a new one at Brescia, where he will arrive to-day; that general is informed of the movements prescribed to generals Massena, Augereau, and Serrurier.

General Massena received orders yesterday to set out very early in the morning of to-day, the 6th Prairial, from the position which he occupied at Ofelingo, with all the troops under his command, for the purpose of taking to-day a new one at Casale, about four miles in rear of Brescia, on the road to Soncino: he is informed of the movements which the advanced guard and generals Kilmaine, Augereau, and Serrurier have orders to make; he will cross the Oglio at Soncino.

General Augereau received orders yesterday to set out very early in the morning of to-day, with all the troops under his command, from the position which he occupied at Fontanella, and to proceed to Baitella, four miles in rear of Brescia, on the road to Bergamo: it is believed that he can pass through Castrenala. If he cannot cross the Oglio at Fontanella, his orders direct him to come and cross at Soncino: he is informed of the movements which the advanced guard and the divisions of generals Massena and Serrurier are to make.

Orders were yesterday despatched to General Serrurier to set out very early this morning from the position which he occupied at Butana, with all the troops under his command, and to take a new position in rear of the Molla, having Bagnolo in advance of him, and Cuisanella in rear of his left. If he can cross the Oglio at Bordanula, he will

follow the road to Padernello and Della ; and, if he cannot cross it at that place, he will come and cross at Soncino, and thence proceed to the position specified above : he is informed of the movements prescribed to generals Kilmaine, Massena, and Augereau.

Two battalions of the 21st demi-brigade set out yesterday evening for Milan, as did also the 20th regiment of dragoons, and the 24th regiment of horse-chasseurs.

The head-quarters break up this evening for Soncino.

AL. BERTHIER.

To the General-in-Chief.

Head-quarters, Soncino, 7 Prairial, year 4 [May 26, 1796].

Since the arrival of your aide-de-camp, Lemarois, I have heard nothing whatever from you, and it is now twenty-four hours since he left you. We are all extremely uneasy at this silence, and the more so because your presence appears to me indispensable here on all accounts, both military and administrative.

At ten o'clock last night, I had not received intelligence of the arrival of the troops at the position which they are to occupy on the Brescia. A letter has this moment reached me from citizen Faultrier, who is staying at Crema till further orders, who writes that a citizen from Lodi, an inhabitant of that town, had informed him that there existed at Lodi an assemblage of five or six thousand peasants against the French, but that, this man not having given his name, and he himself thinking that he had no right to order him to be arrested in a neutral country, the report might be considered as extremely vague, especially since no other advice of it had reached Crema. But, sensible of the importance of ascertaining the truth, at eleven o'clock at night, I despatched Adjutant-General Boyer, with his assistants, with orders to repair first to Crema and then to Lodi, to make the most minute inquiries into the state of things ; and, in case the insurrection should prove true, to acquaint me with it, and himself cross the Adda, either above or below Lodi, to rejoin you and communicate to you all he had learned.

At five this morning, I received a letter from Adjutant-General Boyer, dated Crema, in which he informs me that they have there no intelligence of any movement at Lodi ;

but that he is pursuing his course to that town, to fulfil completely the instructions which I have given him. It is now nine in the morning, and I have no news as yet from Lodi, which makes me presume that all is quiet.

At six this morning I received a letter from General Kilmaine, who acquaints me that at eight yesterday evening he reached Brescia, where his troops arrived extremely fatigued, as well by the heat as by the length of the march, and owing to the new shoes which his men had received. The only intelligence that he could obtain respecting the enemy is, that there is a considerable corps of cavalry at Castiglione: he informs me that he shall have a reconnaissance made this morning, and that he hopes to receive more certain tidings. Generals Massena and Augereau likewise send me word that they have arrived in the positions specified to them, four miles in the rear of Brescia; the first on the road from that town to Soncino; the second on the road from that same town to Bergamo.

Respecting General Serrurier, who ought to be on the right of Massena, I have no sort of intelligence. The latter informs me that he thought yesterday evening that he heard cannon on his right; but I should imagine that if General Serrurier had been aware that the enemy was so near, he would have apprized us of it at head-quarters. I sent off to him yesterday an adjutant, from whom I have no tidings, and who was to return hither after he had seen General Massena. I am going to despatch a second, to endeavour to learn what is become of him. Being likely to receive, from one moment to another, either orders from you or news from the divisions, I have thought it right not to leave the head-quarters.

I repeat, general, that I think your presence here extremely important. For the rest, citizen Lemarois, your aide-de-camp, will supply all that is deficient in this letter.

AL. BERTHIER.

PS. I open my letter, general, to inform you, that the adjutant whom I sent to ascertain the position of General Serrurier has this moment arrived: he reports that this general has taken a position at Guizanella, in rear of Mello, four or five miles on the right of General Massena: he has not received any direct news of the enemy. On leaving Cremona, he received a flag of truce, bringing a packet for me, relative to the exchange of prisoners.

The Oglio having risen a foot, which renders it less fordable, I have ordered a bridge fit for the passage of infantry to be immediately constructed. Your four divisions, including the advanced guard, form at present 27,700 men under arms, infantry and cavalry, concentrated in rear of Brescia, in a space of ten or twelve miles.

AL. BERTHIER.

To the General-in-Chief.

Pavia, 9 Prairial, year 4 [May 28, 1796].

Order, tranquillity, and even confidence, begin to be restored in Pavia and its environs.

Five hundred and fifty men of the garrison of Tortona have arrived here. They had at their head Adjutant-General Gillyvieux. As I was alone here, I have kept him with me. These troops have not brought the two pieces of cannon which you ordered to be sent hither from Tortona. I have written to the commandant of artillery at Lodi, requesting him to complete promptly what is deficient here for the service of the two pieces of cannon which you have left me, and also to send me immediately two caissons of cartridges, the troops having none but what are in their cartouche-boxes; to send me, moreover, two 8-pounders and their caissons; and, lastly, all the supplies necessary for the service of four pieces of cannon and a garrison of 2000 men, for a month. I beg you, general, to be pleased to order this application to be complied with; that is to say, if you approve it. I have desired, in the most express manner, the commissary of war to supply the fort, without the slightest delay, with provisions and all other necessaries for a garrison of 2000 men for a month.

Nothing has come hither but the third battalion of the 84th demi-brigade, which has gone again for Milan. I have left me here the 14th demi-brigade, the 51st, the 46th, 210 horse, 30 artillerymen, and the old garrison of Pavia, forming as yet but a small corps: the disarming of the city has produced more fowling-pieces than muskets, and then these are in great part Austrian. The people have disarmed with a good grace, and I believe too with good faith. A great number of villages have already laid down their arms, and they are successively arriving. I have circulated throughout the whole province a proclama-

tion, which will no doubt produce the desired effect. French arms must be expected to come in from the villages, for it was their inhabitants who disarmed our troops. As soon as those belonging to the old garrison are armed, I shall send them, according to your orders, to their respective corps.

Citizen Ponge, commandant of engineers, is engaged in constructing bridges over the Gravelonne and the Po: he represented to me that he was alone here, that he had need of some one to assist him, and earnestly intreated me to keep here citizen Bouchu, captain of artillery, attached to the equipage of bridges, till the bridges are finished. I have thought it right to accede to this request, and ordered Captain Bouchu to remain temporarily with citizen Ponge till your decision.

The new municipality, chosen by the commissioner of the government, could not be installed till yesterday afternoon. The course of affairs requiring the old one to be left in its functions till this moment, it was not put under arrest before to-day. Of the eleven members who composed it, three left the city before the arrival of the French, the eight others are arrested.

The commissioner of the government and myself have thought it right to demand of the new municipality, composed of patriots, accurate and positive information concerning the members of the old, to submit this to you, and to wait for a further order, in addition to that which you have given me relative to the members of the old municipality. Be it what it will, it shall be executed on the receipt of it: but, general, permit me to implore your clemency and kindness for men of whom such disadvantageous accounts are presented to you; for aged, feeble men, without energy, who, unaccustomed to popular commotions, lost their presence of mind amidst the frightful disorder that prevailed here; for men whom I saw addressing the people, using towards them the only means in their power, persuasion; for men, in short, who saved the lives, and rendered all possible assistance to the officers I had with me, and to more than 150 disarmed volunteers, whom by their prudent measures they rescued from the fury of the people, as well as myself. The pillage has ruined them all. I can assure you, general, that it is not death and terror that require to be suspended over Pavia; all within it is fright-

ful consternation: the lesson which the inhabitants have received is awful: all that we have left us to do is to conciliate them, to gain their confidence; and by humanity and mildness alone shall we succeed.

I invoke with confidence those estimable qualities of your heart: follow its impulse, general, and your name will still be dear to a people which knows that it has deserved the treatment you have inflicted on it. I await your orders with inexpressible anxiety.

The commissioner of the government has transmitted to me to-day a list of the persons to be seized as hostages: they shall be apprehended to-day, and I shall await your orders for sending them to Tortona: none have yet come to me from Milan. The commissioner of the government finding me violently attacked by fever, and incapable of attending to every thing, has required General Serviez to remain here. Be pleased, general, to leave me that excellent officer: I cannot do without him while I am ill.

HAQUIN.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Loano, 10 Prairial, year 4 [May 29, 1796].

Last night, between twelve and one o'clock, two English frigates and a brig appeared off the road of Vado, with the intention of securing the flotilla lying in that road. They despatched nine boats with troops, and were already within half musket-shot, when they were discovered. The commandant of the troops in the place ordered the drums to beat to arms, and in less than seven minutes the artillerymen and the infantry were at their posts. Meanwhile the Infante brig kept up a brisk fire both of grape and chain-shot upon the enemy. The English retired precipitately, setting up loud cries, which causes us to presume that they have lost a great number of men: three of their boats must have been sunk, for we have seen but six this morning.¹

All the troops deserve praise, and particularly the captain and crew of the Infante.

SAURET.

¹ The inferences of the French general relative to our tars and their boats may have appeared most conclusive to himself; but an English reader must consider them as far more patriotic than logical.

To the General-in-Chief.

Turin, May 29, 1796 [10 Prairial, year 4].

Having been required by General Kellermann to grant a passage through the valley of Suza to a demi-brigade of French troops, and not feeling myself authorized to give an answer, it being our intention to allow troops to march only through the valley of Aosta and that of Stura, I have taken the commands of the king on the subject, who, considering the distance which these troops have already travelled to come towards Lanslebourg, and from his desire to satisfy you, has ordered me to prepare every thing for their march through the valley of Suza, for this time only, flattering himself that, out of reciprocity, you will be pleased to inform General Kellermann that in future the ordinary directions through the valley of Aosta and Stura will be given to any troops proceeding through Piedmont to Lombardy. As to the artillery, however, the road of Mont Genevre being the most commodious, there is no difficulty to prevent you from continuing to prefer it. I doubt not, knowing the consideration which you have always had for me, that you will believe the accuracy of my representation; and I assure you that I shall never cease, on my part, to do on other occasions whatever I can, without prejudice to his Majesty, for your satisfaction.

VICTOR EMMANUEL.

To the General-in-Chief.

Tortona, 10 Prairial, year 4 [May 29, 1796].

Your orders did not reach me till I was at Alba. I am a day behind-hand in my march. I shall arrive at Placencia on the 13th. The route that we are pursuing is very dangerous for stragglers: I have found several who had been murdered; but it is the convoys of ammunition that run the greatest risk. Owing to the weakness of the garrisons, these escorts are but small, so that this ammunition is liable to fall into the hands of the gangs of banditti, and to increase their means.

The rebels of Arquata having taken 123 volunteers, and made prize of a sum of 100,000 francs, General Meinier, agreeably to the advice of a council of war, desired me to let him have 1600 men of the column under the command

of General Vallette for a nocturnal expedition. I thought it right to comply with this requisition of urgency, and am proceeding to my destination with 3000 men, and the surplus of General Vallette's column. If you have to employ us immediately, we will do our best to prevent your missing the 1600 men, who are likely to be absent for a few days.

VAUBOIS.

To the General-in-Chief.

Castel Novo, 11 Prairial, year 4 [May 30, 1796].

The enemy has evacuated Castel Novo, and is in full retreat. I am taking the cavalry of the advanced guard, and four pieces of light artillery, to pursue him. The infantry of the advanced guard has orders to follow, with the rest of the light artillery. This evening I shall have the honour to give you an account of my luck. I cannot send you a circumstantial detail of the affair of Borghetto, being too much pressed; but, meanwhile, I cannot refrain from assuring you that the chief of brigade Leclerc, of the 10th regiment of chasseurs, has particularly distinguished himself. It was he who, at the head of some chasseurs, decided the rout of the enemy by one of the most vigorous charges that I have ever seen. General Gardanne was the first who passed the river at the head of some grenadiers, up to the shoulders in water. General Murat made a superb charge at the head of the 10th regiment of hussars. It was he who decided the second rout of the enemy.

KILMAINE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Turin, June 1, 1796 [13 Prairial, year 4].

I inform you that peasants of the province of Alba, irritated by the vexations of one Bonnafous and his adherents, and by the violence which he has sought to do to their principles, have ventured to seize him in the territory of the French demarcation, without having received the least order or the least instigation on the part of the government; and they have brought him to Turin.

The king, my brother, considering his apprehension as illegal, since Castion, the place where he was arrested, has not yet reverted under his authority, has ordered him to be

taken back to the limits of the demarcation and set at liberty.

He doubts not that, in reciprocity for this proceeding, and to avert also the disagreeable circumstances that may arise from the vexations experienced by the peasants of some provinces of the demarcation from the underhand dealings of Bonnafous and adherents, you will be pleased to issue strict orders for putting an end to them; and the king hopes at the same time that this affair will have no unpleasant consequences for the inhabitants of the village of Castion.

VICTOR EMMANUEL.

To the General-in-Chief.

Pavia, 12 Prairial, year 4 [May 31, 1796].

Quiet and tranquillity are perfectly restored in Pavia; great harmony prevails here between the troops and the inhabitants. The latter, most of whom are reduced to poverty, attribute the cause of their misfortune to the country people: the latter may have been instigated; but it is certain, and I can attest from having seen it, that it was they in fact who occasioned the disorder and kept up the insurrection in Pavia. Be this as it may, the inhabitants of both city and country are so terrified at the consequences of their conduct, that it will be long before they think of beginning again. The disarming of the city is finished, and I have no doubt that it has been done in good faith. That of the country must likewise have been effected. The villages have made their submission; the arms of a great number of communes have already arrived here; it is only the most distant that have not yet been able to bring them to Pavia; but the business will be completed to-day or to-morrow. I await your orders to declare that the just severity which you have been obliged to exercise is about to give place to pardon and clemency.

Yesterday, two 6-pounders, with artillerymen and the ammunition necessary for their service, arrived here: they are in battery in the fort. Infantry cartridges have not been sent; yet I am in want of them, and I have just written to General Meinier, to beg him to send me some without delay. As to the provisioning of the fort and the garrison with ammunition, I request you to order the director of the

park of artillery of the army to supply it. There are two 6-pounders, and a five inch and a half howitzer : the garrison will consist of 2000 men. The provisioning with articles of consumption will be completely finished to-day. The commandant of engineers has assured me that the bridge over the Gravelonne will be finished to-day, and that over the Po in a very few days.

HAQUIN.

To the General-in-Chief.

Castiglione di Mantouano, 14 Prairial, year 4 [June 2, 1796].

I have just made a reconnaissance to the very walls of Mantua. I stopped there for a good quarter of an hour, without perceiving any movement on the part of the enemy : I met nothing by the way but a patrol of four horse, which took to flight at sight of my tirailleurs. I think it urgent to remove my advanced guard to Boucouli, where the road branches off to Roverbello ; but I cannot make this movement without cavalry : I beg you to order some to be placed at my disposal.

AUGEREAU.

To M. le Duc d'Aoste.

Head-quarters, Roverbello, 15 Prairial, year 4 [June 3, 1796].

I have received your courier, sir. The conduct of the king, on occasion of M. Bonnafier,¹ is worthy of him.

I shall take measures in order that, during the short time the police of Alba will belong to the army, no disturbance may be committed ; but I hope that we shall accelerate as much as possible the moment of the execution of the treaty, that we may witness the consolidation of that peace which is henceforth to unite the two powers.

I have ordered the commandant of the fortress of Alba to release several private individuals, subjects of the king, who had been arrested, by what kind of reprisals I cannot exactly say.

I flatter myself you are persuaded that I shall not forget anything that can be agreeable to you, earn me your esteem, and convince you of the sentiments of consideration, &c.

BONAPARTE.

¹ Evidently the person called in preceding letters Bonnafons and Bonnafous.

To the General-in-Chief.

Venice, 15 Prairial, year 4 [June 3, 1796].

Receive my congratulations on your glorious entry into the Venetian territory. I calculate, if I am as well as at present, to bring you them in person on Monday.

I learn this moment that the archduke, lately governor of Lombardy, who, according to report, had fled from Venice, not thinking himself in safety there, has just set out with all his treasures. Part of his equipages are at Mestre, and are about to proceed to Carinthia by way of Treviso. He takes that road himself. The rest are put on board lighters to be conveyed on the canals to the port of Caurlo: these barks will ascend the Limene to the port of Gruaro, which is the place of rendezvous. It will take four days at least before this convoy can start for Gorrizia. From Bassano to this rendezvous of Gruaro there is about twenty leagues of very fine road through Castel Franco, Oberzo, and Molta: you know, general, how to go from Verona to Castel Franco and from Verona to Bassano, and you will make what use you think proper of this information.

A Ragusan captain, who left Trieste three days ago, has told me that, during his quarantine, he saw seven or eight of the barks despatched for the Po return and land 700 men, to whom the Venetians had refused a passage upon the Polesino, as they did to the first whom I mentioned to you, and to whom the pope has just refused the same by the Mesola. Others were expected.

This report, made to me very innocently, and without any questions on my part, has all the character of truth. This same captain told me that the departure of all vessels from Trieste was suspended on the news that there were French cruisers in the gulf. He saw the last French galley at Ragusa, and believes it to be off Ancona.

Last week, I received orders from the government to recognize as Frenchmen worthy of the protection of the Republic such only as will constantly wear the national cockade, and never appear before me without it. There are only five or six here; three of them have been settled twenty years at Venice, but they are good Frenchmen and determined to continue so. I notified the order to them, and they immediately obeyed; but this morning Messieurs

the Inquisitors of State sent their *fante* to citizens Barbette, clockmaker, and Pinot, dentist, who demanded their cockades and brought them away. I am drawing up a remonstrance to the senate: it shall be energetic, and I shall, no doubt, have an answer to-morrow. I dare say you will think proper to speak to M. Foscarini about it, as an insult to the nation, and for which we require satisfaction.

LALLEMANT.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte, Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

Paris, 12 Prairial, year 4 [May 31, 1796].

Your despatches of the 28th and 29th Floreal and 3rd Prairial have reached the Directory, citizen-general. It had foreseen that the conquest of all Lombardy would be a glorious and necessary consequence of the skilful passage of the Po at Placentia, and the heroic passage of the Adda at Lodi; and it sees with ever steadfast satisfaction that you have gathered the fruits of victory by marching to fresh successes. Its intention is conformable to the course which you have adopted; not to leave the enemy much breathing time in Mantua: to defer the entire defeat of a vanquished enemy is compromising the final issue. This principle ought to be strictly observed, for it is perfectly analogous to the national character, and particularly applicable to the theatre of the war in Italy. The reinforcements received by Beaulieu will not relieve his troops from the sense of their inferiority; you will force them in their new positions, and you will pursue the wrecks of them into the gorges of the mountains, whence they must be deprived of all hope of issuing, while part of your forces shall go to impose the laws of the Republic in Southern Italy.

Herewith you will receive a copy of the letter which the Directory is writing to Salicetti. You will there see that its wish, conformable with the intention of the laws, is, that all acts, such as armistices, war contributions, and the like, which concern at once the civil and military authority, shall be signed by the generals-in-chief and by the commissioners of the government. You will see, moreover, that the measures which you have taken in regard to the internal administration of the Milanese are approved.

As to the question which you ask respecting the political

state of that country, before the Directory can give a definitive answer, it must wait till the accounts you give of the dispositions of the inhabitants enable it to judge whether those people are susceptible of independence. Meanwhile, direct their opinion towards liberty, bearing in mind that the fate of these States depends on the conditions of peace with the emperor, on our successes on the Rhine, on the essential conditions of our treaty with the Duke of Parma, and on the part that Spain shall take in it.

Watch also over the proceedings of the authorities which you have retained or created, and the secret intrigues of those which you have suppressed.

The Directory approves the remittance which you propose to make of a million to the armies on the Rhine: it thinks that this trait of generous fraternity on the part of the army of Italy will produce the happiest effects among them. They open their campaign to-day, and are going to commence a daring plan of offensive, which will make the emperor repent his rupture of the armistice, and slacken his impotent efforts to repair his losses in Italy.

Ten battalions of the army of the Coasts of the Ocean have orders to join you. They will march by way of Chamberi.

We expect to receive in a few days the courier who will bring us intelligence of new successes on the Mincio and the fall of the citadel of Milan. Rely with confidence on that which we owe you by so many honourable titles, and maintain, citizen-general, the salutary harmony which prevails between citizen Salicetti and you, and in which we feel strongly interested.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 16 Prairial, year 4 [June 4, 1796].

It appears, citizen-general, that, while the peace has been negotiating with the King of Sardinia, they have learned at Turin that this peace would afford to the patriots of Piedmont a guarantee for their future tranquillity: in revenge for the efforts which some of them have made for liberty, the government has hastened to deliver them up to the executioners before the ratification of that peace. The terror struck by the brave army of Italy into the courts of Rome

and Naples seems to produce the same horrors in the south of Italy, and the prisons in which languish men whose only crime is that they have thought of vindicating their rights are emptied by similar executions.

The intention of the Directory is that you notify immediately to the petty princes of Italy that they must put a stop to these atrocities, and that they shall answer for all the blood which they cause to be shed.

The prohibition to persecute the Italian patriots must be introduced as a necessary clause in all armistices that shall be concluded by the commissioners of the government with the army of Italy and by you.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 18 Prairial, year 4 [June 6, 1796].

The minister at war, citizen-general, has made observations on the small number of troops at present in garrison at Toulon. The Directory begs you not to lose sight of that important place, and to keep up constantly there the force necessary for its defence.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

Paris, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].

The new successes which you report, citizen-general, to the Executive Directory in your despatch of the 17th, seem to crown the glory of the army of Italy, but it has still to acquire that of preserving those conquests: it will not be either less brilliant or less useful to the Republic, and it is equally reserved for the genius which has directed such astonishing operations and the courage which has executed them.

After you have expelled all the remnants of the Austrian army from Lombardy, you will guard, no doubt, all the outlets with the means of force and the precautions necessary for interdicting to Beaulieu all access to it, notwithstanding the reinforcements which he is receiving, or which he is to receive in Tyrol. The armistices which are about to be concluded with the Prince of Rome and the King of

Naples, by leaving at your disposal the forces that were destined to march against them, will give great latitude to your dispositions for at once enabling the French to retain quiet possession of the Milanese, and for preventing the ravages of the dog-days. The Leghorn expedition must not be neglected, but undertaken only when you shall think the occasion favourable. The first of your considerations is to keep a vigilant eye on the enterprises of an enemy, who will set everything at work to repair his losses. The glorious opening of the campaign on the Rhine will strike new consternation into Austria and operate a powerful diversion in your favour: the left of the army of the Sambre and Meuse has beaten on the left bank of the Rhine the corps of the Duke of Wirtemberg in two important actions at Ukerath and Altenkirchen. A corps of more than 30,000 men, under the command of the brave General Kleber, formed of the left and part of the centre of General Jourdan's army, is advancing at a rapid rate along the Lahn, and perhaps the entire army commanded by the latter will soon march for the Mayn; that of the Rhine and Moselle is preparing to act on its part by combined movements, the object of which is to transfer immediately the theatre of the war to the other side of the Rhine.

The minister of the finances is about to profit by the notice which you have given of six millions at the disposal of the government. It would be desirable to know with precision where and in what hands that sum is, and if it includes the four millions mentioned in your preceding letters. The Directory has given orders for the escort on this side of Lyons of the two millions that are on the road.

The noble Quirini, envoy of Venice, has transmitted a complaint of the licentiousness of the French troops in the Bressan: you will find a copy of it annexed, and you will be aware of the necessity of repressing these disorders, if they have really taken place. As for the Senate of Venice, it will not be amiss to act towards it with firmness.

The sharp and severe measures which you have taken to quell the insurrection of the inhabitants of the Milanese were necessary: the laws of war and the safety of the army will always render them legitimate under such circumstances.

You will see in our despatch to citizen Salicetti what

are our intentions relative to the proposals made to you on the part of Rome and Naples: it would be superfluous to repeat the contents of it here.

The situation of the southern departments has occasioned the recall of the order given to General Chateauneuf-Randon to conduct to the army of Italy the two demi-brigades formerly destined for you. That general will retain the command of the 9th military division till the return of tranquillity there is insured. The Directory thanks you for the attention which you have had to send horses for its use. CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].

Congratulate, in the name of the Directory, citizen-general, all the grenadiers and carabineers of the advanced guard of the army of Italy, on their gallant conduct at the passage of the Mincio. History will carefully preserve the memory of the heroic acts which have shed lustre on them during this campaign.

The general of brigade Murat has justified, by conduct worthy of praise, the choice which the Directory made of him to perform honourable functions. Assure him, in its name, of the satisfaction which it feels in seeing him continue to range himself among the most intrepid defenders of the Republic.

Tell the chief of brigade Leclerc, of the 10th regiment of chasseurs, that the Directory has seen him with pleasure in the list of the brave men who distinguished themselves at the battle of Borghetto.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].

The Executive Directory, in recommending to you by its letter of the 27th Floreal to visit and pay attentions to the eminent men of science and artists in the countries where you are, made particular mention of the celebrated astronomer Oriani of Milan, as one who ought to be protected and honoured by the republican troops. The Directory will learn with satisfaction that you have fulfilled

its intention in regard to this distinguished artist, and requests you, in consequence, to give it an account of what you have done to give citizen Oriani tokens of the interest and esteem which the French entertain for him, and to prove to him that they know how to unite the love of glory and liberty with that of the arts and talents.

CARNOT.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].

The Directory has received, citizen-general, your letter of the 13th, by which you inform it that two millions in gold, being part of the contributions levied in the lately conquered countries, are on the way by post to Lyons, whence they are to proceed to Paris, their destination. The Directory has desired General Kellermann to make all the dispositions necessary for the safety of these funds. The Directory has already requested you to transmit one million to the army of the Rhine and Moselle. As for the 200,000 livres destined for General Kellermann and the 10,000 which he has already received, that sum shall remain at his disposal.

The minister of the finances is authorised to draw upon Genoa to the amount of ten millions arising from contributions in the enemy's country. In these ten millions are included the sums which he has already expended, the two millions forwarded by you to Lyons; the funds sent to M. Balbi at Genoa, under the superintendence of Faipoult, the envoy; and the produce of the jewels, diamonds, plate, &c. sent to Tortona.

CARNOT.

To the Minister of the Republic at Venice.

Head-quarters, Roverbello, 16 Prairial, year 4 [June 4, 1796].

The senate has sent to me two sages of the council: it is necessary that you express to them the displeasure of the Republic, because Peschiera has been delivered to the Austrians. French blood has been spilt in retaking it. We must not, however, fall out with a Republic, whose alliance is useful to us.

I spoke to the sages about the national cockade. I think

you ought strongly to insist that all the French should wear it, and that reparation must be made for the injury that has been done. Inform me regularly of the minutest particulars. I am just setting out for Milan. Let me hear from you there. Do not leave me in the dark as to what Beaulieu is about, and the movement of troops in Bavaria.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Ceresa, 17 Prairial, year 4 [June 5, 1796].

I arrived here at seven in the morning: the advanced posts of the enemy occupied the village; they retired on our approach. My infantry not having arrived, I was obliged to wait before attacking. The Austrians were entrenched behind two bridges, which they had broken down. Three pieces of cannon defended the approaches: the gate was closed, and the enemy, shut up in an embattled tower which is above it, kept up a very brisk fire. As soon as my infantry and artillery arrived, I gave orders for the attack, which was made with the greatest bravery. The artillery, directed by the chief of battalion Andreossi, rendered the greatest service; the briskness of our fire obliged the enemy to betake himself to flight. Unluckily, the inundations on the one hand, and the breaking down of the bridges on the other, prevented our pursuit. We were obliged to bring up cannon to break open the gates: meanwhile, he was already in the place. I immediately had the bridges repaired, and have just sent an eight-pounder with a strong detachment to interrupt the breaking up of the road, which the enemy is at work upon. At the same time, I have sent out a reconnoissance towards the Stradella gate, which we are within gun-shot of. The enemy is constructing a redoubt there; but I will take care to prevent him from finishing it. We have firm ground on both sides, and are beyond the reach of the inundations.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.

Verona, 17 Prairial, year 4 [June 5, 1796].

The proveditor has just sent me word that 2000 men have arrived at Rocoara, and that more are expected: it is

believed that others will descend by the Astico and the Brenta, which causes some credit to be given to the last news, namely that the enemy is seriously engaged in repairing the roads. The proveditor has sent me an assurance that I should be informed of all the movements of the Austrians.

MASSENA.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 19 Prairial, year 4 [June 7, 1796].

Annexed you will find a copy of the armistice concluded between the two armies, French and Neapolitan.

1. We take 2,400 cavalry from the Austrian army, and put them into a place where they will be at our disposal ;

2. We take from the English five sail of the line and several frigates ;

3. We continue to break up the coalitions ;

If you make peace with Naples, the suspension will have been useful, inasmuch as it will have weakened at once the German army. If, on the contrary, you do not make peace with Naples, the suspension will still have been useful, inasmuch as it will enable me to take prisoners the 2,400 Neapolitan cavalry, and as the King of Naples will have taken a step that must displease the coalition.

This leads me to consider the military question—Can we and ought we to go to Naples ?

The siege of the castle of Milan, the guarding of the Milanese, and the garrisons of conquered places, require 15,000 men ;

The guarding of the Adige and of the positions of the Tyrol, 20,000.

There remain, including the succours coming from the army of the Alps, but 6000 men.

But, if we had 20,000, it would not be advisable to make a march of twenty-five days, in the months of July and August, to seek disease and death. Meanwhile, Beaulieu would be resting his army in the Tyrol, recruiting it, reinforcing it with succours arriving every day, and would retake in autumn what we took from him in spring. By means of this armistice with Naples, we are enabled to dictate to Rome what conditions we please : already at this

moment the court of Rome is employed in preparing a bull against those who preach up civil war in France upon pretext of religion.

From a conversation which I had this morning with M. Azara, minister of Spain, sent by the pope, it appeared to me that he had orders to offer us contributions. I shall soon be at Bologna. Is it your pleasure that I should then accept from the pope, as the price of an armistice, twenty-five millions of contributions in cash, five millions in kind, 300 pictures, statues and manuscripts in proportion, and that I insist on the release of all patriots confined for revolutionary acts? I shall have sufficient time to receive your orders, since I shall not be at Bologna for these ten or fifteen days. Then, if the 6000 men commanded by General Chateauneuf-Randon arrive, it may not be amiss to proceed from Bologna to Rome. At any rate, I beg you to rest persuaded that, when once you have positively acquainted me with your intentions, they must be difficult indeed for me not to be able to execute them.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 19 Prairial, year 4 [June 7, 1796].

When M. Beaulieu learned that we were marching to pass the Mincio, he possessed himself of the fortress of Peschiera, which belonged to the Venetians. This fortress, situated on the lake of Garda, at the head of the Mincio, has a bastioned enclosure, in very good condition, and eighty pieces of cannon, which, it is true, are not mounted.

M. the Provéditeur-General, who was at Verona with 2000 men, might therefore have so managed that this place should not be occupied by the Austrians, who entered without any kind of resistance, when I had arrived at Brescia, that is to say, one day's march off.

As soon as I was apprized that the Austrians were at Peschiera, I knew that not a moment was to be lost in investing the place and depriving the enemy of the means of provisioning it. A few days' delay would have entailed upon me a siege of three months. The battle of Borghetto and the passage of the Mincio put that place into our hands two days afterwards. The provéditeur came in great haste to justify himself: I gave him a very ill reception. I de-

clared that I should march to Venice, to complain in person to the senate of such a manifest treachery. While we were talking, Massena had orders to enter Verona at whatever cost. The alarm at Venice was extreme. The Archduke of Milan, who was there, immediately fled to Germany.

The senate of Venice has just sent to me two sages of the council, to ascertain definitively how matters stand. I repeated my complaints to them; I also referred to the reception given to Monsieur; I told them that, for the rest, I had given you an account of every thing, and that I knew not how you would take the matter: that, when I left Paris, you expected to find in the republic of Venice an ally faithful to principles; that it was not without regret that their conduct in regard to Peschiera had obliged me to think otherwise; that, at any rate, I believed that this would be a storm which it would be possible for the envoy of the senate to lay. Meanwhile, they agree with the best grace to supply us with every thing necessary for the army.

If your plan is to extract five or six millions from Venice, I have purposely provided this sort of rupture for you. You might demand it by way of indemnity for the battle of Borghetto, which I was obliged to fight in order to take that place. If you have more decided intentions, I think you ought to keep up this subject of quarrel, inform me of what you design to do, and await the favourable moment, which I will seize according to circumstances: for we must not have all the world upon our hands at once.

The truth of the affair of Peschiera is, that Beaulieu basely deceived them: he demanded a passage for fifty men, and made himself master of the town. I am at this moment getting Peschiera put into a state of defence; and, in less than a fortnight, it will require siege artillery and a regular siege to take it.

BONAPARTE.

To M. the Prince de Belmonte Pignatelli.

Head-quarters, Milan, 19 Prairial, year 4 [June 7, 1796].

The armistice which we concluded yesterday will be, I hope, the preamble to peace. The negotiations ought to begin as soon as possible; and then, though the troops are long in arriving at their cantonments, I do not conceive that this can be a reason for war, after the order of his majesty

the King of Naples is received, and the troops are on their march for their destination.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Faipoult at Genoa.

Head-quarters, Milan, 19 Prairial, year 4 [June 7, 1796].

I do not write to you so often as I should wish. I have sent you an account of the affair of Borghetto; to-day I inform you of the taking of the suburb of St. George at Mantua and the investment of that place.

I came to Milan to put into execution the treaty of peace with the King of Sardinia. I beg you to inform me about the affairs of Corsica. I calculate upon transmitting to Genoa 1500 fowling-pieces, to be sent thither for the purpose of keeping up the insurrection of the patriots. I am told that the minister of the emperor at Genoa excites the peasants to revolt, and sends them powder and money. If this is so, my intention is to have him seized in Genoa itself.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Lallemand at Venice.

Head-quarters, Milan, 19 Prairial, year 4 [June 7, 1796].

I am glad to see that your discussions have terminated in the way they ought to do.

Let me have regular accounts of the movements of Beau-lieu; neglect nothing; send out spies on all sides, to watch his operations and learn what reinforcements he receives.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Carnot.

Head-quarters, Milan, 20 Prairial, year 4 [June 8, 1796].

I owe you my thanks for the obliging things you say to me. The most gratifying reward for the fatigues, the dangers, the risks, of this profession is to be found in the esteem of the small number of persons whom one appreciates.

By my letter to the Directory, you will see our position. If the battalions announced join us in time, it will be easy for us to go as far as Rome. Still, as the operations in Germany may change our position from one moment to ano-

ther, I think it would be well if the faculty of concluding the armistice with Rome were left to me, or to go thither : in the first case, to prescribe to me the terms of the armistice ; in the second, to tell me what I am to do there, for our troops could not maintain themselves there long. The space is immense, the fanaticism excessive, and the great disproportion of strength makes men bold.

As soon as the inundations are over, I shall be off to Leghorn and Bologna. There I shall receive your orders, and, if you accept the armistice with Rome, I will conclude it.

We shall soon be in July, when every march will put 200 on the sick list.

A commissioner of the Directory is come for the contributions. A million has been despatched to Basle for the army of the Rhine. You have eight millions at Genoa ; you can reckon upon that. Two millions more were going off for Paris ; but the commissary assured me that it is your intention that the whole should go to Genoa.

I will deserve your esteem ; I beg you to continue your friendship to me, and to believe me for life, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To General Clarke.

Head-quarters, Milan, 20 Prairial, year 4 [June 8, 1796].

Your young cousin arrived here yesterday ; he appears to me active, though yet rather young. I will keep him with me : he will soon learn to confront danger and to distinguish himself. I hope that he will prove worthy of you, and that I shall have a good account to give you of him. I am glad to do something that is agreeable to you.

Here all is going on tolerably well ; but the dog-days are coming on at a gallop, and there is no remedy against their pernicious influence. Miserable beings that we are, we can only observe nature, not overcome it !

The campaign of Italy has begun two months too late : we find ourselves obliged to remain in the most unwholesome country in Italy. I see but one way of avoiding being beaten in autumn : that is, to arrange in such a manner as not to be obliged to advance into the south of Italy.

According to all the accounts that are given us, the emperor is sending a great many troops to his army of Italy. We are waiting here with impatience for news from

the Rhine. If our army is successful, as I hope, we must make the emperor pay for his infatuation: meanwhile, I beg you to believe the sentiments of fraternity, &c.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Alexandria, June 8, 1796 [19 Prairial, year 4].

Having been informed that the manifesto issued by you on the 9th Prairial last was to be published in all the villages of the arrondissement of this city comprised within the French line of demarcation, and that the intendant of Alexandria was directed to publish it, I have thought it my duty to send my aide-de-camp to Tortona, to confer on the subject with General Meynier: the precise and absolute orders contained in the said manifesto have not permitted him to come to any conclusion upon it.

It appears to me that a law addressed to the Milanese people, founded on the infraction of the order of the 6th Prairial, unknown to the people of Tortona and Alexandria, cannot be deemed binding for the inhabitants of the said provinces. I observe also that several of the articles of the manifesto, concerning solely what is practised in the Milanese, cannot apply to us.

However, the threatening punishments and all the measures introduced by the rigour of war would strike alarm, consternation, and despair into the bosom of a people that is at peace with France, and whose countenance cannot have displeased, having submitted to the contributions and requisitions as cheerfully as it was possible to do.

When you prescribe disarming, is it not to be feared that rogues will keep their arms, while honest men give them up? Thus, the latter will find themselves incapable of defending their lives or their properties, of resisting banditti, and of contributing with the troops to the public safety.

The alarm-bell, rung at seasonable times at the order of the person who has a right to give it, is also a means of public safety. The French army experienced the good effects of it at Oviglio and Castelluzzo, as General Meynier will have informed you.

SOLARI.

To the General-in-Chief.

Roverbello, 19 Prairial, year 4 [June 7, 1796].

Yesterday, at noon, all the orders with which you charged me were despatched. At two o'clock I set out for Governolo, where there is an old dike that served to force boats to pass the toll-house. The Po is much swollen, and the current of the Mincio flows back to Mantua, which precisely fulfils the wishes of the Austrians, who are inundating themselves as much as they can.

I found at this bridge a guard of General Augereau's, and the country praising the discipline observed by his troops. I continued my route to Ceresa, where the division had arrived in the morning. A cannon-shot from this village, I found a bridge over a branch of the upper lake, which unites with the Mincio. The enemy occupies this bridge, covered by an embattled tower, occupied by 300 men, well entrenched and supported by a good battery of three pieces. General Augereau was aware that he could not execute your orders unless he carried the bridge and the entrenchments of Ceresa; in consequence, he disposed his troops and his artillery for the attack: his cannon protected the movements of the columns of infantry, which advanced with their usual impetuosity upon the tower, where they found the bridge broken down. Meanwhile, two battalions, which were deployed, kept up so brisk a fire that the enemy fled. Our grenadiers repaired the bridge, while a little drummer went up into the tower under the enemy's fire, and descended again to open the gate to the grenadiers, who passed and pursued the terrified enemy, who had retired into the advanced works. I proceeded reconnoitring to within pistol-shot of the cordon of the place, the side of which is the weakest.

This tower and bridge are in the same position as the bridge of Santo Giorgio, excepting that it is a plain which leads to the cordon of the place. This bridge is of the utmost importance for us, especially as it was well entrenched, and might stop the army, if the enemy defended himself stoutly in it. I think, therefore, that we ought to take all possible pains to preserve it. I slept at Ceresa; to-day I have followed the margin of the water, and, turning the place, I arrived at the causeway of Pradella, defended by a very good horn-work, constructed of earth, which has cannon

and is well palisaded. We approached to within hearing distance ; and, after receiving the honours of a few musket-shots, we pursued our route, following the upper lake of the Mincio to Goito.

It results, general, that in that part of the fortress of Mantua comprised between the upper Mincio and the lower Mincio, on the Po, there are but two causeways, those of Ceresa and Pradella, and that we are masters of the head of the most important ; that the place is well encompassed, but that it is indispensable to retain the positions occupied by General Augereau.

I judge it, therefore, to be absolutely necessary that 3000 men should be employed in this part, independently of the troops of General Serrurier.

All agree in reporting that the garrison is composed of only seven battalions and two squadrons ; that there is but a small stock of provisions and ammunition in the place ; that the inhabitants refuse to sell any thing to the troops. Many country-people come out to leave the town, but are sent back ; it appears that, if we had means, it would be easy to take the town.

General Augereau has killed some men of the enemy's. General Serrurier took this morning twelve prisoners, who agree in confirming what you know ; but they assert that, in the attack of Borgo Santo Giorgio, the enemy had 72 wounded and about 50 killed.

I have ordered that not a moment be lost in constructing the bridge over the Mincio below Mantua, in order to ensure the communication between Augereau and Serrurier. Citizen Barral has orders also to construct one over the Po ; but that is an operation of consequence, owing to the breadth of the river ; he will attend punctually to it. As I foresee that the bridge cannot be ready for the passage of the troops, I have ordered the necessary boats and pontoons to be secured, to supply the want of it, and to serve for the passage of the artillery.

The three battalions of grenadiers are collected here, as well as the regiments, 1st hussars, 10th chasseurs, and 8th dragoons.

To-morrow I set out for Verona, and thence proceed to reconnoitre between the lake of Garda and the Adige, then to see how the works get on at Peschiera, and then I shall rejoin you.

I shall spend part of the night in giving such orders as I judge necessary for whatever may be useful to the execution of yours.

No news of the enemy from the quarter of the Tyrol: it appears that he is at a distance.

ALEXANDRE BERTHIER.

To General Kellermann.

Head-quarters, Milan, 21 Prairial, year 4 [June 9, 1796].

I have seen with pleasure the demi-brigades which you have sent: they are in good condition and well disciplined.

I am not afraid of trespassing upon your kindness. I am sending to you an artillery officer, with the necessary funds, to provide for the transport of 5000 muskets, which I earnestly entreat you to forward to us, together with twelve six-inch and twelve eight-inch howitzers.

I anxiously await your answer respecting the 1800 men whom I requested you to direct to be put into Coni, that I may be able to withdraw the garrison.

You ought to have received 100,000 francs; I shall give orders for another 100,000 to be sent you.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Verona, 22 Prairial, year 4 [June 10, 1796].

I am come from Peschiera: the works ordered go on very slowly; there is but a single captain of engineers to conduct them. There is a want of tools; I will have some picked up to-morrow at Verona, as well as labourers.

I have not found a single field-piece at the park: I shall, nevertheless, have need of eight—four at la Corona, and four at Brentino; we occupy those two posts since yesterday. One brigade is at Corona, from which a battalion is detached to the heights of Monte Baldo.

Preabocco is also occupied by a demi-brigade; it detaches one battalion to Brentino: the two new positions have absolute need of mountain artillery; there is not a single mule at the park, neither are there any artillerymen, so that I have two howitzers at Rivoli, which I am obliged to send to the park for want of men to work them. All my artillery of

the two divisions consists of two 4-pounders, under the orders of General Rusca ; a howitzer, and one light artillery 8-pounder, with General Victor ; and two 8, and two 3-pounders, with General Rampon, at Verona : that is all I have of the numerous artillery specified in my instructions.

The 18th and the 27th light infantry have arrived to-day at Peschiera. The position of the troops of the two divisions will be as follows :—

One demi-brigade of light infantry at Corona ;

Another at Preabocco, under the command of General Joubert ;

Two other demi-brigades of light infantry, in second line, to support the first two ;

Two other brigades of light infantry at Salo, under General Rusca ;

One demi-brigade of the line, between Peschiera and Salo, one battalion of it detached to Pescheira ;

The 18th demi-brigade of light infantry and the 18th of the line will form the grand camp between Rivoli and Garda ;

At Verona I leave the 32nd of the line, and temporarily the 17th light infantry, having had information that the enemy is making some movements in that quarter.

Be pleased, general, to give the necessary orders, that all that you destine for the two divisions under my command may be punctually furnished me, and then rely upon my punctuality and vigilance.

MASSENA.

To Citizen Comeiras.

Head-quarters, Milan, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].

I will direct the Grisons to be supplied with 3000 quintals of corn, on condition that they will give us horses in payment. I have at your desire caused the fort of to be destroyed. I will send all you ask for. It is necessary that you should exercise the greatest vigilance towards the Valteline, to learn the movements that Beaulieu may make, and to inform me of them in time.

It would be easy for me to send you a few thousand fowling-pieces ; but would not these be well bestowed in the hands of our friends ? and, if it be true that the heads of

the Leagues are sold to the House of Austria, would it not be dangerous to increase their means of injuring us?

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].

General Laharpe was of the canton of Berne: the authorities of that canton confiscated his property at the commencement of the Revolution. I beg you to use your influence for obtaining its restitution to his children.

The Swiss have demanded of us the circulation of some thousand weight of rice. We have granted that demand, but on condition that the canton of Berne shall restore to young Laharpe the possessions of his father. I hope that you will approve this measure.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Barthelemy, Ambassador at Basle.

Head-quarters, Milan, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].

The canton of Berne confiscated, at the commencement of the Revolution, the property of the late General Laharpe; I beg you to interest yourself, for the purpose of causing it to be restored to his son.

BONAPARTE.

To General Moreau.

Head-quarters, Milan, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].

I transmit to you 1,000,000, which you will draw from the hands of citizen Barthelemy, ambassador of the Republic at Genoa,¹ to whom I have ordered it to be addressed. The army of Italy has solicited permission from the Directory to send you that money, proceeding from the war contributions, in order to relieve our brethren in arms of the army of the Rhine. I am flattered that this occasion, &c.

BONAPARTE.

¹ It should be Basle—a mistake probably arising from haste

To the Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Pavia, 24 Prairial, year 4 [June 12, 1796].

You will give orders for 2000 beds to be made up in the castle of Pavia, with furniture complete. The commissary of war will require for this purpose, from the city, the necessary mattresses, sheets, and blankets.

BONAPARTE.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 25 Prairial, year 4 [June 13, 1796].

The general-in-chief prefers a complaint to the military commission against M. Augustin Spinola, lord [*seigneur*] of Arcquata, as being the chief of the rebellion which has taken place at Arcquata, where several French soldiers have been murdered, the tricoloured cockade torn, the effects of the Republic pillaged, and the imperial standard hoisted.

The seigneur of Arcquata and his wife have always given way to their perfidious instigations.

I require that they be tried by the military commission, conformably with the military laws.

BONAPARTE.

To the Governor of Alexandria.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 25 Prairial, year 4 [June 13, 1796].

The officers and soldiers of the garrison of Serravalle have taken part in the late rebellion of the imperial fiefs: they have encouraged the peasants by furnishing them with munitions of war.

This conduct is very far from being conformable with the intentions of the king and M. the Duke of Aosta.

I beg of you to punish severely the unworthy conduct of these officers and soldiers.

BONAPARTE.

To the Senate of the Republic of Genoa.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 26 Prairial, year 4 [June 14, 1796].

The city of Genoa is the focus whence issue villains, who infest the high roads, murdering the French, and intercepting our convoys, whenever they can. It is from Genoa that the spirit of rebellion is instilled into the imperial fiefs.

M. Girola, who resides in that city, has publicly sent them munitions of war: he welcomes daily the leaders of the assassins, yet dripping with French blood.

It is on the territory of the republic of Genoa that part of these horrors are perpetrated, without any measures being taken by the government: it appears, on the contrary, by its silence and the asylum which it affords them, to smile on the murderers. Woe to the communes which behold with joy these crimes committed on their territory, and French blood spilt by assassins!

It is indispensable that a stop be put to this evil, and that the men who, by their conduct, patronize the banditti, be very severely punished. The governor of Novi protects them: I require the government to make a severe example of him. M. Girola, who has made Genoa a *place d'armes* against the French, must be arrested, or at least expelled from the city of Genoa. These preliminary satisfactions are due to the manes of my brothers in arms, slaughtered upon your territory.

Respecting the future, I demand of you a categorical explanation. Can you, or can you not, clear the territory of the republic of the assassins who fill it? If you do not take measures, I will: I will have the towns and villages burned in which the murder of a single Frenchman is committed. I will have burned the houses that shall afford refuge to the assassins. I will punish the negligent magistrates who shall have transgressed the first principle of neutrality, by granting an asylum to banditti. The murder of a Frenchman shall bring woe upon the entire communes that have not protected him.

The French Republic will be inviolably attached to the principles of neutrality; but the republic of Genoa shall not be a refuge for all the banditti.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Faipoult, Minister at Genoa.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 27 Prairial, year 4 [June 15, 1796].

I send you General Murat, my aide-de-camp. I desire you to introduce him immediately to the senate, for the purpose of delivering to it the note which he will communicate to you. If you were to present it, it would take a fortnight to get an answer; and it is necessary to establish

a more speedy communication, that shall electrify those gentlemen.

The army of the Rhine has beaten the enemy. General Berthier must have sent you the bulletin from Basle.

All is going on well; I embrace you. The intelligence from Paris is of the 19th: nothing new.

I have had above a score of chiefs of banditti who murdered our soldiers apprehended. They shall be shot without mercy. At this moment a division is doing justice on Arcquata and the imperial fiefs.

Get a better governor appointed in Novi than the one who is there. I do not intend that the senate should suffer our soldiers to be slaughtered in detail. I will keep my word to it. BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Faipoult.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 27 Prairial, year 4 [June 15, 1796].

We have established a great many batteries on the Riviera of Genoa: we ought now to sell the cannon and ammunition to the Genoese, that we may not have to guard them, but yet find them there in case we have need of them again.

BONAPARTE.

To the Governor of Novi.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 28 Prairial, year 4 [June 16, 1796].

You give an asylum to the banditti; the assassins are protected in your territory; there are some of them at this moment in all the villages. I require you to cause all the inhabitants of the imperial fiefs that are to be found this day upon your territory to be apprehended. You will answer to me for the execution of the present requisition: I will burn the towns and houses that shall afford refuge to the murderers, or shall not arrest them.

BONAPARTE.

To the Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Tortona, 28 Prairial, year 4 [June 16, 1796].

All the detachments of troops which are in the different towns of the States of the King of Sardinia must rejoin

their corps, excepting the garrisons of Coni, Ceva, Cherasco, Tortona, Alexandria, Oneglia, and Loano.

The troops and convoys of the army are forbidden to take any other route than by Nice, Coni, Fossano, Asti, Alexandria, Tortona, Pavia, Pizzigitone, Cremona, Casal-Major, Borgoforte; or by Genoa, Novi, Tortona; or through the valley of Aosta. The troops of the King of Sardinia having undertaken to escort convoys, an escort of only one or two men will be sent with them.

No further requisitions shall be made in the territories of the King of Sardinia; all the magazines that we have in those countries shall be evacuated and transported to the fortresses left in our possession.

The commissaries of war are expressly forbidden to grant any route to soldiers separated from their battalions till their number amounts to twenty-five. To this effect, the soldiers who shall present themselves for the purpose of rejoining their corps must be subsisted in the place till they are of that number. The commissary of war will then make out a bill of the route to the place where they will have to separate, in order to rejoin their respective corps.

The commandants of fortresses will take care that the soldiers be provided with arms, and give the command of these detachments to a subaltern of the garrison, if there be none among the men who are rejoining: this subaltern shall accompany the detachment to the nearest garrison.

The general of division who commands at Nice shall have under his orders the whole department of the Maritime Alps; he will appoint the commandants at all the stations [*étapes*] in order to superintend the passing soldiers and those stationed at the *étapes*.

The general of division who commands at Coni will have under his superintendence the whole country comprehended between the department of the Maritime Alps, the Stura, and the Tanaro, as far as the territories of Genoa; at the same time, he will command at Ceva and Cherasco: he will place at each station an officer to whom all soldiers having bills of route will address themselves, and on whose *visa* the Piedmontese commandants will deliver station-tickets to our soldiers.

The general of division commanding at Tortona will have under his superintendence all the countries comprised between the Tanaro, the gulf of Genoa, the Po, and the

territories of the Duke of Parma: he will command also at Alexandria: he will appoint officers to superintend the passing soldiers at each station. It will be upon his *visa* only that the agents of the King of Sardinia will deliver station-tickets to our soldiers.

The general commandant of Lombardy will command: officers will be appointed for each station to superintend the men stationed there, and to maintain good discipline among the passing soldiers.

The chief of the staff will send to these different generals a list of the officers, wounded, supernumerary, or unemployed, who might be employed for this purpose.

The chief of the staff will appoint two superior officers to superintend the routes from Cassano to Peschiera, and from Pizzigitone to Goito: these two officers will quarter themselves, the first at Chiaro, and the second at Casale-Major: they shall appoint the officers at each station to superintend the soldiers and to take care that the agents of Venice deliver punctually and of good quality the station allowance to the soldiers and the horses.

Each of the superior officers shall have with him fifteen men of horse gendarmerie and 150 men who shall serve to escort the prisoners, and to go wherever it may be necessary for the safety of the route.

The general commanding the Mantuan shall place officers in all the stations of his arrondissement; the generals of division shall do the same each in his arrondissement, and as far as the station that joins the high road.

The route of Placentia will join the great communication of the army at St. Colombar. The superior officer commanding the fortress of Placentia shall have the superintendence of the whole route from St. Colombar to Parma.

It shall take nine days to go from Coni to Pavia, seven from Pavia to Peschiera, and six from Pavia to Goito.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Pavia, 27 Prairial, year 4 [June 15, 1796].

I have this instant arrived from the bridge over the Po: it is not yet bound together, though people pass over, and even carriages: by to-morrow night it will be made as solid as possible. The roads to the bridge from both sides

of the Po are superb: a corps de garde is established for the guard of this bridge.

The repairs of the fortifications of the castle of Pavia are proceeding with all possible activity. I have given orders to the commissary of war to send off to Milan the horses that were in the depot here.

LANUSSE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Castiglione, 29 Prairial, year 4 [June 17, 1796].

There is no fort at Chiusa, but merely two drawbridges, which I have kept guarded since we have been in this country by 100 men, supported by 300 others: there are, besides, two pieces of cannon, so that there is nothing to fear.

The enemy has made no movement about Verona: he has approached our posts at La Corona: our scouts have already given chase to him, and I have ordered him to be attacked this morning by six companies of carabineers, supported by two battalions. I will give you an account of the result.

General Guillaume, who commands at Peschiera, reports to me that he has not a single grain of powder in the place; that the two bastions of the Verona gate are at length about to be armed, but that he has neither balls nor bombs.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Pavia, 29 Prairial, year 4 [June 17, 1796].

Thirty-two hostages have set out for Tortona; these, added to thirty-four previously sent off, form a total of sixty-four.

The bells of Pavia have been taken down: I shall have them all put together in a magazine. Tranquillity is perfectly re-established here, and confidence begins to revive.

LANUSSE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Castiglione, 30 Prairial, year 4 [June 18, 1796].

I informed you, in my letter of yesterday, that I had ordered a chase of the enemy; it has had all the success that I expected from it: our carabineers killed forty men and

made fifty prisoners, all of the regiment of Tuscany. I had sent a flag of truce the evening before : I had selected an intelligent officer, who had reconnoitred the advanced posts of the enemy : three were carried by the bayonet. This *coup de main* has so intimidated the Austrians, that the rest of the camp took to flight, and several left their arms behind them. It was in this flight that so many men were killed.

I shall make an excursion to Salo to-morrow ; it is said that the enemy is within two leagues of the place : if there is any possibility, he shall be attacked there.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Venice, 30 Prairial, year 4 [June 18, 1796].

I have received the letter which you were pleased to write me on the 10th. I know not how it can have been so long in coming.

Reinforcements are arriving successively in the Tyrol. My man at Bolzano informs me that, since the first to the 30th of June,¹ there have passed through that town 21,000 men for the confines, namely, 18,000 infantry, 14,000 of them by the Adige, and 4,000 by land, 1000 artillery, and 2,000 cavalry.

These troops, with the militia, occupy all the passes of the Tyrol, and their advanced posts are on the Vicentine hills, between Recoara and Astico. A piquet of twenty Hulans and some engineers has advanced to Bassano, but no ulterior preparation announces their descent into the plain. The Venetians are assembling their border militia and their Dalmatians. They are sending their Italians into their islands, and the direct conferences with the government seem to be taking a very favourable turn ; but it is hard work to make the great number think of the future, and they are always strongest in an assembly of 200 ignorant and idle persons, where matters are decided by the plurality of votes.

LALLEMANT.

¹ An evident mistake, perhaps for Prairial.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 23 Prairial, year 4 [June 11, 1796].

The Directory has had laid before it, citizen-general, the letter by which you inform it that the republic of Venice has permitted the Austrians to enter the fortress of Peschiera, and it has thought that this conduct authorized the French Republic to require that the funds belonging to the powers at war with us, especially those belonging personally to the King of England, and which are at present deposited at Venice, be delivered up immediately to us, together with the ships of war, merchantmen, and all other enemies' property whatever, that may now be in the ports of the republic of Venice. The Directory also thinks it possible to borrow of that republic to the amount of 5,000,000 Dutch florins, for which it should accept assignments on the debt which the Batavian republic has contracted to us. It thinks also that you could, if necessary, give bills on the deposit of money at Venice belonging to the King of England, &c., in exchange for the contributions in kind which circumstances might oblige you to levy in the Venetian territory.

The Directory leaves this object for your consideration, and recommends to you to concert for its accomplishment with the commissioners of the government Salicetti and Gareau. It observes to you that it is not its intention to break with the republic of Venice, and your proceedings in this delicate affair ought to be such as not to promote a rupture. The Directory is thoroughly convinced that they will be of a nature not to compromise the dignity of the French nation, and conformable in every respect with the instructions which it gives to you, as well as to the commissioners of the government Salicetti and Gareau, by this present letter.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 27 Prairial, year 4 [June 15, 1796].

The Directory has taken into consideration, citizen-general, the contents of your letter dated Roverbello, the 16th instant. By its despatch of the 23rd, it has acquainted you with its intentions relative to the republic of Venice.

Your letter must necessarily produce some modifications in them. The Directory thinks, in consequence, that it would be possible to borrow at least 12,000,000 tournois of that republic, and to induce it to accept as a guarantee assignments on the debt which the Batavians have contracted to us. The sum lent might be taken from the funds which the king and the government of England have at present in the treasury of Venice.

The Directory is highly satisfied with the conduct which you have pursued, both towards the proveditor-general and towards the two deputies whom the senate of that city sent to you.

The Directory likewise approves of the measure you have taken for putting Peschiera in a state of defence.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 27 Prairial, year 4 [June 15, 1796].

You will no doubt have learned, citizen-general, the facts stated in the report of the French minister at Genoa, a copy of which the Directory has sent you annexed. The perfidious conduct pursued towards us by the Genoese government must be repressed: but, above all, it is important to withdraw from Genoa the funds which are there, and the French minister must already have given orders on that subject. As for the provisions and ammunition of all kinds which may be there, the Directory trusts to you to attend to their removal to a place where they will be less exposed.

The Directory has thought that it might be imprudent and prejudicial to the course of success of the army under your command, to take measures immediately for compelling the Genoese to make suitable reparation for the injury that has been done us. It is not till after you have concluded an armistice with Rome, till that agreed upon with Naples has been executed, and, lastly, till you have finished your excursion to Bologna and Leghorn, that it will be proper to take up the affair of Genoa. Till then, you will content yourself with causing the interests of the French Republic in the city of Genoa to be watched with the most vigilant attention; and, when the favourable moment has arrived, you will take the necessary measures

for obtaining a signal reparation for all those perfidious proceedings in which the Genoese government has engaged against the French Republic, and you will demand a very large indemnity for the capture of the five vessels which the English have recently taken from us by means of the Genoese protection.

For the rest, the Directory refers to the previous instructions which it has addressed to you, and which relate to the city of Genoa.

If you think it advantageous to occupy in force the Gulf of Spezzia at the time when you demand reparation of the Genoese government, the Directory authorizes you to take that measure, and relies in that matter on your prudence and republican energy.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 27 Prairial, year 4 [June 15, 1796].

The Directory has received, citizen-general, your letters dated Verona, the 15th Prairial, Roverbello, the 16th, and Milan, the 19th and 20th of the same month. Though it could have wished that the King of Naples had contributed some millions when the armistice was concluded, the Directory approves it, referring to what was written to you previously on the necessity of making the commissioners of the government with the army under you take a part in transactions of that kind.

It were to be wished that the 2400 horse soldiers who are to repair to Brescia, &c., on leaving the Austrian army, had been bound by the terms of the armistice to return to Naples on foot, and to relinquish their horses with the harness to us.

The Directory has read with pleasure the details of the affairs of the advanced posts of Mantua: it continues to applaud your conduct and that of General Dallemagne and of the chief of brigade Lannes, and owes particular praise to the general of division Augereau.

The Directory approves of the idea of deferring the final arrangement of the armistice which is to be concluded with the Prince of Rome till you are at Bologna or Leghorn. The last despatches of the Directory fix the conditions of it; but if you think the contributions which that prince can

furnish ought to amount to 25,000,000 in specie and 5,000,000 in kind, the Directory agrees to adopt this advantageous modification: it likewise approves the proposal of other demands specified in your letter of 19th Prairial, and hopes that the pope will assent to them.

Our aim must be to terminate the war in the south of Italy as speedily as possible, and to study only the means of procuring peace by our situation in the north of that peninsula.

It is preferable to deposit either at Nice or at Grenoble, instead of Genoa, the funds which your successes and the armistice which you are going to conclude with the pope shall permit you to place at the disposal of the minister of the finances.

The Directory will write to you very soon concerning the ulterior operations of the campaign.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 27 Prairial, year 4 [June 15, 1796].

It may happen, citizen-general, that the court of Naples, satisfied with the armistice which has been concluded between the French and Neapolitan armies, will neglect to send immediately to Paris plenipotentiaries to treat for peace, and seek to maintain itself in that sort of state of neutrality, the prolongation of which would be very disadvantageous to us.

The formal intention of the Directory is that you cause it to be signified to the Prince Belmonte-Pignatelli, or to the court of Naples itself, that, if the negotiations for peace between the French Republic and the King of the Two Sicilies are not commenced in Paris before the expiration of a month, reckoning from the date of these presents, the armistice shall be considered as not having taken place.

It is essential, citizen-general, that you should strongly stimulate the court of Naples, whose intention in not sending to us promptly a minister plenipotentiary might be to amuse us by delays justified upon false pretexts, in order to place itself in a situation to regulate its ulterior conduct by the events of the remainder of the present campaign.

CARNOT.

PART THIRD.

FROM THE TAKING OF BOLOGNA TO THE SECOND BLOCKADE
OF MANTUA.

*To the Commissioners of the Government with the Army of
Italy.*

Head-quarters, Bologna, 3 Messidor, year 4 [June 21, 1796].

The present movements of part of Wurmser's army on the frontiers of the Grisons, the considerable reinforcements which Wurmser is daily receiving, and those still more considerable on march ; the operation upon Leghorn which the government has ordered me to undertake, and in which I have seen no military inconvenience, calculating upon the arrival of 6000 men whom General Chateauneuf-Randon was to bring, but who received counter-orders and are still at Nismes ; the garrison which I shall be obliged to leave in the fortress of Leghorn—all render it necessary for us to make two demi-brigades of the army of the Alps join us as speedily as possible. It would be possible to withdraw one of the two that are at Lyons, and one which is in the department of the Drôme. It will be easy for the general of the army of the Alps to replace the two demi-brigades by moveable columns, composed of sedentary national guards, put in requisition, and to this end I am transmitting to him 150,000 livres in cash, to provide for their pay.

I require you therefore to take the most prompt and efficacious measures in order that these two demi-brigades may proceed immediately to Milan ; the need we have of them is so pressing, that I think we ought to take the nearest, and to use all means to accelerate their march and their arrival in Milan.

BONAPARTE.

[Lower down is written :]

Having seen the above letter from General-in-Chief Bonaparte, and for the considerations therein specified,

The Commissioners of the Government with the Army of Italy and that of the Alps

Require General Kellermann, commander-in-chief of the

army of the Alps, to send without delay two demi-brigades of his army to Milan, to place themselves under the orders of the general-in-chief of the army of Italy.

Done at Bologna, 3 Messidor, year 4.

SALICETTI, GARREAU.

To Citizen Faipoult.

Head-quarters, Bologna, 4 Messidor, year 4 [June 22, 1796].

I have just received your courier: I am too well acquainted with the spirit of the perfidious Genoese government not to have foreseen the answer that it would make.

I have just received, by an extraordinary courier from the Directory, a copy of the note which you presented at the time of the capture of the five vessels.

Here then are two grounds of complaint. I charge you specially to take the most efficacious means that the money, jewels, and other valuable effects belonging to the Republic, which are at Genoa, be speedily removed from that place.

Send for citizen Suci, and let me have, by an extraordinary courier, an inventory of the effects, whatever they may be, which are in Genoa.

I beg you to make me acquainted, from time to time, in the minutest detail, with all that concerns our position with the senate of Genoa.

BONAPARTE.

To Adjutant-General Leclerc.

Head-quarters, Bologna, 4 Messidor, year 4 [June 22, 1796].

You will repair to Coire, the capital of the country of the Grisons: you will there see citizen Comeyras, minister of the Republic; you will traverse the country to the debouché of Swabia; you will send out spies, to pick up information relative to the position and movements of the enemy on the other side of the mountains. Inform me of all that may be worth the trouble by an extraordinary courier, whom you will address to General Despinois at Milan. You will mark the positions which the enemy might take for descending from the mountains into the Milanese, supposing that he had a mind to attempt it. You will remain in the country

long enough to explore it, to make yourself acquainted with it, and to acquire a notion of the spirit that animates the inhabitants.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief of the Grison Leagues.

Bologna, 4 Messidor, year 4 [June 22, 1796].

I address to you, citizen Leclerc, adjutant-general, to give you a token of the friendship of the French Republic, and of the desire which I feel to be useful to you, relying upon a perfect reciprocity on your part.

BONAPARTE.

To the Minister of the Republic at Venice.

Head-quarters, Bologna, 5 Messidor, year 4 [June 23, 1796].

I beg you, citizen minister, to infuse more activity into your secret correspondence, and to send me every day a bulletin of the forces and movements of the enemy. You must have spies at Trent, at Roveredo, at Inspruck, and receive daily bulletins from those places; that is what citizen Barthelemy does at Basle, and thereby he renders important services to the Republic. I am informed, through an indirect channel, that Venice is arming, and you do not tell me what is the nature and what the force of those armaments. You are aware how essential it is that I should have timely information on all such points.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Miot, Minister at Florence.

Head-quarters, Bologna, 5 Messidor, year 4 [June 23, 1796].

I send you citizen Marmont, my aide-de-camp, chief of battalion, to deliver a letter to the Grand-duke of Florence: it is under a flying seal, so that you can see its contents. I should wish you to present it to his royal highness. If you have any thing to say to me, address to this place till tomorrow morning.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Miot.

Head-quarters, Bologna, 8 Messidor, year 4 [June 26, 1796].

I learn this moment that, in consequence of a general order which has been issued not to permit any one going from Bologna to Florence to pass, it is possible that M. Manfredini may not have been allowed to pass, and may be still at Bologna. If that were the case, I should be excessively vexed at this unlucky accident. I beg you to make my excuses to the grand-duke, and to send off a courier immediately to Bologna with the annexed order.

BONAPARTE.

To the General Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Leghorn, 9 Messidor, year 4 [June 27, 1796].

The general chief of the staff will immediately give the most precise orders to the chief of battalion Hulin, commandant of the fortress of Leghorn, to cause the governor of the city to be arrested as soon as he shall be informed that the 75th demi-brigade is about to arrive; that this governor be put under good guard in a house near this camp, and thence sent off to Florence in a carriage which shall be escorted, when the general-in-chief shall have determined the hour for the departure of that officer, who, for the rest, must be treated with all due respect.

BONAPARTE.

To General Vaubois.

Head-quarters, Leghorn, 11 Messidor, year 4 [June 29, 1796].

General Vaubois will keep garrison at Leghorn with the 75th demi-brigade, a company of artillery, and a squadron of the first regiment of hussars. He will get the batteries which defend the entrance of the harbour put into a good state of defence; he will have them arranged in such a manner that there shall be only pieces of one or at most two calibres at each battery; he will have furnaces mounted for red-hot balls, and take care that the guns be supplied with a hundred rounds: he will choose a fort of the town, that which is most capable of defending itself, and which has communications with the interior; he will have this

fort put into a state of defence, make to this end such changes in the disposition of the artillery as he shall think proper, and establish a magazine, which shall contain sufficient to subsist 2000 men for forty days, with all the accessories for sustaining a siege.

He will spare no means for keeping Leghorn in perfect tranquillity ; he will act in such a manner as to attach to himself the troops of the grand-duke of Tuscany, on whom he will keep a constant eye ; he will keep himself in good harmony with the governor ; he will refer to him all matters of detail, pay him great respect, especially in private, but preserve a great superiority over him, especially in public. Should there be plots at Leghorn, or anything else involving the existence of the French troops, he will then take all the measures necessary for restoring tranquillity and punishing the evil-disposed. He will not spare, either persons, or property, or houses.

In all the difficult affairs that may happen, he will consult citizen Miot, minister of the French Republic at Florence, who will be able to give him useful information.

He will protect the consul in the interesting operation with which he is charged : being the first agent of the Republic at Leghorn, he will attend to all the interests of the Republic, and report to me on all the abuses which it may not depend on him to repress.

He will live in suitable style. He will frequently have at his table the officers of the grand-duke and the consuls of the foreign powers : an allowance shall be granted to him for extraordinary expenses.

He will appoint an officer to superintend the harbour : he will appoint a commandant of each fort ; he will keep privateers under a severe discipline, and see to it that they respect the neutral flag, especially the Spanish. He will have daily accounts rendered to him of the reports of the sentries ; he will inform me regularly of all that passes in the country where he is, and send me a report of all news from Corsica that reaches him. He will write to the imperial fiefs around the city to induce them to recognise the Republic, and he will acquaint me with the number of those fiefs, their population, their wealth, and the spirit which animates them. He will keep up severe discipline among his troops ; he will make a point of having all the soldiers in barracks, and not allowing any one,

from the general to the lowest *employé*, to lodge at any inhabitant's.

He shall have with him an adjutant-general, a commissary of war, and an *employé* for each branch of the administration.

BONAPARTE.

To the Consul of the Republic at Leghorn.

Leghorn, 12 Messidor, year 4 [June 30, 1796].

The consul of the Republic at Leghorn will cause the seals to be taken off and inventories made of all the magazines belonging to England and to English merchants, to the emperor, to the czarina of Russia, and in short to all princes and private persons of States with which we are at war. He will take all steps and use all means for discovering, obtaining restitution of, and seizing all merchandize which may have been deposited by different persons with Leghorn merchants; and for this purpose he will even pay whatever he shall think necessary.

BONAPARTE.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

The Directory forwards to you the annexed copy of a letter which the minister of marine has just written to its president, an acquaintance with which may be useful to you for the diplomatic transactions that may take place in Italy. It sends a duplicate of these copies to its commissioner Salicetti.

CARNOT.

The Minister of the Marine to the President of the Executive Directory.

Paris, 2 Messidor, year 4 [June 20, 1796].

I think it my duty to beg you earnestly to write to citizen commissioner of the Directory Salicetti, the conditions which it may be proper to impose on the governments of Italy: by means of these impositions, perfectly legitimate on the part of the conqueror, we can obtain the

rapid means of refitting our navy and reviving its prosperity.

In the Romagna, in the territories of Naples, we shall find timber ready to be embarked in great quantity: in the Modenese, in the Bolognese, in the Ferrarese, in the March of Ancona, in Calabria, and the eastern part of Sicily, war has caused hemp of the finest quality and sail-cloth to accumulate. Is it not fitting that each of these several States should furnish and transport to Toulon, with the least possible delay, the quantities which they shall be able to produce, and which they have already in magazine? Make Italy proud of having contributed to the splendour of our navy; this, it appears to me, would be seconding the views of the numerous patriots of those countries, who take a noble pride in having assisted in the refit and the success of the arms of the Republic.

I beseech you to submit these views to the Directory, and to obtain its consent to this important measure.

TRUGUET.

PS. I denounced, a few days since, to the minister for foreign affairs, the oblique conduct of the government of Genoa: I subjoin here an extract from the letter of the consul of the Republic at Leghorn, which will make you acquainted with that of the Tuscan government.

Extract of a letter from Citizen Belleville, Consul-General of the French Republic in Tuscany, to the Minister of the Marine.

I informed you, by my last letter of the 8th, that M. Eliot and the heads of the English party had been apprehended in Corsica: the intelligence is confirmed, but the Corsicans have limited their demands to the abolition of the taxes and the dissolution of the pretended parliament of a few men whom they dislike. I am sorry that the islanders, whom I fondly believed to be specially born for liberty, are, in so favourable a circumstance, more intent on their present interest than on the honour of belonging to the Republic.

The English are removing from this place riches and immense stores for the purpose of transporting them to

Corsica. Cattle, corn, horses, considerable sums, are all carried off with assiduity and profusion: is it respecting neutrality to allow one of the belligerent powers all sorts of facilities for starving the other?

Decree of the Executive Directory relative to Impositions on Conquered Countries.

3 Messidor, year 4 [June 21, 1796.]

The Executive Directory, considering that it is important to determine by a particular regulation all that relates to the form of the collection, paying in, produce, employment, and order of accountability of the impositions levied in the conquered countries, decrees:

Ordinary Impositions.

Art. 1. The ordinary impositions established in the conquered countries shall continue to be collected for the profit of the Republic.

2. The payment of what remains due upon these impositions is demandable, and shall be effected without delay.

3. The collectors and receivers at present existing shall be charged with this collection, and be obliged to give all the information that shall be demanded of them: in case of the absence of any of them, the commissioners of the government shall supply their place.

4. The commissioners of the government shall cause a statement of what remains due to be delivered to them: to this effect they shall employ such means as appear to them most expeditious.

5. They shall send the statement as speedily as possible to the minister of the finances.

Extraordinary Impositions.

6. The general-in-chief shall have authority to lay on any extraordinary imposition that he shall think proper: he shall consult for this purpose with the commissioners of the government, if there are any with the army.

7. When the amount of this extraordinary contribution shall be determined, the commissioners of the government shall be charged to make all the ulterior dispositions for the execution.

8. They will, in consequence, regulate the quantity to be borne by each commune: they shall, if they think proper, cause the amount that is to be paid to be advanced by the persons assessed highest or the most wealthy, with the understanding of an ulterior assessment to be made by the constituted authorities of the country, and, in short, take all the most prompt and proper measures for getting it in.

9. They shall cause the collection to be made by the receivers of the country, or by those whom they shall appoint for that purpose, according to what they shall deem to be most advantageous for the celerity of the getting in, which they must most especially keep continually in view.

10. They shall acquaint without delay the minister of the finances with the sum to which the extraordinary imposition decreed will amount, and with all the arrangements that have been made to ensure its payment.

Paying-in of the produce of the impositions, ordinary and extraordinary; application of this produce; order of accountability.

11. The produce of the impositions, both ordinary and extraordinary, shall be paid with all diligence of the commissioners of the government into a chest which they shall establish for this purpose near them. The cashier shall give receipts to the different collectors and receivers for the sums paid in.

12. The cashier shall deliver all the sums that are indispensable for the subsistence and wants of the army to the paymaster-general, who will account for them in the usual manner.

13. The commissioners of the government shall give an account every week to the minister of the finances of the sums paid into the chest under their care, those remitted by them to the paymaster-general of the army, and those remaining in the chest. In regard to the latter, they shall conform to the instructions which it will give them.

General Dispositions.

14. The general-in-chief and the commanders of the armed force shall, on the requisition of the commissioners of the government, or of any other person appointed by them,

furnish an armed force whenever it shall be necessary for the levy of these ordinary and extraordinary impositions.

15. The general-in-chief and the commanders of the armed force shall give the most precise and the most rigid orders that none of the moneys arising from these impositions be diverted and lost for the Republic.

16. The commissioners of the government will keep up the most active correspondence with the minister of the finances on everything relating to these same contributions; they will communicate to him, by courier after courier, the dispositions which they shall have made, and the successive progress of their operations.

17. When there shall be a special commissioner of the Directory for the department of the finances and contributions with the army, the articles of execution relating to this object shall principally concern him; still the other commissioners shall have a right to take cognizance of all the operations: in this case, he will deliberate with them, and cause minutes to be kept of the dispositions that shall be determined upon.

18. The minister of the finances is charged with the execution of the present decree.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 4 Messidor, year 4 [June 22, 1796].

The column which you have sent towards the Lake of Como has produced the effect which you expected from it, and has somewhat alarmed the enemy for Swabia; it may have contributed several times to the departure of the corps which have been detached from the army of Wurms, in order to reinforce Beaulieu: some bulletins which have reached the Directory represent their amount at 20,000 men. Your spies and the agents whom you will have placed on the roads must have made you acquainted with the truth. These circumstances must hasten the termination of your affairs with the powers of Italy. At the moment when the Directory is writing to you, you will probably have concluded an armistice with the Pope: make the plenipotentiaries of the prince of Rome repair with as little delay as possible to Paris, to finish the peace, and, above all, hasten the supplies in kind, with which, as it shall be agreed, the French Republic is to be furnished.

It is equally urgent that the plenipotentiary of Naples should arrive in Paris : one day lost for negotiations in time of war may occasion disasters. We strongly recommend to you, in consequence, to accelerate the departure of these ministers, that the Directory may have nothing to engage its attention but the north of Italy, whither the reinforcements which Beaulieu is receiving, and the occupation of the castle of Milan and Mantua by the enemy, summon you back.

By the time you receive this, you will no doubt have executed the important movements of Bologna and Leghorn. May the tutelary genius which watches over the high destinies of the Republic have brought you to that port in time to secure some English ships and the magazines, &c. of those islanders !

You will, no doubt, have heard of the retrograde movement of the left wing of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, from the Lahn to the Sieg. The Directory has ordered it to resume the offensive. The army of the Rhine and Moselle has had some success in advance of Manheim : it is to pass the Rhine immediately in the environs of Strasburg, and to throw itself with impetuosity into Swabia and Franconia. If that commanded by General Jourdan seconds it boldly, as the Directory wishes it to do, it is to be presumed that they will soon bring back part of the troops that Wurmser appears to have detached against the army of Italy.

This state of things would oblige the Directory to prescribe to you, as it does, to confine yourself to acting on the defensive in the Tyrol, if the disposition of the inhabitants of the conquered countries in Italy did not make it an express law for you.

What you have done in the imperial fiefs near Tortona and in the Milanese will inspire them, no doubt, with a salutary fear, but it would be imprudent to trust to that : it would be far more so if the army were to remove further from Lombardy in penetrating too far into the Tyrol. This operation could at most take place in case the republican armies fighting in Germany should succeed in beating back the enemy towards Bohemia or the Danube ; but, in prescribing to you this defensive, the Directory does not mean to deny you the faculty of attacking the enemy whenever you find a favourable occasion : it merely wishes that you

should not dash on too far into the Tyrol, because it believes that this course would prove disastrous.

The Directory approves the articles agreed upon between you and Lieutenant-Colonel de St. Marsan; it will, as you desire, welcome citizen Serbelloni and the other Milanese patriots, deputies at Paris. It deems it superfluous to remind you that the fate of the Milanese depends on the events that may happen, and principally on the success of the armies of the Sambre and Meuse and of the Rhine and Moselle in Germany.

The Directory has thought fit to defer for some time any measure relative to the organization of one or several battalions composed of the Milanese youth.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 4 Messidor, year 4 [June 22, 1796].

It is asserted, citizen-general, that the marble bust of Marcus Aurelius is at Pavia: it is for the interest of the arts that it should be transmitted to France: the Directory commands you to cause all necessary precautions to be taken that it may arrive without damage.

CARNOT.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Castiglione, 1 Messidor, year 4 [June 19, 1796].

I yesterday ordered a reconnaissance in force along the Adige. Our troops have chased the enemy as far as Avis: we have taken forty prisoners, and killed many men. Our loss is two killed and six wounded.

The position and force of the enemy are as follows. General Colli, with 8000 men, is at Roveredo and Campara; General Hohenlohe, who has succeeded Beaulieu, is at Trent, with 12,000.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Castiglione, 4 Messidor, year 4 [June 22, 1796].

I reconnoitred yesterday about Salo and the positions occupied by our troops, and assuredly there is nothing to

fear in that quarter. I crossed the lake in the felucca which has been equipped at Peschiera. This felucca has no sails in it yet; it were very necessary that it should have.

I am setting off for Chiusa: I have some changes to make thereabouts. I am guarding the posts upon the Adige, Bussolenga, La Sega, and La Chiusa, by which the enemy might attempt to cross: those three posts occupy a demi-brigade.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Venice, 7 Messidor, year 4 [June 25, 1796].

The videttes which I keep at Bolzano and Trent inform me that from the 15th to the 18th of June there have passed by that route 3600 more infantry, 1600 of them upon the Adige. They add that the Austrian general has men at work on the road from Trent to Areo, whether he purposes to break into the Brescian, or merely wishes to draw your attention to that quarter, while he gets to Mantua, through the Venetian territory.

Citizen Barthelemi, in giving me the first good news from the Rhine, adds that Wurmser has considerably weakened his army by detaching from it 20,000 men for Italy. If these reinforcements unite, there will be above 50,000 men to put into Italy.

I learn this moment, by a letter from Trent, dated June 22nd, that 2400 more infantry arrived there on the 19th and 20th; but it appears that these troops and some others comprehended in the preceding notes come from Inspruck, and form part of the detachment from the Rhine. I am applying for an explanation.

LALLEMANT.

To the General-in-Chief.

Pietati, 8 Messidor, year 4 [June 26, 1796].

All the works of the engineer department would have been finished this morning, had a certain general of brigade been able to read, or taken the trouble to read, the order given him by the staff of General Serrurier, to furnish us with labourers in the night between the 6th and the 7th. Owing to our not having had any that night, the siege has

been retarded twenty-four hours. Last night, we partly made amends for this neglect: but, to tell the truth, our grand communication will not be practicable for cannon till to-morrow. Do you not think that we have delayed the artillery for want of communications? In the first place, had it been ready, it might have passed behind the dikes, at night, as you have observed; but, let what will be said, three or four batteries have not the necessary strength, and I am afraid that they will not long withstand the enemy's fire. One of the two batteries of St. George is more advanced and more solid; but that which ought to take the advanced works in rear was not begun till the 6th, when I passed that way.

If the artillery can, by its ricochets, weaken the enemy; if the battery of howitzers which I have applied for on my right can beat down the enemy's works, I have nothing but a trench of 120 toises to make, and I shall get within 50 toises of the palisades, that is to say, near enough to carry them without difficulty, if the attack is well conducted. I might succeed, were I to undertake this trench in the night between the 9th and 10th; but I am fearful of unmasking my designs, and had rather wait till our artillery has produced some sort of effect: another thing that decides me to this step is that the enemy is working more on our left than on our right; he seems to be on the wrong scent.

You should have had a plan of the trenches, if all my people had not been either on duty or ill; I have not even a secretary.

CHASSELOUP,
Chief of brigade of engineers.

To the General-in-Chief.

Milan, 8 Messidor, year 4 [June 26, 1796].

We had yesterday thirty-two pieces in battery against the Castle. I ordered the attack to begin this morning with the bridge and the prolongations both together till noon: our batteries played perfectly till past that time. The enemy kept up such a tremendous fire, that they have suffered much. All the epaulements of the battery No. 1, suburb of Venelina, have been broken up. The battery No. 7, suburb of Camasina, is also damaged. In most of them we have had pieces dismounted, bad carriages, and

coups d'embrasure. Our mortar batteries of the centre and the left of attack acted, however, extremely well; they set places on fire several times. To-night we shall work at repairing the batteries. The mortars will continue to play: we shall determine upon the *batteries d'attente* for the pieces from Alexandria. A combination of efforts and resources is required here.

The enemy has particularly annoyed us by his bastioned towers, from which he plays upon all our prolongations. We had eighteen men killed or wounded.

I shall not yet bestow praises on our artillerymen: but for a detachment of the army of the Alps, which has given us a good lift, *en passant*, we could not have kept our ground.

Punishments and rewards—these are the two motives to which I have recourse. I have been much pleased with some of the bombardiers, and have signified this to them by gratuities.

I learn this moment that General Dugard has made a bargain for the transport of artillery from Alexandria to Pavia in a fortnight, and I recognize him in this trait. Luckily, Captain Gastinel has set out with 160 horsed carriages for Alexandria, where he will certainly put an end to this grievous bargain. As for the siege of the Castle, you desire speedy success, and nobody is more interested in that than myself; but there is plenty of work here, and how wretched are the means that ought to hasten it! To-morrow you shall have particulars of our situation. The day has been hot in all ways, and I am worn out with fatigue.

DESPINOIS.

To the General-in-Chief.

Castiglione, 9 Messidor, year 4 [June 27, 1796].

The day before yesterday, four imperial barks appeared at Torni, for the purpose of attacking the demi-galley which we had there, armed. I had sent it that morning to Peschiera: the Austrian vessels, not finding ours as they expected, fired about a hundred cannon or howitzer shot at the troops charged with the defence of that port, and stood up the lake. I was aware of the necessity of accelerating the armament of our flotilla; and, in consequence, I repaired yesterday to Peschiera. I have ordered men to be

set to work on the ship gun-carriages, to enable the other two demi-galleys to get out with one 8-pounder each: these pieces were taken from the park, till those destined for this object, of which we have notice, arrive. I hope, from what the captain has told me, that the three demi-galleys will be cruising by the day after to-morrow: people continue at work on the great barks, and it is said that they will be ready to start in ten days. The demi-galleys will certainly do us better service than the large barks; infinitely lighter, going in a superior manner with oars, they afford advantageous means of boarding; to this end I shall man them with good troops.

I shall have a line formed upon the lake, to prevent the passage of supplies for the Austrian troops. They have long had nothing to live upon but corn brought them by the Venetians; as soon as our naval force is in a state to sail, we will cut off that resource.

To-morrow, a battery will be established at Torni, to protect the anchorage of our vessels there.

To-morrow morning, General Joubert will make a reconnaissance in force, in advance of the Col de Campiou. Yesterday, the ordinary reconnaissance killed one and wounded several of the enemy.

General Rusca will make a strong reconnaissance, and push it as far as possible along the river Chiesa.

All reports agree in stating that the enemy is very far from us, excepting at Corona, where there is every morning a slight fire of small arms.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Castiglione, 10 Messidor, year 4 [June 28, 1796.]

Informed that the enemy was reinforcing himself, and constructing works to fortify himself in all his positions, I ordered a general attack, to ascertain, by sure reconnoissances and in force, the truth of these reports.

Nine companies of carabineers and 600 men of the 4th demi-brigade of light infantry had orders in consequence to proceed under the command of General Joubert to the Bochetta of Campiou: I went thither myself with my staff, and accompanied by General of Brigade Valette, to satisfy myself as to the force of the enemy's positions.

By one o'clock in the morning, the chief of battalion Marchand, with the nine companies of carabineers, had invested and attacked the enemy in their formidable entrenchments. General Joubert, with 600 men of the 4th light infantry, followed him: the enemy, taken by surprise, retired within the entrenchments, where our brave republicans attacked them, arms in hand, and using only their bayonets and swords to storm the redoubts. The regiments of Lattermann, Shosoldo, and 400 Tyrolese defended positions which would have been impregnable had they been defended by Frenchmen; but our brave fellows, regardless of the numbers, the positions, or the terrible fire kept up by the enemy, drove them out of their little fortresses, killed and wounded many, and made 200 prisoners; they took four camps of about 400 tents, all the baggage of the officers, cooking utensils, &c., and 25 mules, with about 15,000 cartridges. The commander of these troops was killed in the entrenchments; 200 of Lattermann's regiment flung themselves from a rock to avoid the bayonets of our intrepid warriors. I shall acquaint you, citizen-general, with the deeds of valour that deserve to be known. General Joubert and his staff behaved admirably, especially the brother of that general who headed one of our columns. Since the promotion of his brother to the rank of general of brigade, he has performed the duties of aide-de-camp, without being an officer. I solicit of you, citizen-general, the rank of sub-lieutenant for this young soldier.

You cannot imagine, general, the number and strength of the entrenchments which the Austrians had thrown up in this quarter. The officer of engineers, who was charged with the direction of it, had orders to make it fit for the reception of the whole present army of Beaulieu, and that which he expects from the Rhine: there would have been room besides for the recruits of two years. The quantity of works which those men have constructed in the space of five or six days is incredible: rocks were suspended on the top of all the heights to crush assailants, but all these terrible means of defence could not stop our brave fellows for a single moment.

The chief of battalion Recco, commanding at Preabocco and Brentino, had orders to march, with the 11th light infantry, which he commands, reinforced by two companies of carabineers and two of grenadiers, upon Belona, to

reconnoitre the positions and strength of the enemy. That officer, known for his military talents and his valour, made his dispositions so ably, according to our instructions, that his carabineers and grenadiers enveloped all the advanced posts of the enemy, and not one of them escaped. Eight hundred Austrians defended the excellent positions of Belona; but our brave warriors, regardless of the number and the excellent positions which the enemy defended, pushed on with bayonets fixed, and overturned all before them. More than 100 Austrians were slain, 70 prisoners were left in our hands, and, but for the battery of four pieces which the enemy had on the left bank of the Adige and the impossibility of crossing that river, which is not fordable, the 800 Austrians would have been entirely cut off.

Our loss in these two affairs is but six killed and eight or nine slightly wounded.

The report of general of brigade Victor, who was ordered to proceed on the left of the lake, with a battalion of his brigade, to Malsesena, has not yet reached me. I have no doubt that it is as advantageous to the arms of the Republic as the two others.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Favorita, 10 Messidor, year 4 [June 28, 1796].

Agreeably to your order of the 28th ult., the commanding officers of the artillery and the engineers and myself met, the day before yesterday, the 8th; we went and inspected together all the points of the citadel, and slept at Ceresa. On the morning of the 9th, we reconnoitred the environs of the city, finishing with St. George, where it was agreed that a mortar battery would be useful.

The commandant of engineers ascertained that the part of the citadel easiest to attack is at the bastion of the Trinity, and the part of the city, on the right of the dike of Ceresa, independently of an incendiary battery, that is to be placed at the *casa* Micheli, which is on the left of the dike of Ceresa, nearly equidistant from the Pradella gate; and another of mortars near St. George, as I have before mentioned.

We have also fixed upon the site for the park of artillery, which will be at an equal distance from the gate of Ceresa

and the *casa* Micheli, on a spot commodious enough and sufficiently in rear: it will only be necessary to take some precautions in regard to water.

On our return yesterday evening, we agreed that, with the greatest possible economy, for the attack of the city, no fewer than thirty pieces of cannon and sixteen mortars could be employed; for that of the citadel, twenty-four pieces and six mortars.

According to our calculations, there will be required 1084 artillerymen, and from 20,000 to 25,000 infantry for the two attacks of the city and the citadel, and 1000 cavalry.

We have judged that the attack of the city could not be made till all the posts in advance have been taken from the enemy; an operation which must be combined on account of the difficulty of the approaches.

The commandant of the engineers has issued the necessary orders for setting about the preparatory works, such as fascines, gabions, &c.

I have said nothing about a change of artillery; I presume that the commandant of that arm will communicate with you about it.

SERRURIER.

To the General-in-Chief.

Castiglione, 11 Messidor, year 4 [June 29, 1796]

The long march which general of brigade Victor had to make yesterday, in the reconnoissance which I had ordered upon Malsesena, caused it to be very late when he reached the enemy: so that his affair was attended with no other results than driving back all the advanced posts, and a brisk fire of small arms between the tirailleurs on both sides. Five imperial barks fired a great deal upon the troops: General Victor says that the artillery of those vessels is ably worked; he estimates the enemy in Malsesena and environs at 1000 or 1200 men: I hope to dislodge them one of these days.

To-morrow, those three galleys will come and cast anchor at Torre, where I have ordered a battery of two pieces to be placed for their protection.

MASSENA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Milan, 11 Messidor, year 4 [June 29, 1796].

Our wishes are fulfilled: the commandant of the Castle of Milan capitulated this morning at three o'clock, and the troops of the Republic now occupy this fortress. Two thousand eight hundred prisoners, one hundred and forty-four pieces of cannon, two thousand weight of powder, five hundred muskets, numerous siege implements — such are the fruits of this capture.

I am this moment sending off the Austrian garrison for Lodi, where it will await your orders.

To-morrow you shall receive an exact inventory of all the things that we found in the Castle. I will likewise mention to you the officers who have particularly distinguished themselves.

I perform to-day a very gratifying duty in commending the conduct of all the besieging troops: artillery, infantry, cavalry, have all concurred in the triumph of our arms. The volunteers multiplied themselves; they were at once on guard, at work, and manning the batteries; and, during the excessive fatigues of twelve days' trenches, their courage and devotedness never slackened for a single moment.

You will find annexed the capitulation which I proposed to M. de Lamy, and which he was obliged to accept.

DESPINOIS.

PS. I have this moment learned that there has been found in the Austrian chests 72,000 livres. Out of these funds, I solicit a gratuity for the besieging troops, who have so richly deserved it.

The Commandant of the Castle of Milan to the General of Division Despinois, commanding in Lombardy.

Castle of Milan, one a.m., June 29, 1796 [11 Messidor, year 4].

If you will suspend hostilities, I will capitulate with you in the morning.

DE LAMY.

*To M. de Lamy, Austrian Commandant of the Castle
of Milan.*

Milan, 11 Messidor, year 4 [June 29, 1796] 3 a.m.

I cannot, sir, accede to a suspension of hostilities at the point where we are, unless in virtue of the following capitulation which I propose to you, and on which you will have to deliberate immediately.

DESPINOIS.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Roverbello, 11 Messidor, year 4 [June 29, 1796].

We have made with General Serrurier and the commandant of the engineers minute reconnoissances of the city and citadel of Mantua. Having afterwards met to determine, agreeably to your orders, the points of attack, and the site of the park, the result of our opinions is as follows :—

To attack the citadel and the city at the same time ; to establish a battery for mortars to throw red-hot balls near the *casa* Micheli ; to establish a mortar battery near the *casa* Zampoli ; to place the park 200 toises in rear of the *casa* Spolverini. The attack of the citadel to be made on the bastion of the centre, called the Trinity, and there would play six batteries : two of five pieces, two of four, and two others of two, with three mortars each ; which would make a total for that part of twenty-four pieces of heavy calibre and six mortars.

The attack of the city to be made on the part to the right of the dike of Ceresa ; and there would play three batteries, one of six pieces, one of four, and another of eight, with four mortars ; which makes in all, for this part, eighteen pieces and four mortars.

The battery near the *casa* Micheli to be of twelve pieces, six of them for red-hot balls, of six mortars. The battery near the *casa* Zampoli to be of six mortars.

The total of the cannon necessary would be fifty-four pieces and twenty-two mortars, those for change not included.

To work this number of pieces, there will be required 1,100 artillerymen ; of troops, there must be from 20,000 to 25,000 infantry, and 1000 cavalry.

SUGNY.

To the General-in-Chief.

Bologna, 12 Messidor, year 4 [June 30, 1796].

I have just received, general, a letter from Cardinal Dugnani, legate of La Romagna, in which he informs me that an armistice has been concluded between the French Republic and his Holiness. As I am absolutely ignorant of the existence of such a treaty, I beg you to let me have a copy of it, and at the same time to send me your instructions on the subject. You will find annexed a copy of the cardinal's letter and of my answer.

I evacuated La Romagna on the 8th, conformably with your orders. I left there, as I have informed you, only a detachment of fifty horse and a company of infantry to cover the collection of the contributions and the removal of the chests.

A courier has just arrived, by whom Captain Albani, who commands at Forli, informs me that an insurrection has broken out at Cesena; that the rebels have seized adjutant-general Verdier, returning from the mission, on which, for want of an officer of engineers, I had sent him to Ancona jointly with adjunct d'Amour. That general officer has been exposed to the greatest dangers, and I know not yet whether he has been able to extricate himself from them. I immediately despatched a courier to the magistrates of the town where the rising had taken place. I summoned them on their responsibility to set at liberty citizen Verdier, and to send him to me under a good and safe guard. At the same time, I ordered the general of brigade Beyrand to march immediately, with what infantry I had left, a six-inch howitzer, and a squadron of cavalry, for Cesena, and to restore order there. I could not forbear giving counter-orders to the battalion on march for Porto Legnago, that the Bolognese might not be left without troops.

You see, general, how M. the cardinal and his infernal *clique* have excited the minds of the inhabitants: certainly, if the troops are withdrawn, we must give up the contributions, the collection of which would then be impracticable. Those who might be left to attend to the collection would run the risk of falling victims to the fury of the populace, inflamed still more by the news of the armistice.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.

Genoa, 6 Messidor, year 4 [June 24, 1796].

The Genoese government has given me no new answer respecting M. Girola. I transmit to you, under No. 1, a copy of a declaration made to me the day before yesterday, concerning the transmission of muskets and ammunition by M. Girola to the rebels at Arcquata.

The senate, or, to speak more correctly, the secretary of state, despatched, on the 30th of this month, an extraordinary courier for Paris. I have no doubt that it was to inform the minister of Genoa in France of your letter and of Murat's arrival. As it was possible for me to give to the same courier a despatch for the minister of the finances, I enclosed in that despatch a letter to the Directory, by which I informed it of all that I sent him, even the copy and translation of the insignificant answer that has been made to you.

It is right, moreover, that you should know that the Directory, having appointed one Marco Frederic to the post of vice-consul of the French Republic at La Spezzia, Genoa refuses to recognize him. On its refusal, I replied by a note, of which I annex a copy, No. 2; you will see that I wished to bring this perverse government, once for all, to an explanation concerning the system of repulsion and persecution which it pursues towards the oldest friends that the Revolution has ever had in its territory. This note is yet unanswered.

The three points in litigation are these—Girola, the five vessels taken at the Arneca, and the cessation of all the animosity against those whom we may call the Genoese patriots.

I see clearly why you desire me in your letter of the 3rd to get everything belonging to the Republic removed from this place.

As to the operations that have taken place here under my superintendence relative to the consignments which have been made to Balbi, the state of the case is this. The account of the cases of money arrived is made up: there has been found seven thousand and some hundred livres less than, as it was announced, they ought to contain. The whole of the plate has been weighed, and yesterday the melting was finished, with the knowledge of this city. To-

morrow, they will proceed to assay the ingots and weigh them. Five copies are made of the minutes of all these operations, which are extremely long.

Happen what will, I see nothing to fear for the silver or the ingots: for, 1. the money serves every day to pay the bills of exchange drawn by the national treasury upon M. Balbi, and by the 1st of July he will have paid them to the amount of nearly 4,000,000 tournois; 2. the value of the sums which will then remain in the hands of M. Balbi, and of the ingots, which will then be assayed and weighed, being known, Genoa will be responsible to us for it. Genoa is incapable of resisting. You may dictate laws to Genoa whenever you please. Approach with 15,000 or 18,000 men, and, above all, with a train of mortars. Send me, if you please, an engineer: he will make a tour outside the fortifications; he will discover how one may, by scaling the great wall and then choosing two favourable points between the great wall and the body of the place for planting mortars and howitzers, keep Genoa in complete dependence.

Genoa must yield to you: you will always have it in your power to force it to restore the sums in specie or bullion which may be taken at Balbi's. As for the jewels and diamonds, to which I have not yet adverted, that is quite a different affair. We have not yet had time to reglue the case which contains them: to ascertain the value of the diamonds and pearls, they must all be dismounted. One can set but very few hands about this work, because they must be watched to prevent embezzlement. I am going to commence that operation the day after to-morrow; it shall be continued without interruption, and regular minutes shall be taken. When you judge that they are ready, send me an order, signed by you and the two commissioners, Garau and Salicetti, by which, upon any pretext you please, that can neither lead to any surmise of your intentions, nor cause Balbi to suspect any diminution of confidence, you will direct me to fetch away from citizen Balbi's the diamonds and jewels that are there, for the purpose of being conveyed to Tortona, or to any other place you may think proper.

For instance, you may make a handle of the fall of the value of diamonds and pearls in Italy, and allege that in consequence you prefer sending them to France.

You will only take care to keep at my disposal at San

Pietro de Arena a detachment of fifty horse, to escort the convoy, which will not be bulky, but very valuable ; and I forewarn you that, without this escort, I will have nothing to do with the business of removal.

I send you, under Nos. 2 and 3, translations of papers from among those sent me by General Berthier.

I have sent off to the minister, Charles Lacroix, the translation of that from Drake to Nelson. He will, perhaps, have in his office the means of deciphering the secret article of that letter. It recommends to him at the same time to warn our government to have an eye upon Toulon, to which that article may possibly relate. The other letters sent, German, Italian, and French, contain nothing worth translating.

Before I conclude my letter, general, I must communicate to you some general ideas concerning Genoa. You will reconcile them with those which you may have conceived on the subject.

What had best be done with Genoa for the advantage of our Republic, and, at the same time, I may say, for the true interest of Genoa itself? That is the interesting question to be resolved.

Must we remind the Genoese of all the wrongs done by their government to the French—the affair of the *Modeste*; the affair of the *Imperieuse*, another frigate taken at the same time, and in the same manner, at La Spezzia; the affair in which, last year, the battery of La Lanterne fired grape at Sibille, who was on board the little xebec the *Leonidas*; the affair of the refusal of a loan to the French, when they were destitute of every thing; that of the recent capture of five vessels at the Arneca; lastly, the obstinacy of the senate in persecuting and molesting all the old partisans of the French Revolution? Yes.

Must we demand, insist on, the annihilation of all decrees, and the cessation of all prosecutions commenced, under specious pretexts, for political language and opinions? Yes.

Must we demand of Genoa a loan of from six to eight millions, and suitable indemnities for the prizes which they have suffered to be taken from us on their territory, without opposing the proceeding? Yes.

Must we require Genoa to admit no more English vessels into its port or in its Riviera? Yes.

Yes, general, most assuredly all this is necessary ; but, in my opinion, all this will not be sufficient : without some further measures, you will obtain only a few momentary advantages ; while, the authority remaining in the hands of our declared enemies, we shall have constantly to watch and repress the underhand manœuvres of the ill-affected senators and the resentment of a populace whom they will exasperate against us. You must, therefore, if you come to Genoa, and wish to produce there an effect worthy of your way of acting and of French dignity, command the banishment of about fifty persons hostile to France, and the reform of the mode of the deliberations, by insisting on their being decided henceforward, in all cases, by a simple majority. Do this, and, above all, on approaching Genoa, publish a manifesto, declaring that you are coming with no other motives but to deliver the people, and even the nobility, from the tyranny of the families which have engrossed all the powers : then your work will be durable ; France will be able to rely on the good intentions of the Genoese, and to consider that State as disposed to continue friends with her, both by inclination and by the consideration of the respective interests of the two nations.

I know not whether it would not be better for us, under certain circumstances, to correspond in cipher : I send you one, No. 6, which is of no use but between us two.

FAIPOULT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 10 Messidor, year 4 [June 28, 1796].

The Directory learns with surprise, citizen-general, that a lighter and two merchantmen, with valuable cargoes, the first of which had retired under the fire of the battery of Portecros, near Toulon, and the other two under that of St. Pierre, have been taken without resistance by the English. It requests you not to suffer the approach of these pirates to the coasts of the Mediterranean, to attend to that service, which is said to be performed with the utmost negligence, and to give it all the activity which circumstances require.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 12 Messidor, year 4 [June 30, 1796].

We have received your despatches, dated 3 Messidor: that which treats of your military position has convinced us that the Leghorn expedition has not made you lose sight of a more essential object—that of preserving the conquests in Italy, by preventing Beaulieu from re-entering the Milanese. We participate in your just impatience for your return to this side of the Po; and we think that you will soon be in a condition to collect your principal forces towards the points threatened.

The Prince of Rome, terrified at the rapidity of your march, will, no doubt, have demanded an armistice, and your instructions on this head will have enabled you to make conditions conformable with our wish, till circumstances and the consolidation of the triumphs of the Republic fix the manner in which it will be consistent with the national dignity and our political system to treat definitively with the Pope.

Your measures in regard to Genoa are approved, and the Directory is desiring the minister of the Republic to that power to insist on the expulsion of M. Girola: those which have for their object the safety of your communications, the tranquillity of the territory, and the avenging of perfidious acts executed or attempted against whatever belongs to the Republic, are likewise deserving of the assent of the Directory.

The observations which you make on the abuses of the administrative service in the levy and application of the contributions have fixed our attention. It has appeared to us that unity of views and harmony among our agents ought to be the basis of the good order to be established in that department; we have, in consequence, revoked the powers of citizen Pinsot: our commissioners, Salicetti and Garrau, will direct all the operations which belong to it. A copy of our instructions to the commissioners of the government with the armies is annexed, and the dispositions contained in our different letters fix the relations which ought to exist between them and you. The entire and legitimate confidence which you have acquired, citizen-general, in every respect, and that which the Directory has granted to its commissioners, Salicetti and Garrau, afford it

the certainty that the same concert will continue to prevail between you. Let not any thing then that can add to the fruit of the conquests of the Republic in Italy, and to the judicious application of the resources which are offered you, escape your vigilance. Point out with that courageous integrity which is peculiar to you all rogues and speculators, and the just severity of the Directory shall not fail to overtake them.

General Kellermann has reported to us the requisition made to him on your application for two demi-brigades, but he has only five battalions left; and this reinforcement will necessarily meet with some delays before it reaches Milan. The 2000 men furnished by the army of the Coasts of the Ocean are on march. As soon as the first troops arrive at Lyons, General Kellermann will despatch to you those that you apply for: he has been directed to send you two battalions; and one of the demi-brigades, commanded by General Chateauneuf, is about to receive orders to proceed to the army of Italy.

The junction of these reinforcements, of the troops which you will bring back from Tuscany into the Milanese, and of those which the fall of the castle of Milan will soon render disposable, will form an imposing force, capable not only of resisting Beaulieu, but also of beating him in his positions, till he is again overthrown. On the 6th, the army of the Rhine and Moselle effected the passage of the Rhine at Strasburg with brilliant success; that of the Sambre and Meuse is necessarily about to resume a vigorous defensive, under favour of this diversion and of a disposable corps lent it by that of the North. Considerable forces are acting at this moment on the right bank of that river, and we hope that the whole theatre of the war will soon be transferred to it.

We have been much pleased to learn that the troops are free from those diseases which usually attack the French in Italy. To satisfy the wants of the soldier, to keep him from intemperance, and to maintain a vigilant discipline, are the most efficient means of preserving armies from those destructive calamities, the rock on which their triumphs are wrecked.

The exquisite productions of the fine arts, of the despatch of which you give us notice, will add to the splendour of the trophies of the army of Italy.

We must at once embellish and enrich France with all the valuable monuments and all the interesting productions of those flourishing countries. It would be useful to introduce into our country mares of a good breed, to improve that of our horses. The territory of several States, and especially that of Naples, affords particular resources of this kind, which the Directory requests you not to neglect.

CARNOT.

The General-in-Chief Bonaparte to the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Roverbello, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 6, 1796].

I learn, this moment, citizens directors, that the garrison of Mantua has made a sortie: it went back quicker than it came out, leaving behind it fifty killed.

I shall make this evening a final reconnaissance for determining upon the last operations of the siege: in four or five days the trenches will be opened.

The divisions of the army which are on the mountains of the Tyrol are in perfect health. The division of General Serrurier, which is besieging Mantua and is 7000 strong, begins to have fifty sick every day. It is impossible for me to keep fewer troops about Mantua, where there is a garrison of at least 8 or 10,000 men. It is now a month that I have kept the place blockaded in this manner. The enemy, informed probably of the weakness of the besiegers, has often attempted to make sorties and always been beaten.

But I am now obliged to reinforce this division, since the opening of the trenches is about to commence. I hope that we shall soon have the city, otherwise we shall have a great many sick.

Wurmser is beginning to make movements for attempting to raise the blockade of Mantua. I am waiting with some impatience for the ten battalions of the army of the Ocean, which you have long promised me, and of which I have not yet had any tidings.

I shall not turn my attention to the demands to be made upon Venice, till the business of Genoa is settled, Mantua reduced, and the matters about to be taken in hand terminated.

It is computed that the reinforcements received by the enemy amount to 31,000 men, 10,000 of whom are Tyrolese;

18,000, remnant of Beaulieu's army; 8000, garrison of Mantua: total, 67,000 men.

The force of our army is as follows: Massena's division, 13,000 men; Sauret's, 8000; Augereau's, 8000; Serrurier's, 7000; Despinos, 5000; cavalry, 3000: total, 40,000 men.

You see the great superiority which the enemy has over us.

In the 40,000 men above mentioned, the garrisons of Leghorn, Milan, Pavia, Tortona, &c., are not included.

I informed you in my last letter that I had demanded 6000 muskets of the republic of Lucca; they were already on their way, but, not being of calibre, I sent them back.

I have caused all the property at Leghorn belonging to Neapolitans to be sequestered, since, by the armistice, the suspension of arms is not considered to have commenced till the moment when the Neapolitan cavalry shall have arrived at the positions indicated to it. I think, however, that you might order restitution of the goods belonging to Neapolitans by an article of the treaty of peace. I have ordered all the inventories of the effects belonging to Neapolitans to be made before their consul.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Roverbello, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 6, 1796].

I transmitted to you, citizens directors, by my last courier, the requisition which I had made to the city of Genoa to expel the minister of the emperor, who never ceased fomenting rebellion in the imperial fiefs and instigating the commission of murders. You will find annexed the note which the secretary of state has addressed to citizen Faipoult, and which he has sent to me. You will likewise find annexed a letter from the minister Faipoult relative to the affairs of Genoa; I beg you to take it into consideration, and to give me your orders upon the subject. As for me, I think, like the minister Faipoult, that there ought to be turned out of the government of Genoa a score of families, which, by the constitution of the country itself, have no right to be in it, since they are feudatories of the emperor or of the King of Naples; that the senate should be compelled to repeal the decree which banishes from Genoa eight

or ten noble families, namely, those which are attached to France, and which, three years ago, prevented the republic of Genoa from joining the coalition. By these means, the government of Genoa would find itself composed of our friends, and we might rely the more upon it since the new banished families would retire among the allies, and thenceforward the new governors of Genoa would fear them as we fear the return of the emigrants. If you approve this plan, you have only to give me your orders, and I will charge myself with the means of ensuring its execution.

I shall expect your answer to this letter in the first decade of Thermidor.

BONAPARTE.

To General Bonaparte.

Venice, 15 Messidor, year 4 [July 3, 1796].

I learn this moment, citizen-general, that a courier who has come to Drake, the English minister, brings him intelligence that General Wurmser is at Trent with a considerable Austrian army and another Austrian general whose name he has not given to me with sufficient accuracy.

I think it right to lose no time in acquainting General Massena, as well as General Kilmaine, with this news; and for this purpose I am despatching a courier, whom I shall address to General Rampon at Verona; but it appeared to me not less necessary to give you the information.

LALLEMANT.

To Citizen Faipoult, Minister of the Republic at Genoa.

Head-quarters, Roveredo, 17 Messidor, year 4 [July 5, 1796].

I had rather that the German deserters should take service in the Spanish army than in the Venetian; I therefore beg you to inform the Spanish recruiter that I authorise him to go to Brescia, whither I will send all the German deserters to him.

I have been here since yesterday. General Massena has been in quest of the enemy, killed 400 of his men, and taken 350 prisoners.

I shall approach your walls by and by.

BONAPARTE.

To the Commissary of the Marine at Toulon.

Head-quarters, Roveredo, 17 Messidor, year 4 [July 5, 1796].

Eighty carriages loaded with hemp are about to start from Bologna for Nice, where they will be at your disposal.

I have written to the minister of the marine, to inform him that he might send commissioners to Rome, to receive to the amount of 4,000,000, in cash.

I shall always have great pleasure in doing any thing that can contribute to the restoration of our navy, though, in reality, it requires an order of the government.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Carnot, Member of the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Roverbello, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 6, 1796].

General Berthier is furious about the imaginary victory which the German news-writers have made Beaulieu gain over us. For my part, I think those gentlemen are right to comfort themselves in the only way that is left them: dreams have always been the consolation of the unfortunate.

All our diplomatic affairs in Italy, with the exception of Genoa and Venice, are terminated.

For Venice, the moment is not favourable: we must first take Mantua and give Wurmser a sound drubbing.

As for Genoa, the precise moment has arrived: I am of the opinion of citizen Faipoult, who is for turning out of the government a score families who have betrayed us in all times, and to obtain, on the contrary, the recall of those in banishment who have shown friendship for us. The moment I know your intentions on the subject, I shall make it my duty to execute them; meanwhile, I shall begin with the negotiations for the 10,000,000.

All goes on well; the enemy is reinforcing himself: we shall not seek him unless he comes too near the Adige; and we are going to concentrate all our means to take Mantua.

BONAPARTE.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 14 Messidor, year 4 [July 2, 1796].

The monastery of the Great St. Bernard has attracted, citizen-general, the attention of the Directory: it has thought

that it ought to contribute to the maintenance of an establishment directed in favour of humanity and the directors of which afford hospitality to all nations. It recommends to you to order the sum of 6000 livres in money to be remitted to the religious of that monastery, to make up for the aid which has been so long withheld.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 17 Messidor, year 4 [July 5, 1796].

The Executive Directory reminds you, citizen-general, of the urgent request that it made you to give precise orders, to be vigilantly followed up, that plans of situations and decadary historical bulletins should be regularly addressed to it. It is sorry to see that, since the commencement of the campaign, the army which you command has not sent any of those different objects. It is important that this task be henceforward punctually performed, and executed upon the plan of the model.

When the occupations of the chief of the staff are too numerous for him to attend personally to this point, he can make an adjutant-general supply his place in drawing up the historical bulletin, which requires a particular talent.

You will fulfil, citizen-general, the wish of the Directory, by paying serious attention to the object of this letter.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 6, 1796].

We have received, citizen-general, your despatches of the 8th. Messidor: we are satisfied with the armistice concluded with the pope. The other advantages which you regret not to have derived from that negociation will be found, we hope with you, at the time of the definitive treaty, which we are in no hurry to conclude, persuaded that the army of Italy, in maintaining its glorious conquests, will give us all the latitude necessary for imposing upon Italy the conditions of peace most favourable to the Republic. In order to have avoided the difficulties which you have met with in the discussion of the armistice, it would have been desirable that our commissioners should have conferred upon it in your

presence only with M. d'Azara ; but at this moment we see nothing but the importance of that event, and the precious faculty which it has given you of marching rapidly back to this side of the Po, before Beaulieu has had time to attempt any thing.

The retaining of the port of Ancona promises advantages to our Levant trade ; but this measure appears to us to be still uncertain for the future. We beg of you, however, till something is settled in regard to this point, which is necessarily connected with ulterior circumstances, to make all the dispositions that you shall deem useful.

It will be very interesting for us to know what opinion we ought to attach to the overtures made to you by Prince Pignatelli relative to Vienna ; and you have acted wisely by directing him to repair without delay to Paris. In diplomacy, as in war, moments are always precious.

The expedition to Leghorn must have been to Genoa a signal of just alarm, which its perfidious neutrality cannot but excite in it. Let the national vengeance follow the victorious army of Italy, and let us not neglect the indemnities demanded by the losses and the sacrifices of the Republic.

The army of the Rhine and Moselle is continuing its victorious and rapid course on the right bank of the Rhine ; it has overthrown part of Wurmser's troops near Offenburg, and gained a battle on the 10th at Reinchen.

We learn this moment that the army of the Sambre and Meuse has, conformably with our precise intentions, resumed its offensive movement, and that the divisions which had crossed the Rhine in falling back have recrossed the river by main force. The Austrians cannot withstand the combined attack of these two powerful armies, which are impatient to follow the immortal traces of that which you command.

CARNOT.

To M. the Provéditeur-General.

Head-quarters, Roveredo, 19 Messidor, year 4 [July 7, 1796].

I have received several reports of murders committed upon Frenchmen by inhabitants of Pont Santo Marco. I have no doubt that you will put a stop to this as speedily as possible, otherwise the villages will be exposed to the just resentment of the army, and I will make a terrible example of them.

I flatter myself that you will cause the guilty to be apprehended, and place additional detachments in that town to secure the communications.

BONAPARTE.

To M. the Proveditor-General.

Head-quarters, Verona, 20 Messidor, year 4 [July 8, 1796].

There prevails between the French troops and the Slavonians an animosity, which ill-affected persons, no doubt, study to inflame. To prevent greater evils, not less grievous than contrary to the interests of the two republics, it is indispensable, sir, that you should send away from Verona to-morrow, on the most plausible pretexts, the battalions of Slavonians which you have in this city.

BONAPARTE.

To M. the Proveditor-General.

Head-quarters, Verona, 21 Messidor, year 4 [July 9, 1796].

The present circumstances of the war and the necessity for defending Verona, oblige me, sir, to place artillery on the ramparts of this city. I have the honour to apprise you that I have given instructions to this effect to the general of artillery.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Bergamo, 17 Messidor, year 4 [July 5, 1796].

The reports of my spies and of travellers agree in assuring me that the enemy is fortifying himself at the mountain of Tonale, and that he is going to form a camp at Balzente. To-morrow I shall have some more positive information, on the return of a trusty person; and by an adjunct [*adjoin*t] whom I have sent into the Valteline, you will have certain intelligence both respecting the adjutant-general whom you have sent to the chief of the Leagues and the dispositions of the Grisons: I am assured that they are disposed and quite ready to take arms against any army that should attempt to violate their territory.

From Bergamo there are four different routes to the country of the Grisons: that of the Lake of Como and

Chiavenna; that of the valley of Brembo; that of Serio and Schalvo, and that of Val Camonica. All these routes are very difficult: they are covered by extremely high and steep mountains.

The debouchés from the Tyrol to Bergamo are by the Tonale, Ponte di Legno, Val Camonica, and the Grisons. The first is as bad as the others.

CERVONI.

To General Berthier, Chief of the Staff.

Bologna, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 6, 1796].

Your order of the 17th of this month, general, reached me only just at the moment when I was setting out for Lugo, where there is formed an apostolic army of 15 or 20,000 men. Those rebels have cavalry, leaders, and generals; they give passports, dated "Head-quarters, Lugo:" they have killed two of my volunteers and a horse chasseur. I have despatched a battalion, two pieces of cannon, and a squadron, and am going at their head to reduce those fanatics to order. I consider this measure as indispensably necessary before leaving this country. I have nevertheless sent off last night M. the Baron de Capeletti, chargé d'affaires of his Catholic Majesty, to try the effect of remonstrance. I am waiting for his answer.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Leghorn, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 6, 1796].

I reported to you in my last, citizen-general, that the military department was going on well at Leghorn: it is the only one about which I am able to satisfy you. I have been excluded from other matters, and am very glad of it, for I am relieved from the responsibility of them.

From what the consul of the Republic tells me, the English magazines will probably yield 5,000,000, if embezzlements, of which he is himself apprehensive, can be prevented. I had slipped my Argus into the commission charged with the sequestrations, inventories, and perhaps the sale; he was turned out by a resolution.

The consul of France has just left me: he has been to complain of the cruelties practised upon the merchants of

the country. These merchants, on receiving intimation that they were to pay to the Republic the amount of what they owed to the English, insisted at first that there was much more due to them from the English than they owed, and that, at least, compensation ought to be made. They were told that they might compound, and that, to excuse them from producing their books, which should be verified, the French would be content with 5 or 6,000,000. Yesterday, as the consul told me, they offered 5,000,000: it was refused. The consul appears to be extremely vexed at this: he declares that this treatment is driving the merchants to despair.

The port is, by order, closely shut: of course it can no longer be frequented, even by neutrals. Might not great injury result from this to the country? The Greeks and other neutrals suffer; and if Provence were in need of corn, are we not driving away those who procure it?

Be it said, between ourselves, I believe that there is a disposition to injure Leghorn for the benefit of Genoa. The Genoese consul Lachèse has been placed on the commission by the commissioners: many Genoese are arriving here, and probably speculating on the goods of the English; this competition could not be otherwise than advantageous; but beware of connivances!

In short, general, I am convinced that, with fair and gentle means, this city would have fulfilled your expectations, and produced, without crying out, 10,000,000 to the Republic.

VAUBOIS.

To the General-in-Chief.

Formigosa, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 6, 1796].

I went yesterday, according to your orders, to the lake of Mantua: after long and useless inquiry for the casa Tasidiani, which nobody knew, guided by the localities, I came to a house which I believe to be that marked in the plan.

The road to it must be constantly above the water in the highest inundations. It is almost entirely sheltered on the side next to the enemy: at any rate, the columns may file along at the rear, without the place having the slightest suspicion of the matter.

The house is situated on the margin of the lake, or, to speak more correctly, of the inundation: one may embark at once, or, if the water is low, by means of some small flying bridges of little consequence. No muddy marsh to cross, consequently no hurdles, &c.

The lake is covered, in front of the house, for a regular breadth of two hundred fathoms, with reeds ten or twelve feet high. For this space, which we crossed with very great difficulty on account of the reeds, the lake is of sufficient depth to carry large boats.

We also traversed it by following the canal marked in the plan on the left of the house; but this direction carried us too far below the entrenchments, and we examined the first.

Beyond the reeds is the Mincio, the channel of which may be from twenty-eight to thirty fathoms in width, which we measured this morning a little lower down. Beyond the Mincio is a flat shore covered with rushes.

No dispositions having been made yesterday evening for measuring the breadth of the Mincio and the space covered with reeds, the operation was deferred till to-night, especially as, by that time, we shall know in what direction we must take these measures: which it is important to ascertain, as will be seen by and by.

The house called Tasidiani is found to correspond by its position nearly with the centre of that of the enemy, between the canal of the cut and the place. In this interval you perceive the entrenchment which defends the cut; it is very raking [*rasant*]; a large camp parallel to the canal of St. George, with posts in advance, one of which faces the casa Tasidiani, with a stationary boat, that, I believe, does not ply at night. We saw it retire yesterday evening and arrive this morning at daybreak; it has six oars and but few hands. The great camp appears to support itself upon an entrenchment which covers the side of the place towards the canal of St. George; this entrenchment, which is palisaded, is extremely raking, appears insultable, and might be turned.

At the angle of the flank of the bastion on the right of this entrenchment, is the termination of a dike which runs to a great distance in front of the enclosure that faces St. George. The enemy is busily at work augmenting the relief. It covers a sallyport, placed in that part of the enclosure which is beyond the third flank.

As to the arming of the part of the enclosure, there are to be seen only six embrasures on the face to the right of the tower, two embrasures on the face that comes next, and one embrasure at the flanked angle, looking more to the right face than to the left.

Now for the reflections suggested by these localities, and what we propose in consequence of those reflections.

A landing upon the right bank of the Mincio appears to us to be practicable, but, instead of making it in front of the entrenchment, it is proposed to make it in rear, near the dike, in order to turn that same entrenchment. The means are these:

To make three cuts running to the same point in the forest of reeds in front of the casa Tasidiani; to make the three great barks which are to carry the men for landing keep moving to and fro in these three canals.

To establish on the remaining part of the Mincio, as well over the canal as through the reeds, a bridge so constructed that the boats be placed lengthwise instead of breadthwise—a necessary precaution both for the facility of the manœuvre and the obstacle opposed by the reeds.

This bridge will be brought ready formed, or at least it will be put together in a very short time in the middle cut, and it will be propelled or hauled to the opposite bank. For this operation expert and intrepid swimmers must be employed.

Supposing the Mincio to be thirty fathoms in width, and the patch of reeds on the right bank likewise thirty fathoms, there will be sixty fathoms to provide for, and eighteen boats of three fathoms each will be sufficient.

This is not all. The bridges and the lighters can be brought at night before the casa Tasidiani, without the enemy perceiving this movement. I followed this morning a canal, which runs along the left side of the Mincio behind the reeds, that carried me to the Mincio, down which I proceeded to Formigosa.

I was accompanied in the reconnaissance of yesterday evening by citizens Samson, chief of battalion of engineers, and Duroc, captain of labourers, and in that of this morning by Captain Duroc alone.

ANDREOSSI.

To the General-in-Chief.

Formigosa, 19 Messidor, year 4 [July 7, 1796].

The reconnaissance of last night has produced nothing. According to the report of Captain Duroc, the cruizing bark has prevented ours from debouching from the reeds. I shall go thither myself this evening.

Citizen Duroc perceived distinctly at sunset the bastion on the right of the entrenchment, which covers the enclosure armed with six pieces of cannon *à barbette* on the side next to the Mincio.

The day before yesterday, we had heard the retreat beaten at the camp, and the sentinels calling to each other to be upon their guard. Yesterday, the retreat was not beat; the utmost silence prevailed, and not a bell in the city sounded.

The water is rising, which will facilitate the landing: it begins to be a little moonlight.

Men are at work upon the bridge for the cut. I have given orders for the construction of six gun-carriages *à coulisse*, that is to say, three for eight-pounders and three for howitzers. I shall have boats sufficient for landing from 300 to 600 men collected to-day; I shall have, besides, several small boats to move about with celerity to the right and left: such were the orders you gave me yesterday.

ANDREOSSI.

To the General-in-Chief.

Verona, 19 Messidor, year 4 [July 7, 1796].

I am writing, citizen-general, from Vicenza, where the enemy, who is very near, apprised of my coming, had formed a plan to carry me off, or at least to lie in wait for me as I left the town: I did my business all the same.

I sent off yesterday morning from Vicenza two trusty men, one for Bassano and the other for Premolano. One returned in the night, with rather circumstantial details, which tally with those that have been given me by three persons from Bassano. I wait here for the second emissary and also two others whom I have despatched to Trent. The details that I have received are these:

At Bassano, 5000 men, 2000 of them cavalry ; at Bressavia, 300 Hulans ; at Pazza, 100 horse.

On the left bank of the Brenta, at Citadella, 200 cavalry ; at Dampo and Pietro, 150 cavalry ; they are said to be Neapolitans.

At Premolano, 6000 to 7000 men, expected to-day at Bassano, of whom about 2000 cavalry. At Bassano and Premolano there is only field artillery and no bridge equipage.

The inhabitants of Vicenza and the environs appear very well disposed, and the extraordinary attentions paid by the principal inhabitants and the podesta do not indicate that they expect to see us driven out, as people said at Verona. The Bishop of Vicenza, who arrived yesterday at Bassano, observed that it would require something more than that to drive out the French.

The Slavonians have all been sent away from Verona, and are at Padova : it appears that they have been strongly excited against us ; so I have been told by one of their officers whom I saw at Vicenza. At Venice and Padova there are about 10,000 Slavonians : it is their chaplains, together with some silly jests of our soldiers, that have occasioned their animosity.

The Venetians, with the exception of three or four thousand Slavonians from Venetian Italy, are arming only at sea ; but they appear to be doing so with activity.

I expect here two men from Trent and one from Premolana : they will arrive this evening ; they are trusty fellows. Meanwhile, here is what I am informed from Trent.

The advanced posts of the enemy at Alla and Borghetto amount to 2500 men. In Roveredo and the environs, there are 15,000 men ; at Bolzano, 12,000. It is said that they expect 15 or 20,000 more. In what they have at present, there are 10,000 cavalry, including the Neapolitans, who have not yet left them. It appears that no troops of the enemy have marched for Bergamo.

KILMAINE.

Note presented to the Doge and Senate of Venice on the 20th Messidor (July 8), by the Minister of the French Republic.

The minister of the French Republic, agreeably to the orders which he has just received, has the honour to inform

your serenity and your excellencies that the French government cannot see with indifference the assemblage of Slavonian soldiers and of national troops, which has been going on for some time in Venice and in the islands of its district.

The Venetians took no defensive measure when the Austrians marched considerable corps of troops into the Venetian territory, and threatened to introduce them at other points which in all ages had been respected. It seems strange that, at the moment when the French, pursuing their enemy upon the same territory which he is still violating with impunity, are forced to occupy, though as friends, posts indispensable for the success of their operations, there should be collected extraordinary forces, the object of which is not even apparent.

It is known to your serenity and your excellencies that the ferment excited by this novelty has extended to the whole Venetian nation. It must necessarily have caused it to believe that these dispositions were directed solely against the French, and this opinion is so accredited through the perfidious insinuations of the emigrants and the partizans of Austria, that the coffee-houses and the public places still ring with the most scandalous expressions, in spite of the reiterated complaints which have been made and the measures which the administration has taken to suppress them.

The general-in-chief of the French army considers these dispositions as hostile, or dictated by a confidence injurious to Venice, and contrary to the interests and the dignity of the French Republic.

The minister of France has orders to demand of your serenity and your excellencies a frank and honest explanation respecting the nature and the object of this movement. He ought to rely upon the positive assurances which the Senate has given to the Executive Directory by its ambassador in Paris, and which M. the Chevalier Pesaro is daily repeating, of the firmest and the most constant friendship of the republic of Venice for the French Republic; but he further expects from its wisdom the immediate cessation of an arming, the continuance of which, in justifying the founded suspicions that it excites in the general, would decide him to steps, which must destroy in a moment that good understanding which the respective ministers of

the two governments have thus far exerted themselves to maintain.

He thinks also that a prompt and satisfactory answer, which should be sent immediately to the general-in-chief of the army, would have the effect of destroying the disadvantageous ideas that he must have conceived, and revive his confidence.

LALLEMANT.

Proclamation of the General-in-Chief to the people of Mantua.

Head-quarters, Roverbello, 18 Messidor, year 4 [July 9, 1796].

The general-in-chief is informed that abuses of all kinds are committed, and that the good people of the duchy of Mantua are crushed by abusive requisitions. In consequence, he orders,

1. That there shall be three assemblies in the duchy of Mantua, composed of one deputy for each commune, who shall meet on the 24th of the month.

The first meeting shall be held at Roverbello, and comprehend the deputies of all the country between the Mincio, the Po, and the States of Venice.

The second assembly shall be held at Gouraque, and shall comprise the deputies of all the conquered countries beyond the Po.

The third shall be held at Castiglione de Scrivia, and comprehend the deputies of all the countries comprised between the Mincio, the Po, the Brescian, and Lombardy.

2. Each deputy shall bring with him : 1, his act of deputation by the municipality ; 2, a paper of complaints which the inhabitants have to make against different individuals of the army ; 3, a statement of the contributions in money which the country has furnished, and into whose hands ; 4, a statement of the contributions in kind that have been furnished, and to whom delivered ; 5, a statement of the amount found in the public chests ; 6, a statement of the direct and indirect impositions, and what is due.

3. The oldest member of each assembly shall be the president ; it shall assemble in a place that shall be specified by the municipalities, where they will meet.

4. Each assembly shall nominate three deputies, to go with all the papers of complaints and the statements above-mentioned to the general-in-chief. Immediately afterwards

the assembly shall be dissolved: it must not last longer than twelve hours.

5. The general-in-chief forbids, upon the severest penalties, agents of the services, commissaries of war, or officers, to make any requisition unless it be signed by the *ordonnateur en chef*.

BONAPARTE.

To General Bonaparte.

Roverbello, 19 Messidor, year 4 [July 8, 1796].

I am come hither, general, to give you an account of my reconnaissance of last night.

Between ten and eleven o'clock I approached, by favour of the reeds, with two boats, as far as the canal of St. George: from that place I detached two men with the lightest of those boats: they proceeded, unperceived, to the opposite bank, above the entrenchments, as you had prescribed: when the poles with which they propelled their boat were not long enough to reach the bottom, they swam with those same poles. No trees in this part; very little herbage; and, in the shallowest parts, two fathoms water. The opposite bank is a dike, the slopes of which afford an easy access; they brought me back specimens of that land of promise, which will soon be ours, if the means are well combined, as I have no doubt they will be: order and silence, and I will answer for the landing.

On attentively examining at sunset the bastion on the right of the entrenchments which cover the enclosure, I did not perceive the six pieces of cannon mentioned in my letter of yesterday: with a good glass I clearly distinguished two embrasures formed on the parapet with gabions full of earth; it did not appear to me that this battery was armed.

The stationary boat went up a little before the retreat; a second came down a little before ten; so apparently a boat does pass the night in this position.

The sentinels of the city cried a good deal till about twelve o'clock, when I retired: those of the camps and the posts depending on them maintain the most profound silence.

All that you have ordered me shall be ready to-morrow evening.

F. ANDREOSI.

To General Bonaparte.

Bologna, 20 Messidor, year 4 [July 8, 1796].

The apostolic army and its head-quarters no longer exist. The Chouans of the Romagna and the Ferrarese have been chased, beaten, dispersed, at all points; and, if I am not mistaken, it will be a long time before they take a fancy to fight us again.

Some priests, who conceived themselves still in the age of the crusades, and five or six villains animated with the spirit of revolt, contrived to collect, by means of terror, a silly and misguided rabble, to which they ridiculously gave the pompous name of army. Regulations, proclamations, acts of authority of all kinds, had already issued from this focus of insurrection; workshops of all sorts were in full activity: all trembled under the tyrannical yoke of these rivals of Charette.

I ordered General Beyrand, who was then at Forli, to seize, if possible, the printer, whose name was attached to an incendiary proclamation which I mentioned to you at the time: that general sent a piquet of cavalry and a detachment of infantry to Lugo, for this operation. Those troops were received with a fire of musketry, and obliged to retire, after having had three men and a horse killed and four or five men wounded.

Incensed at the audacity of these brigands, convinced of the necessity of preventing the spreading of the insurrection, and resolved to avenge French blood, I determined to begin with a decisive blow.

I ordered General Beyrand to repair to Imola, where I directed a battalion of the 4th demi-brigade, 200 horse, and two pieces of artillery, to assemble; and I repaired thither myself. The chief of brigade, Pourallier, had orders to set out with half of the troops that were at Ferrara, and to march to the rear of Lugo, to cut off the rebels, while I should attack them in front.

On arriving at Imola, M. the Baron de Capaletti, chargé des affaires of the King of Spain, proposed to me his mediation, and proceeded to Lugo to persuade that horde to lay down their arms and to return to order: they were obstinate, and rejected these proposals. I marched against them yesterday morning, with nearly 800 infantry, 200 horse, and two pieces of artillery. About a league and a half from

the town, their advanced posts, concealed among the hemp crops, began to fire: our advanced troops dislodged them, and drove them faster than at a foot pace into the town, where they fancied themselves safe. I ordered a few cannon-shot to be sent after them, and several houses to be fired. This demonstration, combined with a brisk fire of musketry, made them shift their quarters precipitately; they fled in disorder into the country, where I caused them to be closely pursued. About 300 were left on the spot. The affair cost us four killed, and six or seven wounded. The leaders of these rebels, certain of the treatment that I should reserve for them, had prudently betaken themselves to flight.

On entering Lugo, shots from windows killed two of my men. I would have burned the town; but women, old men, and children only were left in it; they were respected.

AUGEREAU.

To General Bonaparte.

Leghorn, 21 Messidor, year 4 [July 9, 1796].

I avail myself of the first opportunity to give you an account of the state of Leghorn.

I venture to assure you that the military service is going on well, that the forts are respectable, that the conduct of the troops is good, and that we are ready to receive the enemy.

I do not think that the commission created here to secure to the Republic all that belongs to the English will give you the same satisfaction. Dissension is breaking out in it. The consul of France, Belleville, would have withdrawn; the minister and I prevailed upon him to remain: he gave me to understand that he was afraid of peculation. A Genoese colony has come to take the lead in business. Lachaise, consul of Genoa, associated with Belleville, has taken a high tone: I might even complain of his correspondence.

The commercial business has miscarried, in my opinion. If, as the commissioner Garrau assured me, the merchants offered 5,000,000 in specie, I think it was wrong not to close with them. These merchants allege that the English are prodigiously in their debt, and that they have advice that the English will not pay them; they proclaimed the

stoppage of their payments immediately. I think them in a horrible crisis. I wish the Republic may be a gainer by it; but I doubt that. This business has been roughly treated. A little more suavity and pliability would have succeeded better.

The English magazines are very considerable, as I am told; but I am very often reminded too that the whole will not be for the Republic. The commission is numerous, some of its members not of the best repute; the principal of them have the pen always in their hands; the magazines are frequented only by the subordinates; the inventories are made only by them: in short, they are at liberty to fish in troubled water.

I wash my hands of all these affairs, and confine myself to the military department.

VAUBOIS.

*The Senate of Venice in answer to the Note of the
Minister Lallemand.*

Venice, 9 July, 1796 [21 Messidor, year 4].

The memorial which you have this morning sent affords the Senate occasion, which is always agreeable to it, to renew, in a solemn manner, the assurance of the sincere and constant friendship which it has avowed to the French Republic, and of the firmness and punctuality with which it will exert itself to keep in the principles of the strict neutrality which it has adopted in the course of the present war. The sincerity and frankness of its public conduct, to which the Senate is able to bear a noble testimony in face of the government, will certainly never stoop to malicious interpretations, which could have been devised only by malevolence, and a desire to disturb the perfect harmony which so happily subsists between the two republics.

And as for the arming which we are directing, and which forms the subject of your memorial, though we have already intimated the innocent use to which it was destined, we make it a duty to give you the most precise information on that head.

The entire confidence of the Senate in the friendship and sincerity of the belligerent powers has always disinclined it to take precautions for ensuring the external tranquillity of its States, and has always caused it to confine itself to the maintenance of order in the interior: it still rests upon

the same basis: but, having reason to fear at this moment that the environs of this capital may soon become the theatre of violent military struggles, it cannot refrain from taking the precautions necessary for securing it against unforeseen descents of affrighted inhabitants, or of armed men, dispersed or fugitives, who, coming thither in quest of an asylum, might occasion confusion and terror.

Such is the sole motive of the measures which we have taken, in drawing part of the naval forces nearer to these parts, in directing a suitable number of armed barks for their service to be prepared, and in summoning a sufficient quantity of troops for the guard of the capital. We are persuaded that the noble frankness of the Senate will entirely dispel the suspicions which may have been conceived respecting the object of those same dispositions.

It flatters itself that, in this circumstance, you will give it a new proof of the constant pains you take to strengthen the good understanding between the two governments. We assure you once more of the sentiments of our particular consideration.

To General Bonaparte.

Venice, 23 Messidor, year 4 [July 11, 1796].

On my arrival in this city, to repair to my post, I have met with some particulars which appear to me to be quite certain respecting the state of the enemy's troops towards Bassano, and which, in consequence, I think it my duty to transmit to you.

Persons who went from that city expressly to look at the Austrian camp have reported that, on the 19th instant, there were below Bassano 600 Hulans, 600 hussars, 400 Neapolitan cavalry, 200 light cavalry, two battalions of infantry, and five pieces of cannon. They added that the cavalry was very fine, but that the infantry appeared to be in a bad state. They said too, what I was told elsewhere, that he has very advanced posts as far as Costavolo on the Brenta, some miles on this side of Bassano: their principal occupation was the transport of provisions, which they bring from the Venetian States and convey to Bassano upon the river. Lastly, they have confirmed the statement that frequent patrols are sent towards Vicenza to make reconnaissances.

Moreover, general, I am assured here that the Venetian government is seriously engaged in the choice of a general to command its troops. According to the laws of the country, as you are no doubt aware, that general must be a foreigner; in consequence, three persons, it is said, have been thought of, not one of whom, certainly, is a friend to our Republic. These are, 1, M. Salis, formerly colonel of a Swiss regiment in France; 2, the Prince of Nassau; 3, the Polish general Komarzewski, an old favourite of Stanislaus, the servant and *protégé* of Russia. I shall seek, the moment I arrive in Venice, to verify this fact: if it is true, it might give rise to still greater distrust on our part.

JACOB,

Secretary of the French Legation at Venice.

To General Bonaparte.

Florence, 23 Messidor, year 4 [July 11, 1796].

I have not been able to set out, general, so soon as I wished, on my journey to Rome. I thought it right, before my departure, to agree with M. Azara respecting the course which I was to pursue, and it was agreed that I ought not to arrive till after him in that city, for which he will not start himself for these two or three days. I should not, however, have heeded this motive of prudence and expediency, had I not been obliged to prolong my stay here. I have received news from Leghorn concerning the project formed by the English for possessing themselves of Porto Ferrajo, which has required some explanations on my part with the government of Tuscany.

I have desired, in order to relieve ourselves from all fear of an invasion, which it is highly important to our interests to prevent, that the governor of Porto Ferrajo, a man sold to the English, should be changed; that the grand-duke should give orders for strengthening the garrison of that place, too weak to resist any serious attack; and that it should even be agreed that we should add to it 200 men drawn from Leghorn.

Of these proposals, one only, the change of the governor, was adopted; the others were plumply rejected. The government, founding itself on the principles of a neutrality, which it considers as inherent in its system of administra-

tion, and supporting itself upon the plea that it is at peace with all the powers, declares that it has laid it down as a constant rule not to augment its means of defence in any place ; and, setting out from this point, it refuses to send succours to Porte Ferrajo.

It is therefore evident to my eyes that it is resolved to make no resistance to the English, in case of attempts ; and that we must expect to see Porto Ferrajo in their hands very shortly, if the thing is not already done.

I have not dissembled here any of my thoughts as to the consequences of such a determination, and what bitter but too late regrets it might some day cost Tuscany ; but, in showing all the dissatisfaction that I feel, I can do no more than I have done. In my opinion, it is proper to abstain from illusory threats, and especially in Italy, where, when people are afraid, they always represent the evil to themselves as much greater than it is destined to happen ; but, on the other hand, they soon pass from terror to insolence, when they have not experienced all the ill they feared, because it is in the vindictive character of the inhabitants of this country to see always impotence in their enemies and never generosity.

It will, therefore, be for you, citizen-general, to enlighten me respecting the conduct that I am to pursue. It is, as you perceive, delicate, and will perhaps be still more so by and by, especially at Rome. The examples of Pavia, Binasco, Lugo, ought to be present to us, and impose upon us the law of extreme prudence and extreme distrust. I am far, however, from entertaining any alarm, or to think that it is necessary to draw forces to the centre of Italy ; not but that I believe they would be useful to ensure the execution of the armistices which you have made, because, looking back incessantly to the real object of the war, I should consider the dissemination of our forces as an obstacle to the execution of the plan of campaign of Tyrol, to the importance of which every other consideration must give way.

MIOT.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Verona, 24 Messidor, year 4 [July 12, 1796].

General Sauret, with 3000 men, defends from Salò, situated on the Lake of Garda, to the Lake of Iseo.

General Massena, with 12,000 men, defends from Torre to Rivalta on the Adige, and thence he defends the passage of the Adige to San Giovanni, three miles lower down than Verona. The city of Verona has been put into a state of defence by means of the artillery found in that place.

General Despinos defends, with 5000 men, from San Giovanni to Runco.

General Augereau, with 8000 men, defends from Runco to Castaniara; there are sluices, by means of which the whole of the low country may be inundated.

General Kilmaine, with 2000 cavalry and 12 pieces of light artillery, is at Valeza, ready to start for any point at which the enemy might be disposed to attempt a passage. Porto Legnago, where there is a bridge over the Adige, has been put into a state of defence, by using the Venetian artillery found in the place.

Besides the bridges which we have at Porto Legnago and Verona, I am getting a bridge of boats constructed opposite to the Chiusa, defended by good batteries of position.

By means of these three bridges, the army will pass rapidly, on the first movement of the enemy, from the defensive to the offensive.

The enemy has his advanced posts at Alta and Malsesena, and he is now pushing very considerable columns behind the Brenta. There are nearly 8000 men at Bassano. We have been for several days observing that position.

Woe to him who shall calculate wrong! . . .

As for us, we are solely occupied with the siege of Mantua. I meditate a bold stroke: boats, Austrian uniforms, incendiary batteries, shall all be ready by the 28th. The ulterior operations will entirely depend on the success of this *coup de main*, which, like those of that nature, depends absolutely on luck, on a dog or a goose.

This state of things makes me think that we ought to defer the operation of Genoa for ten or twelve days, especially as I shall not before then receive your answer to a letter that I have sent you.

You will find annexed a copy of a letter which I have written, in consequence, to the minister of the Republic Faipoult. M. Cattaneo, whom the senate of Genoa has sent to me, arrived this morning. He has, as you may

conceive, been extremely pleased with what I have told him. The steps that Faipoult will take, and other accessory operations, will enable us to attain our aim, which is to gain about a fortnight, by which time our situation in Italy will be so decided that I shall follow, without obstacle, point by point, the orders that you shall give me respecting Genoa and Venice.

The latter republic is arming briskly. Citizen Lalle-mant has not apprized me, as he ought to have done, of the nature and activity of these armaments. You will find annexed a copy of the note which he addressed to the senate, and of the answer of the senate. At any rate, I am master of all the strong places of the republic of Venice on the Adige. Perhaps you may think proper to begin now to pick a little quarrel with the minister of Venice in Paris, in order that, after the taking of Mantua, and after I have driven the Austrians from the Brenta, I may find the greater facility for the demand which you intend me to make of some millions.

We begin to have many sick before Mantua, but not one death yet. The heat is excessive, and the air of Mantua extremely unwholesome.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 26 Messidor, year 4 [July 14, 1796].

All the troops of the divisions employed in the expedition to Leghorn and Bologna have recrossed the Po. I have only ordered that 400 men should be left in the citadel of Ferrara. By the treaty, the legation of Ferrara is to remain united to the French Republic.

A monk, coming from Trent, brought intelligence into the Romagna that the Austrians had passed the Adige, raised the blockade of Mantua, and were making forced marches to the Romagna. Seditious papers and fanatic preachers were everywhere preaching insurrection: they organized in a few days what they called the Catholic and Papal Army; they established their head-quarters at Lugo, a large village of the legation of Ferrara, though surrounded by the Romagna.

General Augereau ordered the chief of brigade Pourallier to go and reduce Lugo. That officer, at the head of

a battalion, arrived before Lugo, where the alarm-bell had been ringing for several hours: he found there some thousands of peasants. An officer of grenadiers advanced, with a flag of truce: they made signs to him to approach; and a moment afterwards a shower of musket-balls was poured upon him. These wretches, cowardly as perfidious, ran away: some hundreds were left dead on the ground. Since this event, which occurred on the 18th, order has been restored and all is perfectly quiet.

BONAPARTE.

The Grand-Duke of Tuscany to General Bonaparte.

Florence, July 13, 1796 [25 Messidor, year 4].

By the copies of the three notes annexed from M. Miot, minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic and the answers that have been made to them, you may acquaint yourself with his proposals tending to an augmentation of the garrison of Porto Ferrajo, for the purpose of defending that place against an attack of the enemy. Being at peace with all the powers of Europe, and, in the course of the present war, having never augmented by a single man the small military forces of the grand-duchy, in the intention of repelling foreign hostilities, I cannot lend myself to such measures prejudicial to the neutrality, (the fundamental law of Tuscany) assured by treaties and particularly the last concluded with the French Republic, and recognised by all the belligerent powers.

To these grave and important motives is added that of an absolute impossibility to send any reinforcement to Porto Ferrajo, since, before the receipt of M. Miot's notes, the sea was not free, and Leghorn was blockaded by English ships, which permit nothing to approach, and prevent the departure of every vessel; which reduces that port to the last extremity.

The question, general, relates to a matter in which the glory of your name is concerned: you guaranteed to me the observance of that same neutrality in your letter dated June 24th last, and I earnestly solicit you to interpose your authority that this demand may remain without effect. I flatter myself to obtain this from your equity, and am with particular esteem

FERDINAND.

To General Bonaparte.

Castiglione, 25 Messidor, year 4 [July 13, 1796].

The apprehension, which I expressed, citizen-general, in my despatches of the 23d of this month, are realized: the fortress of Porto Ferrajo was surrendered to the English the day before yesterday; they landed 800 men, who were admitted without difficulty.

I have taken, as I have informed you, all the steps in my power, to prevent an event so contrary to our interests and especially to the tranquillity of Leghorn, where it might in a moment develop the seeds of disturbance and revolt, which pains are there taking to propagate in all quarters, and now I think that I can do nothing more without positive orders. It is for the Directory to give them, or for you to communicate to me your intentions, in case this circumstance should have been provided against in the instructions which you have. I wait with anxiety for letters from you, to enlighten me in regard to the course which I am to pursue in this delicate circumstance, and especially respecting the plans that you shall have formed.

MIOT.

To General Bonaparte.

Venice, 26 Messidor, year 4 [July 14, 1796].

The last letters from Trent of July 9th give the enumeration of the Austrian troops, which are at present in position in General Massena's quarter: they are represented as amounting to about 24,000 men, besides those which are on the Lake of Garda and in the valley of Lidro; viz.

Eight thousand at Bica, entrenched; 4000 below, along the Adige; 8000 on the passes of Monte Baldo; 4000 at Valasso, Terraguolo, and Solgaria. These corps are commanded by Colli and Mitrowski.

The corps of 5000 encamped from Valsugana to Bassano is preparing to return to the mountains; it is too weak to withstand an attack with which it is threatened by the French, and it is probable that it will join the others.

Mantua reduced, and I hope it will not be long first, I think, general, it would be very important to detach part of the disposable forces by Bassano. Pardon this hint.

The Venetians have decided to withdraw all their Slavonians from the *terra firma*, and to confine their defensive to the sea and the lagoons. They will have at sea in a few days in the Adriatic Gulf forty light vessels, besides their galleys sent to Istria, and sixteen armed barks in the lagoons, which were occupied by the 6000 Slavonians whom they had sent for.

All the letters from Germany say that the reinforcements destined for Italy have had orders to halt.

LALLEMANT.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Milan, 27 Messidor, year 4 [July 15, 1796].

It cannot but be painful to me, general, to be of a different opinion from you on a subject of such importance as that of the supplies to be furnished to the Grisons: the habit of very just though very rapid apprehension, which I know you to possess, causes me to mistrust my reason, whenever it is in contradiction to yours. This sentiment has led me to examine anew the motives of my conviction: as it has not depended upon me to change it, I ought to tell you the causes with that frankness due to each other from two fellow-citizens, alike solicitous for the welfare of their country, and differing only about the means which may perhaps promote it.

You think that the conquest of the Milanese has destroyed all treaties concluded by its dukes with foreign powers; I think so too, and you will find this opinion put forth as a principle in the memorial No. 1, which I have transmitted to you; but take notice that the Directory, to conciliate the Grisons, and on my application, has consented that the treaties which concern them, and which promise them fifteen hundred loads of corn on their paying for it, shall be executed, and that it has transmitted a warrant for it to you. This admits of no application to the general principle of the effect of a conquest, since the French government has consented not to avail itself of that point. Bear in mind, too, that I have notified this resolution to the heads of the three Leagues; that they have a right to calculate upon its being executed, and that it is, no doubt, to this persuasion that I owe my almost unanimous recognition as resident; lastly, bear in mind that, before even the

resolution of the Directory existed, you had promised the Grisons, at my solicitation, to take care that they should be supplied with four thousand sacks of corn, and that you made no condition that the chiefs of the Leagues should demand of you the execution of the capitulations: so that to insist on it now would be in a manner to retract your promise, which you have certainly not yet done towards any one, or to appear to be striving to overreach them, which would be a part not worthy of you.

You ask me—"If you consent to grant purely and simply the fifteen hundred loads of corn, where is my certainty, if you have need of passages, that they will consent to grant them, after having received beforehand the means of doing without you?"

I answer, in the first place, that my certainty on this point is founded on the experience of what I have already obtained in this country, without having procured for it so important a benefit as that of sustenance. Recollect that, supported by your victories, I have crushed the Austrian party there, caused the Republic to be unanimously recognised, and, what was more difficult than all the rest, that, in place of the constitutional anarchy, I have brought about the establishment there of a provisional government, invested with very extensive powers, in which the partisans of our Republic have the exclusive sway.

I answer, in the second place, that, with the means with which you supply me for paying the disbanded soldiers and sergeants, I will make of them so many missionaries, who will not only vote and induce others to vote for the passage, when you or I shall demand it, but who, on the first signal from us, would knock on the head those who should dare attempt to oppose it.

I answer, moreover, that the possessor of the Milanese holds the Grisons not merely by the corn, but that he holds them also by an infinity of still stronger ties, for they can procure corn in Suabia, but they cannot make Suabia, like the Milanese, a market for their cattle and for their other produce, nor a place of passage and consumption for the commodities which traverse the Grison country, and the transit of which, together with the tolls arising from them, constitute their only public revenue: so that, in order to unite the Grisons absolutely and overturn their government, for want of funds, you need but, as conqueror and ruler of the Milanese, close your passes against them.

In the last place, I answer that if, notwithstanding all these reasons, you wish to hold the Grisons by a still stronger tie, instead of fifteen hundred loads of corn, supply them provisionally with but a thousand, and assign, as the motive of this diminution, the displeasure which you have felt at the conduct of twelve communes out of the sixty-three, where the Republic has been insulted and the admission of its minister refused; which causes you to consider those communes, until their retractation and the exemplary punishment of their ringleaders, as enemies of the Republic, and consequently deserving to be excluded from its benefits.

In this manner, you will prevent the revolution, which is commencing in favour of liberty and in favour of France among the Grisons, from retrograding. You will prevent Austria, which offered corn when she saw that we were about to grant it, from enhancing that favour by your refusal.

I earnestly beg of you to reflect on these reasons, and also to grant something to my word which would be compromised; and this might cost me the popularity which I have acquired with the Grisons, and which it is for the interest of the Republic that I should retain.

COMEYRAS.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 23 Messidor, year 4 [July 11, 1796].

We have received, citizen-general, your interesting despatches of the 14th Messidor. The success of the Leghorn expedition has given us great satisfaction, and we approve everything that you have done and ordered in that auspicious circumstance for the Republic. We must now strive assiduously to reap all the advantages that it affords. To sequester all effects belonging to the powers at war with France, to impose heavy contributions on the individuals belonging to them—such are the measures which we must employ without deviating from them; but it is the English in particular against whom this right of war must be most rigorously exercised: we have at once to avenge upon them the right of nations, which the Machiavelian government of England has incessantly violated, and the independence of the neutral nations, which it has despised,

in order to injure us with the more security. The English settled at Leghorn must be in our eyes like inhabitants of London; let them be subjected to severe impositions: the national generosity, however, dictates to us, while seeking to indemnify ourselves for our losses, not to carry rigour to the length of cruelty.

Though, citizen-general, we say nothing to you about Genoa, and the measures which you have to pursue in regard to it, according to our preceding instructions, we think, nevertheless, that you will have made such dispositions as that important object requires: we shall be glad to receive some account of them forthwith, and we have no doubt that you are proceeding in this matter with the same wisdom and firmness that you have shown in Tuscany.

M. Corsini, the minister of the latter, has made remonstrances on what concerns that power: it is admitted, however, that the conduct of England rendered ours perfectly legitimate: for the rest, he receives but vague answers from us; we shall make no alteration in the instructions which you have, and it is for you and our commissioners to act in consequence.

The taking of the Castle of Milan is a fortunate operation: the troops employed in it deserve that we should charge you to congratulate them in the name of the Republic on this success.

We are of opinion, upon military and political considerations, that this castle ought to be demolished. You will give the necessary orders: it is useful to cause this demolition and that of the barracks at the parade to be regarded as that of another Bastille, which Austrian despotism had hitherto employed to keep under its yoke those flourishing countries, which seem peculiarly formed for liberty. By favour of this idea, which you will accredit among the people, excite a generous enthusiasm for the fall of that citadel. It will no doubt be but a faint image of that which presided at the destruction of the Bastille: but it will awaken the ancient hatred of Lombardy against the emperor, and make it dread the return of his domination.

All the artillery, all the effects in the magazines, found in Milan, which will not be necessary for the army, shall be sent to France. Keep with you only what is serviceable to your movements, nothing that is liable to embarrass them.

Your return to this side of the Po adds to our confidence in regard to the position of the army which you command. After negotiating ably and gathering the fruit of those victories, you are about to display again the military talents which prepared them. Everything bespeaks that the campaign of the Rhine will be equally brilliant and decisive.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 23 Messidor, year 4 [July 11, 1796].

The Executive Directory is informed, citizen-general, by the resident of the Republic with that of the Grisons, that you have promised those people to permit in their favour the exportation of corn from the Milanese, which had been formerly granted to them. The Directory finds no fault with this measure, so long as it is not prejudicial to the supply of the army; but thinks it useful to recommend to you to inform yourself accurately whether, in return for the exportation of corn from the Milanese into the country of the Grisons, the latter were not obliged to grant a free passage through their territory to the imperial troops. If such a clause exists, you will feel the importance of getting it renewed for our advantage.

The Directory cannot, at this moment, settle any thing relating to the Bolognese and Ferrarese; but it is glad to see that this interesting part of the State of the Church is impatient to shake off the yoke of the pope. We ought to study to keep up in that country dispositions favourable to liberty, till its political fate is decided, according to the desire which you express, or to ulterior circumstances.

The difficulty which has arisen in regard to the legation of Ravenna cannot bear discussion; it is evident that the town of Faenza cannot be taken here for the entire legation, of which it is the principal town; and, whatever desire the Directory may feel to accede to the observations of M. d'Azara, out of regard for the court of Spain, it cannot in this circumstance overthrow the sense of an article of the armistice which has been sincerely assented to. Be pleased, citizen-general, to make a suitable use of this decision, in repeating to M. d'Azara the assurance of our consideration for his court.

The safety of the valuable objects of art that Rome is to furnish ought not to be endangered; they must be carried by land, and any means of transport employed which the country can afford, on payment of course of the necessary remuneration.

The thoughts of the government are naturally directed by present circumstances to Corsica and the expulsion of the English from that island. Promote the explosion of the elements of insurrection which it contains against its proud dominators.

The Directory authorizes the delivery of letters-of-marque to the armed vessels of the Mediterranean; but it is important to require a legitimate surety from the captains to whom they are delivered, and to prevent the abuse that has been made of them: this has been so great that French ships have been captured by pirates, which had taken these letters of marque.

The Directory begs you to take all the precautions required for the conveyance of the effects and money, which, as you give notice, you will have to transmit.

The commissioners of the Directory, Salicetti and Garrau, have sent us a report on the importance of occupying Porto Ferrajo, which might be held with a garrison of a hundred men. If you think this measure useful, we give the necessary authorization to that effect.

CARNOT.

To Citizen Faipoult, Minister at Genoa.

Head-quarters, Milan, 25 Messidor, year 4 [July 13, 1796].

I have not yet seen M. Cataneo, citizen minister; when I see him he shall be satisfied with me, and I shall neglect nothing to lull him and to give the senate a little more confidence.

The time of Genoa is not yet come, for two reasons:

1. Because the Austrians are reinforcing themselves, and I shall soon have a battle. If conqueror, I shall have Mantua, and then a mere estafette at Genoa will be as good as a whole army;

2. The ideas of the Directory relative to Genoa appear to me not yet fixed.

It has ordered me to demand the contribution, but not permitted me any political operation. I have despatched an

extraordinary courier with your letter, and asked for orders, which I shall have in the first decade of next month. Between this and then, forget all the subjects of complaint that we have against Genoa.

Give them to understand that you and I have ceased to intermeddle in such matters, since they sent M. Spinola to Paris. Give them to understand that we are both highly satisfied with their choice, and that it is to us a guarantee of their good intentions. Tell them positively that I have been extremely pleased with the measures which they have adopted relative to M. Girola; in short, omit no circumstance that can revive hope in the heart of the senate of Genoa, and lull it to sleep till the moment for awaking.

I have received all your notes. Your correspondence is becoming extremely interesting to me.

You will find annexed a letter addressed to me by M. Vicente Spinola. It seems to me that there must be some territory which is in discussion between Genoa and Piedmont. Give me some explanations on this subject. Let me know what interest they attach to it, and, on the demand of the senate, tell them it is possible that they might be immediately put into possession: in short, citizen minister, manage so that we gain a fortnight, that hope revives, as well as confidence between you and the Genoese government, in order that, if we are beaten, we may find it friendly.

Transmit speedily to Tortona all that is at M. Balbi's. It is the intention of the Directory to collect all at Paris for the purpose of making a grand financial operation. I shall send thither thirty millions.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Miot, Minister of the Republic at Florence.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].

I have received, citizen minister, your different letters relative to the occupation of Porto Ferrajo by the English. So long as there was any hope of prevailing on the grand-duke to put that place into a condition for resisting, you did right to speak firmly to him; now, I think with you, threats would be impotent and useless. I think that we ought to make no further mention of the matter, not to show any mark of resentment, and wait till circumstances and the orders of the government shall enable us to act, not talk.

I beg you to keep an eye on what is doing at Leghorn, and to let me hear frequently from you.

If circumstances should oppose your proceeding immediately to Rome, let me know, that I may take other measures.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Sapey.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].

All the Corsicans have orders to repair to Leghorn, to embark there for the island. General Gentili is going himself. Prepare all possible means of embarkation and passage. I am ordering General Vaubois to keep 8000 pounds of powder, 4000 fowling-pieces, 1000 pair of shoes, and a certain quantity of ball, at your disposal, in order to supply the insurgents of that department.

I authorize you to take the measures which you propose in your letter of the 19th Messidor. Spare no means to transmit succours and to obtain news from the departments of Corsica.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Bonelli.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].

I have received your letter from Bocognano, dated the 23rd of June. I congratulate you on your arrival in Corsica. I have given orders to all the refugees to prepare themselves to set out, for the purpose of putting themselves at the head of the brave patriots of Corsica, shaking off the English yoke, and reconquering liberty, the perpetual object of the solicitude of our countrymen.

What glory for them, if they can single-handed drive those proud English out of their country! Glory and happiness to those who shall first declare themselves! I recommend to you not to give yourself up to any party-spirit; let all the past be forgotten, except for the small number of perfidious men who have misled those brave people.

The armies of the Sambre and Meuse and of the Rhine are in the heart of Germany: every thing smiles upon the Republic. Manage to let us hear something about you soon. Embrace our good friends, and assure them that before long they shall be delivered from the tyranny which oppresses them.

BONAPARTE.

To the Ordonnateur-in-Chief.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].

You will place 100,000 francs at the disposal of citizen Sucy, commissary of war at Genoa, to supply the wants of the hospitals, the transport of artillery and of the siege equipage which is at Savona, and all the other expenses relative to the troops that are still left in the Riviera of Genoa.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Garrau, Commissioner of the Government.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].

The requisition which you have made, citizen-commissioner, to General Vaubois, is contrary to the instructions which the government has given me. I beg you for the future to keep within the limits of the functions prescribed you by the government of the Executive Directory: otherwise I shall be obliged to forbid, by an order of the day, compliance with your requisitions. We are all only by the law: he who would fain command and usurp functions not granted to him by the law is no republican.

When you were representative of the people, you had unlimited powers; everybody made it a duty to obey you: now, you are commissioner of the government, invested with a very high character: positive instructions have regulated your functions: adhere to them. I am well aware that you will repeat the remark which I shall make like Dumouriez—It is clear that a general who has the presumption to command the army which the government has entrusted to him, and to issue orders without a resolution of the commissioners, cannot but be a conspirator.

BONAPARTE.

To General Vaubois.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].

I am not at all pleased, general, with your proclamation. The commissioner of the government has no right to make requisitions to you; and, in the important place which you command, a man is as culpable to obey those who have no

right to command as to disobey his legitimate superiors. From the spirit of the instructions which I had given you, and from all that I had said to you *viva voce* during my stay in Leghorn, it ought to have been easy for you to perceive that that proclamation would not have my approbation.

Citizen Belleville has been solely charged with the operations relative to the sequestration of the property in Leghorn belonging to our enemies. I have learned with astonishment the waste and disorder existing in that business. You ought to grant citizen Belleville all the force that he has need of, and to invest him with all the confidence necessary for him to denounce abuses, and to enable him to turn to the profit of the Republic the goods which we have sequestered from our enemies.

Hasten the arming and equipping of the 75th demi-brigade, because, as soon as those brave fellows have rested, my intention is to recall them to the army.

It is not the intention of the government that any injury should be done to the Leghorn merchants or to the subjects of the Grand-Duke of Tuscany. At the same time that we study the interests of the nation, we ought to be generous and just. I have been as much grieved as astonished at the vexations committed against the commerce of Leghorn.

Be pleased to give me a detailed account of all that has been done on this subject. You will take care, in particular, to inform me by what authority citizen Lachaise has quitted his consulship at Genoa to intrude into the affair of Leghorn. A great quantity of Corsican refugees are proceeding to Leghorn, to take shipping there for the island. Keep 4000 fowling-pieces, 1000 pair of pistols, 6000 pounds of powder, and ball in proportion, at the disposal of citizen Sapey, who will have instructions to transmit them to the insurgent patriots of that department.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].

I have to speak to you, citizens directors, of our position, military, administrative, and political, at Leghorn.

The batteries against the sea are in good condition: we have repaired a citadel, in which the garrison can shelter itself against an insurrection. We have there a garrison

of 2800 men, very good troops, two companies of artillery, and a good officer of engineers. If the French army were obliged to abandon the north of Italy, that garrison would retire by Massa and the Riviera of Genoa. General Vaubois, who commands it, is a prudent, firm, and excellent officer.

At the time of our entering Leghorn I directed citizen Belleville, consul of the Republic in that place, to put seals upon all the magazines belonging to the English, Portuguese, Russians, and all other powers with which we are at war, as well as to the merchants of those different nations. I warned citizen Belleville that he should be personally responsible for any dilapidations that might take place. This man is universally esteemed for his integrity. After my departure, a host of Genoese stock-jobbers came to get possession of all this wealth. All the measures that I had taken were deranged; instead of one responsible person were substituted commissions, each member of which plunders while amusing his neighbour. You will find annexed extracts from two letters from General Vaubois. People are conducting themselves in a harsher manner towards the Leghorn merchants, and treating them with more rigour than you wish them to treat the English merchants themselves: this alarms the commerce of all Italy, makes us pass in its eyes for Vandals, and utterly estranges the merchants of the city of Genoa; and the mass of the people of that city, which has always been favourable to us, is now decidedly against us.

If our administrative conduct at Leghorn is detestable, our political conduct towards Tuscany is no better. I have always refrained from making any kind of proclamation, and expressly ordered that no act, wearing the semblance of an act of government, should be issued. You will see, by the annexed proclamation, how little heed is paid to my intentions, and to the orders which I have given. The measure for driving emigrants from Leghorn, and from the country for twenty leagues round it, by a proclamation, is as useless as it is impolitic. There are very few emigrants in Leghorn: the grand-duke himself has given orders for their expulsion. It would have been much more simple to have caused three or four to be apprehended by the native authorities, and then the few others would have run off fast enough. This proclamation, arrogating a jurisdiction over

twenty leagues of country, has a very bad effect, unless—which is totally contrary to your instructions—we were to assume the tone and policy of ancient Rome.

The English have taken possession of Porto Ferrajo. Masters of the sea, as they are, it would have been difficult to oppose this enterprise. When we shall be masters of Corsica, which cannot be long first, it will become possible for us to drive them from this island. You will find annexed a copy of the letter written to me by the Grand Duke of Tuscany, of that of our minister at Florence, and of the answer.

In the present position of Italy we must not make ourselves any new enemy, and await the issue of the campaign, in order to adopt a course conformable with the true interests of the Republic. No doubt you will then be sensible that it is not expedient for us to leave the duchy of Tuscany to the brother of the emperor. I should wish that till then no threat, no hostile language, should be used at Leghorn against the court of Tuscany. My slightest words, and those of your commissioners, are watched and approached with the utmost respect; but here people imagine themselves to be in the lobbies of the Convention.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 20, 1796].

Citizen Comeyras, minister of the Republic to the Grisons, has arrived in these last days at head-quarters. He could have wished that, in consequence of capitulations existing between the Archduke of Milan and the Grison Leagues, I had ordered these latter to be supplied with corn. We have even had a little discussion, because he alleged that you had ordered this supply; but, on referring to the letter written to me by the minister, Lacroix, he was convinced that it was a mere authorization to furnish it, if I thought fit. I then observed to him that it was impossible to furnish the quantity of corn that he desired, unless the Leagues insisted on the execution of this article of the capitulations, which would give us a right to demand the passage that is granted to the Archduke of Milan, by way of indemnity for the said supply.

We have agreed, in consequence, that, on his arrival at

Coire, he shall write to the chiefs of the Leagues, that he had met with some obstacles to the execution of the order of the Directory for the supply of the corn, which cannot take place till they have officially communicated the capitulations to me. The commissioner Comeyras asked me for money to pay the pensions of the Grisons: he thinks that, with 60,000 francs, our party in that country would be considerably increased.

If the circumstances of the war were to carry us into the country of the Grisons, or if we needed a force there to oppose the incursions of the enemy, would it be amiss to form a corps of all the Swiss who have been in the service of France and are pensioned? This would form a *corps d'élite* of 800 men, perfectly acquainted with the roads, and who might be of great service to us.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 2 Thermidor, year 4 [July 22, 1796].

The gentlemen of the senate of Venice would have liked to serve us as they did Charles VIII. They calculated that, like him, we should penetrate to the foot of Italy, and were probably waiting for us on our return.

I immediately seized the citadel of Verona, which I have armed with their cannon, and at the same time I sent a courier to citizen Lallemand, our minister at Venice, to bid him enjoin the senate to desist from its armaments. You have seen the notes that I sent you on the subject by my last courier: the arming is already discontinued.

The republic of Venice has already furnished us with 3,000,000 for the subsistence of the army: not that it furnishes this itself, but a contractor, whom it secretly pays. So I agreed with the proveditor-general, promising, however, that some day the French Republic should pay.

This contractor has called upon me several times to apply for money. I have dismissed him with promises, and a positive order to continue to supply: he has been to the commissioners of the government, who have given him a bill of exchange for 300,000 livres, to receive out of the contributions of the Pope. Of all measures this was the worst, so now he will supply no more. By this bill of exchange for 300,000 livres, payable at a time when it is known that

there are 21,000,000 coming to us, they have taken away all hope of being paid, and at the same time led people to conclude that by importunity and withholding supplies they may extract money from us: so that now I am obliged to storm against the proveditor, to exaggerate the murders committed on our troops, to complain bitterly of the arming, which was not attempted while the Imperialists were the stronger, and thereby I shall oblige him to supply all that is required, in order to appease me. That is the way to treat these folks; they will continue to supply me, half willingly, half forcibly, till the taking of Mantua, and then I will tell them plumply that they must pay me the contribution mentioned in your instructions, which will easily be done. I think it might be well for you to express to M. Quirini your astonishment at the arming of the Venetians, which was no doubt directed against us. There is not a government more treacherous and more cowardly than that.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 4 Thermidor, year 4 [July 22, 1796].

I have informed you, citizens directors, that I have sent over a score of refugees to Corsica. You will find annexed a letter which I have received from him who commands them.

I have ordered general of division Gentili, and generals Casalta and Cervoni, to proceed to Leghorn, whence they will sail to put themselves at the head of the insurgents. General Gentili, who is to have this command, is a clever, prudent man, possessing the esteem of the country-people, and the confidence of the mountaineers.

I am ordering the gendarmerie of the department of Corsica, of 180 men, all natives, to repair to Leghorn, whence I will get them also sent over. These, together with 4000 fowling-pieces, and 6000 pounds of powder, will give us the whole interior of the country. The moment all this is organized, I will send over a company of artillerymen, with five or six mountain pieces, with which it will be easy to take St. Florent, which has no permanent fortification. This port taken, the English will have no interest to keep the others; besides, the people of Ajaccio and Bastia are very impatient of the English yoke.

I beg you to be pleased to let me know if you think there will be any inconvenience in granting a general amnesty to the people of that department, excepting the principal chiefs.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 4 Thermidor, year 4 [July 22, 1796].

The town of Reggio has risen against the Duke of Modena; deputies of that town have come to solicit protection and assistance: as we have concluded an armistice with the duke, I thought it advisable to exhort them to tranquillity. I mention this merely that you may know that the subjects of the dukes of Parma and Modena are very little attached to their princes.

BONAPARTE.

To his Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of State of Rome.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 3 Thermidor, year 4 [July 21, 1796].

I have the honour, monseigneur, to send to his Holiness citizen Cacault, agent of the French Republic in Italy, that he may attend to the execution of the armistice which has been concluded between the French Republic and his Holiness, under the mediation of the court of Spain. I beg you to be pleased to recognize him in that quality.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Cacault.

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 3 Thermidor, year 4 [July 21, 1796].

You will find annexed a letter for M. d'Azara, and the cardinal secretary of state for foreign affairs of his Holiness, with a copy of the armistice concluded between the Republic and the pope, as well as an additional article relative to the legation of Faenza, with the decision of the Executive Directory.

You will be pleased, in consequence, to demand an order from the pope for the commandant of Ancona to receive the garrison that I shall send thither.

You will despatch the 5,000,000 which are to form the first payment, namely, 2,000,000 to the head-quarters, for

which a receipt shall be given by the paymaster of the army, and the rest to Tortona. The first convoy must leave Rome twenty-four hours after your arrival.

The 5,000,000 that are to form the second payment must leave Rome a few days after the first; for, according to the armistice, it ought to be despatched by the 5th Thermidor.

The 5,500,000 livres which form the last payment ought to leave Rome by the 5th Vendemiaire.

The scientific men and artists, who are to select the pictures, manuscripts, and statues, will address themselves to you, and you will afford them the necessary protection, by taking such steps as may be expedient. If it were advisable to give funds to the artists for defraying the expenses of carriage, let them be taken from the funds arising from the pope's contributions.

Four millions out of the 5,500,000, which the pope is to furnish as the last payment, are destined for the navy. The minister of the marine is to send commissioners for this purpose.

You will give notice, meanwhile, that the hemp, timber, and other materials of that nature for ship-building, may be got ready.

The remaining 1,500,000 livres are to be furnished in horses and cloth for clothing the troops. You will demand, in consequence, 400 horses, of the height for hussars; 400 for dragoons; and 600 for draught, which are to be transferred to Milan, where they shall be appraised by General Baurevoir, director of the dépôts of the army, and skilful persons sent by the pope: for the rest, blue and white cloth for clothing the troops.

You will demand the liberation of all persons who have been apprehended at Rome for their opinions, and especially those named in the annexed list, as well as citizen Labrousse of Bordeaux.

In consequence of the decision of the Directory, and of the commission appointed in Florence by M. d'Azara, the pope is bound to pay the contributions which had been imposed upon the legation of Ravenna, amounting to 1,200,000 francs in goods, and 1,200,000 in money.

BONAPARTE.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 29 Messidor, year 4 [July 17, 1796].

According to the last despatches from the general-in-chief of the army of the Alps, citizen-general, it appears that he had not received the 200,000 francs in money which you have been charged to send him. The state of things is such, that the transmission of these funds cannot be longer delayed without the most serious inconveniences. We request you, therefore, to send off those 200,000 francs with the least possible delay.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 29 Messidor, year 4 [July 17, 1796].

The Directory, citizen-general, has received the letter which you addressed to it from Roverbello, on the 18th instant: it has learned with pleasure that the troops blockading Mantua, under the command of General Serrurier, have repulsed with advantage the sorties attempted by the garrison.

If the Directory had before it a statement of the supplies that are likely to be in the place, it might be able to decide whether it were preferable to open the trenches before it, or to be content with a simple blockade, by means of which we should make ourselves masters of it. The sickness which has begun to appear in the division of General Serrurier causes the Directory to think that the resolution which you have taken to open the trenches is most suitable in the present circumstances; and it has learnt with satisfaction that you have not neglected to employ in the works of the siege the prisoners that you have taken from the Prince of Rome, &c.

According to private letters from General Berthier, it appears that the fevers which have manifested themselves in the French division at Mantua, are but ephemeral; perhaps they will cease on the immediate removal of the sick to a certain distance, and by enabling them to breathe a more wholesome air: we found great benefit from this course in Zealand.

You must soon have accounts of the march of the reinforcements which the army of the Coasts of the Ocean has detached for the army of Italy. The Directory sends you

annexed a statement of the demi-brigades and the battalions which compose it ; these troops form a total of 12,000 men. The Directory thinks it right to observe, that the army of the Alps is reduced, as it were, to nothing, and it is expedient that you should leave General Kellermann about 2000 men, which are indispensably necessary, as well to attend to the demolition of the fortresses of Piedmont, as to maintain the police in the departments under his command.

The statement you have sent us of the enemy's force which is opposed to you has appeared to us exaggerated. The general-in-chief Moreau seems even to believe that some of the Austrian reinforcements detached by the army of Hohenlohe to strengthen that which you are fighting have returned towards the Rhine, to oppose the efforts of the army of the Rhine and Moselle. When Mantua shall be in the power of the army of Italy, the troops which have taken it, united to those which you have towards the Tyrol, will give you a great superiority of force over General Wurmser.

The fusils of the republic of Lucca might be made useful for Corsica.

The Directory approves of the measures which you have taken for the sequestration of the property belonging to Neapolitans at Leghorn.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 29 Messidor, year 4 [July 17, 1796].

Intelligence which has just reached the Executive Directory, of the successes of the armies of Sambre and Meuse, and Rhine and Moselle, leads it to presume, citizen-general, that the Austrians, finding it absolutely impossible to defend the right bank of the Rhine any longer, have resolved to abandon it : they appear to have an intention of retiring into the heart of Germany. The orders which the Directory has transmitted to the Republican generals, to pursue them with vigour, give it hopes that they will be driven back either upon Bohemia or the right bank of the Danube.

Annexed you will find a copy of the letter which we wrote to General Moreau on the 5th Messidor : we have thought that it might be useful to communicate it to you.

In regard to what concerns Venice, the Directory thinks as you do. The first operation to make sure of is to reduce Mantua; the second is to drive back Wurmser, in case he should attempt to re-enter Italy; and, above all, to keep him in a state of harassing anxiety for the soldiers whom he commands.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 29 Messidor, year 4 [July 17, 1796].

It is with regret, citizen-general, that the Directory finds itself compelled to abandon, in some measure, the principles which it has laid down for itself, and which it has steadily followed till this day, with the city of Genoa: but the conduct of the Genoese government towards the French Republic has forced it, against its will, to take the severe measures contained in the annexed resolution.

You will be pleased, general, to carry it into execution as soon as circumstances permit. The Directory trusts to your prudence relative to the choice of the moment and that of the means of execution; in like manner, it leaves to you both the proclamation which is to precede your demands, and the precautions to be taken that the funds and other valuable effects deposited at Genoa may not run the slightest risks: it will be better, general, to place those objects in safety than to be obliged to claim them.

CARNOT.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 29 Messidor, year 4 [July 17, 1796].

The Executive Directory, which has received, citizen-general, your letter of the 18th Messidor, relative to the means of driving the English out of Corsica, and restoring those departments to the Republic without efforts, has adopted all the views which you have there expressed.

It authorises you to get shipped for Corsica, either at Leghorn or by any other way, all the Corsican patriots whose courage and civism are known to you.

It authorises you to send over eight to ten thousand fowling-pieces, and seven or eight thousand pounds of powder.

It authorises you to promise, in the name of the government, proofs of the national gratitude to all the Corsicans who are fighting for the liberty of their native country.

It authorises you to promise a general and absolute pardon to those who shall return to their duty.

It authorises you, in short, to use all the means that you shall deem practicable, in the operation with which you are particularly charged.

The Directory, convinced that, to ensure the success of this great operation, it is necessary to give it a chief known for his talents, his civism, his attachment to the French Republic, and who unites the confidence of the government with that of the Corsican patriots, is writing by the same courier to citizen Salicetti : it informs him that it has cast its eyes upon him for this purpose, and promises him all the succours that will depend on itself and you. To complete your glory and render it more brilliant, you have nothing to do, general, but to add to the title of conqueror of Italy that of liberator of the country which gave you birth.

The Directory hopes it from your talents and your energy.

CARNOT.

To Citizen Salicetti.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 4 Thermidor, year 4 [July 22, 1796.]

Fortune has appeared for a moment contrary to us : so many events have occurred during the last five or six days, and I am yet so much engaged, that it is impossible for me to give you an accurate account of them ; but, at last, thanks to the victory of Lonado and the rigorous measures which I have adopted, things will take a satisfactory turn. I have raised the siege of Mantua, and am here with nearly my whole army.

I shall seize the first occasion to give battle to the enemy : it will decide the fate of Italy. Beaten, I shall retire from the Adda ; beating, I shall not stop at the marshes of Mantua. Louis¹ will give you a verbal account of our two victories of Lonado and Salo. Louis will talk to you about my present force and that of the enemy. Write to General Kellermann, to send me all the disposable troops by double marches. Be assured that the castles of Milan, Tortona, Alexandria, and Pavia, are provisioned. We are ex-

¹ His brother, Louis Bonaparte.

tremely fatigued here ; five of my horses have died of fatigue. I cannot write to the Directory ; I beg of you to inform it in a few words of what you see and what Louis will tell you verbally. BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Rome, 22 July, 1796 [13 Prairial, year 4].

Monsieur le General, permit me to call myself to your remembrance on an occasion so glorious for the arms of the Republic and for you, who direct them with so much glory. I suppose the conquest of Mantua to be accomplished, and this triumph added to the others that you have so justly won in Italy.

Citizen Miot will, no doubt, have informed you of the state of the commission with which you have entrusted him, for the execution of the treaty of armistice concluded at Bologna between the Republic and the pope. Every thing is admirably arranged, and the first five millions are already despatched for Imola, where we agreed that they should be put into the hands of the deputies of the Republic. As to all the rest, the pope assents with all the sincerity in the world, and citizen Miot has attended to the interests of the Republic with such care and vigilance that every body renders him the justice which is his due. He is about to return to Florence ; citizen Cacault, whom you have sent to take his place, having arrived. The scientific commissioners have arrived, too, and I shall try to do my best in order that they may fulfil their commission, and to render their stay at Rome as agreeable as possible.

The Sieur Ratti, who will have the honour to deliver this letter, will speak to you for me about la Messola and Santo Martino, which the Ferrarese were desirous of comprehending in their territory ; but it is so notorious throughout all Italy that those two properties were purchased by the popes, and have never been governed or administered by the legates of Ferrara, that this has no need of proofs : nevertheless, I have the honour to send you two authentic documents of the contracts for the purchase of the lands in question ; and, I hope, general, from your justice, that you will be pleased to order that the pope be left in possession of what legitimately belongs to him, according to the letter and spirit of our treaty.

I hope, general, that your triumphs will soon give us a peace useful and glorious to the Republic which you serve, and necessarily to mankind. Meanwhile, I have the honour to be, with the sentiments of admiration with which you have inspired me, &c. THE CHEVALIER D'AZARA.

PS. M. Cacault has just delivered to me the two letters with which you have honoured me, dated 3rd Thermidor, and I thank you for the care you have been pleased to take respecting the additional article relative to Romagna. For the rest, the person of Citizen Cacault has long been known to me, and I hope that he will complete the execution of the treaty to your entire satisfaction. I presented him this morning to the pope and to the secretary of state, by whom he was received with all the distinction that he could desire, and citizen Miot took leave at the same time.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Venice, 5 Thermidor, year 4 [July 23, 1796].

All the letters from the Tyrol speak of nothing but the perplexity of General Wurmser. He was anxious to descend and to attempt the deliverance of Mantua; he wished also for more force, that he might at once act and guard the threatened Tyrol. You will take Mantua in a few days; you will attack the camp at Bassano; and you will force the passes of the Tyrol by the two routes.

It was reported here, the day before yesterday, that 2,400 men, who had come to Trieste by the Friule, above Udine, had gone to reinforce the camp of Bassano; but it is added that all is quiet there.

It has also been reported that a corps of Austrians, likewise come from Trieste, nobody knows how, had arrived at Ferrara, to pass through the territory of Venice by the Polesino. The senate does not believe a word of it; but, embarrassed as it is with its Slavonians, it has just given orders for the departure of fourteen barks manned by 1500 or 2000 of these same Slavonians, which are to station themselves at the conflux of the Adige and the Po, above Brondolo; they will never be dangerous there: they are commanded by Cleva.

All that has passed before my eyes, and some expressions dropped by M. Pesaro, lead me to believe it to be true, as

it is reported, that the Venetians are really threatened by Russia and England, as well as by the Austrians: accordingly, all their efforts of defence are directed towards the sea, and I can assure you that they will soon have nothing to fear in that quarter for their capital.

LALLEMANT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 7 Thermidor, year 4 [July 25, 1796].

We have received, citizen-general, your letters dated the 18th, 24th, and 26th Messidor.

We are very glad to learn that the divisions which you conducted beyond the Po have recrossed that river, and that you are vigorously pushing the siege of Mantua. The insalubrity of the works of that siege and the preparations going on in the Tyrol make us earnestly desire to see that place surrendered very soon to the troops which you command. Stratagems and daring *coups de main* are in fact an essential part of the art of attacking fortresses; and those which you meditate against this will, no doubt, accelerate the surrender, by favour of the secrecy in which you will contrive to envelop their profound combinations, and by the rapidity of their execution.

Our last despatches will have informed you of our adhesion to the proposals which you made to us relative to Genoa; and we think with you that that operation ought to be deferred, as well as that concerning Venice, till the moment when the taking of Mantua shall have consolidated your position in such a manner as to deprive those two States of all hope of escaping the justice of our demands and the empire of the arms of the Republic.

It is to be regretted that the interesting island of Elba is in the hands of the English, who find in it a sort of compensation for the loss of Leghorn, and whence they may molest your dispositions in favour of Corsica; but that event has the advantage for us of unveiling the secret intentions which the grand-duke had hitherto coloured with the apparent desire to preserve his neutrality. In any other circumstances, we should not have scrupled to propose war to that perfidious power; but, when the rapid course of our triumphs is daily tending to dissolve the remnant of the coalition and necessarily leading to a general peace, it has

not appeared prudent to us to kindle fresh flames of war, reserving to ourselves to remonstrate hereafter against this violation of treaties, which we show that we are ourselves tenacious of respecting.

Reports are in circulation that the emperor, according to the probabilities of a health always precarious, is approaching his end. To take advantage of this event, it is necessary that you should be informed of it with the utmost possible celerity, when it has taken place. Keep up for this purpose secret correspondence with Vienna. The grand-duke of Tuscany, heir to the imperial throne, will not hesitate to repair to his capital immediately after the death of his brother. The point will then be to prevent him, to seize him as an enemy of the Republic, and to occupy Tuscany militarily. This plan, though based upon conjectures by no means certain, is not the less deserving of all your attention.

The seditious movements, repeated on the part of the Italians against the French troops, bespeak a profound hatred in them of our successes, since the false report of a reverse, how improbable soever, is sufficient alone to make it break forth in so serious a manner. Combine, citizen-general, with the activity of your military labours that care which is claimed by the constant and rigid repression of those alarming germs of insurrection, which might perhaps astonish the troops and cool their courage against the Austrians, to whom it must never cease to display itself with the same brilliancy. One powerful expedient to be employed against revolt is to carry off a great number of hostages and the most considerable persons in the different countries.

The right of the army of the Rhine and Moselle nearly touches upon the Lake of Constance, and will soon alarm the rear of the Austrian army of Italy. Prince Charles, reduced to half his force by his losses and the garrisons which he has thrown into fortresses, is taking the route of the Danube. Generals Moreau and Jourdan are briskly pressing him on his two flanks.

The most decisive campaign appears to be already secure from any reverse, and the news which the Directory expects very shortly from you, citizen-general, will add still more to the glorious and astonishing situation of the Republic.

CARNOT.

To the General-in-Chief.

Venice, 8 Thermidor, year 4 [July 26, 1796].

According to a letter, dated July 23rd, which I received yesterday, there had passed through Bolzano from the 20th to the said 23rd, 9150 infantry, 1800 cavalry, and 34 artillerymen. This new number, added to all those of which I previously had advice, appears to me rather excessive; but, on the other hand, I have some reason to rely upon the writer: so that I suspend my judgment, and nevertheless think it right to transmit you this information. My man adds that the infantry and the artillerymen come from the Rhine.

It appears from other letters that the Austrians are retreating from Bassano, but that they are marching detachments of twelve to fifteen hundred men, in different parts of their frontiers from the side of the Friule, to Goritz, Gradisca, and the Pontieba. It is difficult to guess what is their design in this.

I am informed, besides, that 600 cavalry had no sooner arrived at Roveredo than it received orders to fall back.

The minister of Prussia at Vienna writes, in a letter which I have seen, that a courier had come to that cabinet from the court of Naples, and that, from what transpired, this courier had brought to the emperor the assurance that the king of the Two Sicilies would not subscribe any disgraceful peace.

LALLEMANT.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Venice, 8 Thermidor, year 4 [July 26, 1796].

I had yesterday a conversation with M. Pesaro, of which I think it my duty to give you an account without delay. We had to talk about some particular business; but he was anxious to speak to me upon a subject that appeared to him much more important. It was the serious apprehension which he felt, as well as the principal members of the college, that the republic of Venice would soon be at war with us. He told me that, according to the accounts which he had just received from Verona, you had clearly manifested the intention of declaring it; that you had expressed to him, who performs the functions of proveditor-general, ex-

treme dissatisfaction ; that you had made demands, with which it was impossible to comply at the moment ; and that you had, nevertheless, threatened to treat the Venetians as enemies if you did not immediately obtain what you desired ; that, besides, great rigour had begun to be shown in various places to individuals ; and, lastly, that you had expressly declared that, unless Venice disarmed in a very short time, you would actually declare war against it.

After he had thus explained to me the causes of his alarm, he entered into very long justificatory details. He represented to me that ever since the French army had entered the territories of Venice, its government had made it, he said, a duty and a pleasure to promote your arrangements and to comply with your demands ; if it had not done more, it was for want of means, or from the necessity in which it found itself to avoid embroiling itself with the other belligerent powers, from which, however, it was continually receiving very severe reproaches : that, it is true, we might have had reason to complain of the sentiments and conduct of various individuals ; but that they had flattered themselves that, on directing our attention to the proceedings of the government, we should not judge of its principles and its intentions by the indiscreet conduct or the imprudent language of individuals inflamed against us by ancient prejudices, by a sense of the momentary evils which they were necessarily suffering, and still more by the intrigues of a great number of malevolent persons, who wish for nothing better than to embroil Venice with France, and thus to punish it for its refusal to join the coalition ; that, on the other hand, this same government neglected nothing that it could do without danger to change opinion in regard to us ; that it curbed the licentiousness of our enemies ; that it had begun and should continue by degrees to remove the most ardent, that is to say, the emigrants, and that these precautions had already produced effects equally happy and perceptible ; that, as for the arming, which appeared to excite your distrust, it had not had in its principle any other motives but those which have been stated in the written answer given by the senate ; that, if any others have arisen to induce them to continue those preparations for defence, which are such as ought to dispel all our suspicions, since they are threats seriously addressed to Venice, both by England and by Russia, the truth of

these reasons is proved by the nature and the direction of those same preparations ; that, besides, they are too inconsiderable to be regarded as the continuation of a design formed against France ; that we ought not to draw any unfavourable inference either from the extraordinary contributions and impositions which the government has demanded, for, in this, its intention has been much less to provide for its arming than to enable it to satisfy our requisitions ; lastly, that the senate conceived that it had proved in every way the sincerity and constancy of its friendly dispositions towards France, and that, in consequence, the contrary dispositions which you now manifested caused those to whom they were known equal surprise and chagrin.

Such was in substance the address of M. Pesaro. As I had no instructions, touching the alleged facts on which he founded his fears, I could not return any very precise answer ; but I thought that I ought, in one way or other, to allay his apprehensions ; and for this purpose I employed general reflections, which it would be superfluous to repeat to you. I failed, no doubt, to cheer him completely, but I made him a little easier ; and for the rest he seemed to think that they ought to strive above all things to please you, and to avoid all quarrel with France. He even appeared to think that such was the opinion of his principal colleagues, and that such would also be the resolution of the senate, to whom, he said, they should not fail to submit, in the approaching sitting of Thursday, the accounts received from Verona.

In addition, citizen-general, it seems to me absolutely necessary, in the present circumstances, to tell you what I know of the dispositions of our own government, and what I am able to judge of those of the government of Venice. Permit me to enter into some details on this subject.

In the first place, I see, by the letters which I receive from the minister, that the Executive Directory appears to calculate upon the neutrality of the Venetian republic, and even to be satisfied with it, since it recommends to me to keep it up : nay, more, it appears to think of forming a much closer connexion between the two nations, and this matter has already formed the subject of several despatches. The latest that I have received, on Saturday last, insists

particularly on this point ; you may judge of it from the paragraph which I transcribe.

“ It is time that the republic of Venice should rouse itself from the long sloth in which it has stagnated ever since the peace of Passarowitz, and that it should resume among the powers the rank which it held before 1718 : France now offers it the means to do so. Venice has an opportunity to increase her territory, to acquire fortresses, which will consolidate her power, and serve to form between the two republics a federative compact, founded on their reciprocal interests.”

I am ordered, besides, to persuade the Venetians to send a negociator to Paris.

In the second place, as for this government, it is but too true that it has shown an extreme aversion for our revolution ; it is but too true that it has violently decried and calumniated it in its territories ; that several French individuals have experienced rigorous treatment there ; that hatred of us has there been industriously excited and fomented ; and that most heads, even those of several important personages, have been heated and led astray by religious fanaticism.

It is likewise but too true that this same government, long accustomed to tremble before that of Austria, has yielded more than it ought to have done to her influence, and that it paid the greater attention to her, and the less to us, because its old prejudices promised it something very different from our successes. But what appears to me not less true at this moment is, that it is sincere in its protestations of neutrality and good understanding with France ; that, its prejudices giving way at last to its true interests, it frankly wishes to see the Austrian yoke broken, under which it bowed, like all Italy. I am not sanguine, it is true, in expecting that we shall induce it to help itself with its own hands : there are yet too many fears, too many prejudices, in a great number of minds, and, besides, all are stupified by the long habit of indolence. But we may promise ourselves, I think, that so far from crossing those who are labouring for its deliverance, it will at least make some secret efforts, and cherish some secret wishes in their favour.

As for the arming, some doubts may be entertained respecting the nature of the motives which have determined it ; but, be this as it may, it seems to me that, in the state

in which it is, it ought not to excite any distrust. I have given you an account of it in my preceding letters, and you have, no doubt, judged that it was too feeble to excite any alarm. I will add, that I see before my eyes the truth of what M. Pesaro said to me. All the preparations which are making have no other object but the guard of the lagoons and the defence of the sea-coast. This indicates no hostile intentions against us.

Such, citizen-general, is what I have thought it right to lay before you. Your wisdom and understanding will make amends for all that I might further have told you, and will not fail to suggest to you the resolutions most suitable to the interests of the Republic. It belongs to you to combine the glory of a victorious general and of a prudent and enlightened politician.

LALLEMANT.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 13 Thermidor, year 4 [July 31, 1796].

The Executive Directory, citizen-general, which cannot but be well satisfied with the indefatigable activity with which you combat the enemies of liberty—the Executive Directory, which shares with all the good citizens, with all the true friends of the country, with the sincere republicans, the admiration excited by the great military talents which you display, and which give you just titles to the national gratitude, sees with indignation the efforts that scribblers, covered with different masks, are daily making to deceive the public, and to second the enemies of our country by reports, which cannot have any other object but to sow dissension among the friends of order and peace. The Directory sees with indignation the perfidy with which these coalition scribblers have dared to attack the loyalty, the constant fidelity of your services, and it owes to itself the formal contradiction which it gives to the absurd calumnies which they are impelled to hazard by the necessity of feeding malignity with stories capable of sharpening it, and gaining readers for their productions. Some, openly royalists, crudely circulate a falsehood; others, calling themselves patriots *par excellence*, but proceeding towards the same point, comment upon it, embellish it in their way, upon pretence of combating their so-called antagonists.

Both are thus labouring to check the progress of order which is establishing itself; both are seconding the enemies of the Revolution; both are striving to sow discord and to disorganize the armies; both play in this manner upon the credulity of their readers and of those from whom they derive their subsistence, and they indecently give them, as certain, tales which are the mere coinage of their wild imaginations.

No, citizen-general, never have the friends of Austria been able to prejudice the Directory against you, because the Directory knows your principles and your inviolable attachment to the Republic. No, never has there been a question about your recall; never has the Directory, never has any of its members, thought of giving a successor to him who so gloriously leads our republicans to victory. The scribbler who, assuming the air of defending you, dared assert that he was acquainted with the intrigue plotted against you, and of which an affair of money was but the pretext; the other who, dressing himself in a false virtue, dared to add that he had had the delicacy to keep silence about events which would have made our enemies laugh, are both impostors: both deceive the public, and are evidently unworthy of its confidence. If that man, so well informed, if that man, who, like his brethren in calumny, strives to give himself an air of importance, by pretending to be acquainted with all the secrets of the State—if that man is acquainted with one intrigue of the nature of that which he mentions, let him disclose it, let him make it known to the Directory: it is important enough assuredly; it too deeply interests the public welfare and the progress of our armies, for him who can reveal it to be able to dispense himself from denouncing it to those whom its object is to lead into error. But the silence of that man, his silence which will be his condemnation, will enlighten the public as to the confidence that it will henceforth owe to his insinuations.

You possess, citizen-general, the confidence of the Directory: the services which you are daily rendering give you a right to it; the considerable sums which the Republic owes to your victories prove that you attend at once to glory and to the interests of your country: all the good citizens are agreed on that point; you will have no difficulty to abandon the boastings and the calumnies of the others to

the contempt which they deserve of themselves, and still more for the spirit which directs them.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 14 Thermidor, year 4 [August 1, 1796].

What you wrote to the Directory from Castiglione, on the 4th Thermidor, citizen-general, relative to the demolition of the fortifications of the castles of Milan and of Mantua, has its approbation. I think, however, that every thing ought to be prepared for playing the mines and destroying the works, in case success on the part of the enemy should render that measure necessary. As for Mantua, the Directory adopts the proposal you make to demolish that place immediately, and to send to France forthwith the 300 pieces of artillery which are there. When that city has been demolished, you can order the destruction of the fortifications of the castle of Milan.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 14 Thermidor, year 4 [August 1, 1796].

The account you gave us, citizen-general, of the siege of Mantua persuades us that you use all the activity which that operation demands, and the success of which we are impatiently expecting. It is superfluous to recommend to you to attend to the wants of the troops employed in it, in order to mitigate the effects of the labours in which they are engaged, and to check the progress of the diseases which have broken out among the divisions.

We have approved in a particular despatch the proposals relative to that place, when daring, perseverance, and talent combined, shall have put it into our hands, as well as relative to the castle of Milan.

We cannot second too heartily the zeal which you manifest for recovering Corsica from the English, and we authorize you to grant an amnesty there in concert with the commissioner Salicetti, specially charged with the execution of the dispositions which you have made.

LAREVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 14 Thermidor, year 4 [August 1, 1796].

The Directory is informed, citizen-general, that, agreeably to its orders, the minister of war has directed the general commanding in the 11th military division to retain in that arrondissement a squadron of the 18th regiment of dragoons, and to send the three squadrons of that corps to the army of Italy without delay.

The disturbances which have broken out in the department of the Bouches du Rhone, and especially at Marseilles and Aix, have induced us to send thither immediately General Willot, who has our confidence. We beg him to watch that department with particular vigilance, and to prevent to the utmost of his power a civil war from bursting forth.

We have just ordered the minister of war to despatch for Marseilles one of the three squadrons of the 18th regiment of dragoons destined for Italy.

The horses which you have sent to the Directory are arrived.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 14 Thermidor, year 4 [August 1, 1796].

We have received, citizen-general, the letter which you have written to us from Castiglione the 4th of Thermidor, in which you mention the insurrection of the inhabitants of Reggio, and the dispositions of the people subject to the dukes of Parma and Modena. Circumstances and the friendship existing between the French Republic and the court of Spain might require some concessions to be granted at the general peace to the Duke of Parma, whose aggrandizement in Italy would be advantageous to France in several political respects.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 14 Thermidor, year 4 [August 1, 1796].

We have paid, citizen-general, particular attention to that one of your last despatches which relates to Leghorn. We

persist in the determination which has hitherto governed our conduct in regard to the grand-duchy of Tuscany, and we have seen with pain, in the measures pursued by our commissioners, a forgetfulness of our political principles in regard to that power. Without ceasing to proceed towards our goal—the crippling of the English in the Mediterranean, by closing the ports against them, and bringing back Corsica under the laws of the Republic, by favour of the occupation of Leghorn—we will not make any attack at this moment on the independence of Tuscany, or perform any acts of government in its territory. We defer, till more favourable circumstances, the grievances which must arise for us from the partiality of the grand-duke to the English; accordingly, we recommend to our commissioners to employ the forms which neutrality requires, and to consult previously with you on the resolutions which appear useful to them, abstaining, however, from every thing that would tend to usurp the rights of the Tuscan government. It is necessary, without giving umbrage to it, and without affecting the exercise of authority, to husband the advantages of the Republic, whose interests this system will favour.

M. Corsini has transmitted to us a memorial containing the grievances of his court: we have thought it right to accede to his demand to revoke the resolution concerning persons of English extraction, while rejecting his other proposals.

The administrative operations at Leghorn likewise engage our solicitude; and our formal intention is to establish the rule of security, good order, and integrity there. We earnestly call the attention of our commissioners to this important object.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 14 Thermidor, year 4 [August 1, 1796].

The observations contained, citizen-general, in your letter concerning the State of Venice, have appeared to us extremely judicious. The Directory authorises you to take all the measures that you have proposed till the military events, the happy issue of which we are awaiting, determine in a positive manner our conduct in regard to that power.

As for the remonstrances of the Grison Leagues, the course which you have taken likewise deserves the approbation of the Directory, being conformable with its preceding instructions. It is useful to profit by the need they have of the corn of the Milanese to ascertain their disposition.

The constitutional act forbids us to authorise the use you propose to make of a corps of 800 Swiss pensioners.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Poli, 11 Thermidor, year 4 [July 29, 1796].

I am just come from Rivoli: the fire has ceased; we still hold the position of Campo-Orongo—heights behind Rivoli. Our troops are harassed; they are absolutely knocked up; they have fought above fifty different actions. I never saw the Austrians fight so furiously; they were all drunk with brandy. Our troops, though with empty bellies, fought with surprising courage. If you send me a reinforcement of 7 or 8000 men, I almost promise you to re-occupy la Corona to-morrow; but we want fresh troops. Let me have news of you, general; I have had none to-day: I am impatient to hear from you.

I have just sent to ascertain whether the enemy is in the environs of the Chiusa. I shall sleep at the bridge, Pigeon and Victor at Rivoli. Joubert is ill.

MASSENA.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Pieverono, 11 Thermidor, year 4 [July 29, 1796].

I certainly expected to find the troops which arrived yesterday from Vicenza diminished in number. You will see, citizen-general, that, after all, it will be but a reconnaissance: that we shall know. To-day all precautions are taken; strong reconnaissances started in the night, to push very forward on all the roads leading from the enemy, and assuredly, if we are to be attacked, it will not be at Vicenza only that the movement will take place, but along our whole line. Health and friendship.

MASSENA.

To General Bonaparte.

Venice, 12 Thermidor, year 4 [July 30, 1796].

Citizen-general, according to a letter, which I have received from Bolzano, dated the 27th July, there have passed through that part, since the preceding letter, 120 artillerymen, 5000 infantry, and 4000 cavalry, all these forces coming from the Rhine. The same letter adds that, on the 25th, the Austrian troops put themselves in motion to the number of 30,000, taking different directions, namely those of Val Isella, Salto, Alla, Guiducasio, and Brescia. It also gives me to understand that there are movements towards Munich, for my man asks if it would be advisable for him to go thither.

Other advices from Vicenza, dated July 18, assure me that the number of the Austrian troops arrived in the environs of that city does not exceed 3000, composed of Hulans, hussars, and infantry. Those which are posted at the Campo Marzo are provided with two pieces of cannon, one placed on a hill on the other side of the river, and one on the Verona road. Health and fraternity.

LALLEMANT.

To General Bonaparte.

Rome, 12 Thermidor, year 4 [July 31, 1796].

Citizen general-in-chief, I arrived here the day before yesterday. I delivered your letters to M. Azara and to cardinal Zelada. M. Azara presented me this morning to the pope, by whom I have been very well received. Citizen Miot and his secretary of legation set out this evening for Florence. The scientific men and artists arrived this morning. Here I am installed with those who ought to assist in the work ; we will endeavour to do it well.

Citizen Miot has spared nothing to inform you by couriers of what is doing. Five millions are on the road to Imola : I shall hasten the second remittance.

Agreeably to your instructions, I applied to the governor of Ancona for an order to receive the garrison which you are to send : I was told that this order was given, and that commissioners from you had already come to Ancona, and taken cognizance of the state of things.

An English frigate is blockading this port. This system

of blockade pursued by the English at Leghorn and other places is designed to distress the people, by causing a want of work, and exciting them by despair to revolt against us.

You know that there are fifty thousand pounds of powder ready to be delivered here for the army. I am going to have it tried by citizens Monge and Berthollet; we ought to know whether it is good: soon afterwards we will send it off to you by Pistoia and Modena. I will give notice of it to the French comandant at Bologna, who can send national guards to escort and take it wherever you please.

I have requested citizen Miot to communicate to me your answers, which may serve me here for ulterior instructions.

I have not yet said any thing about the article concerning the contribution of Ravenna, because I have been engaged with more urgent matters. I shall immediately have the necessary interview upon that article with M. Azara.

They wish to wait here for the answer from Imola concerning the manner in which the delivery of the first five millions will be effected, before forwarding the second instalment. It is found very difficult to collect this second sum, which, besides, will be behind-hand: I shall be pressing. People must be aware that the Directory will not turn its attention to the definitive peace, till the conditions of the armistice are fulfilled. They must, therefore, bestir themselves here, notwithstanding their extreme disposition to tardiness in every thing. We shall fall to work to-morrow with the scientific men and artists to decide upon the objects to be demanded in kind. I shall give you an account of every thing, after I have learned from Miot what answer you have given to all his propositions.

CACAULT.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Roverbello, 13 Thermidor, year 4 [July 31, 1796].

My troops arrived here this morning, at three o'clock, after marching two nights and a day. They are going to Castellaro. I observe to you that I have but the 4th demi-brigade and the 51st, forming part of General Kilmaine's division. I have also a few cavalry and eleven pieces of light artillery, far too many for so few infantry.

On the arrival of General Kilmaine, I went to see him,

in order to concert with him for the good of the service. I have agreed with him that he should place a demi-brigade between Roverbello and Castellaro, to cover Mantua, and to be able to afford each other mutual assistance; for it is fourteen miles from Castellaro to Roverbello. You see that I am lonely enough, and without hope of any succour; but, the greater the danger, the greater firmness we must show. Rely upon my zeal and my activity.

I beg you to let me know upon what point I am to effect my retreat, in case I am forced; for I am not aware of your intentions or of the position of the army. All your orders have been executed. In those which you have given me on the subject of the retreat, I have not been at all annoyed.

AUGEREAU.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Milan, 13 Thermidor, year 4 [July 31, 1796].

I am now persuaded that the enemy have taken Brescia. I am setting off for Cassano, to make the necessary reconnaissances myself, and I will acquaint you with what I have learned. So far, notwithstanding the usual exaggerations, nothing leads me to believe that the corps of the enemy which has come to Brescia is considerable. We have some convoys on the road, that fell back to Cassano, which will be the principal object of my examination.

They are working hard in execution of your orders concerning the castle of Milan. It will be supplied with provisions to-morrow, and I will endeavour to fulfil your intentions. As soon as the communication is re-established, or as soon as you point me out another, I will send you the detachments of cavalry which are daily equipping and the other convoys destined for the head-quarters.

SAHUGUET.

To General Bonaparte.

Lonado, 14 Thermidor, year 4 [August 1, 1796].

General Massena has not arrived here, as he sent me word; having no news of Sauret, I could neither march upon Brescia nor follow up the victory. I learn this moment that General Sauret, after taking Salo, has retired upon Desensano, and know not what to make of it. General Massena

is about to rejoin me. We shall act together, agreeably to the instructions which I have received from you.

The battle of Lonado was terrible ; and I can assure you the enemy has been so mauled that he will not forget it : he has left above 1000 muskets, lost a great many men, and gone off in the greatest confusion. We have taken 300 prisoners. Had we been stronger, or only fresher, we should not have stopped there.

DESPINOIS.

PS. The enemy is guarding the bridge of St. Mark ; I am told that he has 5000 men in Brescia, and nearly the like number before the place ; nothing positive : if we may believe the prisoners, we had to do yesterday with 8 or 9000 infantry and 800 horse.

M. Bataglia, proveditor of Brescia, lets you know that he is here. He knows nothing about the positions and strength of the enemy ; or, at least, he says nothing precise or positive.

To General Bonaparte.

16 Thermidor, year 4 [August 3, 1796].

I have learned with pain that you are displeased because I did not keep Salò after I had taken it. You will recollect, general, that you were for a moment undecided whether we should go. You afterwards decided that, if it were only to deliver General Guyeux and his demi-brigade, we ought to go ; but you gave me no orders to remain there. General Despinos took a different course, which greatly embarrassed me, when I began my attack and saw that he did not come. Had he apprized me of it, I would have detached a column, which would have entered by the Brescia gate ; and, by means of this manœuvre, I should have made prisoners of the whole garrison and of the lieutenant-general commanding there, and taken fifteen pieces of artillery parked at the camp of Tormini.

General Despinos says that he corresponded with me. I have received but one letter from him at four in the afternoon, when I was falling back to reach the heights in front of Desensano, having seen a great number of barks full of troops upon the lake and the general with them. I was afraid that they were coming to land near Desensano, to cut off my retreat.

On arriving at Lonado, Generals Massena, Despinos, and I, consulted together in the presence of General St. Hilaire. There was a question about returning to Salo. The general asked how long it would take to get there; I replied that it would not take above four hours; that, according to calculations, I could have arrived there by five o'clock in the evening; that they had but to decide and I would march immediately. General Massena was of opinion that it would be rather late. It was decided that the three divisions should march in column to the bridge of St. Mark, and that, if the enemy opposed our passage, the cavalry should ford and each horseman take a volunteer behind him. I marched, and had nearly reached Brescia, when I received orders to fall back; I then marched for Salo. At the bridge of St. Mark, I allowed the troops to rest for a moment. General Pigeon, who followed me, sent me an orderly to let me know that he was making his retreat upon Brescia, the enemy coming in force from Gavardo. I drew up my division in order of battle; I immediately sent twenty horse chasseurs to reconnoitre the Gavardo road, where I ordered two pieces of cannon to be placed. I detached tirailleurs in front till the return of the chasseurs. The officer commanding the reconnaissance made me a report of his mission; he had seen nothing, and I resumed my march. General Massena sent me an orderly, who told me from him that I ought to make all the infantry advance upon Lonado. I was approaching it, when I met General Massena, who expressed his astonishment to find me there: I replied that it was only in consequence of his own advice, when he told me that the orderly had made a mistake, and that this disposition related only to the remainder of General Pigeon's troops. I then fell back to regain the Salo road. You see, general, that, but for these unlucky accidents, I should have arrived in good time. I was then obliged to relinquish the command to the general of brigade Guyeux, having had my leg crushed: making a charge at the head of the 24th regiment of chasseurs, we passed along a very narrow road, where I was pressed by the squadron, and my leg swelled to such a prodigious size that I could neither walk nor ride. I have transmitted to you the details of my expedition, fearing that you had not received them.

I had about 1500 infantry and 90 horse chasseurs, and,

notwithstanding the superiority of the enemy, whose force amounted to 3500 infantry and 400 hussars, or dragoons, having cannon, I made 90 prisoners, among whom were three captains and a sub-lieutenant. I took two pieces of cannon and two pair of colours of the regiment of Provence, and I delivered the 27th demi-brigade, General Guyeux, General Rusca, and his aide-de-camp, who were prisoners.

The chief of brigade Desaix, commanding the Allobroges, has distinguished himself. He entered the town twice at the head of the carabineers of the division, and received a ball in the shoulder. Notwithstanding his wound, he has never quitted the corps.

SAURET.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Castiglione di Stiviere,
16 Thermidor, year 4 [August 3, 1796].

The enemy is completely beaten ; 3000 prisoners, cannon, and ammunition, are the fruits of this victory. The three arms fought well ; each has done its duty. We have to regret the death of some brave men : General Beyrand was killed on the field of battle, General Robert wounded ; the chief of brigade Pourailler is likewise killed and several brave chiefs of battalion.

The enemy received reinforcements several times ; the fight was most bloody : I estimate the loss of the enemy at 7000 men. Your aide-de-camp Marmont conducted himself to admiration during the whole engagement : he has displayed great military talents. I beg you to send me General St. Hilaire to command the 4th demi-brigade, and likewise the chief of brigade Lannes, who has the brevet for taking the command of it ; otherwise those brave troops are undone. You will endeavour also to send me a general of brigade to command the 51st. We must strive to profit by this victory. I will send you the circumstantial report relative to the affair of to-day, in which I shall solicit of you promotion for the officers who have distinguished themselves.

AUGEREAU.

PS. Not having officers enough, I have retained the aide-de-camp of General St. Hilaire.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Castiglione di Stiviere,
16 Thermidor, year 4 [August 3, 1796].

I inform you, general, that the enemy has taken positions by the side of us, that is to say, as far as we could pursue him: the darkness put an end to our engagement. At night-fall, precisely at the moment when I was making dispositions, 200 hussars appeared upon our rear, and approached to within pistol-shot of the town: at the same moment the whole park of artillery was put to the rout, and struck terror into the minds of the soldiers, who ran away as fast as they could. Fortunately, we succeeded in rallying some of them to serve to guard us.

The troops before us amount to 20,000 infantry. For my part, I have computed them at 15,000, though all reports agree in the first statement. You see, general, that I shall be attacked to-morrow morning by fresh troops and far superior in number. Our soldiers are harassed with fatigue and destitute of provisions. If you do not send me troops, it is impossible for me to resist, willing as the troops may be to fight. The cavalry has suffered severely, considering its small number. I have not an officer; they are all killed or wounded. We fought sixteen hours in a parched plain, where there was not a drop of water. The soldiers have suffered much.

I beg you to tell me what I have to do, in case I should be obliged to retreat, and to what point I am to proceed with my troops. An immediate answer.

AUGEREAU.

To General Bonaparte.

Lonado, 16 Thermidor, year 4 [August 3, 1796].

I have this instant received a letter from General Rampon, who tells me that General Guyeux is blocking up the enemy in Salo, and that he has already taken so many prisoners that he has not men sufficient to guard them. He declares that the enemy is in complete rout, and desires me to march to him with my division. General Rampon, having opened the letter to me, set out immediately, to proceed to his assistance.

I am afraid that this precipitate movement will cause me to

have some *alerte* in the night. Finding myself weakened by four battalions, I am resolved to make my troops fall back to Lonado and to leave no posts but on the heights of Desensano. To-morrow morning by daybreak at Salo, if there is nothing new.

There is still a firing of small arms towards Castillon.

MASSENA.

To General Guillaume [Commandant of Peschiera].

Head-quarters, Castiglione, 16 Thermidor, year 4 [Aug. 3, 1796].

You ought to have witnessed the battles fought yesterday and the preceding days: we have taken 20,000 men, and killed a great number. The enemy's army is totally broken up, and to-morrow we shall be within your walls. Meanwhile, let what will happen, hold out to the last extremity. The breach made, show the greatest firmness. Health, esteem, and glory.

BONAPARTE.

To General Guillaume.

Salo, 17 Thermidor, year 4 [August 4, 1796].

The most complete victory has crowned this day: the enemy has at length given up to us all his positions, which he made in vain the most desperate efforts to defend. General Massena will give you an account of the attack that we made this morning with such brilliant success.

The state of things has not permitted me, since my coming to this division, to give you any account of the operations concerted with General Despinos. This division has hitherto had too much to do to make itself master of all the positions which could alone enable it to protect the movements of General Despinos, of whom we have no intelligence. Now that the communications are more free, I have strongly urged General Guyeux, who had no instructions nor any idea of your plans, to make a movement to-morrow, for the purpose of putting into that operation all the unity that it requires and seconding the attempts of General Despinos upon the rock of Amfoux.

The enemy is so closely pressed in this quarter, where we have cut him off from all retreat towards the lake, that

he cannot escape a total loss ; for he is between this division, that of General Despinois, and Brescia.

I wrote to you yesterday, citizen-general, how grieved I was on reaching the column of Salo, to find it in all respects so unfit to concur on that same day in the object which its march was designed to fulfil. General Guyeux was ignorant of everything, even to the course that he had to take. At length, all was repaired and placed on such a footing that something may now be undertaken in that quarter.

I am only afraid that the delay has given a good deal of uneasiness to General Despinois, who has thus far been separated from us. Believe, citizen-general, in my entire devotedness and in the triumph of the arms of the Republic.

ST. HILAIRE.

To General Bonaparte.

Brescia, 17 Thermidor, year 4 [August 4, 1796].

According to the instructions given me for the attack of Gavardo, I marched with the first battalion of the 11th demi-brigade to the heights of this village, passing by the left of Picton. This position, occupied by the enemy, defended the village of Gavardo.

The impetuosity with which the enemy was charged by the battalion obliged him to fall back into the village, where, supported by several pieces of artillery, he was likewise forced. One of their pieces and above 150 prisoners were already in our power ; we were masters of the village of Gavardo and the bridge, and the retreat of the troops who were attacked by General Despinois was totally cut off : to no purpose two squadrons, which escorted the artillery and baggage, charged in the village ; our troops, in ambush on all sides, forced them to fall back upon Picton. To decide the victory, nothing more was required but to force him in this village ; but I soon judged that the troops of General Despinois had been repulsed, on seeing two enemy's columns advancing directly upon me. The fire of these two brought back to the charge that which had retreated upon Salo. In a moment, we were surrounded on all sides. The first battalion of the 11th demi-brigade here deserved the warmest praise. The only way I had left to preserve these excellent troops for the Republic was

to charge the enemy's column with the bayonet ; I had no great difficulty to persuade the brave fellows to second my design, and well did they keep the oath which they made me, to conquer or die. The charge beaten, a most vehement fire soon opened us a passage, which afforded us the facility to gain the mountains by which we effected our retreat. It was not till we had marched more than thirty miles upon horrible roads that we arrived at Rezato, where we learned that General Despinois had retired to Brescia.

We were obliged to abandon the prisoners we had at first made. In our different attacks the enemy has had an infinite number killed and wounded, and among them several officers of distinction. We have brought in fifty prisoners taken during our retreat. Our loss in killed and prisoners is about sixty men.

Ill health, added to a forced march, made on foot, obliges me, to my great regret, to keep my bed. Health and respect.
DALLEMAGNE.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 17 Thermidor, year 4 [August 4, 1796].

I address to you annexed the extract of a letter from my secretary, who, on the 15th of this month, saw Casal-Maggior in full revolt. Murder, robbery, plunder, outrages of all kinds, have been committed by a furious multitude. I am in, according to all appearances, for five horses stolen, all my baggage, consisting of linen, clothes, books, maps, memorials, and military correspondence, carriage, waggon, everything valuable and useful that I possessed ; and my aides-de-camp are in nearly the same condition. I have no doubt that you will signally avenge the outrage offered to the Republic by these villains. In this assurance, I solicit of you a particular reparation, proportioned, if it be possible, to the loss that I have sustained ; I say, if it be possible, for nobody can restore to me the fruit of several years' researches. I rely, in this matter, on your severe equity.

Health and respect.

DESPINOIS.

To General Bonaparte.

Brescia, 17 Thermidor, year 4 [August 4, 1796].

Had nothing but daring been needed yesterday, we should no doubt have triumphed: I have sought the enemy and attacked him without hesitation. What more could I do? The arms that ought to have seconded the head failed me when I wanted them; and, on this point, I should betray my duty, were I not to tell you the whole truth: there is no good, no resource to be hoped from the eighth brigade; it is so infected with cowardice, that, on the firing of a single musket by one of our sentinels, this morning, at an Austrian prisoner who had appeared on the road, half the corps was already in flight. We, General Bertin and I, and all the brave, join to beseech you to put this corps in its place, or at least to spare us the evident risk of being dishonoured with it, and of being prevented from justifying your confidence. At any rate, the division of which you have given me the command cannot exist in the state of disorganization in which it is at present. It is in want of everything, and not a creature to furnish it with supplies, no commissary of war, no agent, not even a medical officer and an hospital for the wounded. It is always the case that, when a prey to distresses, and suffering all sorts of privations, the soldier is disheartened; and it is this mischievous impression too that we ought to hasten to destroy.

The Adjutant-General Herbin found nothing but rocks at Santo-Osseto; no provisions either behind or before, unless indeed you proceed a great distance further. This consideration and the loneliness of his position induced me to recall him to Nave, where he remains posted till fresh orders.

I shall send this evening, unless contrary dispositions be directed by you, the third battalion of the 11th to occupy Rezato and the gorges of Irle and Massaro: by these means I shall cover Brescia, and secure, as much as possible, all the communications of your left. It is painful and grievous to me to remain in some sort a spectator of your successes; but, when one does enterprise, there ought to be at least an appearance of success, and here I have it not. The woful experience that we had yesterday takes from me the very hope of it.

Send me, I beg of you, in all possible cases, infantry

cartridges and field-pieces with their ammunition. We are reduced to ten cartridges per man, and at Brescia there is but a small stock, destined exclusively for the garrison of the castle. Health and respect.

DESPINOIS.

To General Bonaparte.

Caliverge, 17 Thermidor, year 4 [August 14, 1796].

I have the honour to inform you that, last night, after the return of my aide-de-camp, whom you had ordered to proceed to Gavardo, and who was unable to reach that place, because it is occupied by the enemy, I sent immediately a confidential man, who has always served me well, to ascertain the force of the enemy, both infantry, cavalry, and artillery. He has reported to me that it is about 5 or 6000 men; the infantry is in the town, the cavalry outside; and four small pieces of cannon are placed about a mile from Gavardo, on the right. He was stopped at the first post, which is of seven men, five infantry and two cavalry: at a little distance from this first, there is another of about 200 infantry and 100 cavalry. He was conducted to the general, and asked whence he came; he said from Pont St. Mark, and added that he came several times a week to Gavardo and its environs, to buy oats and other produce in which he dealt. When questioned if there were many French towards Pont St. Mark and Lonado, he replied that he saw some of them every day, but could not tell their number.

The road which he took to go thither runs before Pont St. Mark, coming from Brescia: thus, I should think, general, if you should march troops to that quarter, it might be advisable to send one column by this road and one by that running from Brescia by way of Rezato to Gavardo. Artillery may be taken thither by both routes.

If General Guyeux is at Salo, he might come thither by the Termini road, passing through Villa Nova, detaching a column, and making it cross by the bridge of Termini or that of Villa Nova: this column would pass through Supra Ponte; then the enemy would have no sort of retreat.

This man left Gavardo at ten this morning, and was conducted back by two Hulans to the first post, having a guide with him. Health and consideration.

SAURET.

To General Bonaparte.

Salo, 18 Thermidor, year 4 [August 5, 1796].

The troops under my command are scouring the mountains in the environs of Salo, and bringing in Austrian prisoners every moment: to-day the number is 200, one of them a captain; these, added to 1510 whom we had taken in the fights of the 16th and 17th, form a total of 1710, including a general and several officers. We took also 26 caissons or carriages, most of them full of ammunition, one twelve-pounder, one five, and one three. A twelve-pounder has just been discovered on the road to the camp of La Corona at Sabio; I have ordered it to be taken to Salo: there is a great quantity of muskets which the enemy threw away upon the mountains when betaking himself to flight; I have had them collected and brought hither. His retreat is directed upon Anfo, which is occupied at this moment by his wrecks.

The inhabitants of Salo and also of the neighbouring villages have expressed to us the greatest attachment for the French Republic; on returning into their territory, everybody hailed our approach; the doors of houses which had before been closed on account of the misconduct of the Austrians, who plundered them all the time they continued there, were instantly thrown open with the greatest joy, and the inhabitants themselves were anxious to afford all possible accommodations to the troops that I command. Several had concealed our sick officers, and paid them all the attentions that humanity requires. Health and respect.

GUYEUX.

PS. One hundred more prisoners have just arrived. At Villa Nova and Gavardo there are 150 wounded, whom I shall have taken to the rear as soon as I can.

I am just informed that there have been found two four-pounders, the carriages of which have been burned. These pieces were hid in ditches on the heights of Villa Nova.

To General Bonaparte.

Cremona, 18 Thermidor, year 4 [August 5, 1796].

Having thoroughly ascertained, general, that it was impossible for me to follow the movement of the division ordered

by your letter of the 17th, at eight in the morning, I had myself set down at Cremona, and shall push on to Placentia, where I shall try to recover my health and strength. Health and respect.

SERRURIER.

To General Bonaparte.

Monte Chiaro, 18 Thermidor, year 4 [August 5, 1796].

The total exhaustion of my strength prevents me, my dear general, from joining you and sharing your glory. Fever and pains have so reduced me that I cannot hold myself upright, much less sit a horse. I am going to Brescia in quest of relief. With rest and bark, I hope to rejoin you shortly.

I am told that I have lost my horses and my equipages. I lent one to General St. Hilaire, who asked me for it in your name, to make an excursion, and has not sent it back. I have but two left. Health and friendship.

KILMAINE.

To General Bonaparte.

Cavriana, 18 Thermidor, year 4 [August 5, 1796].

We have pursued the enemy beyond Cavriana; we are collecting the stragglers, and the number of the prisoners is increasing every moment. They abandon in their flight arms, baggage, and ammunition of all kinds; it is the most complete rout, and I think there is occasion to profit by it. I am going to march upon Peschiera with the 5th demi-brigade. Send us, if possible, some bread, or let us know, at least, where to get it.

Part of the enemy are retiring upon Peschiera, part upon Mantua.

DESPINOIS.

To General Bonaparte.

Rome, 19 Thermidor, year 4 [August 6, 1796].

Since the evacuation of Verona and Ferrara, the most silly and malicious reports are circulated against us. This weak and timid government lends an ear to all sorts of lies. It has despatched Monsignor Lagreca, vice-legate of Ferrara,

to be near that legation, as if the Austrians were about to arrive there.

I have written to M. Azara a letter, of which I send you a copy annexed. He has just delivered it to the Roman government. It will make you acquainted with the way in which I shall here follow up the affair which you have entrusted to me.

The pope has conceived apprehensions for the safety of the convoy of the 5,000,000 sent off for Imola: he is afraid that the enemy may come and carry off that money. A very polite communication informs me of the alarm he is in. You will see by the annexed copy of my answer to M. Azara what explanation I have thought it right to give on this subject.

There is talk of a plan concerted between Vienna and Naples, according to which the troops of the King of the Two Sicilies are to advance to Ferrara, to give a hand to the Austrians. It is said that the English are offering a subsidy to set the army of Naples in motion. It is everywhere asserted in Rome that the siege of Mantua is raised, and that the besieging army, all sick, has retired to Cremona. This is the land of fables. I shall occupy myself solely in extracting from it the advantages which your victories have ensured, and which they will maintain.

CACAULT.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Salo, 20 Thermidor, year 4 [August 7, 1796].

I have the honour to inform you that the two colours which I took from the enemy were carried on the 21st by two chasseurs of the 24th regiment to Castiglione: the receipt was even signed by an adjunct [*adjoint*] under the route of the orderlies. I sent for the two chasseurs who carried them, and who told me that they had delivered them, at the staff, to a citizen of middling size, with a pale face, and a coat embroidered at the pockets. Health and consideration.

SAURET.

To General Bonaparte.

Brescia, 21 Thermidor, year 4 [August 8, 1796].

Take my life, general, or give me back my honour; I do not deserve to lose it. I am overwhelmed with grief. Re-

ceiving no consolatory answer from you, I here subjoin the motives which determined me to that retreat which I was far from considering as dishonourable. View them, I beg of you, as the strictest truth ; and, besides, it will be easy to convince yourself on the subject by my demi-brigade.

If you wish to be informed of my military, moral, and political conduct, during the four years that I have been general, nothing will be so easy for me, not only by the officers under whom I have served, but also by the troops that have been under my command, and you have a great many of them in your army. If you wish to go back still further, even for the thirty-one years that I have been in the service, I could do that too.

Deign to take into consideration my unhappy position. I depend upon your justice. Health and fraternity.

VALETTE.

To General Bonaparte.

Salo, 21 Thermidor, year 4 [August 7, 1796].

I am afraid that you have not received my letter dated the 18th Thermidor, since the orderly who carried it has not returned : I told you in it that the enemy was rallying his wrecks at Anfo. I have searched all the mountains about Salo ; 200 prisoners have been picked up ; these, added to the 1510, from the fights of the 16th and 17th, furnish a total of 1710, including one general and several officers. In those actions, 26 caissons or carriages, most of them loaded with ammunition, fell into our hands. I have had all the muskets collected which the enemy threw away in his rout. Six hundred were brought to me yesterday, and have been delivered to the commandant of the artillery. Health and respect.

GUYEUX.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Salo, 21 Thermidor, year 4 [August 8, 1796].

I have the honour to inform you that, General Massena having withdrawn the third battalion of the 11th demi-brigade of the division which I command, I have only three demi-brigades left, forming at most 1800 men, and 80 horse chasseurs of the 24th regiment. It is very difficult to

fulfil your views with so small a force. I cannot put troops into Gavardo, and your intentions were that I should occupy Santo-Osseto and Nave, since it is the road through the valley of Sabia to Brescia. Health and consideration.

SAURET.

To General Bonaparte.

Verona, 22 Thermidor, year 4 [August 9, 1796].

You will find annexed, general, copies of two letters, one from General Beaumont, containing some particulars concerning the position of the enemy, which I think of sufficient interest to transmit to you; and the other from the general of brigade Robert, who, after being wounded in the affair of Castiglione de Stiviere, learned that his baggage, constituting all his resources, had been taken by the enemy. The merit of that general and his unfortunate situation must interest every man of feeling. I flatter myself, therefore, that you will grant this brave officer the relief which he has a right to expect from the public gratitude.

AUGEREAU.

To General Bonaparte.

Verona, 22 Thermidor, year 4 [August 9, 1796].

If the troops marching for Mantua had arrived before the place a little earlier, we should perhaps have still recovered part of our means: so much is certain that the trench nearest to the place was not entirely filled till three days back, and that nothing had yet been done to destroy the incendiary batteries. It appears that the garrison is rather stronger than it was: I judge by the manner in which it spreads itself over the country: the corps which you have sent thither must act cautiously. I am just told that it consists of no more than 2700 men, and that General Fiorella had resigned his command on account of illness. Unluckily, accidents delay our march upon the place; besides, I confess that 2700 might be sufficient for one side of the place, but not for two; and yet nothing can be done, without a corps against the citadel and another between Pradella and Ceresa.

If, instead of a simple blockade, it were thought fit to add a bombardment, this operation would require only two addi-

tional battalions to be placed in the quarter of St. George, and I think that it might cause the gates to be opened to us much sooner than if we were to wait to starve them out in the city. It remains then to be ascertained if the artillery can draw twelve or fifteen mortars well provisioned from the fortresses of Milan, Tortona, and Alexandria, and contrive to make the bombs explode; for it is a fact that most of them did not explode in Mantua.

If, instead of twelve or fifteen mortars, the artillery could procure us thirty pieces of large calibre, we would then make the attack by main force from the entrenchments, and we should have the place in ten days: only it would be requisite to add a good demi-brigade to the blockading troops. If one considers of what importance Mantua is to us, one cannot but regret that Murat did not attack that entrenched camp, as it had been planned. Mantua is necessary if one would remain peaceful possessor of Italy; it is more than that when one designs to march into the Tyrol. For the rest, I do not think that with reinforcements of fewer than 15,000 men you could undertake to form your junction with the armies of the Rhine. We must have, in the present state, a force before Mantua, another disposable one to extinguish the petty conflagrations to which your absence may give rise, and, lastly, an army very preponderant in force to that of the enemy, because it will be weakened at every step, in traversing a barbarous country, while theirs will recruit itself with all those people seasoned to war, who will flee before you. The possession of all Italy is too great an advantage to the French Republic to be risked without important motives. To return to Mantua, the whole reduces itself to these questions: 1, if we can have thirty pieces of large calibre, supplied with five or six hundred rounds; 2, if, not having those, we can procure twelve mortars, with five hundred bombs each; but, in any case, 2700 men are not sufficient to keep within bounds on two points a garrison that has been renewed and is stronger than the former.

CHASSELOUP.

PS. It is said, general, that Wurmser has not got enough, and that he is disposed to have another taste: General Augereau will finish him; but perhaps there will be need for a bridge to communicate with Massena, or, better still, to take the position which you have pointed out to

me behind the Adige. It seems to me that, if we were masters of Trent, the enemy could be only on one of the banks of the Adige; and that to keep him in awe we should have no need to scatter our forces: what I am advancing is but an idea thrown out; I am not sufficiently acquainted with the country to affirm this.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Proverano, 23 Thermidor, year 4 [August 10, 1796].

Nothing new, general. According to the report which I have had, the enemy has five battalions at La Corona: he is establishing batteries there, and making a great many entrenchments; he has, besides, three battalions in the gorge of Preaboco.

My duty requires me to report to you the officers who have distinguished themselves in the different affairs that have taken place between the 11th and the 20th. Generals Victor, Joubert, Pigeon, and Rampon, have exhibited great capacity and bravery. The adjutants-general Monnier and Chabran marched at the head of the columns to Lonado, and their example contributed not a little to the great advantages gained by my division. Citizens Somet, Degiovanni, Ducos, and Reille, appeared at the head of their columns with great intrepidity. I solicit promotion for these officers; they have many titles to it. The chief of battalion Charlot, commanding the brave 32nd demi-brigade, deserves also the rank of chief of brigade, which he filled temporarily. This officer is full of intelligence and valour, and deserves that one should take some pains for his promotion. I shall transmit to you shortly the names of the other brave officers who have distinguished themselves, persuaded that you will study, as usual, to do them justice.

MASSENA.

To General Bonaparte.

Rome, 23 Thermidor, year 4 [August 10, 1796].

Accept the congratulations which I address to you, in the transport of my joy, upon the decisive victory which you gained on the 16th instant. In rendering the greatest and most important service to the Republic, you have saved Italy from the disasters into which the disputed war which

the Germans wished to keep up would have plunged that fine country.

The dawn of the first successes of the Germans had heated to frenzy the lively imaginations of the Italians. It was believed that we were ruined, because so the furious agents of London and Naples gave out. It had been concerted between Vienna and Naples that the King of the Two Sicilies should push forward his army, to give a hand to the Imperialists. The pope was to be compelled to break the armistice, and all the princes of Italy to furnish a contingent, to assist in driving us beyond the Alps.

The court of Rome, intimidated, and prompt to believe absurdities that are to its taste, resolved, without speaking to M. d'Azara, to send the vice-legate of Ferrara, Monsignor della Greca, to resume his post and to re-establish the papal authority, the moment the French have evacuated that duchy. I am assured that the Cardinal Mattei, Archbishop of Ferrara, made attempts to induce the municipality of that city to renounce the oath of fidelity to the Republic.

The imbecility of the great, and the passion with which they are inflamed against us, have inspired the emissaries of our enemies scattered among the people with the temerity to insult grievously the two young Frenchmen, secretaries of the commission of the arts, and even to put their lives in peril. I send you annexed a copy of the account which they have drawn up of what they have had to endure, and I send you also a copy of my official letter on this subject, which I addressed to M. d'Azara, that he might give it his support, as he has done, with the Roman government, which is now, after your decisive victory, anxious to satisfy us.

There is a million tournois in gold rods, out of what is ready to be despatched from Rome, and they are striving to increase that sum, to furnish the second contribution already due; but, before forwarding this convoy, I wished that the first 5,000,000 should have arrived and been received, as citizen Miot was to have concerted, that I might be able to govern myself in the direction of the second convoy with the greater certainty.

The pope has just appointed Cardinal Zelada, who was doing nothing whatever, secretary of state. We are weathering a sort of storm raised by extravagant ideas of

your defeats. The government is desirous to fulfil the armistice: it is determined to do so faithfully; but habitual incapacity and indolence, which keep all here in a state of torpor, will not stir without being goaded.

I inform the *commissaire ordonnateur* Dennié of what concerns him.

I beg you, general, to accept the homage of my admiration and attachment.

CACAULT.

To the General Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 24 Thermidor, year 4 [August 11, 1796].

You will be pleased to send off a patrol of fifteen men on horseback to arrest the Abbé Zerbi at Poncino, and to carry him to the prison of Milan.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Head-quarters, Salò, 24 Thermidor, year 4 [August 11, 1796].

According to your orders, I am not to leave Salò with the division which I command, until replaced by two battalions of the 85th demi-brigade: they are not yet arrived. It is utterly impossible that I can be at Salò by seven in the morning, and it is now five.

SAURET.

PS. I have the honour to inform you that I have at most 3000 men in my division.

To M. the Chevalier d'Azara at Rome.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].

I have received several letters from you, sir, which circumstances and my engagements have prevented me from answering so promptly as I should have wished.

Cacault will deliver to you the two authentic papers which you have sent me with a letter from the municipality of Ferrara. You will there see that it is a settled affair.

I am assured that the court of Rome has insisted on your proving that France has been erected into a republic. I am told that at Rome no more benedictions are given to Ferrarese and Bolognese, but plenty to the people of Lugo.

Add to this the legate sent to Ferrara, and the postponement of the execution of the armistice, and the king, your master, will be convinced of the bad faith of a government whose imbecility equals its weakness.

M. Capelletti is behaving very ill at Bologna: it is for you, sir, to set him to rights; I shall be sorry to be obliged to drive him out of the city. It is as well that I should not know what he is, what he is about, and what he pretends to do.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Parma has behaved towards the French army with the utmost frankness and the most sincere sentiments of friendship.

I beg you, sir, to believe, &c.,

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Cacault at Rome.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].

The pope has sent a cardinal legate to Ferrara, at the time when he thought, no doubt, that the French were undone—is this conformable with the treaty of armistice which we have signed? The citizens of Ferrara have refused to receive him. I have just given orders to this cardinal to repair immediately to head-quarters.

You will find annexed a letter from the municipality of Ferrara, which appears to agree with M. d'Azara; that affair, therefore, is settled. I send you, in consequence, the two authentic papers which the minister had transmitted to me.

The first convoy of money is not yet arrived: every thing goes on very slowly. It appears that there is great insincerity. Be vigilant and give me information. Send trusty men to learn what is doing in Naples, and what was done there during our military operations. You will find annexed accounts and addresses, which will please you and make you acquainted with what is passing.

BONAPARTE.

To His Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Tuscany.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].

I have received the letter dated the 13th of July, with which your Royal Highness has honoured me. It did not

reach me till very late, which, added to the numerous events that have recently passed, has delayed my answer.

The government has learned with the greatest pain the occupation of Porto Ferrajo by the English. It would have been so easy for your Highness to defend that place; it would have been so advantageous to you to retain possession of that important portion of your territories, that one is obliged to think that the treachery of your governor, like that of Spannochi, has caused an event as disagreeable to France as to your own subjects.

The Executive Directory would, no doubt, be authorized to seize, by way of reprisal, territories of your Royal Highness on the continent; but, adhering to sentiments of moderation, the French government will not make change or alteration of any kind in the neutrality and good harmony which prevail between it and your Royal Highness.

I am with sentiments of esteem, &c.,

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Miot.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 24 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796.]

I have received your different letters, my dear minister; you will find annexed several copies of the narrative you desired. The emperor is said to be at the point of death. Try to see some one who can inform you of the moment when it is likely to happen.

You must be aware how important this is, and how essential it is that I should be apprized of the moment when the grand-duke is to set out for Vienna.

Send by a courier the annexed papers to General Vaubois and citizen Cacault. Let me hear from you with your usual punctuality. It is to the interest of the government that nothing should be done in Tuscany to indispose the grand-duke; so, maintain the neutrality.

BONAPARTE.

To the Senate of Bologna.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].

I learn, gentlemen, that the ex-Jesuits, the priests, and the monks, are disturbing the public tranquillity. Let them know that, while the French Republic protects reli-

gion and its ministers, it is inexorable towards those who, forgetting their profession, intermeddle in public or civil affairs. Inform the heads of the different religions that, on the first complaint brought to me against the monks, I will make the whole convent responsible; I will expel them from the city, and confiscate their property for the benefit of the poor.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 26 Thermidor, year 4 [August 13, 1796].

The enemy, after his retreat, occupied in force La Corona and Monte Baldo: it appeared to be his intention to maintain himself there. Massena marched thither on the 24th Thermidor, made himself master of Monte Baldo, La Corona, and Preabolo, and took seven pieces of cannon and 400 prisoners. He highly praises the 38th demi-brigade of light infantry, his aide-de-camp Rey, and his adjutant-general Chabran.

On the 25th, I ordered General Sauret and general of brigade St. Hilaire to proceed to the Rocca d'Anfo, where the enemy showed a disposition to make a stand. This operation was successful: we forced the Rocca d'Anfo, fell in with the enemy at Lodrono: after a slight action, we took the baggage, six pieces of cannon, and 1100 prisoners.

Augereau has passed the Adige, driven the enemy upon Roveredo, and taken some hundred prisoners. The enemy has 4000 sick in Mantua; in this month the environs of that city are pestilential, and all I do is to place there camps of observation to keep the garrison within bounds.

If a division of the army of the Rhine can come and take position at Inspruck, and throw the enemy upon the right, I will march to Trieste, blow up its port, and sack the city.

If the army of the Sambre and Meuse reaches the Danube, and that of the Rhine can be in force at Inspruck, I will march for Vienna by the Trieste road, and then we shall have time to carry off the immense resources which that place contains.

The first plan may be executed immediately; for the second there would be required a good battle, to scatter Prince Charles as I have scattered Wurmser, and then all march to Vienna. The heat is excessive. I have 15,000 sick; few, very few, deaths.

I am waiting for the succours which you promise me: there has yet arrived next to nothing.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 26 Thermidor, year 4 [August 13, 1796].

I have received with gratitude, citizens directors, the new testimony of esteem which you have given me by your letter of the 13th Thermidor. I know not why the journalists should bear me a grudge. They have attacked me at the same time as the Austrians. You have crushed them by the publication of your letter.

I have completely beaten the Austrians; thus, to this hour, these double attempts of our enemies have proved unsuccessful.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 26 Thermidor, year 4 [August 13, 1796].

The jewels and diamonds which the army sent to Genoa, which were since on the road for Paris, but directed to turn back to Genoa, must be worth at least two or three million; yet no more than 400,000 francs was offered for them in Genoa. I think that it would be advantageous to the Republic that these valuable articles should be conveyed to Paris. The great number of foreigners in that capital will render the sale of those things more productive; besides, I am told that Flachat and Co. are to have them for 400,000 francs. This would be a ruinous business for the government.

I had caused the property of the Neapolitans at Leghorn to be sequestrated. The commissioner of the government, as the consul writes to me, has had the sequestration taken off: yet that would have been a good article of the treaty of peace. That court of Naples behaves ill: the Neapolitans who are here behaved very ill during our military events, and I think that it would be very dangerous to allow them to remain here. Is M. Pignatelli in Paris? Are the negotiations for peace begun? If not, I think that we have a right to sequester this cavalry. There are 200 horses.

It is said that the King of Naples is advancing into the territory of the pope. I have had it signified to him that, if he advanced into the dominions of his Holiness, the armistice should be null, and that I would march to cover Rome.

The court of Rome, believing that the army was undone, had already sent a legate to Ferrara. The municipality and the guard of that city have behaved well, and refused to receive him. I have just ordered the cardinal to come to my head-quarters.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 26 Thermidor, year 4 [August 13, 1796].

I think it useful, citizens directors, to give you my opinion of the generals employed in this army. You will see that there are very few who can be of service to me.

BERTHIER: talents, courage, character—every thing in his favour.

AUGEREAU: a great deal of character, courage, firmness, activity, habit of war; is beloved by the soldiers, lucky in his operations.

MASSENA: active, indefatigable, daring; has quickness of apprehension and promptness in decision.

SERRURIER: fights like a soldier, takes nothing upon himself, firm, has not a very good opinion of his troops; is ill.

DESPINOIS: soft, without activity, without daring, has not fighting habits, is not liked by the soldiers, does not fight at their head; has, for the rest, *hauteur*, intelligence, and sound political principles: fit to command in the interior.

SAURET: good, very good soldier, but not enlightened enough to be general; not lucky.

ABATUCCI: not fit to command fifty men.

GARNIER, MEUNIER, CASABIANCA: incapable, not fit to command a battalion in so active and so serious a war as this.

MACQUART: a brave man, no talents, fiery.

GAUTHIER: fit for an office [*bureau*]; never was engaged in war.

VAUBOIS and SAHUGUET were employed in the fortresses; I have transferred them to the army: I shall learn to appreciate them; they have both acquitted themselves

extremely well of the commissions that I have hitherto given them ; but the example of General DESPINOIS, who was all right at Milan, and all wrong at the head of his division, orders me to judge of men by their actions.

BONAPARTE.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].

Scarcely were we informed, citizen-general, of the events which you report to us in your letter of the 15th, when news arrived of the battle of Castiglione. The circumstances which preceded that victory render it still more memorable and dear to the Republic, and we consider it as one of the most decisive of those which the brave army under your command has gained in the course of the campaign.

In the interval that elapsed between the arrival of the two couriers, we doubted not for a moment the return of Fortune in favour of the Republican arms, and our confidence never ceased to rest upon the talent and valour which conduct them.

We have seen with satisfaction the resolution which you have rapidly taken to raise the siege of Mantua, in order to collect your forces. The moments were precious, and you have skilfully appreciated their importance. Let us profit by experience, the result of which seemed likely to prove disastrous to us, and which is itself a signal advantage. Let us relinquish the plan of reducing Mantua by a regular siege, and leave its garrison to be extinguished by diseases which must be making great ravages among them, to judge from their effects on the besieging troops. You are engaged in a new campaign, in which the Republican army has taken as decisive an offensive as when it drove the enemy from the Apennines into the Tyrol. He is increased by some reinforcements, but those which you are successively receiving, and the irreparable losses which he has just sustained, afford you great means of fighting with the advantages of a vigorous offensive.

Our intention is, no doubt, conformable with your views. Go, fulfil it ; carry the conquests of the Republic to Inspruck, reducing the army of Wurmser to fugitive wrecks, which have Austria alone to rally in. To second this plan,

we have ordered General Moreau, who, according to the last reports, has pushed Prince Charles nearly to Donauwerth, to occupy by his right the line of Inspruck at Ingolstadt. This movement tends to cut off the communication between the imperial armies of Italy and Germany, and to facilitate your march upon the Inn. Meanwhile, General Kleber, who commands *ad interim* the army of the Sambre and Meuse, the general-in-chief of which is ill, is to direct his course for Ratisbon, after he has dispersed the corps of General Wartensleben, who is opposed to him, and inferior in force.

The surprise which has taken place at Salo has, no doubt, fixed your attention, for the purpose of preventing the dangers of negligence and indolence in the service. This event was for a moment too serious not to demand a severe example of the faults to which it may be owing. We request you to give us an account of it.

You will think, no doubt, that it is useful to profit by the new impression of fear and admiration produced in Italy by the recent successes of the Republic, to commence the political operations concerning Genoa and Venice. We have not yet fixed the moment for them, and we still leave you to do so, persuaded that you will have the skill to seize the most favourable.

The levy of the contributions also ought, if possible, to acquire new activity, as also the remittance to France of what is not necessary for the maintenance of the army.

We are informed that the military are yielding, with an alarming facility, particularly at Milan, to the affected kindness of the inhabitants, who seek to circumvent and corrupt, in the bosom of pleasure, that purity of the republican spirit which ought to animate them. General Despinis does not appear to be exempt from reproach on this subject. Recall them, citizen-general, to the severity of principles, and rigidly repress the forgetfulness of them. We even authorize you to turn out of the army, at the same time reporting to us, all the officers or military *employés* who might tend to disorganize it by so dangerous a conduct.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

The Executive Directory to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

Paris, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].

You will find annexed, citizen-general, a report of the commissioner of the Directory to the municipal administration of the canton of Mont Louis, concerning the outrages perpetrated by several of the men of the 7th battalion of Paris, on their passage through that commune to join the army of Italy. You will there see that several volunteers have committed acts of violence against the citizens, and fired upon the national guard and the commissioner of the Directory. The want of means for seizing the delinquents on the spot where the offence was committed prevented their being brought to trial; but the Directory requests you to let them be sought out, and undergo, by way of military police, such punishment as you will think that they have deserved.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

Resolution of the Directory respecting General Valette.

Paris, 28 Thermidor, year 4 [August 15, 1796].

The Executive Directory resolves that general of brigade Valette, suspended provisionally from his functions in the army of Italy by the General-in-Chief Bonaparte, and charged with cowardice, and with having abandoned the post of Castiglione, which was committed to him, shall be tried without delay by a council of war.

The minister of war is charged with the present resolution.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 28 Thermidor, year 4 [August 15, 1796].

Your letter of the 19th, citizen-general, has crowned our satisfaction. It seems that if Fortune for a moment placed the brave army of Italy in a critical situation, it was only to afford it a more signal occasion for developing all its courage, and its leaders for employing the most brilliant resources of their talents. In our last despatch we expressed to you our opinion respecting the bold and skilful

course which you had adopted, without hesitation, to raise the siege of Mantua, though it was already advanced, and to march against an enemy formidable for his strength and his offensive position. This profound combination has led to victory, and the celerity of your movements has rendered irreparable the wavering of Wurmser and the fault which he committed of dividing his forces on the Lake of Garda.

The plan which you have traced for us, and which is connected with that which ought to direct the operations in Germany, could not be conceived more seasonably, since it is partly executed already by favour of the memorable events which have opened to you the gorges of the Tyrol. The wrecks of the Austrians will not be able to defend the course of the Inn; you will descend it rapidly, while General Moreau will close against them, by the prolongation of his right, the outlets of the defiles of the mountains towards Germany. It would be highly important that you should put yourself into direct correspondence with that general. According to his last reports, he must have arrived by this time with his principal forces on the Danube, near Donauwerth.

The army of the Sambre and Meuse is likewise marching from success to success. The corps commanded by General Wartensleben, which is opposed to it, is, as we had foreseen in our last instructions, divided, to cover Bohemia and Austria, and thereby favours the execution of our orders, according to which General Jourdan ought to direct his course upon Ratisbon. We prescribe, in particular, to the generals-in-chief of the armies acting in Germany, to let the numerous and brilliant actions which they have fought be followed by more serious engagements, the results of which shall be decisive. It is only by great battles won that they will be able to dissolve the Austrian army completely; and, skilful as it may be to fall back from position to position, we hope that, as they approach one another, they will force it to a general engagement, the issue of which will oblige it to go to a great distance to rally.

We request you to let us know if the 6000 men you were to receive from the 9th and 10th military divisions have arrived. We are already informed that the reinforcements from the Coasts of the Ocean are successively joining you.

Exert the active vigilance and firmness which characterize you, in regard to the transmission into the interior of the Republic of all the articles that are to be brought from Italy. Oblige the *employés* of all classes to pay strict and immediate attention to our orders on all the points that concern them.

We have just received an account that the department of the Maritime Alps is infested by Barbets: these banditti, issuing from Piedmont and the Riviera of Genoa, increased by deserters, emigrants, and disbanded Sardinian soldiers, are daily committing gross outrages on the public tranquillity. Deliver, citizen-general, our southern provinces from this scourge, which is a usual concomitant of wars in Italy, and which it is now urgent to check.

The promotions which you have solicited of us are already granted. The minister of war is charged with the execution of the resolution which we have taken in consequence.

The army of the Alps is in extreme distress. We request you to send it the first sums that shall be at your disposal to the amount of 300,000 livres.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.

Your despatch of the 21st Thermidor, citizen-general, has reached us. It contained the happy news of the raising of the siege of Peschiera, that of the relinquishment of the line of the Mincio, and intelligence of the retreat of the Austrian beyond the Adige.

To conquer enemies abroad is to crush those at home, and the brilliant successes of the army which you command give a worthy reply to envy and malignity, which would fain have calumniated you, and which are daily striving in vain to overturn the constitutional government.

Honour to the brave men of the army of Italy, who fight with such ardour and devotedness, to ensure the independence and peace of the Republic! Honour to the general who leads them with such talent and courage in the career of glory!

We have ordered the general-in-chief of the army of the Rhine and Moselle to despatch a corps of 15,000 men towards Inspruck, and even towards Brixen. It is for you,

citizen-general, to second this movement; your last successes afford you the possibility to do so; nay, it becomes urgent that you should attack the enemy and drive him before you. The army of the Archduke Charles, increased by some reinforcements from Galicia and the interior of Austria, is become so imposing as to attack that commanded by the general-in-chief Moreau, and to fight, between Neresheim and Donauwerth, a battle, the success of which, for a moment doubtful, was decided in our favour. If General Wurmser were to obtain a moment's rest, he might be able to detach some troops, which, joined to the forces of the army of the Archduke Charles, would oppose the enterprises of the army of the Rhine and Moselle, and perhaps fight it with advantage. We think it right to refer to our letters of the 25th and 28th Thermidor.

We have heard with great satisfaction of the proofs of attachment to liberty given by the people of Milan, Bologna, and Ferrara. We recommend to you to cultivate with care these happy dispositions.

We wait with impatience, citizen-general, for tidings of your march, of the situation of the army, and of the steps which circumstances shall have permitted you to take in regard to the republic of Venice, in conformity with the orders which we have transmitted to you on this head.

Again we recommend to you to send with as little delay as possible the sum of 300,000 francs to the army of the Alps.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

To the General-in-Chief.

Rome, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].

You have saved our lives by your victories of the 16th instant. The court of Vienna and the agents of London and Naples made sure that thirty battalions, drafted from the army of the Rhine, would put yours to the rout, and every preparation was made for exterminating it. A sedition had been got up against the French even in the little port of Civita Vecchia, and two of our seamen were very ill used.

The Roman government, to which you are now giving the *ton*, is doing what it ought to do—punishing the guilty.

I have complained grievously, as of a step that might be

called an infraction of the armistice, of the mission of the vice-legate, Monsignor della Greca to Ferrara, as if to take possession ; and still more of what Cardinal Mattei, archbishop of Ferrara, has done to persuade the municipality to renounce the oath of fidelity to the Republic, and of his temerity in causing the arms of the pope to be set up in that conquered country.

The government is sensible that it was in the wrong. The answer given me was plausible enough—that the French, in evacuating Ferrara, had spiked their cannon, and thrown water upon their powder ; they seemed to have been afraid that the Austrians would make their appearance, and so the Roman government conceived that it might show itself, without injury to our rights, and for the preservation of the interests of the country.

I am prosecuting the accomplishment of the conditions of the armistice which are likely to be of more pressing necessity. I am waiting for accounts of the convoy of 5,000,000, which citizen Miot sent off by way of Imola, before I despatch the second contribution and the other objects in kind.

I beg you to accept my devoted attachment.

CACAULT.

To the General-in-Chief.

Lavenone, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].

I have received your letter, citizen-general : it cannot prescribe any thing that I have not the greatest desire to do.

We wrote to you yesterday, in concert with General Sauret, concerning the position which we are to attack. On arriving at Lavenone, we procured more precise reports relative to the environs of the position, which is susceptible of being turned, in spite of great difficulties.

I am starting with my column to go round the Rocco d'Anfo by the left, while General Sauret will attack in front. We will inform you immediately of the result of our attack. It is impossible to make a diversion on our right for want of boats.

ST. HILAIRE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Rome, 25 Thermidor, year 4 [August 12, 1796].

Amidst your astonishing victories, permit the voice of a good Spaniard to mingle its applause with that of so many others, who proclaim you already the first general of our time. Your late actions of themselves have deserved and ensured immortality, and I hope that my expressions will not be suspected of flattery.

I thank you for the kindness which you have had to answer me so graciously respecting the affair of the Mesula and the San Martina. If I had not been pretty sure of the justice of my application, I would not have importuned you.

Baron de Capelletti does not behave perfectly well, I am aware; but it is not my fault. He is only silly, and I beg you to pardon him, assuring you that the lesson which I have read him to-day is such that henceforth he will not give you the slightest cause of complaint. I have communicated to citizen Cacault the letter that I am writing to him, and he is quite satisfied with it. I have also agreed with the same citizen for prescribing to the Spanish Jesuits the condition which they are to keep, and for informing the senate of Bologna that it must arrange with me all that relates to the Spaniards through the medium of Cacault: so every thing will go on smoothly. Capelletti was accredited to the legates of Bologna, but he cannot be to the new senate. He is, however, an officer of the King of Spain, to whom different commissions for his service are entrusted, and, as such, he is under my orders.

I had no hand whatever in the conduct of the court of Rome at Ferrara, and was one of the last to hear of it. Citizen Cacault has written to you on this subject, at the same time sending you a note from the minister of the pope; and I should not mention the matter to you if it were not intimately connected with our armistice.

Believe me, general, there has been nothing but ignorance in all this, and no malice whatever; and the idea which was current that the Austrians were coming to possess themselves of Ferrara, upon which they have old claims, occasioned the mission of the papal minister, who was supposed to be capable of preventing the Germans from seizing a country abandoned by the French, when the English and

their emissaries were everywhere proclaiming that you were ruined. If my intercession with you, general, has any influence, I beg you to pardon the archbishop whom you have ordered to be apprehended.

Citizen Cacault and I agree perfectly well about everything, particularly about the armistice, and I hope that we shall complete the business in spite of the baneful influence of our neighbours. Your last declaration to the court of Naples will work miracles.

Accept the congratulations and homage of one who has the honour to be, with the greatest consideration, monsieur le general, your, &c.

THE CHEVALIER D'AZARA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Verona, 26 Thermidor, year 4 [August 13, 1796].

Having been prevented from accompanying citizen Chasseloup in the mission which you have given him, and being prevented, moreover, from sending Miron, for the same reason, I have sent the chief of battalion Labadie, citizen Perneti, and other officers who are acquainted with the environs of Mantua. I have the honour to address to you their report. The five 32-pounders of Goito were carried off by the enemy: we have not been able to learn what became of those of the batteries of la Favorita, St. George, and Ceresa, for the reasons mentioned in the report.

LESPINASSE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Head-quarters, Verona, 27 Thermidor, year 4 [August 14, 1796].

Here, general, are the dispositions which I propose to make, if you adopt them and they accord with yours:

The corps of my division at Verona occupying the amphitheatre of that place, both for the enemy's army and for the garrison of Mantua, I think it would be essential, in order to observe the enemy's movements on my right and left, to detach a corps of 400 men to Porto-Legnago, 300 to Pesano, and 300 to Busolengo, which would form cross patrols, and consequently guard the Adige. I request you to let me know if this is conformable with your intentions, and likewise to communicate to me any change that you may think it right to make, and I will execute it forthwith.

The force of my division is about 6000 men : if I send away the 17th demi-brigade, as you desire, that will reduce my strength.

I await your answer to all these observations. Rely on my zeal and my activity.

AUGEREAU.

PS. I send you annexed a plan of the line which, I believe, the army occupies at this moment. You will perceive that, in taking these new positions, my left will find itself appuyed on la Corona, and near enough to send forces thither ; and my left on Porto Legnago, where I shall defend the passage of the bridge.

To the General-in-Chief.

Piovesano, 27 Thermidor, year 4 [August 14, 1796].

According to the order which I received, general, on the 25th, I proceeded to Rivoli, and returned the same day to Piovesano, to see General Massena ; yesterday we examined the banks of the Adige. From the Siega, where you begin to enter the valley, to Rivoli and beyond, the mountains of the left bank descend almost perpendicularly to the river, which renders the establishment of any *tête de pont* impossible, because it could not be supported. With the chiefs of battalion Maubert and Carrière, we examined a position a little above the Siega, which was pointed out to us by General Massena, but in combining the means of defence, we have seen that they would be insufficient on account of the nature of the ground.

Between the Siega and Polo, the right bank, either from the difficulty of access, or because it is commanded by the left bank, forbids any establishment of a bridge. There is therefore no point but Polo, which presents a favourable position, and it was there that the last bridge was constructed.

I have sent to Verona for the necessary boats and cordage, and to Dolce to order down four or five rafts, which I am told the enemy has abandoned.

We have now at Peschiera three demi-galleys, two armed on the forecastle with two Austrian 5-pounders, one with an 11-pounder ;

Two barks, having each a 13-pounder on the forecastle, and two Austrian 5-pounders in the stern ;

Two other barks to be armed, one of which will carry an 11-pounder, the other a 13. I have directed the carriages to be built at Peschiera.

The enemy had, during the late affairs, thirteen armed barks ; those who have seen them assert that three only carried each a piece of large calibre ; the ten others, which were not so large, had small guns or musketoons. The crews are Slavonians : the barks, it is said, are commanded by an English officer. According to the reports made to citizen Allemand, the enemy have a flotilla of about thirty barks at Riva.

The extraordinary swellings of the river which take place in the month of September, and particularly in that of October, oblige me to send to Placentia and Pavia an officer with a detachment of workmen and seamen, to attend to the safety of the bridge and to direct the manœuvres in times of inundation.

The Italians who were charged with this business are presenting without scruple accounts of 12,000 livres French money, in which they set themselves down, with their friends, for salaries of 500 livres per month. I have ordered citizen Duroc to go to Placentia as soon as his health permits, not only to verify the account of 12,000 livres, but also to make out that of the expenses of the bridge, ever since its construction, which expenses ought at least to be defrayed out of the contributions.

I am in a very ill state of health, general ; the officers and the principal workmen are ill : I shall nevertheless do the impossible to hasten the construction of the bridge which you have ordered.

ANDREOSSI.

To the General-in-Chief.

Head-quarters, Staro, 27 Thermidor, year 4 [August 14, 1796].

From all the reports or particulars that I have obtained respecting the flight of the enemy, every thing indicates that the army is retreating to Trent. I sent yesterday one of my aides-de-camp as a flag of truce ; he went six leagues without finding a single man of the enemy's, and all the inhabitants assured him that the enemy were re-

treating to Trent: not liking to run after them, he turned back, and by the way he fell in with four Austrian companies escaping from the mountains: he delivered the packet to the officer in command of the troops, and, as it was very late, he was obliged to pass the night with them. During the night, the commandant of these troops received orders to set out and to proceed to Trent.

I shall send to-morrow to make a reconnaissance for exploring the localities of the country: I shall make it push on further, especially on my left.

The position which I occupy at this moment is as follows:

Head-quarters at Staro—Four companies of the 27th demi-brigade at Ponte Tassaro—Four companies of the 39th demi-brigade at Thiarno, on the Riva road, where the inhabitants reported to me that the enemy had evacuated Riva—Four companies of the 25th at Lodrono and castle St. Barbe—First battalion of the 25th at Condino—One company of Allobroges at Rocca d'Anfo.

I have to lay before you, general, praises of the cavalry for the manner in which it has behaved: it vigorously charged the enemy's infantry; it made in part all the prisoners, and took six pieces of cannon. If my infantry had not been so fatigued, I should have taken the 5000 men who were at Lodrono or Staro. This force was commanded by Prince Reuss.

The Rocca d'Anfo was stormed so expeditiously by our brave carabineers, grenadiers, and volunteers, that, on reaching Staro, where the action took place, the prisoners inquired which way I had come, adding it was not possible that it could be by the Rocca d'Anfo.

The country which we at present occupy affords us no great resources: the inhabitants do their utmost to furnish bread, wine, and meat, for the subsistence of the division.

The valley of Ydro is entirely our own.

SAURET.

To the General-in-Chief.

Rome, Thermidor 28, year 4 [August 15, 1796].

There arrived here, yesterday evening, an express sent by the governor of Frosinone to the cardinal secretary of state, to inform him of the entry of Neapolitan troops into

that town of the Ecclesiastical State. The letter intimated that only 2000 men had yet arrived, but that other troops were to follow this advanced guard.

The Neapolitan commandant, on his entry, caused proclamations to be publicly read, ordering the troops, in the name of his Sicilian Majesty, to observe good order, discipline, and respect towards the sovereign of the place and his subjects. It is not known here what can be the real object of such a surprise; according to all appearances, however, there is no question about an occupation of the ecclesiastical territory, but only a passage of Neapolitan troops, which have an ulterior destination.

The Roman government is preparing to make protests and other customary formalities: it is incapable of any opposition.

The resident of Naples at Venice has despatched to Naples a courier, who passed through this city a week ago, reporting everywhere that our army was defeated and retreating to Tortona. It may be that, in the first moment, when the cabinet of Naples believed these false rumours to be true, it may have immediately ordered its troops to advance, agreeably to what I had told you of the promises of the King of Naples to push forward 30,000 men to give a hand to the Imperialists. The authentic intelligence of your victory coming afterwards will perhaps produce a change of resolutions. Our enemies, and especially the English, who are friends of the cabinet of Naples, wish to intimidate the pope, to prevent him from fulfilling the conditions of the armistice.

They would have the Neapolitan army, which is numerous, as you may ascertain by the table of the military state of Italy that I had the honour to send you at the commencement of the campaign, advance to retake Leghorn and to occupy our conquered countries; they would like at least to produce a diversion. When they made sure that the thirty battalions brought from the army of the Rhine would beat your army, they had concerted a vast plan for uniting all the means of Italy and even those of the King of Sardinia.

The English, at least, would now be glad that Neapolitan troops should go and retake Leghorn, and that a Neapolitan army should march to Ferrara and support the garrison of Mantua.

Naples has threatened the pope, if he delivers to us the 30,000lbs. of powder. Its emissaries are exciting the rabble, by which the two secretaries of the commission of arts have been insulted; and I am told that the postillion, whom the tribunals of Rome sentenced to death as the most guilty in this affair, is now withdrawn, and has taken refuge in the Farnese palace, belonging to the King of Naples; but I have no certain proofs of this last fact.

It seems difficult to believe that, after the news of your victory of the 16th, the court of Naples should venture to break the armistice which you have granted it; but it seems certain that it would not have failed to do so, if the army of Italy had been beaten.

If the march of the Neapolitan troops, whose advanced guard has entered the papal territory at Frosinone, continues; if the army advances, it will no doubt be to retake Leghorn and then proceed for Mantua. I foresee that this army will pass through Rome; it has taken the road to Frosinone, where there is not the same danger from unwholesome air as by Terracina.

You may conceive how intimidated the court of Rome must be under such circumstances, and that its operations in fulfilment of the armistice cannot proceed at the rate I wish. I hope that the 5,000,000 sent to Imola will have been delivered, agreeably to the arrangements made and the directions given by citizen Miot.

I have the honour to send you a copy of the note which I have presented to solicit the pardon of two malefactors who had insulted the two secretaries of the commission of the arts. I send you also a copy of the sentence given with a promptness unexampled, unless in very extraordinary cases, and of the answer of the cardinal secretary of state, informing me that the pope has granted the pardon which I solicited. So long as things can be left in their natural state, I shall find myself placed here upon a theatrical stage, where it is not very difficult to support the highest characters. If the Neapolitan army comes to make a disturbance on the stage, I will support to the best of my ability, and as far as it is possible, the truth of principles.

Nothing but a greater and unforeseen force can prevent the pope from executing the conditions of the armistice. I believe that he would be sincerely glad to be delivered from other dangers at this rate. I endeavour to give the govern-

ment to understand that, after paying this tribute, it may rely on the protection of the army. Here is required a protector more mighty than St. Peter and St. Paul. The course of things is in alliance with Rome. It would be laughable to see you at one and the same time general of the Holy See and of the French Republic.

I shall be anxious to send you any further news. It has appeared to me advisable to send an express to citizen Miot with this despatch, and to request him to forward it as speedily as possible, with the news and observations which he can communicate to you himself.

Permit me, general, to request you to send the accompanying despatch by one of your couriers to the minister Delacroix.

I beg you to accept my devoted attachment.

CACAULT.

PS. If the Neapolitan advanced guard were destined to pass through the Romagna and not through Rome, it would have taken the Aquila road. This army appears to have marched without having given orders for preparing quarters, provisions, &c.: these considerations keep all minds in suspense.

You will find annexed the answer of Cardinal Zelada to the letter by which you accredited me to this court.

To Monsieur le Marquis Gherardini.

Asti, 26 Thermidor, year 4 [August 13, 1796].

I have the honour to send to your Excellency, by a sergeant of my regiment, a letter forwarded at the most earnest solicitation of the Austrian officers prisoners, whom I saw arrive in a most deplorable state at Asti, followed by 2000 soldiers of different regiments, especially that of Erbach. They were conducted by an adjutant of General Bonaparte's, named Forestier, who dined with me, a man of good family, young, full of fire, and possessed of a brilliant understanding. This officer, who dined with me, appeared to take the sufferings of the poor prisoners deeply to heart; and I have no doubt that he will leave nothing untried to mitigate their condition till they reach the place of their destination. He is most anxious to receive the answer of

your Excellency at Bra, and especially some relief for those unfortunate men.

M. Forestier has assured me that the imperial army was 60,000 strong, when it came to attack that of the Republic, which he estimates at no more than 80,000, including everything. According to his account, a strong Austrian column ran some risk in its retreat beyond the Mincio: he admits the extraordinary bravery of the troops, but does not bestow the like praise on the skill of your generals; he pointed out to me on the map the blunders committed. Nevertheless, as the siege of Mantua is raised, and almost all the cannon have been taken by your army, he thinks that it will yet require a hard tug to turn it out of Italy: "for," added he, "if despair had not forced us to fight with surprising courage for the preservation of our lives, the Republican army would have been destroyed without resource." He believes that M. Wurmser has set out for Vienna. Bonaparte killed seven horses in two days; the fatigues are excessive: all the French wounded in the battle are dying of mortification. I put down all this in haste: you know my respectful attachment for you.

ZIMMERMANN.

To General Zimmermann.

August 14, 1796 [27 Thermidor, year 4].

General, I am infinitely thankful for your kindness, and touched by the sympathy which you show for our poor prisoners. I have directed the sum of 500 francs to be put into the hands of your serjeant, which may be of some service to the officers for the present. I beg Major Haugwitz to send a receipt for it to you, and you will be pleased to forward it to me here.

I beg your pardon for not writing to you myself, but I am confined to my bed by indisposition.

GHERARDINI.

PS. I give the packet containing the 500 francs to your serjeant Greilinger, and beg you to forward it to Bra, keeping an account of the expenses which you will have to pay on this occasion.

To the General Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 1 Fructidor, year 4 [August 18, 1796].

You will order general of brigade Murat to proceed to Casal-Maggior, where he will command a moveable column destined to carry into execution the different articles of the requisition relative to Casal-Maggior.

You will appoint a military commission to accompany him, for the purpose of trying those who have murdered Frenchmen, and the authors and instigators of revolt.

He shall have with him a commissary of war and the military agent to levy the contribution of a million.

He will effect the complete disarming: he will take care to execute in three or four days the different dispositions of the proclamation.

His moveable column shall be composed of one hundred men of the 21st regiment of chasseurs, two pieces of light artillery, and the 51st demi-brigade.

BONAPARTE.

To the Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 1 Fructidor, year 4 [August 18, 1796].

1. The chiefs of corps will transmit to the generals of division under whom they are a note of the absent officers, and especially of those who are at Milan, Brescia, and Placentia.

2. Those who are at Brescia, Milan, and Placentia, without leave, and who have been absent more than forty-eight hours, shall be immediately displaced by the general of division, who will send the note for this purpose to the chief of the staff.

3. The general of division will cause a list to be furnished him of those who are absent with permission, and will revoke the permissions that are not indispensable for the service. He will fix in this revocation the day when the officer must rejoin his corps, upon pain of dismissal.

4. The commandants of Milan, Brescia, and Placentia, shall cause it to be published in those cities and posted at the gates, that every officer, whoever he be, even though wounded, must have his name entered at the staff of the place.

6. The municipality shall deliver every five days a list of the officers lodging in the town, with the day of their arrival.

The commandants of the places shall send a duplicate of this statement to the general staff.

7. They shall cause all the officers who may be in their town without a permission from the chiefs of their corps, examined by the general of division, to be arrested.

8. Those who have substantial reasons of service to authorize their stay in one of the places shall have from the staff of the place a billet authorizing them to remain for so many days.

9. Every officer who shall be found in one of these places six hours after the expiration of his permission shall be arrested, and the circumstance shall be reported to the general of division under whom his corps is.

BONAPARTE.

To General Kellermann.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 1 Fructidor, year 4 [August 18, 1796].

We are in circumstances, my dear general, in which we have the most urgent need of troops. Disease is daily consigning the men to the hospitals. I beg you, therefore, not to lose a single moment, and to hasten the march of the troops as much as you can. The least delay may be dangerous and produce the worst effect.

Wurmser is daily receiving new reinforcements. I reckon, my dear general, upon your usual zeal, and I beg you to accept my thanks for the trouble that you have never ceased to take.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Rome, 1 Fructidor, year 4 [August 18, 1796].

I have received the letter with which you honoured me on the 21st Thermidor. I transmitted immediately to the court of Naples and that of Rome the two despatches, copies of which I send you annexed: nothing could have come more opportunely to give a little tone to this country and to stop and repress the court of Naples. M. Acton must have received yesterday evening my letter, delivered, the day before yesterday, to the chargé d'affaires of his Sicilian Majesty before the departure of the post. This chargé d'affaires ought to have come and paid me a visit, as all

the diplomatic agents, and even the ambassador of Venice, have done, according to the custom of Rome. I observe further that I wrote a very polite note to this chargé d'affaires, requesting him to transmit my letter to M. Acton, and that he had the rudeness not to answer me. If these trifles are of any signification, it is because they concur to indicate that all those belonging to the court of Naples are fearful of recognizing the armistice and foresee the rupture of it.

Four of our seamen are unworthily confined by the government at Orbitello.

Passports to go to Palermo have been refused here to Gamelin, a native of that city, son of the consul of France. All the petty circumstances of this kind serve to strengthen the great reasons we have for being persuaded that, if the Austrians had beaten you, the Neapolitans would have repeated the perfidy practised upon Latouche, after the convention signed four years ago in presence of the French squadron.

They write here concerning the German army that the Neapolitan cavalry is to join the Austrians. I know how little credit such private letters deserve; but the concurrence of indications and proofs ought not to escape us and appears to me to demand your attention.

You will observe that, in my letter to M. Acton, I take no notice of the entry of the Neapolitans into Ponte Corvo, which belongs to the pope; but it is enclosed in the Neapolitan territory towards the frontier, and dependent on the papal government of Frosinone.

The 2,000 Sicilian troops have only entered Ponte Corvo, on the road to Rome through Frosinone: but they have not arrived at Frosinone, as it was at first believed, and as I wrote to you. The thing is the same at bottom. I will send you a copy of the protests of the pope against this entrance of the Neapolitans into Ponte Corvo; they have not been transmitted to me.

Apprehensions are felt here of the march of a Neapolitan column for the Romagna, the troops having approached extremely near to Tronto and Giulianova, confines of the papal territory.

At the same time with my letter M. Acton must have received my despatch, sent from this city by an express of the resident of Naples at Venice, very different from his first which I have mentioned to you, for he says to the person

to whom the packet was addressed in Rome: "The Austrians are driven into the Tyrol; nothing can withstand the French." This intelligence will frighten M. Acton, who is naturally timid, and who is aware that these numerous troops must remain where they are placed as a bugbear, so long as the Austrians shall not have beaten us.

Up to this moment, I have no tidings that the 2000 Neapolitan troops have advanced beyond Ponte Corvo, or that orders have been given to make any preparation for the passage of an army through the Ecclesiastical State. I shall look sharp and inform you promptly of whatever may happen. There is now every reason to believe that the projects concerted against us are dissolved, and that the Sicilian army, which has had plans taken of all the positions in the ecclesiastical territory along the borders of Naples, will not dare to pass the frontier.

I am circulating the news of the march of 18,000 men of your army for Bologna.

The convoy of the 5,000,000 of the first contribution must by this time have reached its destination. I have requested the commandant of the citadel of Bologna, who was preparing to go and receive that money at Imola, to inform you, as well as commissary-general Dennié, of the arrival of the money at Bologna.

In three days, citizens Berthollet and Monge will make the necessary experiments on the bars prepared for the pope's second contribution: the amount of the bullion is not more than 1,000,000 tournois. I am urging them to prepare more expeditiously for the entire payment of the 5,000,000 already in arrear, but I see no speedy and decided term with respect to the whole sum: this business I shall endeavour to settle next week.

The commissioners are now busily engaged with the pope's architect in getting the selected articles, of which they have delivered a list, ready for packing.

I have already observed to you that there are few things here directly useful to the army: the contribution must therefore be received in kind, in things useful to the manufactures of France, and which the government will be able to turn into cash. You know that I have already had delivered 50,000lbs. of alum, which will be conveyed to Genoa in neutral ships; the rest will be forwarded by land.

The new secretary of state, Cardinal Busca, appears to

have activity, and we are making more progress since his appointment. The accomplishment of the business is severely felt by a country which has been accustomed only to hold out its hand and receive. All will be accomplished, I hope, notwithstanding the rage of our enemies, who have, in this capital of Christendom, much more powerful means of intrigue and influence than any where else.

You answer me, on the subject of the manuscripts, that the armistice specifies five hundred volumes; but the Chevalier d'Azara has declared to us here, upon his honour, that he agreed with you and the commissioners Salicetti and Garrau that three hundred manuscripts only should be taken. The commissioner Salicetti has said the same thing to the commissioners of the arts, Tinette and Barthelemy; it appears, therefore, to be true that it was verbally agreed with M. d'Azara that only three hundred manuscripts should be required.

They will not refuse to give five hundred if you insist upon it; but M. d'Azara will receive a mortification, which you will probably not think it right to give him, if the thing has been agreed upon without your recollecting it, though the minister of Spain and the commissioners remember it well. There are nearly twenty thousand manuscripts in the Vatican library: if we take the three hundred best, we shall have all that are really of any value. Good works are printed; the rest are of no worth but to bibliographers. I submit these considerations to you, citizen-general: it is necessary that the commissioners should know definitively whether they are to take five hundred or three hundred manuscripts.

As the object of my instructions concerning the contribution of Ravenna would only divert attention from more pressing matters, were I to insist on that object at present, I defer the thorough discussion of it. When we have in our hands a great part of the things promised, I shall have the more force for determining the rest.

I have not failed to censure severely the orders relative to Ferrara, and have informed you what answer was made me. I have a direct correspondence with Bologna and Ferrara, which enables me to keep an eye here upon what concerns those two provinces.

I have taken care to intimate to M. d'Azara that M. Capelletti, chargé d'affaires of Spain at Bologna, is a senseless

fanatic, whose sentiments are too conformable with those that are attributed to the ex-Jesuits, which renders him incapable of managing them well, and must lay you under the necessity of sending all the ex-Jesuits out of Bologna. M. d'Azara, who is an enlightened man, does not remonstrate on the subject of your orders for ensuring the tranquillity of the people: he hopes that the two members of the senate who have been sent to you will have obtained permission for such of the ex-Jesuits as have been prudent to remain: as for the others, they will be placed elsewhere.

Ever since your great victories, M. d'Azara is as much transported with joy as ourselves: he is so mixed up in the armistice of Rome, that his honour requires it to be fulfilled; and, in order that the government here may feel obliged to him for it, we must keep up a superiority of force in Italy, and the independence of Rome must be visibly owing to his mediation. Of course, he is certainly for us, and goes hand in hand with me in perfect and intimate harmony.

It is easy to have courage under the ægis of your valour and of the prodigies achieved by all our armies. He who animates me must always exhibit the appearance of impassibility. Thus it is that, without changing tone or language, I transact the affairs with which I have been charged in Italy ever since the beginning of the war. Be pleased to consider that there are no means of proceeding fast without breaking: we have to do with corpses.

CACAULT.

To General Bonaparte.

Rome, 1 Fructidor, year 4 [August 18, 1796].

I have the honour to send you the note received by the Chevalier d'Azara from the secretary to the cardinal secretary of state. There are the Neapolitans marching again, it seems, for the Romagna. Combine the whole with the attack of the English on Leghorn and the entry of the Sicilian troops into Ponte Corvo, and doubt, if you can, the perfidy of the ministry of Naples.

CACAULT.

PS. It is known that there were brought from Naples very considerable supplies for the army, which were to have enabled it to march for some time in the country, where no preparation had been made for it.

The Secretary of the Cardinal Secretary of State, annexed to the preceding.

Rome, August 18, 1796 [1 Fructidor, year 4].

Your excellency learns to-day, by a letter from Ancona, that, on Saturday last, the arms of the King of Naples were set up over the door of the consul of his Sicilian majesty, though he had been in that city above a year. This took place after the arrival of a lieutenant and an ensign, officers of his nation, who, after staying a single day, set out for Sinigaglia. It is said, also, that intelligence had arrived at Sinigaglia that 24,000 Neapolitan troops are on the point of marching for the Romagna: the route which they are to take is not specified.

Though his excellency conceives that this report is destitute of the characters which might induce a belief in its accuracy, still he deems it a duty to communicate it to you, that you may point out to him what it would be advisable to do, in case they should arrive in those parts.

He also begs you to give him further intelligence on the subject to which the note that you have transmitted to him refers, and concerning which he has already collected all possible necessary particulars.

Having executed the orders of his Excellency, I make it a duty to testify to your Excellency the respect and gratitude with which I shall be eternally your most obedient servant,

JOSEPH EVANGELISTI.

To the General-in-Chief.

Rome, 2 Fructidor, year 4 [August 19, 1796].

I have received the letter with which you have honoured me, dated Brescia, 25 Thermidor, with copies of your report sent to the Directory of the glorious actions of the 16th and following days; I have taken care to make good use of it.

The summons sent to M. the Cardinal Mattei, Archbishop of Ferrara, and the severity exercised against the fanatics of Bologna, will produce the best effect. I endeavour to support these measures by all the humble means in my power. M. d'Azara concurs in them with all his heart.

The first convoy of money must now have arrived. You

know that to-morrow we shall assay and pack a sixth million at the Mint. The rest is progressing.

People here would be glad if it were possible to slip out of the conditions of the armistice; but bad faith on the part of the government cannot have place, since it has become evident that it cannot save itself but by fulfilling the treaty.

I have the honour to send you annexed a copy of the answer which I have received from the secretary of state to the assurance which I gave on your part that, in case the Ecclesiastical State were attacked, a division of the army would come to defend it.

If M. Acton answers me, courier by courier, as he ought to do, and as he will have time, I shall receive his letter on Monday next, in three days.

I send you annexed a bulletin that has come to me from Isola, on the frontier of the kingdom of Naples, on the road to Rome.

I beg you to accept, &c.

CACAULT.

PS. At the moment of despatching my letter, citizen-general, I have received the two notes annexed, from the cardinal secretary of state, who begs M. d'Azara and myself to use the strongest solicitations to obtain your permission for the speedy return of Cardinal Mattei to his see of Ferrara. You see by these notes how warm an interest the pope and the secretary of state take in this affair. The summons has produced its complete effect. Clemency and generosity, in terminating the affair, will produce a new one, which cannot but be advantageous to your glory.

To the General-in-Chief.

Rome, 3 Fructidor, year 4 [August 20, 1796].

I lately intimated to you that Mr. Windham, minister of England at Florence, had arrived here, spreading a report that the English were bombarding Leghorn. It is now alleged that letters have been received, announcing the coming of another army of 30,000 men to Wurmser's assistance. There are no lies or intrigues which are not employed to mislead the public mind, and to uphold the hope that we shall be defeated.

Mr. Windham is only passing through Rome; he is proceeding to Naples. The false reports which he has circu-

lated are not the real objects of his journey; he has intimated to a person whom M. Azara and I have known that he is going to Naples, to make, in the name of England, the most violent reproaches there, because the Sicilian troops have not prevented the fulfilment of the armistice with the pope by occupying Rome; because the Neapolitan army has not come to drive the French from Leghorn; because that army is not marching through the Romagna for Lombardy: he declares that this is what the court of Naples had promised. He adds that this court demanded of England, six weeks ago, the same subsidy that was paid to the King of Sardinia; that this affair is on the point of being arranged, and that an answer to it is expected from London.

The hope of Mr. Windham and the object of his unexpected journey to Naples are to decide that court to execute, as far as it is concerned, the grand plan concerted upon the supposition that the Germans would prove the stronger; in your quarter, I am persuaded, that it will not now succeed.

The intelligence received here from the direction of Naples is not so threatening and alarming for the Ecclesiastical State as it was. I send you annexed a little Italian bulletin, which even alleges that the king has left Lora.

I have just been attending, with Monge and Berthollet, the weighing and assaying of the first million, in bars, of the second contribution. We have had it cased and sealed up together with regular statements. They are at work here melting down into bars plate which has arrived for a second million. The operation will be finished on the 10th of this month, and I calculate on despatching, by the 11th or 12th instant, 2,000,000, by the same route to Imola which the first convoy took.

CACAULT.

To M. the Prince de Castelcicala, Director of the Foreign Affairs of his Sicilian Majesty.

Rome, 4 Fructidor, year 4 [August 21, 1796.]

Monsieur le Prince, I have received the letter which you did me the honour to write me on the 20th of August. I shall lose no time in sending it to the general-in-chief, Bonaparte, and to the minister for foreign affairs, who will lay it before the Directory.

The enemies of France, everywhere vanquished, will soon leave the agents of the Republic no other duty to perform but to reconcile. I shall be too happy, Monsieur le Prince, if my good offices can concur in the speedy establishment of the definitive peace between France and your court.

The friendships which I contracted at Naples attach me everlastingly to that fine country and to its welfare. I think I cannot prove to you the sincerity with which I desire good harmony between the two powers better than by pointing out to you frankly some particulars which are likely to give umbrage.

Report speaks of 30,000 Neapolitans, who had been promised to be sent to give a hand to the Austrians, if the French army had been beaten, and of a combined attack upon the French garrison of Leghorn; of a plan for carrying off our convoy of money on the road to the Romagna; and of a formal opposition of the King of the Two Sicilies to the purchase of powder for our army in the Ecclesiastical State. Report speaks of a treaty ready to be concluded, in virtue of which the court of London is to pay to that of Naples the same subsidy that it formerly gave to the King of Sardinia.

After the vast plan combined on the false supposition that our heroes were to be beaten has too generally crumbled in pieces, I am grieved to see persons attached to the court of Naples explain themselves openly in a manner that is not accordant with the armistice. Your party in Rome ought no longer to be our enemy. M. the Chevalier Binetti dispenses himself from the customary attentions towards me, and, on the other hand, I learn that Dr. Corona, a subject of his Sicilian Majesty's, has been reprimanded as having failed in duty to his sovereign, by visiting the French commissioners who are in Rome.

A French officer and three seamen have been apprehended at Orbitello and treated harshly. The Directory cannot fail to be informed of these circumstances, which leads me to observe to you that it might be proper to inform M. the Prince Belmonte, and to enable him to furnish the requisite explanations and particulars.

I beg you, Monsieur le Prince, to accept the assurance of my sentiments of the highest consideration.

CACAULT.

To M. the General Acton, first minister of his Sicilian Majesty.

Rome, 4 Fructidor, year 4 [August 21, 1796].

I have received the answer of your Excellency, dated the 20th of August, as well as that of M. the Prince Castelvica. I shall send those two letters to the General-in-chief Bonaparte, and also to the minister for foreign affairs. I am answering M. the Prince of Castelvica more at length: he will no doubt communicate to you what I have the honour to submit to him.

I seize this opportunity of renewing to your excellency the assurance of my respect.

CACAULT.

Note of the Commissioners Monge and Berthollet, respecting the Powder of the Ecclesiastical State.

Rome, 5 Fructidor, year 4 [August 22, 1796].

Citizen Cacault having requested us to examine the qualities of the powder manufactured in the States of the pope, we applied for specimens of that powder to M. Salvi, the contractor for it: he delivered to us two, one of very fine grain, the other of a rather coarser grain, which alone appeared to us to be suitable for the use of the musket.

Destitute of all the usual means for proving it, we were obliged to have recourse to such as were at our disposal. We first inquired the proportions employed: these are 100lbs. of refined saltpetre, 120lbs. of charcoal, and 10lbs. of sulphur. These proportions are good, and the paste is well beaten, so that no fault is to be found with the manner in which it is fabricated.

It was necessary to ascertain the state of the saltpetre that enters into the composition. To this end, we dissolved a certain quantity of Roman powder, and compared it with a solution of French powder, by means of the solution of silver. This produced a much more considerable precipitate with the solution of the Roman powder than with that of France; which indicates that the saltpetre used here is imperfectly purified, and contains a considerable proportion of sea salt. We had the same result with a small quantity of saltpetre which was given us.

The Roman powder, therefore, is prepared with a salt-

petre that contains much marine salt, which is not only foreign to its effects, but diminishes the rapidity of the detonation, and renders the powder susceptible of contracting damp from the air.

Having no instrument for proving the strength of the powder, we could not determine to what degree the impurity of the saltpetre deteriorates the Roman powder: we only perceive that it has an imperfection which cannot but induce an apprehension that it has not sufficient strength.

BERTHOLLET AND MONGE,
Commissioners of the French Government
for the Arts and Sciences.

To the General-in-Chief.

Head-quarters, Milan, 3 Fructidor, year 4 [August 20, 1796].

You have no need of proofs, I dare say, to convince you of the frequent correspondence which exists between the courts of Vienna and Turin, and the intrigues of the archduke in this country; but I think it my duty to communicate to you some notes which I have collected, and which seem to deserve your credit and perhaps your attention.

1. The couriers from Vienna to Turin, and *vice versa*, succeed one another without interruption, and all of them pass through Bellinzona and Canobio. Might it not be possible to carry off one of them from the latter place or the environs, to learn what our enemies are concerting?

2. One Andriana, innkeeper at Bellinzona, is the confidant and diplomatic agent of the archduke, to whom he takes frequent journeys.

3. On the 27th of Thermidor last, 300 armed Piedmontese passed through Canobio, and went on board six barks on the lake, which steered for Ossola.

BARAGUAY-D'HILLIERS.

To the General-in-Chief.

Head-quarters, Staro, 3 Fructidor, year 4 [August 20, 1796].

It was not till yesterday noon, citizen-general, that I received your letter of the 1st Fructidor.

I have to give you an account of the reconnaissance which we have made of the roads leading to Riva.

The shortest of all, which leads to Riva in six hours, is

that which, traversing the valley of Ydro, leads to the village of Ponale, on the Lake of Garda, where you embark for Riva. This road, which has the advantage in point of time, presents such great difficulties for cavalry and artillery, that it is passable for a corps of infantry only, and is therefore unfit for us, being obliged to take both along with us.

The other road, leading to Riva, after a march of eleven hours, is that which, passing from Staro to Thion, and thence through Balino and Cavrast, leads straight to Riva: this is passable for all arms and for baggage; only it has the inconvenience of two marches, the distance being too great for a single march.

In this case, my opinion is that advantage might be taken of both roads, by marching a corps of infantry, which should embark at Ponale, and make itself master of Riva, while the division should be proceeding at the same time towards Riva through Thion. This double direction would take from the enemy all desire to prevent the corps of troops proceeding by the longest road from reaching Riva, since it would be already occupied by that which had come by way of Ponale. I await your orders therefore.

You desire me, citizen-general, to keep here three three-pounders of the cannon taken from the enemy; I observe to you that I have not been able to keep more than one here, because, the horses which I applied for not having arrived, I was obliged to send off the others with oxen for Salo: I have given orders for them to come back, but we want horses and artillerymen.

We are still in the greatest distress here for provisions: we never receive more than the smaller part of what we ought to have, and then nothing but bread. This part of the army is totally neglected.

The execution of your order relative to cartridges causes me to have need of 100,000 and 6000 flints, to supply the place of those which have been delivered out to make up fifty rounds per man. All the flints which were here in reserve have turned out to be pistol-flints. Have the goodness, citizen-general, to give orders that this mistake be not again committed.

SAURET.

To the General-in-Chief.

Polo, 4 Fructidor, year 4 [August 21, 1796].

I received, general, on the 25th of last month, the order to proceed to Rivoli, and in the evening I was with General Massena at Provezano. On the 26th, we visited the banks of the Adige. I reported to you on the 27th that the site of the old bridge was the only one that appeared suitable to us. I cannot tell why my letter has not reached you.

The bridge will be finished this evening, and would have been much sooner, but for the difficulty we have had to procure boats; and this moment I have just sent in search of the last.

General Massena desired to have a flying bridge at Rivoli for the communication with the Chiusa; I have had it established.

During the time that the bridge was building, I had sixteen pontoons collected and refitted with their beams and planks out of wood picked up here and there in the villages and the country. The cordage and most of the iron work necessary for the mechanism and speedy construction of the bridge were not to be found. These boats, decked two and two and drawn by horses, might serve to furnish a communication at any point you should wish; in short, they would be a disposable bridge, which could be shifted at pleasure. The navigation of the Adige being very difficult, on account of the rapidity of the current, the sand-banks and the rocks which are in its bed, and the hollows which are on its banks, it would be necessary to have boatmen of the country: they alone can manage boats upon it. I know not whether your plans include such a bridge.

ANDREOSI.

To the General-in-Chief.

Rome, 5 Fructidor, year 4 [August 22, 1796].

Monsieur le General, I have many thanks to return you for the letter which you did me the honour to write, dated the ... Fructidor. It contains expressions which, coming from a hero like you, are infinitely flattering to my self-love, and I account it the most fortunate circumstance of my whole life to have deserved your esteem.

You have good reason to say that everybody's head is

turning round in this part of Italy. I know that friend Cacault gives you a regular account of all that is passing at Naples, and you may rely on the accuracy of his reports. The arming is just what you have been told, and, for some months, we have seen the Neapolitan general make more movements and choose more encampments than General Bonaparte, who is fighting almost every day.

The object of these movements is in accordance with those who are not fond of France: you are aware of that. Meanwhile, the Neapolitan troops retain Ponto Corvo, and for some days past they have been augmenting their number. I am sure that your 10,000 men, led by you, will accomplish your object: but, as you have something more to do than to conquer, you will attend to everything. In going or returning, you will of course visit the Capitol, and in that case I hope you will do me the honour to take up your quarters at my house. You will certainly be at a friend's.

I cannot give you any precise idea of the infernal intrigue which has hitherto thwarted the accomplishment of our armistice, and which proceeds from the very quarter to which I have been alluding. We have fallen into another embarrassment about the peace, which had been begun, under bad auspices, to be negociated at Paris, and is to be concluded somehow or other in Italy. Friend Cacault, to whom I have communicated everything without reserve, gives you a full account of the affair: I shall, therefore, spare you the repetition.

I have long been acquainted with the ingratitude of the Romans, but, if I do them a benefit in spite of their teeth, it is not for their sakes that I do it; I act from far nobler principles. Still I have friends among them, who are worthy of being yours also.

If Devins succeeds Wurmser, you will have to do with an old acquaintance of the army of Italy, and I have no doubt that, polite as you are, you will accompany him to Vienna.

Accept, general, the homage of him who will be eternally your very humble, &c.,

THE CHEVALIER D'AZARA.

To the General-in-Chief.

Head-quarters, Staro, 6 Fructidor, year 4 [August 23, 1796].

I have the honour to inform you that I have sent a reconnaissance to Thion, where, during the last days, an enemy's patrol had made its appearance. I await the return of the reconnaissance to inform you of the result.

I am informed this morning, by my confidential man, that the enemy, to the number of 300, passed the night between the 4th and 5th at Riva, and left that place again yesterday morning.

I report to you, general, that ever since the 25th, the day of my arrival at Staro, the troops have not been able to get more than a quarter of the ration of bread, in spite of all the precautions that it has been in my power to take. When the convoys are setting out for Salo, five, six thousand rations of bread are announced, but frequently only half the quantity arrives.

SAURET.

To General Bonaparte.

Venice, 5 Fructidor, year 4 [August 22, 1796].

I received, about six in the evening, the letter which you wrote me yesterday. I immediately applied for a conference with M. Pezaro, and the result of the conversation which I have just had with him is as follows:

I was first asked whether you wish the articles which you mention to me to be procured for you, even in case the *Sieur Vivanti* should continue to supply you, or if you ask this government for them only in case that merchant should absolutely refuse that service. They propose to request him, and flatter themselves that they shall prevail on him, to supply you as before; but, be this as it may, even though you should desire the articles, independently of the supplies of the *Sieur Vivanti*, nothing shall be left undone to satisfy you. They merely observe that there will be great difficulty in regard to hay, the crop of which failed this year, and nearly an impossibility in regard to bullocks, because the epidemic disease, which has prevailed and which still prevails in the States of Venice, has destroyed such a quantity of these animals, that there are scarcely any left.

Be pleased then, general, to give me as soon as possible

an answer to the question ; after that, I will take care that you shall be promptly served ; I will even take care, in the mean time, that they shall attend to the measures to be taken in any case : and this, moreover, is what I am promised by M. Pezaro, who desires also that I should assure you anew of the anxiety of the Venetian government to do all that can be agreeable to you and to the French Republic.

LALLEMANT.

To the General-in-Chief.

August 23, 1796 [6 Fructidor, year 4].

I transmit, annexed, to your excellency, the account sent me by the officer commanding at Limon of the catastrophe which happened on the 20th instant to M. the General Dujard, his suite, and his escort. I shall add what I have since learned, and which consists in this, that the banditti took the carts laden with the general's baggage for a convoy of money. He was killed at the first discharge, as were likewise Lieutenant-Colonel Bicistrat and a soldier, and six wounded, one of whom died a few hours afterwards, and another yesterday, here, on his passage. I have had another taken to our military hospital, because he could scarcely walk. The officers are going to Coni to recruit themselves from bruises occasioned by their falls in escaping. All the baggage and twenty-two horses have been carried off ; the prodigious rain that commenced when our detachment came to the rescue, prevented its going in quest of the banditti. I send you also the minutes which the French officers have drawn up concerning the circumstances consequent on the event, and the declaration made by them to the officer commanding at Limon relative to his conduct on this occasion.

I have just received a letter from General Macquart, which is not perfectly clear. He supposes that the brigands take refuge at Entraignes, Vaudier, Limon, and Levernant, and alleges that those communes know and ought to apprehend them : he requests me to give strict orders on this subject. He observes that the Piedmontese are not murdered, and, what is still more particular, that the late general's guide told him that the Piedmontese officer at Limon had not sent to warn them till after they were slaughtered. Your excellency will see by the report made to me by this officer at

Limon, that he could not inform them sooner, and that from Limon to the Col de Tende the distance is great.

I shall, nevertheless, make all possible inquiries to discover if there are any of these assassins, and to have them secured. The French officers who turned back have assured me that they were fired at from the barns above the Limonais, which are not in our territory. This event has produced the greatest sensation in the minds of the French, who reason upon it, each according to his dispositions towards us.

These banditti form a very considerable assemblage. There are Frenchmen, Nisards, Corsicans, Genoese, and deserters from us. Several of them come at night upon our lands, go off to other villages, doing harm to nobody, and paying everywhere for what they want. The communes, fearing their vengeance, dare not pursue them: they are seen in several villages in the same night, which, coming to the ears of the general at Coni, leads him to suspect that they live in those places, or have confederates there. I shall send orders to the communes of the mountain, of the Limon and the Limonais, to prevent fresh outrages, and a detachment to Entraignes to secure the brigands, who are suspected of stopping there most frequently, and at the same time to oppose the smuggling that is carried on there. This step will attest to the general the reality of the precautions which I am taking to second his views against these robbers, and I will continue them till the communications are interrupted by the snow.

After the plunder of the last convoy, one of the banditti carried his parcel to Brois, and committed it to the care of a working man, a native of Entraignes; the depositary, Renti, ran off with the deposit. In the night of the following day, seven other brigands seized Renti, and carried him off with his trust, and he has not been heard of since. This has struck terror into the villages of the mountain, and they dare not make any disclosures.

DE LA FLECHERE,

Governor of the Province of Coni.

To the General-in-Chief.

Head-quarters, Verona, 6 Fructidor, year 4 [August 23, 1796].

Nobody professes more sincerely than myself, general, the justice that ought to be rendered to your indefatigable zeal

and your military talents. The esteem which I entertain for you, and which all brave men who wish what is right share with me, is a just tribute due to your care and your solicitude for the success and glory of the Republic.

I am well aware that, if things do not go on as the chief, you, some others, and myself, desire, it is a misfortune which must be attributed to fatality, which puts into armies creatures who impose shackles by incapacity, by negligence, and whom custom has caused to be thought necessary. The 29th demi-brigade has joined my division, which I reviewed on the 3rd and 4th instant. Indeed, the condition of that 29th is pitiable: it has at most a hundred bayonets; it has no clothes, no shoes; I found in it volunteers under arms without any covering but a shirt and linen trowsers. These troops must necessarily be armed, equipped, and clothed, or left in the rear, for they cannot be brought before the enemy in this state, occasioned by the carelessness of the chief. They are, nevertheless, soldiers, who, on some occasions, have exhibited proofs of bravery and on whom one might rely; which ought to stimulate our anxiety to put them in order and render them fit to do good service. Make, I beg of you, all the efforts you can to this end.

The rest of the division is going on very well, only that some of those who have come back from the hospitals are in want of arms, and excepting some bayonets lost, some coats and pair of shoes which are deficient, and which it is urgent to supply.

Discipline and order are observed in the best possible manner. Adieu, my dear general: set everything to rights, and let us prosecute our labours: that is what I desire.

AUGEREAU.

To the General-in-Chief.

Borgo-Forte, 7 Fructidor, year 4 [August 24, 1796].

As I dare say your aide-de-camp, citizen Lahoz, will have returned to you before you have received the report of the divisionary General Sahuguet, I cannot help intimating that, up to this time, I have nothing but good news to tell you.

The enemy, after a vigorous resistance, has been completely

beaten at Borgo-Forte. In order to force him at the bridge of La Roque, it was necessary to exert republican bravery to the utmost: in consequence, I owe the highest praise to the 6th battalion of grenadiers, and particularly to the 12th demi-brigade of infantry of the line. I must not omit to mention, citizen-general, the conduct displayed in this affair by the officers of the 12th demi-brigade, and particularly by the chief of the first battalion Beurnet. The adjutant-major of the 6th battalion of grenadiers was one of the first to force the barricades of the bridge of La Roque. Citizen Lahoz ably seconded me.

I have, general, to repeat to you my solicitation for the rank of chief of battalion for my aide-de-camp Marigny, known for his courage and his activity, and who has given fresh proofs of bravery in this little affair.

We have to regret several brave men. The loss of the enemy has been considerable, particularly in slain, for our troops gave no quarter.

I could not, without compromising myself, get into collision with the troops of the enemy in his line along the causeway, where he is said to be in force. I await with impatience the junction of the troops of General Sahuguet: meanwhile, strong detachments are annoying the enemy on the Ceresa road and on the dike.

DALLEMAGNE.

To the Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Milan, 8 Fructidor, year 4 [August 25, 1796].

You will be pleased to send orders for assembling in the village of Tende a moveable column composed of 50 gendarmes of the department of the Maritime Alps, 50 gendarmes of the department of the Var, 3200 men from the division of General Casabianca, 200 men from Antibes and the Marguerite islands, 150 men of the national guard of the Maritime Alps, 200 men of the national guard of the district of Grasse, and two pieces of cannon.

This moveable column will be commanded by General Casabianca. The military commission which I have ordered for trying the Barbets shall meet at the village of Tende: it shall be charged to collect all the information that can be furnished it by the municipalities and the inhabitants for

destroying those assemblages and clearing the department of the banditti who infest it.

The generals, superior officers, soldiers, and commission, assembled at Tende, shall be paid half in money and half in mandats, like the active army.

The paymaster of the army shall cause this moveable column to be paid by the paymaster of Coni; it shall be furnished with provisions by the city of Coni, and have a ration of meat, like the rest of the army.

The villages shall be responsible for the aid they give to the villains.

General Macquart and the Piedmontese general shall be apprized of the formation of this moveable column.

General Macquart shall have orders to concert with General Casabianca for sending out on his part strong piquets, in order to the rapid destruction of the banditti.

BONAPARTE.

To the Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Milan, 8 Fructidor, year 4 [August 25, 1796].

You will be pleased, citizen-general, to order General Gentili to organize in companies all the Corsican refugees that are at Leghorn, officers, sub-officers, and soldiers. The refugee Corsican generals, the chiefs of brigade or battalion, shall each command one of these companies. Muskets from those that are in the place shall be distributed among them.

These companies shall do no other service than what is connected with the embarkation for Corsica. In case of *generale* or *alerte*, General Gentili shall take the orders of the general of division commanding the place respecting the posts which the said companies are to occupy. The captains, lieutenants, and sub-lieutenants of these companies shall be armed with muskets.

I leave it to you to make a regulation for determining whatever I may not have provided for, that all the Corsican refugees forming part of the said companies may obtain the rations due to their rank without confusion, and that they may, in case of need, supply the place at Leghorn of the battalion of the 75th demi-brigade, which I have withdrawn from that place.

You will inform General Gentili that I shall send him forthwith instructions concerning the expedition to Corsica.

The gendarmerie of the 28th division, being organized, must concur in the duty of the place. You will authorize its chiefs to recruit among the Corsican refugees in Leghorn.

BONAPARTE.

Give orders for 200 men of the battalion of the 12th demi-brigade, which is at Milan, to set out early to-morrow morning and proceed by the shortest road to Casal Maggior, to be under the orders of General Murat, in lieu of the 51st demi-brigade.

Give orders to the 51st demi-brigade to set out, as soon as these 200 men have arrived, and proceed to Leghorn by the shortest route.

Give orders for establishing within thrice twenty-four hours, in the castle of Pavia, an hospital for venereal cases. There shall be kept in the magazine of the castle, five hundred muskets, with flints, cartridges, &c., for the purpose of arming the venereal patients in case of need.

Give orders to the battalion of the 6th demi-brigade, the first that arrives, to leave 200 men in the castle of Pavia. As soon as these 200 men shall arrive at Pavia, give orders to the 14th demi-brigade to set out for Leghorn by the shortest way. Let the 51st demi-brigade and the 14th be reviewed at the moment of their departure.

Order the establishment of an hospital for 500 patients in the castle of Milan. My intention is that the men who are least ill be selected. Order that there be constantly kept in the castle of Milan five hundred muskets, with all that is necessary for arming the said patients in case of need.

BONAPARTE.

To the General of Division Sauret.

Head-quarters, Milan, 8 Fructidor, year 4 [August 25, 1796].

The consideration of your health has alone induced me to give you the command of the reserve, and to supersede you in that of the division at present under your orders: that division is, moreover, destined for movements, the rapidity of which is incompatible with your present state; but you will know how to make yourself useful in the post in which I am placing you, and which is not less essential: the

service which it is to do is not so hard and more adapted to your situation.

The reserve is intended to see the enemy, but it is destined to come at him by less difficult roads. The services which you have rendered must assure you that this change involves nothing that ought to affect you; it is absolutely foreign to any diminution in the confidence that I owe to your bravery and your patriotism.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 8 Fructidor, year 4 [August 25, 1796].

1. The division of General Sahuguet is blockading Mantua.

On the 7th, at three in the morning, we had at once attacked the bridge of Governolo and Borgo-Forte, to oblige the garrison to retire within its walls. After a brisk cannonade, General Sahuguet in person took the bridge of Governolo, at the same time that General Dallemagne made himself master of Borgo-Forte. The enemy has lost 500 killed, wounded, and prisoners. The 12th demi-brigade and citizen Lahoz distinguished themselves.

2. The division of General Augereau is at Verona.

3. That of General Massena is at Rivoli. That of General Sauret, the command of which I have just given to General Vaubois, General Sauret being ill, is at Staro.

It was indispensable to allow the troops a few days' rest, to rally the scattered corps after so violent a shock, and to reorganize the service of the administrations, absolutely broken up. Some of those gentlemen ran all the way to the Gulf of Spezzia without stopping.

The commissary of war Salva leaves the army; panic-struck, he beholds enemies everywhere; he crosses the Po, and communicates to all he meets the terrors that bewilder him; he fancies that the Hulus are at his heels. In vain he scampers away for two days and two nights; nothing can raise his spirits; writing to all quarters, Run for your lives! [*Sauve qui peut*] he arrives within two leagues of Genoa, and—dies, in twenty-four hours, of a violent fever, in the delirium of which he fancies himself wounded by a hundred swords, and still those of the terrible Hulus. Nothing equals this cowardice but the bravery of the soldiers. Many commissaries of war have not shown more bravery.

Such, citizens directors, is the inconvenience of the law which requires that the commissaries of war should be civil agents, while they need courage and military habits to a greater degree than the officers themselves: the courage which is necessary for them is wholly moral; it is never the fruit of the habit of dangers. I have, therefore, felt on this occasion how essential it is to appoint to the office of commissaries of war none but men who have served in the line for several campaigns and given proofs of courage. Any man who values life higher than the national glory and the esteem of his comrades ought not to form part of the French army. It is revolting to hear every day the persons of the different administrations confessing, and almost boasting of it, that they were afraid.

We have in the army 15,000 sick; the deaths are not above fifteen or twenty a day: but the month of September is said to be the time when diseases are most dangerous. Up to this moment, there is nothing but slight fevers. I have just been inspecting the hospitals of Milan: I am highly pleased with them, which is partly owing to the zeal and activity of citizen Burisse, principal agent of that department.

I have not yet received any troops coming from the Ocean: we have only tidings of 3000 men, composing the sixth demi-brigade, who are to arrive at Milan on the 15th.

I hear nothing of any troops of the division of General Chateauneuf-Randon: only the 10th demi-brigade of the line, 600 strong, has arrived at Nice.

If the 6000 men of General Chateauneuf-Randon's whom you have promised me, and the 13,000 announced long ago from the army of the Ocean, had arrived, my army would be almost doubled, and I should have swept the Austrian army before me. If these reinforcements arrive in the course of the month, we shall continue to find ourselves in a respectable position, and capable even of putting an end to the extravagance of Naples; but I fear that your orders relative to the movement of those troops are badly executed.

Our demi-galleys have run out of Peschiera, where they have taken ten large barks and two pieces of cannon belonging to the enemy.

Every thing here is in a satisfactory position. We are waiting for the first tidings of General Moreau before we advance into the Tyrol: but, if nothing arrives in a few days,

we shall advance provisionally as far as Trent. I am assured that General Wurmser is recalled and succeeded by General Devins.

The King of Sardinia having disbanded his provincial regiments, the Barbets have increased. A cart conveying money has been plundered. General Dugard, going to Nice, has been killed. I have organized a moveable column against the Barbets, with a tribunal to do justice upon them.

I cannot exercise any sort of influence on the departments of the Var and the Rhone. I am at such a distance that letters reach me much later than the minister of war.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Rome, 8 Fructidor, year 4 [August 25, 1796].

I have the honour to send you a copy of what I am writing to the commissary-general Dennié, that you may see how we stand in regard to the supplies. I will send by the first courier a memorial concerning 1400 horses that you demand, according to which you will be able to send hither or into Romagna the officer whom you may appoint to superintend the operation.

Nothing new at Naples. I have taken measures to be informed of what is passing in that quarter, in order to report to you.

I send you annexed a copy of the new lamentation of the cardinal secretary of state on the subject of the new *veniat* notified to Monsignor La Greca, lately vice-legate of Ferrara. This Monsignor La Greca is the son of a merchant of Naples, and does not much interest this country. Cardinal Mattei, archbishop of Ferrara, is a Roman prince, of an ancient house, characterless, according to the taste of the Romans, and generally liked and esteemed both by the pope and the public. The justice of the orders that you have given respecting those two prelates is acknowledged: they have been exposed to deserved severities. Now that they are walking tolerably straight here, I foresee that the embarrassing prelates will be surrendered to the wishes of his Holiness.

The insurrections planned, to which we should all perhaps have fallen victims but for your signal victories, could not arise spontaneously from the Italian people, who have

shrewdness, and who can see perfectly well, even at Rome, the justice of our cause : all was the effect of the instigations and manœuvres of the English, Neapolitan, and Imperial emissaries.

Several cardinals have distinguished themselves by declaiming and striving to act in that absolute Babel of Rome against the French and your operations. M. the cardinal Pignatelli-Monteleone, a Neapolitan, legate of Ferrara, who is your prisoner, was one of the warmest in exciting the old pope to despatch the vice-legate, La Greca, from this city. M. the cardinal Caraffa, another Neapolitan, is one of the greatest hatchers of lies against us. M. the cardinal Borgia, a very learned and thought to be a discreet man, rose up against us, and published a pamphlet, proving that the ecclesiastical canons forbade the pope to furnish powder for the use of our army. The cardinal Albani, the eldest member of the sacred college, whom the ambition of his family attaches to the court of Vienna, is another of those possessed zealots who have endeavoured to inflame people's minds against us. These gentlemen now appear to be somewhat down in the mouth : fear alone can control them.

The pope, who now sees the consequences, is not pleased with them, but this government knows not how to restrain such personages. If you were to desire cardinal Mattei and Monsignor La Greca to tell these gentlemen that you shall hold them personally responsible for whatever happens in Rome, and to tell the pope that if people here fail in obedience to the sovereign, in what relates to the maintenance of good order and justice, you will send him an armed force, I believe that it would produce a very good effect. We must allay by fear the fire of the passions before we can succeed in conciliating opinions.

Would you believe that Azara lives here forsaken, and that the high company who owe everything to him treat him as though he had done them a great disservice ?

I beg you to accept, &c.,

CACAULT.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief.

Paris, 6 Fructidor, year 4 [August 23, 1796].

The last accounts that you have transmitted to us, citizen-general, of your military operations prove to us that the

brave army which you command is daily gathering the fruits of victory, by increasing the distress of its enemy. Appalled at his defeat, no doubt, he will not dare to venture for a long time upon a pitched battle with the rest of his forces: it is your business, therefore, to study to destroy him in partial and frequent affairs, as you have done since the memorable actions of the 16th and 18th. Pressed on his rear by the rapid march of the right wing of the army of the Rhine and Moselle, which is advancing upon the Inn, it is to be presumed that he will make but a feeble and uncertain defence in the Tyrol, and thenceforward your pursuit ought to acquire a new degree of celerity, either for the purpose of overtaking the rear-guard and cutting it in pieces, or to get to important passes before it, according to occasion or the nature of the localities in which you have to deploy all the variety of combinations and the resources of art as you have already developed them by turns in mountain operations and in those of the plain. We have praised the boldness of your plan to pounce suddenly upon Trieste, but to us the favourable moment does not seem to have yet arrived. The reduction of the strength of the army by disease, the more than equivocal dispositions of the different powers of Italy, and the most pressing interest of all, that of dissolving the forces of Austria, by inflicting on them reiterated defeats, and thus dealing, as it were, the last blows to our continental enemies—all these considerations decide us to prescribe to you not to deviate, in the present circumstances, from the plan which has for its object to connect your left with the right of General Moreau, and to combine your movements in such a manner as to crush Wurmser and prince Charles, while General Jourdan will exert his utmost efforts to drive Wartensleben into Bohemia, and so to reduce his power that he shall be unable either to cover that kingdom, or to protect the left bank of the Danube, if he should fall back on that side.

After the three republican armies have executed these dispositions in their totality, and the gates of Austria shall be opened to them, we authorize you to throw a division upon Trieste, in order to destroy its port and its public establishments.

Till then, prudence commands us to defer that enterprise. We regret that we cannot give it our immediate assent; but the essential point is to confirm the conquest of Italy, and

to deprive the enemy, who has dared once more to dispute it with the army under your command, of all hope and all means of recovering it. It is, moreover, to be observed that the corps which you would direct upon Trieste might be compromised on its retreat into Italy in case of a reverse, no very likely thing, it is true.

We have received accounts that the 6,000 men, whom General Chateauneuf-Randon had orders to despatch to Italy, have long been in motion : inform us of their arrival, as well as that of the reinforcements which have been drawn from the Coasts of the Ocean. Our intention is to keep the army of Italy in such a state of force as shall ensure to it a constant superiority in all the operations that concern it, either by reinforcing it with troops from the interior, or by lending it succours from the army of the Rhine and Moselle, to which we shall send 6,000 men when the communication between them shall be established : for we repeat to you, we must retain, at any rate, our advantages in Italy ; it is the object to which the thoughts of the government are most strongly attached, and which must have the greatest influence on the continental peace.

When the emperor has been forced to accept the conditions of that peace necessary to Europe, we shall have to decide upon that which it will suit the interests and the splendour of the victories of the Republic to impose upon the different States of Italy ; and then we shall be able, with perfect security, to threaten Rome and Naples, to make them accede to our views.

The diseases which are attacking the garrison of Mantua must soon reduce that place and relieve us from the necessity of observing it, unless at a distance. The health of the troops strongly engages our attention, and claims no doubt your most assiduous care, merited by the courage and the republican fidelity of these brave defenders of the country. The sick whose state admits of their removal ought to be conveyed, as far as it is practicable, to more wholesome situations.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 6 Fructidor, year 4 [August 23, 1796].

The Directory has received, citizen-general, your letter from Brescia of the 27th Thermidor, containing notes re-

specting some generals of the army of Italy. The Directory has been pleased with it, and shall turn its attention to the subject, when you have transmitted further notes, relative to the generals of brigade and the adjutant-generals under your command. You have forgotten several officers, especially General Kilmaine.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 6 Fructidor, year 4 [August 23, 1796].

The Directory has received, citizen-general, the letter which you have written to it from Brescia, on the 26th ult. It gave orders immediately to the minister of the finances to have the jewels, valued at 400,000 livres, but which you estimate at 2 or 3,000,000, brought to Paris. The Directory is pleased with your vigilance on this essential occasion: it feels every day how urgent it is that all the friends of the Republic should denounce the numerous abuses which impede the march of its financial operations, and double the inconveniences occasioned by a too complicated administration in that important department. The supplies which the army of Italy pours into the national treasury are the more valuable the more violent the crisis: they have contributed to thwart the plots of our internal enemies.

We shall continue to recommend to you and to the commissioners of the government to place at the disposal of the minister of the finances all the sums that are not indispensable for the different services of the army which you command.

The Directory has been grieved to hear of the removal of the sequestration from the property of the Neapolitans at Leghorn: it is a measure to which circumstances forbid us to revert at present. The future conduct of the court of Naples towards us will determine the ulterior steps that we shall have to take. Before the effort of Wurmser on the Adige and the Mincio, M. de Belmonte Pignatelli, who is in Paris, strove, by all the means that foreign diplomacy is skilled in employing, to avoid any occasion for treating seriously for peace with the French Republic. Since the army of Italy and the talents of its general have conquered the audacious Austrian, the conduct of the envoy of Naples has totally changed, and he has become as eager for nego-

ciating peace as he appeared at first to be disinclined to do so. It is easy to perceive that the King of the Two Sicilies wishes to take advantage of your removal to a greater distance, to conclude, on terms extremely advantageous to him, a treaty against which his partiality for England and for Austria revolts. It is for you, citizen-general, to inform us respecting our real situation in Italy and our particular position in regard to Naples. What you say on the subject of the unfavourable dispositions of the Neapolitans at Brescia, and of the danger which there would be in leaving them there, has led us to consider the state of the army of Italy with the most serious attention. We have asked ourselves if the hottest season of the year, the moment when the army has 15,000 sick, the moment, above all, when it is preparing not only to enter the Tyrol, but perhaps to throw itself upon Trieste, is a favourable period for breaking the armistice concluded with Naples. We have thought that the hour for that rupture, if it must take place, has not arrived, and that it would nevertheless be dangerous to go to sleep upon Italian faith, by which we have been so often deceived.

In consequence, citizen-general, we think it right merely to recommend to you to keep a vigilant eye upon the Neapolitans at Brescia, to scatter them in such a manner as to render them less dangerous, to gain some of them, were it only to learn all their proceedings, and to be in readiness to seize their horses and their arms, in case of necessity. If the court of Naples, unfaithful to the armistice, were to show itself openly our enemy; if it were to come forward to meet you, or to declare itself anew absolutely in favour of Austria and England—then, and in case of an absolutely imminent danger, we authorize you, citizen-general, to make yourself master of the 200 Neapolitan horse, who are in the rear of the army of Italy.

The Directory approves what you have done in regard to the legate sent by the court of Rome to Ferrara. We have sent away the envoy of the Prince of Rome, who had been despatched to us without any power to treat with the French Republic. These steps, however, do not place us in a hostile situation in regard to the pope, but they warn us to lose no time in extracting from Rome, by taking care to intimidate it as you have done, the contributions of all kinds granted to us by the armistice.

It is right, citizen-general, that you should have an eye upon what the court of Turin is doing. Its ambassador in France, the Chevalier Revel, a French emigrant, has just been sent away by us on account of that quality. We are waiting for his successor. This measure makes no change in the state of peace in which we are in regard to Piedmont, but we know that they rejoiced in that country at the ephemeral successes of Wurmser.

It is better to be on one's guard than to run the risk of being deceived.

REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

PART FOURTH.

FROM THE BATTLE OF ROVEREDO TO THE RESUMPTION OF
HOSTILITIES BY A NEW AUSTRIAN ARMY.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 9 Fructidor, year 4 [August 26, 1796].

You will find annexed, citizens-directors, two letters which I have received from Corsica. The English are embarking all their munitions of war, to remove them to the isle of Elba. What is become of the plan which they may have had at the time when they believed us to be beaten, of making a dash upon Leghorn, as the annexed proclamation would lead one to believe?

All the Corsican refugees are already arrived at Leghorn; the commissary Salicetti calculates on starting to-day.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 9 Fructidor, year 4 [August 26, 1796].

I have made a beginning of the negotiations at Venice. I have demanded of them provisions for the supply of the army. You will find annexed a copy of the letter to citizen Lallemand. As soon as I have swept the Tyrol, negotiations conformable to your orders shall be commenced; at the present moment they would not succeed; those people have a powerful navy, and are sheltered from all insult in their capital; it may even prove extremely difficult to put the property of the English and the emperor under sequestration.

I have sent for citizen Faypoult to Milan. We have agreed upon the preparatory measures to be taken for the execution of your instructions relative to Genoa.

At the same moment that we shall be at Trent, the army of the Rhine will be at Inspruck, and that part of the corps of troops coming to me from La Vendée reaches Tortona, I

shall proceed in person to Genoa, and your decree shall be executed in its full tenour.

As for the Grand-duke of Tuscany, we must continue to dissemble with him. I have made a change of troops in the fortress of Leghorn, to put out calculators as to their number, and to make a movement in the interior of Italy for the purpose of accrediting the reports that I get circulated with a view to overawe the populace of Rome and the Neapolitans.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 9 Fructidor, year 4 [August 26, 1796].

The King of Naples, at the head of 24,000 men, which in reality may not exceed 15,000, has advanced into the territories of the pope, threatening to march to Rome and thence come and join Wurmser, or proceed to Leghorn, in order to drive us, in concert with the English, from that place. Rome was in alarm, and the cabinet of his Holiness in the greatest consternation.

I have written to citizen Cacault to soothe the court of Rome, and to signify to that of Naples that, if the King of the Two Sicilies advanced into the territories of Rome, I should consider the armistice as null, and march a division of my army to cover Rome. Citizen Cacault assures me, without being certain of it, that the King of Naples has desisted from his enterprise, and that he has himself returned to Naples. That court is perfidious and stupid. I am of opinion that, if M. Pignatelli has not yet arrived in Paris, it would be proper to sequester the 2000 cavalry that we have in depot, to seize all the goods that are at Leghorn, to draw up a strong manifesto, exposing the bad faith of the court of Naples, particularly of Acton; the moment it is threatened it will become humble and submissive. I have written to M. d'Azara at Rome; I have told him that, if the court of Naples, in contempt of the armistice, again offers to enter the lists, I engage, before the face of Europe, to march against the pretended 70,000 men, with 6000 grenadiers, 4000 cavalry, and 50 pieces of cannon. The fine season is advancing: six weeks hence I hope the greatest part of our sick will be cured. When the succours that you announce to me arrive, I shall be able at once to carry on

the siege of Mantua, and to overawe the Neapolitans and the Austrians.

The court of Rome, during our disasters, behaved no better than the others: it had sent a legate to Ferrara; I ordered him to be seized and detain him an hostage at Brescia; it is cardinal Mattei. The vice-legate, named Greca, had escaped, and was not more than two hours' distance from Rome; I sent him an order to come to Milan, and he came. As he is less culpable, I shall dismiss him after keeping him here for a few days.

Many reports are circulated respecting the King of Sardinia, but I think they are all unfounded. He has sold his artillery equipage, disbanded his provincial regiments, and is endeavouring to recruit, because he would rather have foreign troops than native regiments, on which he cannot much rely. It would be well if the journalists would be pleased not to publish such absurdities as they are daily circulating concerning him. There are petty paragraphs, dashed off from sheer rumour, without any ill intention, which do us more harm and make us more enemies than a contribution, from which we should derive advantage. Perhaps it might be useful if an official journal were to insert an article contradicting these absurd and ridiculous reports.

BONAPARTE.

To Citizen Miot, Minister of the Republic at Florence.

Head-quarters, Milan, 9 Fructidor, year 4 [August 26, 1796].

I have received all your letters. There are at Leghorn 2500 men of the 75th demi-brigade and 600 Corsican refugees, whom I am organizing into companies. I am sending the 15th and the 14th demi-brigades: make yourself easy.

Dissemble with the grand-duke; if he behaves ill, he shall pay all at once: people of that sort are not much to be feared.

BONAPARTE.

To the Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Brescia, 13 Fructidor, year 4 [August 30, 1796].

It frequently happens that deficiency of the means of conveyance prevents the soldier from receiving his ration of bread of twenty-four ounces, and he gets no more than

twelve: it is but just, when this happens, to indemnify him by giving him an equivalent in money. In consequence, the general-in-chief orders that, in this case, there shall be given him one sou and a half per twelve ounces. The inspector of provisions of the division must give a certificate, which shall be examined [*visé*] by the commissary of war, the chief of the staff of the division, and the general commanding the camp. The *commissaire ordonnateur*, at the end of the decade, shall present the certificate to the commissary-general, who shall cause it to be paid.

BONAPARTE.

To the General-in-Chief.

Rome, 12 Fructidor, year 4 [August 30, 1796].

I have received the two letters from Milan, of the 8th of this month, with which you have honoured me.

I have the honour to send you the answer of the cardinal secretary of state, to the demand of a supply of a thousand bullocks for the army. Orders are given for them to be delivered as fast as possible, and I have sent the commandant of the citadel of Bologna a letter from myself, specifying the persons who will be legitimately charged with the said bullocks, and to give a receipt for them on account of the contribution in kind.

I had the honour to inform you before that orders had been given by the pope for admitting the French garrison into Ancona, on the terms of the armistice, and that you could, therefore, send the garrison whenever you pleased. I send you annexed the pope's order which you wish to have; it is signed by the cardinal secretary of state, in the usual form, the most authentic and the only one customary here.

All that results from the note sent to Ancona, to the secretary of state, in which you have observed that the consul of his Sicilian majesty had placed the arms of his master over his door, is that the court of Naples now thinks fit to have at that port a regular consul, to whom it gives a somewhat higher character to support, conceiving that at the present time it has more need to be apprized of what is passing in that quarter.

The Prince de Belmonte has found himself in Paris, like M. Petracchi, without sufficient powers for signing the preliminaries which have been communicated to him. He has,

therefore sent off a courier to his court, which I believe to be now much frightened : it keeps up its stern and martial countenance. M. the Prince of Castelcicala has not answered my second letter, and I hear that his chargé d'affaires has orders not to receive any letters that I may send to him for his court.

All the solicitude, all the vigilance, all the efforts of M. Acton are principally employed in preventing all communication of Neapolitans with foreigners, so that it is very difficult for me to obtain correct information relative to the state of his army. I shall send you the bulletins as fast as I receive them.

Your letter to M. Azara will be read and shown about : copies of it will probably reach Naples, and they will greatly rejoice the public.

I have answered the municipality of Ferrara and the senate of Bologna, on the subject of the alarm which they felt, but which was unfounded, that the pope had given orders for depriving them of the spiritual graces. I have also explained to the senate of Bologna how I had arranged with M. Azara to prevent both M. Capelletti and the ex-Jesuits from giving it the least annoyance.

The effect of the pardon solicited for two wretches has been better than if we had left them in the galleys, where they already were ; but I have made them sensible here that you blamed me for it. If you did but know this beggarly population, and how I am beset all day long by mendicants ! There is nothing dangerous here but the emissaries of the coalition, especially the English and the Neapolitans.

We are now proceeding tolerably well towards the execution of the armistice ; but here are new incidents arising, of which you are apparently informed.

A fresh courier from M. Petracchi, minister of the pope in Paris, arrived here yesterday, bringing me the decree of the Directory, a copy of which you will find annexed.

I have acquainted you with the difficulty which has arisen upon the first article of the treaty ; I send you annexed a copy of that article. The congregation of the cardinals summoned by his Holiness to give him their opinions, both upon the first article of the treaty and the new incident of the decree of the Directory, has judged that, on the first point, the article could not in conscience be admitted without some reserves for the conservation of the faith. For the rest, it

has decided that the pope should send to the commissioners of the Executive Directory, Salicetti and Garrau, a plenipotentiary to obtain peace. M. Azara has been requested to accompany this new minister, and consented. A courier will set off immediately to seek out the commissioners and to inquire to what place Monseigneur Caleppi is to repair with M. Azara.

The pope weeps ; but neither he nor his council can yet bring themselves to listen to the opinion of the divines whom I mentioned to you, or to the more solid reasons which M. Azara and I have given to make them comprehend that the article referred only to temporal matters.

As for the armistice, there is no backwardness about its fulfilment. The more important affair of the definitive treaty is now under consideration : this leaves no opportunity to negotiate here for the purpose of inducing the pope to take the measures which you suggest in regard to constitutional priests. I imagine that the Directory means to send to the commissioners a treaty ready to sign without rejoinder.

CACAULT.

The Prince Castelvicala to Citizen Cacaault.

I have received, sir, the letter which you have been pleased to address to me on the 22nd instant, in answer to that which, by command of his Sicilian majesty, I had the honour to write to you on the 20th of the same month. The king, who has read the contents, has seen with surprise the reports circulated respecting the march of his troops, since all these rumours were entirely overthrown and demolished by the declaration which I made to you in my preceding letter, that the troops of his majesty would not pass the limits of this kingdom unless foreign troops entered the territories of the pope and directed their march against us. Precautions and measures of safety and foresight cannot be absolutely neglected by his majesty ; but the king will scrupulously observe the armistice, sincerely desiring the return of good harmony ; and in consequence of this very sincere disposition on his part, he will always employ such becoming and suitable means as can contribute to manifest the truth of this assertion.

I have the honour to transmit to you a summary of the facts concerning the detention of the officer and three French

seamen whom you mentioned in your letter, and you will there observe the regularity of the conduct of the Neapolitan commandant.

THE PRINCE DE CASTELCICALA.

Citizen Cacauly to the Prince de Castalcicala.

Rome, 14 Fructidor, year 4 [August 31, 1796].

I have received the letter which you did me the honour to write to me on the 29th of August. The general-in-chief Bonaparte had been irritated by a concurrence of the circumstances and reports which I specified to you; but, having received a copy of your letter and of General Acton's dated the 20th of August, he now sends me word that he has no further doubt of the observance of the armistice, the execution of which he also will faithfully uphold.

I have referred the affair of the four Frenchmen detained at Orbitello to the consul-general at Leghorn, Belleville, that he may settle it with the consul of his Sicilian majesty. I shall transmit to him to-day the summary which you have been pleased to send me. I shall also address a copy of that paper to the captain of La Dangereuse, who is at Civita Vecchia, that both may be informed of the decision of the king, who sets at liberty the officer and the three seamen.

As nobody desires more sincerely than myself the speedy re-establishment of peace, you will always find me disposed to promote a good understanding, and to give you proof, monsieur le prince, of the sentiments of the highest consideration.

CACAULT.

To General Bonaparte.

Verona, 14 Fructidor, year 4 [August 31, 1796].

I perceive, general, and I am even certain that the Venetians, so far from meaning to observe neutrality in regard to us, are preparing and secretly fomenting—the nobles and the priests in particular—acts of hostility against us: I can no longer doubt it, since hostilities are already commencing. One of my patrols cannot go a league from its camp, without being attacked and fired at by the peasants, who assemble in arms at the sound of the alarm-bell. Several volunteers

have already been murdered, and I have not been able to discover the culprits and to bring them to justice. The podesta of Verona, on my complaint, expressed great anxiety to put a stop to these outrages, which will have mischievous consequences, and affects to be taking a great deal of trouble; but, in fact, not a criminal has yet been apprehended. I can hardly believe that the Venetian government suffers itself to be deceived on this point, and is ignorant of the source whence such outrages proceed.

Does it favour the Austrians in tacitly approving these hostile insurrections? I cannot help thinking so; and this must be cleared up as speedily as possible.

At two o'clock this morning, my advanced post of cavalry was attacked by an advanced guard of enemy's hussars on the Vicenza road: a few sword-cuts were exchanged, and the arrival of a strong patrol of ours forced the enemy to retreat; he was about 100 strong—horse. According to certain intelligence, these troops were directed to our advanced posts by nobles of the country: some of these latter have gone so far, to my knowledge, as to give money to our grenadiers and volunteers for the purpose of enticing them into insubordination and disorder; which, I hope, will never happen, for I make them observe the strictest discipline. There is one noble in particular, whose name I have, that promises to get rid of the generals by laying ambuscades for them; in short, the emperor and our French emigrants have all this country in their favour: I am sure of it.

It is high time, general, to ascertain at once the intentions of the government of Venice: let it tell us whether we are at war or at peace with it. Till we receive an answer to this question, I will do my best to protect this side of the army, and to maintain safety and order among the troops that I command.

AUGEREAU.

To the Chief of the Staff.

Pinvenzano, 15 Fructidor, year 4 [September 1, 1796].

The bad weather which we have had for some days has obliged General Pigeon to order down the posts from Monte Baldo. If the weather changes, I shall direct him to send them up again.

The soldiers suffer cruelly: two-thirds of my division, at

least, are in want of coats, waistcoats, breeches, shirts, &c., and absolutely barefoot. This deficiency of clothing gives us a great many sick, and will give us a great many more, if people never do anything but promise without sending us necessaries.

I give you notice, general, that, if the movement of the general-in-chief takes place, the soldiers whom I command cannot march in any way whatever ; it is physically impossible, unless one would choose to leave half of them half-way. I have no hesitation to tell you that, if the same attentions are not paid to my division as to the others, I will give in my resignation and renounce the profession. Let it not be supposed that I am swayed by ill-humour : it is as a free man and fond of what is right that I thus express myself.

I have long been applying at Verona for flour, for the purpose of setting to work the ovens that are within reach of my division. I know not from what diabolical speculation it is that they will never send anything but bread ready baked at Verona, which, when it arrives here, is always mouldy, at least two-thirds of it. When liquids are sent to us, it is always in musty casks ; and, before they are landed and delivered at the magazine, half the quantity is always gone.

I have written to the commissary ; I have stationed an officer of my staff at Verona ; but, for all that, things do not go on as they ought to do. If you talk to the commissaries and the agents, they tell you that a much greater quantity of provisions is sent off than is wanted for the division ; but they are well aware, from the letters which I have written them, that half and more is not fit to be received. Let the general-in-chief give orders that this shall be no longer the case. Health and fraternity.

MASSENA.

The Executive Directory to General Bonaparte.

Paris, 17 Fructidor, year 4 [September 3, 1796].

The Directory has received, citizen-general, your despatches of the 9th of this month. The statement of the strength of the army which you command, rendered inactive at this moment by sickness, and the account you give of the delay experienced in their march by the reinforcements

destined for you, have deeply affected it. It is writing anew and in the most imperative manner, on this latter subject, to Generals Kellermann and Chateauneuf-Randon ; it nevertheless observes that your preceding letters and those of its commissioners mentioned that the troops despatched from the Coasts of the Ocean were arriving successively at Milan.

Important as it may be to follow up the enemy after his defeat, still we admit the necessity of the delay which you have thought it right to interpose before you enter the Tyrol. The nature of the ground, the particular knowledge of it possessed by the Austrians, who, though beaten and considerably weakened, yet dared to resist in new positions, and the internal situation of Italy, are, on this head, so many motives which we can appreciate. But the time bestowed on these necessary precautions ought to ensure greater activity in the ulterior operations ; and we think that you will be forthwith at Trent, and very soon either at Brixen or at Inspruck, according as circumstances shall decide you.

The passage of the Lech by the army of the Rhine and Moselle, the direction of its right upon the rear of the Austrian army, and the retreat of Prince Charles upon the Iser, add new confidence to the security which we share with you respecting the sequel of your movements, and which arises from your multiplied victories, the influence of which cannot fail to be decisive in favour of the Republic, since the distress of the court of Vienna and the humiliation of its defeats have not yet touched it sufficiently to make it sincerely desirous of putting an end to the war. The more obstinate and the more haughty it is, the more terrible let us be, and let us redouble our energy to close the campaign with new successes, without compromising most especially those which we have already won.

We approve the vigour of your threats in regard to Naples, and we authorize you to carry them into effect, if that court resumes a hostile attitude towards France. We wish to be accurately informed of what has passed, and what motive the King of Naples now alleges for his movement upon Rome.

We continue to reserve for the most favourable moment the execution of our views respecting the powers of Italy with which we have interests to discuss ; the most essential point now is to ensure our triumphs.

Though at a distance from the parts where the Barbets carry on their pillage, do not lose sight of those obscure and dangerous enemies: orders emanating from you will have more effect than any that can be issued without your participation in repressing that evil, which is spreading in several departments.

The laws relative to the organization of commissaries of war, so far from authorizing pusillanimity, prescribe to them, on the contrary, a courage equal to that of the defenders of the country. One of our decrees orders, moreover, that some of them shall always be attached to the troops, even in presence of the enemy, and that such as should be cowardly enough to quit the post of honour, of danger, shall be brought to trial. We request you, citizen-general, to let that decree be laid before you, and to provide for its rigid execution.

We request you also to inform us of everything relating to the operation that is about to be commenced in Corsica, and to second with all your means the zeal of citizen Salicetti, and the daring of the refugees of that island.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX, *President*.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Trent, 20 Fructidor, year 4 [September 6, 1796].

We have nothing to do, citizens directors, if we would profit by our present position, than to march upon Trieste. We shall be at Botzen as soon as the army of the Rhine shall have advanced upon Inspruck, but this plan which we are adopting, and which would have been good in the month of June, is good for nothing at the end of September: the snow will soon re-establish the barriers of nature: the cold is already becoming severe; the enemy who has felt it has thrown himself upon the Brenta to cover Trieste. I am marching to-day along the Brenta to attack the enemy at Bassano, or to cut off his rear, if he makes a movement upon Verona. You are aware that it is impossible for me to entangle myself in the mountains of the Tyrol, when the whole hostile army is at Bassano, and threatens my flank and my rear. Arrived at Bassano, I shall beat the enemy; how then would you have me drive him before me and strive to take Trieste from him? On the day that I should beat the enemy at Bassano, and the army of the Rhine be at

Inspruck, the 4000 men left of the division which guarded Trent would retire by Brixen and Lintz upon the Friule; then the communication with the army of the Rhine will be truly established, and I shall have flung back the enemy beyond Trieste, an essential point, whence the enemy's army derives its supplies. Then, according to the nature of circumstances, I shall stay at Trieste, or return to the Adige. After destroying that port, and according to the nature of events, I will dictate to the Venetians the laws which you have sent me in your ulterior instructions. Then again it will be easy, if the reinforcements from General Chateauf-Randon arrive, and if you take care that I am furnished with 10,000 men of the army of the Alps, to send a good army to Naples. Lastly, citizens-directors, do you not choose this winter to have the war carried into the heart of Italy? Let us carry it into the Friule.

The army of the Rhine, occupying Inspruck, guards my left flank: a month hence the snow and ice will do that for it, and it will be able to return to the Danube. You are better aware, no doubt, than I am what an effect the taking of Trieste would produce upon Constantinople, Hungary, and all Italy. At any rate, citizens-directors, on the 22nd I shall be at Bassano. If the enemy waits for me, there will be a battle that will decide the fate of this whole country; if the enemy falls back again upon Trieste, I will do what military circumstances shall cause me to judge most suitable; but I shall await your orders to know whether I am or am not to dash upon Trieste.

I think that it might be necessary to form at Milan three battalions of Milanese, which would serve to reinforce the army blockading Mantua. If you adopt the plan of going to Trieste, I beg you to let me know in what manner you wish me to conduct myself towards that city, in case it should be thought proper to evacuate it some time afterwards.

BONAPARTE.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief.

Paris, 23 Fructidor, year 4 [September 9, 1796].

In Germany, citizen-general, there have occurred some events, which, without compromising thus far the successes which the Republic has obtained, require, nevertheless, a

new degree of energy for executing the new dispositions that we have ordered. The army of the Sambre and Meuse, attacked suddenly by Prince Charles, who has brought General Wartenleben a reinforcement from Bavaria, has been obliged, though without any serious battle, to fall back upon the Rednitz and successively upon the Lahn.

This situation, which might be attended with disastrous consequences, if we were not to thwart the design of the enemy by a prompt and bold measure, has decided us to direct General Moreau to march immediately with the greatest part of his force, between the Rednitz and the Upper Neckar to attack Prince Charles, who will be attacked in front at the same time by General Beurnonville, who is bringing from the army of the North to that of the Sambre and Meuse a reinforcement of which he will take the command. General Jourdan, having need of rest, passes from that to the army of the North. General Moreau will establish in Bavaria, before he leaves it, a defensive, sufficiently strong to cover the Lech, and to curb such enemies as there are in this part of the theatre of the war. But, to accomplish this object which is essential, it is necessary that you should briskly occupy the Austrians in the Tyrol, who might carry succours into Bavaria, as they have already done, according to the reports which have reached us, in order to find themselves in force on the right of their line of operations. We think, therefore, that you ought to act in such a manner as to march with rapidity upon Inspruck, and threaten to make an irruption into Bavaria. Avoid scattering the troops as much as the nature of the ground will permit, that nothing may be left to chance in that difficult kind of operations which you will have to execute. You will be deeply sensible that present circumstances are of the highest importance, and that it is incumbent on us to deploy all our means and especially to combine the employment of them along the whole line occupied by our acting armies. This concert alone can restore the offensive to us at all points; and we hope that the manœuvre of Prince Charles, fortunate for a moment, will draw upon his army terrible strokes, by inducing him to try anew the fortune of battles.

We transmit to you a copy of the last report of General Jourdan.

In this despatch, citizen-general, we confine ourselves to the subject of the movement which we prescribe to the brave

army of Italy and its able general, to operate immediately in the Tyrol.

We refer to our preceding letters for all that relates to the other affairs of the command that is entrusted to you.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Marseilles, 23 Fructidor, year 4 [September 9, 1796].

The eighth division is stripped of general officers. Till the minister has supplied the places of those whom he has taken from me, I have thought it right to keep temporarily General of brigade Verné, whose health prevents him from returning so soon to the army. I have given him the command of the department of the Lower Alps: I shall inform the minister of this arrangement. According to the statements of situation addressed to the staff, you will see that I have not 6000 men for the four departments of the eighth division. Agreeably to your orders, I have despatched fifty gendarmes of the department of the Var, and I cannot supply their place without great inconvenience. Marseilles must be disgarnished, and I have not a hundred disposable horses; but Toulon and the department of the Var can no longer furnish the service of the ordonnances for the escort of the mails.

The Executive Directory had given me an order to keep a complete squadron of the 18th regiment of dragoons on its passage. In consequence of the state of that corps, which left 150 horses at Liurbone, and 30 at Nimes, which General Chateauneuf-Randon took it upon him to retain, I was obliged to limit the number that I kept to 55 mounted dragoons, 25 for the department of Vaucluse and 30 for Marseilles. The chief of brigade leaves me 17 ailing horses and 55 dismounted men, whom I hope to remount, as I have received advice that some horses are coming from the interior to the depot. The rest of this regiment, reduced to nearly nothing, will set out on the 25th for Italy.

I have learned, general, that it is your intention to take the grenadiers from me: in the state in which these departments are, that measure might be attended with the most disastrous consequences. The fire is smouldering under the ashes; agitators, enemies by interest and character to

every government that strives to establish the sway of the laws, are daily hatching new plots. The removal of the constituted authorities pronounced by the Legislative Body cannot fail to occasion violent movements, if there is not at hand a force sufficiently imposing to prevent them. In all quarters, the dangerous party is armed; it forms assemblages and commits acts of violence; deserters, men who have taken the benefit of amnesties, who occupy civil posts, enrol the persons liable to the requisition and the vagabonds of all countries. I have presented to the government a picture of my position, and I am soliciting from it succours of all kinds. Till they arrive, I cannot strip myself of the few troops I have, without perilling the public weal. This is not all: all the military administrations are cramped by the want of funds. Four days after my arrival, the troops would have been without bread, had not I overstepped my powers, and insisted on emptying all the chests, taking upon myself personal engagements.

The agents-in-chief of the victualling section, of military transports, of forage, of hospitals, &c., are with the army, and take no heed of this division, with the supply of which they are charged. The pay of the different corps was several months in arrear. Such is the state of the division, the command of which has, for my sins, been committed to me. I dare say that this picture, equally true and alarming, has been kept out of your sight. You are gaining victories over the foreign enemy; I congratulate you upon them with all my heart; but this is not sufficient for the happiness of the country: you must ensure order and tranquillity at home, and you will then have all the kinds of glory to which a republican hero ought to aspire. See what you can do to assist us. Health and fraternity!

The General of Division,
WILLOT.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Bassano, 23 Fructidor, year 4 [September 9, 1796].

You are aware, general, how brilliant the conduct of the 4th demi-brigade of infantry of the line has always been: you witnessed its exploits in the actions of the 21st and 22nd of this month. That intrepidity which characterizes it is

partly owing to the example of the brave officers who command it; among these the following have particularly distinguished themselves, and I solicit for them well-merited promotion.

I solicit the rank of general of brigade for the chief of brigade Lannes, who in this army as in that of the Eastern Pyrenees has never ceased to exhibit the most signal proofs of valour, and who in the last affair took two colours from the enemy;

That of chief of brigade, commanding the 4th demi-brigade, for the chief of battalion, brother of that officer: he has rendered the most important services, and combines the most useful talents with the greatest courage. He was wounded in the battle of Ceva, and again yesterday: this misfortune, which gives him a claim to the public gratitude, will not prevent him from appearing again in a short time at the head of his brave comrades.

Lastly, I desire that citizens Cassan and Gros, captains of grenadiers, equally commendable for their bravery, their zeal, and their morality, be promoted to the rank of chiefs of battalion.

I hope, general, that you will be pleased to transmit these applications to the Executive Directory, on whose justice I rely in this matter, as much as upon yours.

AUGEREAU.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Guisenfeld, 23 Fructidor, year 4 [September 9, 1796].

I have received, citizen-general, your letter of the 14th of this month. I was ready to attempt the attack of the gorges of the Tyrol; the Lech and the Iser were forced, which gave us excellent debouchés upon Inspruck; but the army of the Sambre and Meuse, having almost reached Ratisbon, has been repulsed successively to Bamberg—it is even said to Wurtzburg: which obliges me to change my direction. The enemy, who has not been able to withstand us at this point, keeps the field only by strong parties of cavalry on our flanks and our rear, which sometimes annoy us.

I dare not commit to paper my present plan, apprehensive lest this courier should fall into the hands of the enemy: as soon as it is determined upon, I will communicate it to you.

Our advanced posts occupy Neuburg and Neustadt ; the army is encamped at Guisenfeld ; Ferino's corps occupies Mosburg, Franken, and Munich ; the right is at the sources of the Lech towards Kempten and Schöngau. I wish most sincerely that more favourable circumstances may enable me to second your operations.

The General-in-Chief of the Army of the Rhine,

MOREAU.

PS. General Reynier sends you, in a few words in cipher, what we are going to do.

To General Bonaparte.

26 Fructidor, year 4 [September 12, 1796].

We had proceeded, according to your instructions, to the bridge of Castellara on the 25th Fructidor ; the length of the march prevented our arrival before eight or nine in the evening. We had found at Bigarello about 60 hussars of the garrison of Mantua, whom we pursued, but in vain : we had but one horse.

No sooner had we made our first establishments on the Molinella, about three or four hundred fathoms in advance of Castellara on the Porto-Legnago road, when the advanced guard of Wurmser arrived from the opposite direction. A few musket shots of our advanced sentinels and the tramp of horses made us believe so ; the signal of the cannon fired at Mantua on the return of the hussars into that place, and several times repeated, left us no doubt. Joy at stopping Wurmser gave new strength to our weary soldiers, and the destruction of the brick bridge and the making of fortifications to mask the avenues were accomplished with enthusiasm by the army of Italy.

During our march, on arriving at Bigarello, we had left General Pelletier with 600 men at the point where the road which our column had followed joins the high road from Mantua to Castellara : by abattis which were ordered about a thousand toises farther on, towards Mantua, and by breaking down two bridges, he was to cover us from all possible efforts of the garrison : we had moreover left about two miles in rear, at the Due Castelli, 200 men, who were to break up the roads and to destroy the bridges in the direction of Mantua.

All that we now had to do was to cover ourselves against

Wurmser: we sent to break down the bridge of Sorgate, over the Tione, about 1500 toises from Castellara, which bridge is situated on a high road, which comes from Nogara and at the distance of about two miles leads to Castellara.

All our men were engaged in these occupations, which were most urgent, when a patrole, sent off in the morning of the 26th by this bridge of Sorgate, informed us that it had been to a great distance, without finding any Austrian post; and even ten chasseurs, who had been despatched towards Villa Impenta, assured us that they had seen a great number of Hulans. In their report, they confounded the three rivers which are on that side; we, nevertheless, marched off 200 men whom we meant to send to the bridge of Villa Impenta, in order to afford ourselves the means of slipping to our right: the 200 men returned before they had gone a quarter of a league. The movement of Wurmser was then clear.

We had endeavoured to collect all possible information respecting the road from Villa Impenta to Ronco-Ferraro, and we still suspected there was a débouché for an Austrian army there: we resolved immediately to reconnoitre Ronco-Ferraro; we had yet but glimpses of projects. Some chasseurs started, and, to avoid the loss of time between the report of the scouts and the orders to be given for turning them to the best possible account, we pushed forward with the utmost despatch 80 men of the advanced guard upon that road. A quarter of an hour afterwards, when another detachment of 100 men was about to push forward to support or follow them, our chasseurs returned at a gallop upon the road; and our 80 men came back in haste and in disorder through the fields and the lateral vineyards.

There is a second road, which parts from the Castellara road at the bridge of La Molinella, about 250 toises from the road of which I have been speaking, towards our left — in the position which we were now obliged to take — and which runs and branches off towards the right hand road, about 2000 fathoms further. We soon learned that our little post pushed forward on this road, fell back also in disorder. Our enemies, masters of the angle of the two roads, advanced upon us by both routes; they had filled the intermediate ground with tirailleurs, and a fire of small arms commenced on all sides.

Our troops were scattered: several detachments were occupied in covering the working parties at the different and very distant bridges. The 200 men at the bridge of La Molinella were not disposable; 500 were still at Bigarello, 200 at the Duc Castelli. If the enemy were to pass by one of these roads, he would cut our line, but the confidence and the courage of the troops did not allow us to be for a moment uneasy respecting our position.

We collected the troops that we had left. St. Hilaire pushed forward by the left hand road. Beaumont endeavoured to make his way over the broken ground in the centre, and Charton proceeded along the right hand road, but with so few men that each of them had really nothing but tirailleurs. I learned in a moment that Charton had been killed by a discharge of grape. I ordered Beaumont, who was proceeding to this right hand road to cheer the troops whom the ravage of the grape-shot had daunted, to be called back. One piece of light artillery was taken to each of the roads, and a great number of horses of the enemy's cuirassiers were killed. They fell back: our troops then advanced, but presently it was their turn to fall back. There were several such alternations from three in the afternoon, when the action commenced, to seven in the evening. I sent successively reinforcements of twenty-five or thirty men on either side, in proportion as the return of detachments strengthened my reserve.

Thus Wurmser appeared to be kept in check by our advanced posts, which were supported: the enemy must have supposed that we were in force in the village. General Kilmaine's column, which arrived at ten o'clock the preceding night and started in the morning according to fresh orders, must have misled the enemy; he imagined that we were 10,000 men, as I was told; the truth is that the troops opposed to him were under 1000.

But it was not without loss that our brave fellows thus baffled Wurmser, reinforced by part of the garrison of Mantua: we had at least 300 men killed or wounded, including those of the 12th demi-brigade of light infantry, with the chief of brigade Dugoulot at their head. He was ordered with 250 men to throw himself upon the right flank of the enemy's cavalry; this detachment ventured imprudently into a plain, of which Dugoulot, wounded, was no longer master: it would have charged the squadrons of the

cuirassiers which were there, but it was crushed by that cavalry. All that were not killed are prisoners; and I hope Dugoulot is among the number.

On the other hand, the ground which the enemy occupied is strewn with carcasses of men and horses. We have taken but eight prisoners: forty chasseurs whom I had could not pursue the enemy when he retreated.

General Kilmaine, who arrived at nine in the evening, gave me fifty horse, who pushed on for three or four miles, that is to say to Ronco-Ferraro, before which the enemy bivouacked.

I received at the same hour a letter from Murat, informing me of the arrival of the advanced guard of our army at Nogaro; and I immediately apprized him that I should return to my post agreeably to your instructions. It was agreed with General Kilmaine that he should endeavour to retain for our army the passage by Castellaro, or the enemy might come and occupy my position, for the purpose of defending it against our army which was coming in pursuit of him. I set out at ten in the evening, and arrived at Goito, bringing all back in the best order.

It is not without reason that I have every where said *we* instead of *I*. All the measures that I took were assented to or dictated by Generals Beaumont and St. Hilaire, by the brave Charton before his death, and by the brave and honest Abbé, whom I charged from the commencement with all the details of the division, who escaped twenty times the grape of the right and of the left, and who is, as I am told, a lieutenant in I know not what demi-brigade.

Motdier, chief of battalion of engineers; N...., quartermaster of the 1st regiment of light artillery, who commanded the howitzer on the left and had six horses killed by the grape-shot; N...., chief of battalion of the 19th infantry; the thousand men who were in the fight, whose names I should be glad to know, have all done wonders.

I beg your permission to keep with me Razout, Charton's aide-de-camp, and Gardeur, formerly aide-de-camp of General Causse, who have rendered the greatest services. I am obliged also to name to you Croisier and Cabanes, both captains in the 25th chasseurs, who have executed the reconnaissances with which I charged them with the utmost possible intelligence.

SAHUGUET.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Porto Legnago,
27 Fructidor, year 4 [September 13, 1796].

During the ever active and uninterrupted campaigns of four years, I have been struggling with the inconveniences of a shattered constitution. I did hope that palliatives would bring me to the moment when peace would permit me to think of repose: the fatigues of the last march have overthrown that hope, and I find myself assailed by so many complaints at once that I am compelled to renounce for a time the continuance of my service. The piles absolutely forbid riding; almost universal rheumatic pains, and my chest, which has been long affected, have thrown me into a state that is almost intolerable. It is painful for me thus to leave the work of war incomplete at the moment when it is terminating, but it is consolatory to my heart to have worn out my faculties, ruined my health, destroyed my constitution, in serving my country. Nobody has served it with greater zeal, or has with greater regret found himself compelled to suspend his labours. I hope, general, that you are convinced of all this.

I leave the command of the division to the general of brigade Bon; but I engage to send you an officer who will have your confidence. That general of brigade who would be qualified to command it is of the shortest standing, and that would not do.

I am going to Brescia or Milan, whence, if I can recruit myself, I will return and resume my functions as soon as possible.

AUGEREAU.

To General Bonaparte.

Trent, 1st complementary day, year 4 [September 17, 1796].

I have been at Trent, my dear general, for these two hours, and shall return to my post immediately. We have repulsed the enemy this morning, and taken a hundred and odd prisoners. This little affair over, I am come to Trent to make the council, heretofore aulic, take the oath authentically.

By the 7th article of the order which you have left at Trent, one Lingui Cheluzzi, a Tuscan, finds himself in the

predicament to be obliged to quit Trent in twenty-four hours. He appears to be regretted by the municipality and by the inhabitants; but he calls the council, or part of the council, rascals; is he right? I know nothing about it.

It has appeared to me that the best understanding does not prevail between the council and the municipality. I have ordered the commandant of the place to watch the conduct of both narrowly, in order to discover in which confidence may be put. I will acquaint you with all that I discover. I cannot help following the 7th article of your order; but if Lingui Cheluzzi, whom you are acquainted with, deserves an exception, you will be pleased to let me know.

VAUBOIS.

To General Bonaparte.

Paris, 3rd complementary day, year 4 [September 19, 1796].

We awaited, my dear general, with an impatience which you may easily imagine, the result of the action for which you had prepared us by your preceding courier. We have just received your last accounts, and, though accustomed to the most extraordinary things on your part, our hopes have been surpassed by the victory of Bassano. What glory for you, immortal Bonaparte! What a blow for proud Austria! She would not raise her head after it, if all our armies were as successful as that of Italy; but the miserable retreat of Jourdan disconcerts all our plans. The army of the Rhine and Moselle, which was going to give you the hand, has found itself compromised, nearly cut off, obliged to fall back precipitately to defend its flank, and it will require all the skill of Moreau to get it out of the scrape. However, Beurnonville, who succeeds Jourdan, is coming with a considerable reinforcement; he is about to resume the offensive, and I hope that the end of all this will be the general discomfiture of Prince Charles's army.

From this nothing less will result than that we shall be deprived of the resources of Bavaria, that your left is no longer supported, that we shall have great difficulty to send you succours equivalent to the column that should have joined you by way of Inspruck. It is in your energy then that we shall find new means. Push on to Trieste, if you think that your right is safe, and are easy about your rear;

raise heavy contributions in the Friule, and threaten the emperor with the destruction of his only port if he does not make haste to accept peace : but it must come to that if he is obstinate. Recollect that, as soon as winter-quarters are taken on the Rhine, he will have a great disposable force, which he will not fail to employ against you, and that this is one reason for not involving yourself, without being certain of the gorges of the Tyrol.

CARNOT.

To His Majesty the King of Sardinia.

Head-quarters, Milan,
5th complementary day, year 4 [September 21, 1796].

The officers appointed by your Majesty to command in the part of your dominions that has been restored to you view, if not with pleasure, at least with indifference, the murders and robberies committed against the French.

By the treaty of peace concluded between your Majesty and the French Republic, the Republic was to continue to occupy that part of the territories which had been given up to the army by the treaty of armistice. Conceiving that I should do something agreeable to your Majesty, I restored to you not only the civil government but also the military government, with the special clause that the roads should be guarded, and that even our convoys should be escorted by your troops.

I therefore request that your Majesty will be pleased to order a corps of respectable troops to be kept in the villages of Limon and Limonais, which should send out patrols as far as Lacas, escorting convoys, and taking all necessary measures for making that road safe, as well as Vadier, and generally in all the districts bordering on Demont, forming the communication between Coni and Barcelonetta.

I likewise request of your Majesty that the five persons who have been apprehended at Borgo-San-Dalmazzo by the French, may be delivered into the hands of the military commandant at Coni.

I beg of you also to give orders to your different governors to exert themselves heartily for the apprehension of the banditti wherever they are found.

Independently of the interest of humanity and justice,

your Majesty will give, by this conduct, a proof of your sincerity, and contribute to extinguish those germs of discord, which would ultimately spread into the heart of your Majesty's territories.

BONAPARTE.

To the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the King of Sardinia.

Head-quarters, Milan,
5th complementary day, year 4 [September 21, 1796].

I am no diplomatist, sir, I am a soldier: you will forgive my frankness. In different parts of his Majesty's dominions, the French are murdered, robbed. By the treaty of peace, the king, who is bound to grant us a passage through his territories, ought to make it safe for us; and it is to this end alone that, contrary to the tenour of the treaty of peace, I have taken it upon myself to restore to his Majesty not only the civil government but likewise the military government in that part of his dominions which has been restored to him by the Republic. At Viné, at Limon, before the face of the garrison of Demont, and that of the corps of troops commanded by M. Fanchar at Borgo-San-Dalmazzo, outrages are daily committed which appear to be not merely tolerated but even encouraged by the government.

I shall therefore request of you a simple explanation.

1. Ought not the king to be expected to indemnify and make good the losses sustained in consequence of crimes committed in his territories against the French, when those crimes are committed in broad day, and by paid bodies of two or three hundred persons?

2. Is the king, with 25,000 men whom he has under arms, strong enough to quell banditti in his dominions and to enforce respect for the laws of justice, of humanity, and of treaties?

People judge of men, sir, by their actions alone: the integrity of the king is universally known; yet one is almost forced to think that there are political reasons which cause atrocities so revolting to be encouraged or at least tolerated.

I have written to his Majesty himself; I request you to present my letter to him. The French government will never do any thing openly or secretly tending to destroy or to weaken the effect of the king's government upon his

subjects ; you are aware, nevertheless, that this would be not less easy than successful. The very day that you sincerely set about destroying the banditti who infest our communication between Coni and Barcelonetta, they will cease to exist. I beg you to believe me, &c. BONAPARTE.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Pavia,
5th complementary day, year 4 [September 21, 1796].

I am writing you to-day a military and a political letter.

I have made the council of Trent take the oath ; it has done so with a good grace ; and received it from the other subordinate authorities. There is a strongly marked and malignant division between the inhabitants, and it cannot but lead to public disturbances. Who is right ? who is wrong ? This is what I cannot yet form any sound judgment upon. The podesta, concerning whom I wrote to you, sides with the municipality ; but he is obliged to leave Trent : I await your answer on that subject. He has a great many partisans among the people ; that tells in his favour.

The council has for one of its members a certain count, whom I somewhat mistrust : but there are other members, and one in particular, who are reputed to have been fond of our revolution ever since its birth : all these members were, nevertheless, nominated by the prince-bishop, and the municipality by the people.

One observation has been made to me by divers inhabitants, whom I believe to be well disposed : they see with pain that the council has no authority above it : they dread tyranny, and are apprehensive that the spirit of party will direct their determinations.

They would wish you to nominate three persons who have your confidence, of whose way of thinking you are sure, and who will attend to their business. I submit their wishes to you. VAUBOIS.

To the General-in-Chief.

Rome, 1 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 22, 1796].

I have the honour to send you annexed a copy of the letter which I transmitted yesterday to the secretary of state.

Some persons doubt the authenticity of the letter of the King of Naples to the pope, a copy of which I sent you; however, it is not formally contradicted. I am left here without any person to write to me, or to give me any hint about it. I should be glad to have a word from you.

It seems to me that the pope cannot get out of trouble without sending a cardinal ambassador to Paris to sign everything. He is very loth to come to this determination.

If the 2,000,000 which were despatched hence three weeks ago have not arrived at Imola or Bologna, their progress must have been delayed.

I beg you, citizen-general-in-chief, to accept my attachment.

CACAULT.

PS. I have this moment received the accompanying bulletin, which reports a movement of Neapolitan troops that have already arrived at Ripatransone, in the ecclesiastical territory, marching towards Ancona. I cannot think that at this moment the government of Venice dare enter into a league with the emperor, the pope, and the King of Naples; yet that is what people talk of. The fools call this league "the last resource of Italy."

I have sent to ask the pope's secretary for foreign affairs whether he had received any intelligence of this movement of the Neapolitans, as he cannot fail to have done, if it is true. The answer this moment is—Nothing new on that subject. Perhaps accounts may be received by and by.

To General Bonaparte.

Verona, 1 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 22, 1796].

It is a long time, general, since I had the honour to write to you concerning the very suspicious conduct of the cabinet of Turin towards the French Republic. I dare say that at this moment you are thoroughly informed of the manœuvres of that cabinet, and of the real aim proposed to themselves by the ministers of Vienna and England residing at Turin.

The circumstances daily occurring are so many motives for leading one to presume that this king will not keep the peace any longer than the force which has compelled him

to make it shall exist. Here are some of them extracted from the report dated the 30th Fructidor last.

The club of the aristocrats meeting at Turin in the house of Sales is still conspiring against our patriots and the invincible army of Italy. In Piedmont there has been organized a Vendée of 1600 men, half in the valley of Aosta, and half on the Col de Tende. Their principal object is to slaughter our brave brothers in arms in detail. For some days past, they have been murdering all who pass, and the assassins have the temerity to come to Turin to sell the arms and clothes of the unfortunate victims.

The chiefs of these banditti are the Marquis Caluso and M. Genosio, a clerk in the great Tobacco office. The banditti are paid by the king at the rate of 20 sous per day. To arm these scoundrels, stores have been taken from the royal arsenals, and in no small quantity.

Four companies of free chasseurs of the night patrol have been dissolved for the purpose of being incorporated in this band. Letters have been sent all over the country declaring that all the French are infected with the plague and ought to be put to death; otherwise Piedmont will be ruined. These letters were despatched by the club at the time of the last affair which the French had with the Austrians. The Duke de Chablais said on this occasion: "If the French have been successful this time, they will not be so a second."

Not an emigrant has yet left Piedmont, and they insolently wear there all the devices of royalty. Giraud, Chevalier Rousset, Rotondo, and several others, imprisoned for their political opinions, are still languishing in fetters.

The Austrian prisoners, whom the French send through Piedmont on their way to France, are seduced by agents paid by the government, who conceal them from the French escort, and then send them to the Swiss regiments in the pay of the tyrant.

PICO.¹

To the General-in-Chief.

Verona, 1 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 22, 1796].

Till now, nobody has been stirring to pick up information towards the Friule: I have placed a man at Udine to give us intelligence of the movements of the enemy.

¹ A Piedmontese, employed as a secret agent.

The man whom I sent to Mantua entered the place, and reports to me that the whole of the enemy's troops in that quarter amount to 15,000 infantry and 6500 cavalry, of whom 6 or 7000 are sick. There are four military hospitals: one in the convent of Santa Barbara, near the gate of St. George; another at Santo Spirito, a convent of reformed; a third at Santa Catarina—last two near the Ceresa gate; the fourth and last at Santo Barnaba, near the Pusterla gate.

There are three hay-magazines: one in the palace of the Marquis Lanzoni; a second in the Domismondi palace—both situated in the street of Santo Christophoro; and the third, which is the largest, at la Trinita, nearly in the centre of the city. These magazines are almost empty; forage is expected to arrive by the Po, and they will endeavour to introduce it by the Ceresa gate. At St. Gervais, in the Gonzaga palace, near the Molina gate, there is a magazine of oats tolerably well provided.

There are also two powder-magazines in the city: one is in the church of Santo Sebastiano, near the Pusterla gate, and the other in the church of Santo Nicolo, between the Ceresa gate and the Catena gate. The latter is the more considerable.

It has been observed to me that the post of Rivalta, by which the spies coming from the Tyrol introduce themselves into Mantua, ought to be guarded.

PICO.

To General Bonaparte.

Verona, 2 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 23, 1796].

I inform you, citizen-general, that, in the evening of the day before yesterday, the 2000 men who were at Pordenone arrived at Sacile. A corps of 200 infantry and 100 cavalry has also arrived at Porto Buffole, and a third detachment has proceeded to Molta.

PICO.

To General Bonaparte.

Verona, 3 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 24, 1796].

The enemy have advanced from Sacile to Treviso: from that place they sent two corps, one to Castel Franco,

which has sent patroles to Citadella and to the environs of Bassano; the other to Novale, which has detached patroles to Padua and the environs.

I am assured that the whole army of 23,000 men, which is to keep on the defensive on the side towards Trieste, has received orders to act in concert with that which is in the environs of Bolzano, and which may be about 12,000 strong. The first is commanded by General Colli, the second by General Loudon.

One Nicolino, an innkeeper in Brescia, who has a brother in the Berchini hussars, has written to me, applying for payment of, 1stly, 490 francs in money, expended by your order for secret correspondence in that quarter, a note of which I sent you some time since; 2ndly, 12 sequins, which he says he laid out at the time of the discovery, ten or twelve days ago, of the *pharmacie* of the Austrians, which was concealed in the custom-house of Brescia.

PICO.

To General Bonaparte.

Rome, 3 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 24, 1796].

The reply of the commissioner Salicetti, who sends me word that, all things considered, he thinks that the commissioners of the arts had better return to Florence, determined them to set out yesterday evening. I have written to the cardinal secretary of state to apprise him that the commissioners were going to make an excursion in Tuscany, which would be no detriment whatever to the operations agreed on for the armistice. I send you herewith the answer made me by Cardinal Busca in sending their passport, and his reply to my preceding notes.

I called upon him this morning to have a fuller verbal explanation with him. This Milanese cardinal, having his fortune at Milan, is imbued, it is true, with the spirit that animates the congregations and the pope, but he is aware that he must keep terms with us: hence I have no reason but to speak well of him at present. The result of our conversation is, that the Roman and papal government, which, in fact, is preserved as much as possible by the proposed treaty, seems to his holiness and to all the cardinals to be destroyed and annihilated, if they accept such conditions. Accordingly, the court of Rome is determined,

without hope of return, to persist in the refusal to sign, notified at Florence by M. Caleppi.

As it is asserted here that the Directory has notified to M. Pieracchi that, if the pope did not sign the conditions, every thing would be upon a war footing again, the government is directing its whole attention to defensive measures, seeking to arm a great number of men and to make alliances.

It is alleged to be too clear and too manifest that France must treat this country in a hostile manner, otherwise the pope will, in spite of the armistice, refuse to deliver the promised contributions. In consequence, the cardinal secretary of state has signified to me verbally that the execution of the armistice, in so far as relates to the delivery of the productions of art and of the contributions, was suspended; but that, for the rest, one may be sure that the pope will not break the treaty by any hostility.

I have perceived clearly enough that he was ready to notify to me in writing this suspension of the execution of the armistice and its motives, hoping that in consequence I should decide upon retiring to Florence, until the definitive solution of the difficulties.

Notwithstanding the sternness of my behaviour, which, in reality, cannot give rise to any suspicion of understanding with what is here called our party, and which I am not acquainted with, our enemies, who can find nothing else to allege against me, are alarmed at the danger of my stay at Rome, as if I were a person to excite disturbances, like a harebrained enthusiast. Hence, out of stupidity, and not to be annoyed by the sight of any Frenchman here, the pope and his ministers would be glad to see me set off.

The cattle, selected by the commissioners for improving the breeds in France, yet remain to be sent off: they will start to-morrow for Bologna.

Though I know full well and officially that the productions of art will not be despatched, I shall let the commissioners, whose labours are not yet interrupted, proceed with packing the statues in cases, and with the construction of carriages for transporting them; and, without contrary orders, I shall remain as long as I can to observe Naples and this country, but it cannot be for any long time. I see no hope of inducing the pope to sign the proposed treaty, or even to negotiate with submission for the mitigation of

certain articles : he is so dragooned that he is really to be pitied.

The secretary of state assured me that he had no intelligence that the Neapolitan troops had advanced into the Ecclesiastical State, that he was merely informed of the army of Naples, which is on the frontier.

It is true that the court of Naples has ordered a declaration to be made here, that the negociation with the French Republic forbade it to engage at the present moment against it. That court is sending to Rome the Marquis del Vasto, grand-master of the king's household, to make proposals for treating. He is expected every moment.

The exasperation of minds in all the tyrannies and aristocracies of Italy against our power, dominant and extorting in proportion, renders it necessary to have forces decisive and to be relied on. More than 16,000,000 inhabitants might rise at once against us ; it is this that is contemplated—it is this that is hoped.

I delivered to the commissioners, on their departure for Florence, all the very detailed maps of the kingdom of Naples as yet engraved from Zanoni's surveys. This collection they will forward to you from Florence as soon as possible.

CACAULT.

PS. They are raising a great outcry here on account of the ransom demanded for Cardinal Mattei.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte, commanding the Army of Italy.

Paris, 4th complementary day, year 4 [September 20, 1796].

The army which you command, citizen-general, has completely justified our hopes in the course of this campaign ; but it seems to have surpassed them by the new successes which you have reported to us. The result of the actions of the 21st and the 22d Fructidor is as glorious as it is unparalleled, and, if Wurmser should even contrive to escape from your pursuit with his wretched wrecks, which is not probable, we must consider the discomfiture of his army as entire, and the conquest of Italy as irrevocable.

Let the republican army, citizen-general, enjoy the prize that is justly reserved for it by the public gratitude and

esteem, after such signal triumphs: express to it our particular satisfaction; and accept yourself the distinguished part of it which is your due.

Among the measures which we have adopted for the purpose of following up our advantages, and rendering them decisive in favour of the Republic, whose interests all tend to peace, the first is, to signify to the emperor, that, unless he consents to send immediately to Paris an envoy furnished with powers to enter into negociation, you will destroy his port of Trieste and all his establishments on the Adriatic Sea. As soon as the fate of Wurmser and his last division is decided, you will send a despatch to Vienna to make this notification, and you will march upon Trieste, ready to execute a threat, justified by the laws of war and the obstinacy of a haughty house, which dares attempt every thing against the Republic, and sports with its sincerity.

During this movement you will continue to effect the dispersion of the remnant of the Austrians scattered in the Tyrol; you will establish a safe communication between the army of the Rhine and Moselle; and you will impose heavy contributions wherever the French arms penetrate.

It is to be presumed that, when you are at a distance from the Milanese, such of the inhabitants of the interior of Italy as are ill-affected towards us will seize the opportunity to foment new revolts. Repress beforehand the explosion of their perfidious designs, by giving the generals, to whom you commit the safety of the troops and of the countries which they occupy, precise orders, and by specifying to them the salutary measures which they will have to take according to circumstances.

As to the political situation of Italy, one principal observation fixes our attention, and ought to direct your conduct in regard to the different States or towns which may desire to give themselves a government, which is that peace, our highest wish, may depend on the lot of the Milanese, and that it behoves us to husband the means of exchange, in order to consolidate the union of certain parts of the territory of the Republic. It is, therefore, essential not to favour indiscreetly political innovations detrimental to the conclusion of peace and to the corroboration of our liberty.

The moment appears to have at length arrived for chastising Venice by the measures which we have already pre-

scribed to you, and the execution of which a prudent caution has induced us to defer. Lay due stress on the legitimacy of your pretensions ; use conciliatory forms as far as they are capable of accomplishing your object ; and then, if it be necessary, let the means of victory follow proceedings conformable to the neutrality which we wish to maintain with that State, after the just satisfaction that we have a right to require of it.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX,
President.

To the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 4th complementary day, year 4 [September 20, 1796].

We approve, citizen-general, the proposal which you make us to accede to the wishes of the Milanese, which is desirous of forming battalions to be employed in the blockade of Mantua, since you find in it no inconveniences in a military point of view ; but, in adopting this measure, it is essential to observe that our laws do not allow us to introduce foreign corps into our armies : so the battalions of the Milanese shall be considered as distinct troops from those of the Republic, and which have a common enemy to combat, though on this head nothing shall be stipulated with the Milanese.

A consideration has been submitted to us, respecting which we wish to have your opinion. While you are prosecuting the plan of operations, which we have chalked out in our first despatch of this day, is it not dangerous to leave the Piedmontese troops in superiority of force in Italy ; and would it not be advisable to induce the King of Sardinia, by the concession of some advantages, to send 15,000 men to march in concert with the army which you command ?

We do not presume that the King of Sardinia will readily acquiesce in this proposal : whatever may be the acknowledged honour of the French nation, he will be afraid to strip his territories of troops, and thereby deliver them up defenceless to his allies, whom perhaps he still dreads.

Be this as it may, notwithstanding the inconveniences which we imagine that we can perceive, we authorize you to treat on this subject with the court of Turin, if you see any advantage in it, and to give it all the guarantees necessary

for its safety. If this negociation comes to nothing, it will be very useful to make sure of the disarming of Piedmont, as it has been stipulated in the treaty of peace, in order that you may not leave behind you any subject of uneasiness that might distract your movements.

The same attention ought to be paid to the court of Naples: at the present moment we can only watch it and control it at a distance. Our most important object is to strike at the house of Austria, and to march upon Trieste. Fix a short time for the answer of the court of Vienna to your declaration, in order not to lose time, which the approach of the bad season renders more valuable.

We have received from citizen Salicetti intelligence of happy augury for the success of our designs respecting Corsica.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX,
President.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 4th complementary day, year 4 [September 20, 1796].

We have received, citizen-general, a remonstrance sent from Mondovi, the value of which you are much more capable of appreciating than we. The complaint is that, in spite of the amnesty, the Piedmontese patriots, who have declared in favour of France, are still persecuted by the Sardinian government, and among others by one Moschetti. It is alleged that the line of demarcation which determines the Piedmontese possessions that our troops are to occupy till the peace, is frequently broken, and that, ever since the month of Messidor, there have been Sardinian troops at Mondovi. Complaints are most especially made of the extreme licentiousness practised with impunity by our soldiers and by some of their officers in those parts of the conquered countries in which they are distributed. It is added, that an inevitable consequence of this relaxation of discipline is, that the inhabitants, victims of the excesses of their conquerors, are continually murdering those on whom they cannot otherwise revenge themselves. Perhaps there may be exaggeration in these complaints; but several particular facts have already proved that they are not without foundation. The Directory, citizen-general, beseeches you, therefore, to give all the orders necessary for

putting a stop to these horrible acts of vengeance, and above all for preventing the cause of them. All the officers under your command ought to be worthy of the signal successes which you are continually obtaining over the enemy ; and we know that you will not allow men who dishonour the Republic to remain in the army, when its triumphs, owing to your talents and its valour, so highly exalt its glory.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX,
President.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 4 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 25, 1796].

We awaited with confidence, citizen-general, the tidings which you had announced to us by the courier who preceded him of the 30th Fructidor, and they were, in fact, very satisfactory, though the success which you report to us was not so complete as we had a right to hope from the precision and the boldness of your dispositions. The defeat of Wurmser under the walls of Mantua has avenged the brave army of Italy for his escape from its pursuit at the passage of the Adige and the Brenta, and all that it has left to do to crown its glory is to bring that place under the power of the Republic, with the wrecks of the Austrian army shut up in it. To accomplish this object, not only is it necessary not to leave any thing to chance, but the recent events that have occurred in Germany command us to set every thing at work to prevent the arrival of the troops which the Austrians might send to the relief of Mantua. How important soever may be the operation which we have prescribed upon Trieste, it is still more essential to consolidate the conquest of Italy by the reduction of the first of those two places, and we recommend to you to employ all your means to that end, with the boldness and activity which direct all your enterprises. Certainly, it were to be wished that your march upon Trieste could be effected at the same time, and it is to be feared that the season will not permit you to undertake it till Mantua has surrendered ; but we repeat that we think that we ought to sacrifice this advantage to the necessity of closing the door of Italy against the Austrian reinforcements, and remaining masters of it at the end of the campaign.

We are fully persuaded that you feel all the force of our

motives in not leaving any thing to the chances of fortune. It is in Italy that we must indemnify ourselves for our reverses in Germany, and force the emperor to peace: it is, therefore, necessary to render our military position there impregnable.

Without analyzing here the causes of the checks in Germany, we shall merely inform you that the army of the Sambre and Meuse has successively abandoned the Rednitz, the Mayn, and the Lahn, and that it has fallen back, part upon Dusseldorf, part behind the Rhine. General Beurnonville, who had assumed the command, and reinforced it with a considerable corps from that of the North, announces that he is about to move it forward, and we hope that he will march with sufficient celerity to prevent the greater part of the enemy's forces from falling upon the army of the Rhine and Moselle, and obliging that to retreat too. In the contrary supposition, it is to be concluded that the enemy will afterwards march reinforcements into the Tyrol; and it is this consideration which induces us to desire you to regard the reduction of Mantua as an object to which you ought to sacrifice at this moment every other operation.

The dislike of the Germans to our troops, occasioned by indiscipline, and the consequences that have resulted from it, give us a new and a melancholy warning how fatal to the glory of an army is laxity in the exercise of military authority, from rank to rank, and how important it is to gain the inhabitants of the theatre of war by the maintenance of good order.

But it is not enough for us to prevent their becoming our enemies; we must render them such towards their old government, and sow the seeds of insurrection even in the countries to which our armies have not yet penetrated. This observation applies particularly to Hungary, where political principles, deep-rooted among the higher and lower nobility and the different classes of the people, render the Austrian yoke more heavy. Circulate there, in the native language, proclamations the energy of which shall awaken the pride of the Hungarians and their ancient hatred of their oppressors. The fame of your successes and of French honour will beget a confidence in your promises, and perhaps excite in them a desire to reconquer their independence: the court of Vienna, at least, will be alarmed, and the re-

sources of all kinds which it derives from that kingdom will diminish in proportion to its fears.

We are going to receive with lively satisfaction the colours which aide-de-camp Marmont has brought, and we propose to grant to the brave men who have lately distinguished themselves the rewards which you have solicited for them.

We request you to express to the army, and particularly to the general officers and others who have been wounded, the satisfaction which we have received from their devotedness.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX,
President.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 6 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 26, 1796].

We think it useful to transmit to you, citizen-general, by an extraordinary courier, a letter which we have just received from the general-in-chief, Moreau: it will make you acquainted with the position in which the army of the Rhine and Moselle is at this moment. We hope that it will maintain itself on the banks of the Danube till that of the Sambre and Meuse can resume the offensive, and, aided by the efforts which this latter will immediately make, it shall again advance to the banks of the Lech, and even to those of the Iser, for the purpose of taking its winter-quarters there.

In this state of things we fear that the enemy, quitting the army of the Sambre and Meuse, may for a moment bring to bear some force against that of the Rhine and Moselle, in order to mask with the greater certainty a movement, the object of which would be to make a dash upon you with all the disposable troops, to oblige you to raise the siege of Mantua; and we think it useful to recommend to you to guard with care the debouchés of the Tyrol, at the same time levying in that country all the contributions you can, till the bad season intercepts them and forbids any enterprise against you from that side. The attention of Austria is almost exclusively turned to Mantua. That city, which the court of Vienna considers as the last bulwark of Italy, contains the wrecks of General Wurmser's army, and it is to be presumed that the emperor will make every effort to relieve it.

Strive then, citizen-general, to finish this campaign in Italy with the reduction of that place, to which the fate of this peninsula is in some measure attached. Continue to correspond frequently with the general-in-chief Moreau, that the harmony of your movements may awe the enemies of the Republic, whom the conquest of Italy has astonished, and who will find themselves compelled to think seriously of peace, when they shall be certain that this country, defended by talent, courage, and strength, cannot be wrung from us, and that the brave army of Italy and its chief, who have conquered, leave them no hope of recovering it.

The last sums sent to the army of the Alps were absorbed immediately, and part has been employed for absolutely indispensable expenses incurred for the conduct of numerous prisoners of war taken by the army of Italy.

It is with regret that we inform you, citizen-general, that it is impossible for the national treasury to supply the urgent wants of the army of the Alps; which the slight aid sent by you has not yet been able to place in a satisfactory situation. We recommend to you to consider this army as forming in some measure part of that which is under your orders, and we request you to provide for all its necessities, concerting with the general-in-chief who commands it. Your zeal is known to us, and we know that it is sufficient to point out to you the way to be useful to your country, to be persuaded that you will be eager to pursue it.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX, President.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 8 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 29, 1796].

Our commissioners with the army of Italy have reported to us, citizen-general, the refusal given on the part of the pope to accept the conditions of peace that we have submitted to him. Our intention is not to modify them; but, as it is important to finish the campaign with the reduction of Mantua, in order to dictate with the greater assurance laws in southern Italy, and it is useful meanwhile not to break the armistice which you have concluded, we are instructing our commissioners to prolong the negocia-

tion till such time as we shall be able imperatively to command peace to Rome or to overthrow its power.

General Beurnonville has made a movement in advance of the Sieg; Prince Charles is before him. The campaign is recommencing in that part of the theatre of war with hope of success, and General Moreau, who supports himself upon Ulm and Bregentz, likewise gives us hopes that he will maintain his ground in Suabia, till a decided offensive is re-established on the left of our line of operations. Some corps from the Tyrol have attempted to annoy his right flank and been repulsed.

We are hastening the marching of a reinforcement of about 10,000 men, which we destine for you. Every day the conquest of Italy appears likely to turn the balance of political interests more and more in our favour; its consolidation is involved in the taking of Mantua, and we give you all the means in our power for finishing the campaign with that decided advantage.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

The Executive Directory to the General-in-Chief Bonaparte.

Paris, 10 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 1, 1796].

You will find annexed, citizen-general, a decree relative to Wurmser: that hostile general, whom you have beaten so often, and who is very near his last defeat, in the place which you are besieging, falls under the laws of the Republic relative to emigrants. We leave you to judge whether it is advisable to communicate to him this decree, in order to induce him to surrender Mantua, by exciting in him a dread of being sent to Paris and there tried as an emigrant, if he holds out to the last extremity, and by offering him an honourable capitulation if he consents to deliver up that place to you. It appears to us that this alternative must startle him; and whatever confidence we may have in the important operation in which you are engaged, we ought not to neglect any of the legitimate means which can be useful against an obstinate army; but if you think, from a particular knowledge of the state of things, that this communication would produce a contrary effect and urge Wurmser to make a desperate defence, instead of suffering himself to be overcome by personal

fear, you will not make any use of the decree, and we rely upon the force of our arms and the talent which distinguishes them to accelerate the taking of Mantua, to which we attach the highest value.

L. M. REVEILLERE-LEPAUX.

To General Bonaparte.

Roverbello, 4 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 25, 1796].

I learn this moment, general, that the enemy yesterday attacked Porto-Legnago: what is the result of that attack, and what the force of the enemy, I know not; neither do Generals Massena and Kilmaine. I immediately despatched fifty chasseurs of the 10th for Porto Legnago, by way of Castellara, Nogara, and Sanguinetto. The officer commanding this reconnaissance has orders to push on till he falls in with the enemy, or can inform me of his force and his position.

General Kilmaine sends word that General Bon has marched upon Castellara with his division, and that he has orders to break down all the bridges across the Tanaro.

I shall send out continual patrols upon Isola until I have received some intelligence.

I see with pain, general, that prisoners continue to be escorted with culpable indifference and almost without precautions. Yesterday, from 7 to 800 prisoners were committed to the charge of eight dragoons, from the Duc Castelli to Roverbello, and without one foot soldier. They were conducted yesterday to Peschiera by thirty horse chasseurs only, and without infantry: it is nevertheless high time to take precautions. I know from good authority that a corps is forming entirely of deserters in the Val Trompia, and that every day, three or four boat-loads of these deserters are sent across Lake Iseo to increase the nucleus collecting in the Val Trompia.

The corps descending from Padua is estimated at 10,000 men. Some volunteers complained bitterly yesterday under my windows that the prisoners of whom this new army was partly composed were suffered to escape: they nevertheless flatter themselves that they shall beat them and see them better guarded in future.

I learn too from a letter written at Venice that a body of Hungarians has already arrived at Trieste.

The inhabitants of Bergamo, out of gratitude for not having had a French garrison, have given an entertainment to the governor of the town, who has ordered a young man of Brescia, named Lechi, to leave Bergamo immediately, for having published in a coffee-house the news of your triumphs far from agreeable to the country, and treated there as a falsehood.

You are no doubt aware that the prisoners who desert are favoured in the whole of the Bergamasco by the constituted authorities. You are already informed of this ; but I am too much attached to your glory and your person not to communicate to you every particular that I can pick up respecting the proceedings and the intentions of our enemies.

MURAT.

To the General-in-Chief.

Florence, 4 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 25, 1796].

Garrau must have informed you, general, of the pope's answer. He has refused to accept the conditions which the Executive Directory offered him through us.

The successes which you have lately obtained are so splendid, that to me it appears impossible for the emperor to think of opposing an army to you in Italy : but Jourdan's reverses in Germany, if as disastrous as they are reported to be, must throw the Executive Directory into great embarrassment.

The tidings from Corsica are good. The interior of the island cannot be more discontented than it is with the English : it appears to be only waiting for the fit moment to break forth. Canzo, with twelve men of his own choosing, has landed on the island towards Ajaccio ; a score more, from this side of the mountains, have landed on the beach of Ravague. Rocca Serra, Subrini, and two deputies sent to us from Sartenne, with thirty-six or forty refugees, were to set sail yesterday evening, if the weather were favourable. General Gentili and Casalta, with 300 men, are only waiting for a fair wind to be off ; and as soon as the movement has assumed the character which I am striving to give it, I will repair thither myself, unless you think

that my presence can be of any utility for the operations which you are about to undertake in Italy.

The Directory has just written to me to put in requisition all the hemp I can in Ferrara and Bologna, and to transmit it forthwith to Toulon. To this end four clerks in the Navy Office have arrived with instructions to accelerate the transport of the hemp, which I shall place at their disposal. I shall set out for Bologna to-morrow, and avail myself of this opportunity to organize at Ferrara an administration composed of natives of the country, capable of managing affairs *ad interim*. If you have anything to say to me meanwhile, I beg you to write to me at Bologna or Ferrara.

While I am engaged in superintending the collection of the hemp and giving a more regular march to the administration of this country, the embarkation of the Corsicans will be actively continued at Leghorn. Every preparation is already made there for their speedy departure. Everything leads me to believe that the expedition will be successful, especially as the English have embarked part of their troops at St. Florent, to reinforce the garrison of Gibraltar.

At Leghorn there have been some movements during the last days, on account of a miracle performed by a Christ in a church. General Serrurier must have given you an account of this affair: all is now quiet again.

SALICETTI.

To General Bonaparte.

Venice, 7 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 28, 1796].

The enemy have retired from Treviso: their last advanced posts, since six p.m. on the 5th instant, are at Corrigliano and Oderto on the river Montigan, and at Molto, which is at the conflux of the Montigan and the Livenza. In each of these villages there is a corps of 150 men, part cavalry.

Towards Trent, the enemy is advanced upon the right of that city; and I am assured some detachments have appeared at Sabio in the valley of Sabio.

For these three or four days past, the city of Verona has been crowded with French, who give out that they are in the service of the Republic, though many of them do

not wear the cockade. Their conversation is not republican, so that there is reason to suspect them to be royalists come from the interior or emigrants.

PICO.

To General Bonaparte.

Fachiani Farm, in the Sarraglio,
8 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 29, 1796].

I inform you, general, that our investment has been made in the best order and without loss. Wurmser has profited by the succours given him at St. George and at Governolo. From the faint resistance he has made, we may conclude that he has not precisely the garrison which he needs for the place. According to my calculations, he cannot have men enough, for I think he has 1200 fewer than on his arrival.

Having traversed the Sarraglio in more than one direction, I have perceived that it cannot be so unwholesome as it is reputed; the soil is every where dry, and there is no water but on the banks of the lake towards Mantua; what proves that it is an agreeable spot to live in, is the great number of handsome country-houses. I enter into these particulars, merely to intimate to you that we might form some establishments there. Nay, more, general: if you do not get a bridge thrown over the Po, for the passage of provisions from the other side, in a month the roads by the dikes and by Formigosa will frequently expose your troops to the want of subsistence. Another consideration might be added, namely, that this would relieve the country about Verona, which has been occupied by armies during the whole campaign. The causeway from Ceresa to Borgo-Forte is very good; it would therefore be requisite that the bridge should be within reach of that causeway.

I have this instant received your letter of the 7th Vendemiaire, in which you order me to cut and break down the dikes of Governolo. Those who suggested these ideas meant, no doubt, to say—destroy the sluices of Governolo: but it is thirty years since they were destroyed, and since the Po, when swollen, ascends without impediment to Mantua.

As there are persons who think of making a Venice of Mantua, they ought to have proposed to you a very consi-

derable undertaking, but great in its results, namely, to bar the whole Mincio with a dike, having in its upper part the form of a mill-dam, that the water may never rise above the dikes, but always keep at that height. I shall revert to this subject when I have seen Governolo again ; on a day of battle I cannot say more to you ; only be easy about Mantua : they are labouring very hard, and I am going to fortify all our positions by redoubts, which will take from the enemy all inclination to come to seek us.

CHASSELOUP-LAUBAT.

To the General-in-Chief.

Rodiza, 8 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 28, 1796].

I shall now answer the different articles of your letter.

The cavalry, according to the arrangement which you approved at Verona, is to be divided into three brigades ; the first is that of General Beaumont, the second that of General Murat, the third that of General Leclerc. You will find annexed the statement of subdivision. Not a single musket has yet arrived from Cremona ; but Landrieux has found 300 new ones at Raggiolo in a forsaken mansion, and sent me them. I am arming with them 300 of the 69th brigade, whom I am bringing from Cremona.

I shall establish at San Benedetto the depot for convalescents, the formation of which you order : I think with you that this will be an excellent site.

As we have no brandy and Cremona cannot furnish any more, I avail myself of that which is at Modena, and, in consequence, am giving orders to the commissary of war charged with the two divisions to get a quantity.

I have agreed upon everything with General Lespinasse ; but, as we are in want of artillerymen and cannot supply it, I am taking gunners' assistants from the battalions. This measure is of the strictest necessity.

The enemy made a sortie yesterday morning, but without success : I send you a copy of General Chabot's report on the subject.

Our flotilla makes no progress : at the rate this goes on, we shall not have an armed boat on the lake in less than a fortnight : the enemy is armed in force at Mantua.

Moreau's last victory is a brilliant one, no doubt ; but

the victory of an army which nevertheless does not decamp is of no great service to us, and my opinion is that we shall be obliged to reckon upon ourselves alone. If it were possible to fall upon the enemy before they have collected their troops, what think you of that, general? You can dispose of 20,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry: a little revolutionary march would astonish them. Whatever you do, general, accept my most sincere wishes for your success and your glory.

KILMAINE.

PS. This moment, general, I have received your letter by my aide-de-camp. I think that it would be possible to make ourselves masters of the works of Pradella, and also to make a lodgment there; but I imagine that it would cost us a great many men, and as for the blockade, the enemy is so closely cooped-up on this side that not a creature can either go in or out. If we had but wherewithal to commence the siege, we should be sure to take it; but then this would be much easier, because, by throwing a few bombs into the work, we should drive off those who are defending it, and can batter the flank with siege pieces.

I think that it is possible to surprise it, but that we should have difficulty to maintain ourselves in it. For the rest, if a few days were of no consequence, I might hope that the fever would grant me some respite and allow me to preside on the occasion: I shall write to General Dallemagne and to the engineers; this is all that I can do at the moment, for I am unable to ride and still less to walk. In two days, I will write to you on the subject. -

I will send and get the proclamations printed at Modena and have them posted in all the environs of Mantua.

The preparations and the great number of boats which the enemy is arming in Mantua indicate the intention of an external sortie, and probably on the side of St. George, where our forces are thinned in an alarming manner. That division has lost 1500 men in the last fortnight, and the posts can no longer be manned.

The 1st regiment of hussars will march in two days for Legnago, as well as the remainder of the 20th dragoons, because by that time our moveable columns will have returned. The first regiment of cavalry must come to Roverbello, and, if the 5th cavalry has not arrived, I shall keep a detachment of the 20th dragoons till it does.

To General Bonaparte.

Rome, 8 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 29, 1796].

I send you herewith two edicts of the pope's: the first, to show that his Holiness does not consider himself as being at war, and orders only defensive measures; the second, to institute a civic guard for the safety of the city of Rome.

I send you also a copy of the despatch of the King of Naples to M. the Marquis del Vasto, authorizing him to come and treat on his behalf with the pope. That envoy had, the day before yesterday, a long audience of the pope, in the presence of the secretary of state. The league between those two courts is considered as concluded. His Sicilian Majesty will march forward 30,000 men: the English promise to give money; the pope will furnish 8000 men and fanaticism for the whole people. Between two extravagant courts, it is not easy to establish harmony: I am assured that the treaty is not yet signed.

M. Acton would be obliged to relinquish his place if he were to sign a treaty with France, proving how ill he has thus far guided his master. He knows full well that the Neapolitan troops will be worsted if they hazard a battle: he wishes at least to gain time.

If these troops remain on the frontier, the French will quickly force one of the points of their line, and make a rapid march to Naples, to settle the business. M. Acton intends that the peace should have two acts: he has, indeed, a very large company. That half which is to be pushed forward into the Ecclesiastical State will somewhat retard our army. The beaten troops will retire to the frontier, where there will be another battle to fight. After this second and last defeat, the generalissimo Acton will embark in a frigate and sail to England, to enjoy his fortune and the favour of Mr. Pitt. His masters will become whatever they can: the Ecclesiastical State will be swallowed up.

M. Acton flatters himself that it will be time enough to sign a very hard peace when the French shall be in Rome, and that, after having utterly ruined the affairs of the pope, he may contrive to get so much larger a share of the Ecclesiastical State.

This country is consigned to foreign influence; the family of Albani, attached to Austria, has a great ascendancy.

The best posts at the court of Rome are occupied by Neapolitans; the English have a great number of emissaries and hired clamourers. The pope is a narrow-minded man, but violent and proud, who has been excited and in whom pains are taken to keep up the spirit of infatuation: nobody here cares about the welfare of the country: the people feast themselves upon absurd fables.

The agents of Austria, London, Naples, unite their influence to make this country a victim: it is sufficient for them to throw an additional obstacle in our way, by exasperating the rabble against us. There are people who would be glad to instigate the populace to murder me, in order to animate it to defend itself against the French for the purpose of escaping their vengeance. You cannot form any idea of the misguided state of minds in Lower Italy. The presence of the armies can alone rectify opinions, by closing the mouths of furious declaimers, who are paid by the courts.

I am of opinion that the proposed treaty will not be signed either in Rome or Naples, without the presence of armies. If our forces are needed elsewhere, there is no hurry: leave those two States to ruin themselves still more; but we must not give up one step of the ground that we have gained: this would diminish too much the idea of our strength. When the emperor is pulled down and compelled to sign a peace, provided that neither Rome nor Naples is comprehended in it, those two States will be at the mercy of the Directory.

This league between the emperor, Rome, and Naples, would soon be strengthened by the adhesion of Venice, Turin, and Tuscany, if they could flatter themselves with the idea of driving us out of Italy. For this reason we must not proceed a step further than we have done without duly examining our strength, which we must not compromise by too much exposing so vast a fortune.

I beg you, citizen-general-in-chief, to take notice in what tone M. the Cardinal Secretary of State has written to me in the accompanying note on the subject of a French detachment arrived at Farnese. I have endeavoured to reply in such a manner as to set him to rights, as you will see in the annexed copy of my answer.

It seems to me that they have made a mistake at Leghorn in sending a detachment to Farnese as if it were an

imperial fief: it is dependent on the pope alone. Prince Chigi, the proprietor, has just assured me in writing, upon his word of honour, that never did his family receive imperial investiture, or pay any contribution to the emperor. I shall write to citizen Miot to desire him to investigate this affair with the commandant of Leghorn. I should be sorry if, in a moment of doubt and fermentation, the suspension of arms with the pope were broken, before the Directory or the general-in-chief had given orders for it.

I beg you, general, to accept, &c.

CACAULT.

To General Bonaparte.

Rome, 9 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 30, 1796]

I find, upon investigation, that only three Frenchmen, without arms, have been peaceably at Farnese: so there is not the least fault to find with our troops. I send you herewith copies of two new notes.

It is said that the Marquis del Vasto finds some difficulty in settling the treaty of alliance with the pope: it is said that the principal of them arises from the refusal of the pope to declare the war which you are waging in Lower Italy a war of religion.

I have not the means of learning precisely what is secretly negotiating between Rome and Naples. To me everything seems tending to overturn and engulph at once the Ecclesiastical State, which is but the country of dreams: I shall repair to you, general, after my departure from Rome, if that does take place. I shall go to recover some portion of mind in the society of a great man, after having been so long among children.

CACAULT.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Verona, 9 Vendemiaire, year 5 [September 30, 1796].

The 18th of the line is still at St. George and at La Favorita, agreeably to orders given by General Kilmaine, without my having heard anything from him: it had remained at Roverbello in consequence of an order from General Berthier.

A superior officer, whom I had sent to make a circuit,

for the purpose of ordering in the detached troops of my division, could not return by Bassano. The enemy occupies Castel-Franco and Santa Lucia, and pushes reconnaissances as far as Bassano.

I am writing to Murat for him to send me a regiment of cavalry, for the purpose of making reconnaissances as far as Vicenza. I have been obliged to give orders to General Pigeon to rejoin his brigade, having none besides him: I had left him at Roverbello. Victor is absent, and Rampon very ill. Order the 18th demi-brigade to come and join me.

MASSENA.

To General Bonaparte.

Head-quarters, Bassano, 10 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 1, 1796].

I should wish you to send me immediately the 75th demi-brigade, which is to proceed to Montebello: with this reinforcement, I should certainly hold out for a week at Bassano, as you desire, and with still greater certainty, when I have once received all the troops that you promise me. I will do, as usual, all that lies in my power to second your intentions in everything; I will keep the enemy continually in check by my frequent reconnaissances.

Have the goodness, general, to let me be apprised of the departure of the two demi-brigades which Vaubois is to send me down the Brenta, so that I may be able to take advantage of that moment for placing the Tyrolese, who are about Borgo, between two fires, in sending on my part to meet them.

The Castle of Covolo would be destroyed by this time if I had had an officer of engineers and a few sappers additional: I have but nine in all, and I have only a lieutenant of engineers, who is always ill and cannot be of any use to me.

The number of the sick in the hospital of Bassano is decreasing; I shall send to-morrow to inspect the hospitals of Vicenza and Montebello.

MASSENA.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 11 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 2, 1796].

The people of Lombardy are speaking out more plainly every day; but there is a very considerable class that would

wish, before throwing down the gauntlet to the emperor, to be invited to do so by a proclamation of the government, which would be a sort of guarantee of the interest that France will take in this country at the general peace.

This resolution of the government and a decree establishing a regulating government, and acknowledging the independence of Lombardy from that day, with some modifications for the time that the war continues, would be worth as much to the army as a corps of three or four thousand auxiliaries.

The knaveries that are committed are innumerable: amid the bustle of war, it was not possible to keep a strict eye upon them; but now that, during my stay at Milan, circumstances allow me to do so, I promise you to make fierce war upon them: I shall soon have to apprise you that the council has done justice upon a dozen of them.

Henceforward, the people of Lombardy, more fortunate, will feel less the weight of the army and be less liable to vexations. The same is not the case with the unfortunate Mantuan; Nature shudders in thinking of the host of rogues who are desolating that country. I have made some dispositions to diminish the evil.

Bologna and Ferrara, having no troops, are the luckiest of all: superintendents have just been established there; if they behave like the former military agents of Lombardy, most of whom ran away with their chests, they will carry desolation into that fine country. I shall take care to have accounts of them sent to me.

Reggio has made its revolution, and shaken off the yoke of the Duke of Modena. There is not perhaps in Italy a district more decided in favour of liberty.

Modena tried to do the same; but the fifteen hundred troops that the duke keeps in garrison there fire upon the people and disperse the mob. I believe the shortest way would be to declare the armistice broken, since five or six hundred thousand livres are still due, and to place that city on the same footing as Bologna and Reggio. We should have so many enemies the fewer, for the regency makes no secret of the fear with which we fill it, and the joy which it feels at the successes of the enemy. I request you to give me your orders on that point.

My opinion is that this State ought not to be left in the commotion in which it is, but that it would be proper to

declare to the plenipotentiary whom you have in Paris that the negotiations are broken off. Instead of having a new enemy, we should have, on the contrary, succours and allies, the united populations of Modena and Reggio. However, as the face of affairs is changing every fortnight in this country, since that follows the military operations, and as there is no need that your rupture with Modena should occur at a moment when I could not spare fifteen hundred men for a few days, to establish a new order of things in that country, you could declare to the envoy of Modena that you have acquainted me with your intentions, and commit to me the conclusion of peace with his prince. He would then come to head-quarters, you taking care to intimate to him that he must be there before the expiration of twelve days. I would then declare to him that all the negotiations were broken off; at the same moment, our troops shall enter Modena, make the garrison lay down its arms, take the most furious aristocrats for hostages, and put friends of the liberty of Modena into office in their stead.

You will then have Modena, Reggio, Bologna, and Ferrara, where the mass of the people is daily training itself for liberty, where the majority regard us as deliverers, and our cause as theirs.

The territories of Modena extend to the Mantuan: you must be aware how advantageous it would be to us to have there, instead of an inimical government, a government like that of Bologna, which would be entirely devoted to us. We could, at the general peace, give the Mantuan to the Duke of Parma, which would be politic in every respect; but it would be useful for you to cause this to be intimated to the ambassador of Spain, that it may get round to the Duke of Parma, which would induce him to render us many services. Since we are in alliance with Spain, it would not be amiss if the Duke of Parma were to join one of his regiments of seven or eight hundred men to our army; this would render disposable a like number of our troops, and make all the inhabitants of the duchy of Parma consider our cause as theirs; and that is always a great thing. I shall employ this corps before Mantua or in escorting convoys or prisoners, which our men do very negligently: out of 4000 prisoners, 1000 generally escape, which arises from the small number of men that I can spare for escorts. I have tried four hundred Milanese

for escorts, and with complete success. The duke ought also to be obliged to furnish us with a battalion of pioneers of about eight hundred men, with the necessary implements.

Distant as we are from France, the alliance of this prince will be a valuable assistance to us, since his territories are upon the theatre of the war.

The Barbets cut up our communications. They are no longer single-handed robbers; they are organized bodies of four or five hundred men. General Garnier, at the head of a moveable column, which I have organized, occupies Tende at this moment: he has taken a dozen of them and had them shot.

The administration of the department of the Var has refused to furnish two hundred men whom I put in requisition for the formation of this moveable column. General Willot has not only refused to obey an order that I gave him for the departure of the 10th battalion of the Ain, but he has likewise kept back the 11th demi-brigade, which General Chateauneuf-Randon was sending to the army, and a squadron of the 18th regiment of dragoons. That general has, nevertheless, eight thousand men in his division—troops sufficient to conquer the South of France, if it were in revolt.

I keep in awe and attend to the police of an enemy's country more extensive than his whole division, with eight or nine hundred men. That general has too exaggerated opinions, and too readily embraces the different opinions of the parties which are tearing France in pieces, to be able to maintain order in the South without a strong army.

General Willot served at the beginning of the revolution in the army of Italy: he has the character of being a brave man and a good officer, but a furious royalist. As I do not know him, and have not had time to weigh his operations, I am far from confirming this opinion; but what appears clear enough to me is that he acts in the South as in La Vendée, which is the very way to make it spring up there.

When a man disregards all constituted authority, when he declares all the inhabitants in mass of several departments unworthy of the name of citizen, he either wishes to form a considerable army or to give rise to civil war: I can see no middle course. If you leave General Willot at Mar-

seilles, you must give him an army of twenty thousand men, or expect the most afflicting scenes.

When a city is in a state of siege, a military man becomes, to my thinking, a kind of magistrate, and ought to conduct himself with the moderation and decorum required by circumstances, and he ought not to be an instrument of factions, an advanced guard officer. I submit to you all these reflexions, specially on account of the need I have for troops.

I beg you therefore to take the 8th division from under my command, because the principles and conduct of General Willot are not such as they ought to be in his situation; and I should think myself dishonoured to see a leaven of disturbance forming in a place where I command, and to suffer a general under my orders to be but an instrument of faction.

By his disobedience and by his insubordination, he is the cause of the horrors committing at this moment in the department of the Maritime Alps. The convoy of pictures, the masterpieces of Italy, has been obliged to return to Coni; it would have been taken by the Barbets. If General Willot does not immediately obey the order that I have given him to despatch the 83rd demi-brigade, my intention is to suspend him from his functions. Nice itself, at the present moment, is not safe.

The Barbets draw their forces from the provincial regiment of Nice, which the King of Sardinia has disbanded: perhaps it might be useful to form a particular corps from all the inhabitants of the Maritime Alps who were serving in the provincial regiment and the free corps, at the beginning of the war. In this case, one might declare that they shall not resume their rights of citizens till they have served two years under the colours of the Republic.

I have written very strong letters to the minister of foreign affairs and to the King of Sardinia himself. I hope that the number of these banditti will daily become less formidable.

I have sent citizen Poussielgue, secretary of legation at Genoa, to Turin, to sound the disposition of that cabinet for a treaty of alliance: we must have that prince or the republic of Genoa. I even expressed a wish for an interview with the minister for foreign affairs of the King of Sardinia, but that could not be arranged. BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 10 Vendemiaire, year 4 [October 1, 1796].

After the battle of St. George, we endeavoured to draw Wurmser into a second action, in order to weaken the garrison in an affair *extra muros*: we took good care, therefore, to occupy the Sarraglio; I hoped that he would proceed thither. We continued only to occupy the bridge of Governolo, with a view to facilitate our passage of the Mincio.

On the 4th complementary day, the enemy marched 1500 cavalry to Castellucio; our *grand'gardes* fell back as they had been ordered; the enemy came no further. On the 3rd Vendemiaire, he marched upon Governolo, following the right bank of the Mincio. After a very brisk cannonade and several charges of our infantry, he was put to the rout; a hundred of his men were taken and five caissons, with their teams.

General Kilmaine, to whom I have given the command of the two divisions besieging Mantua, remained in his former positions till the 8th, still hoping that the enemy, urged by the desire to bring in forage, would attempt to come out; but the enemy had encamped at the Carthusian convent, before the Pradella gate, and the chapel before the Ceresa gate. General Kilmaine made his dispositions of attack, and marched by several points upon these two camps, which the enemy evacuated at his approach, after a slight fire of musketry from the rear-guard. We occupy the Pradella gate and that of Ceresa, and are blockading the citadel.

It is impossible at this moment to think of the siege of Mantua on account of the rains: it will not be feasible before January. By that time the emperor will have a powerful army in the Tyrol and in the Friule; he has already collected a corps of 6000 men in the latter country, and sent 8000 men to Botzen. Nothing can equal the activity which prevails in the empire for recruiting the army of Italy.

The force of our army is as follows:—I have 18,000 men in the army of observation, 9000 men in the besieging army. I leave you to conclude whether, if I receive no reinforcements, it is possible for me to make head this winter against the emperor, who will have 50,000 men in six weeks.

I have required the commissioner of the government to direct the 40th demi-brigade, which is at Lyons, to be sent to me; I have ordered the 83rd, which is at Marseilles,

and the 10th battalion of the Ain, which is at Toulon, and is to be incorporated in our *cadres*, to be despatched to me. These two demi-brigades, if they arrive, form 4500 men.

General Willot has unseasonably detained the 11th demi-brigade, 400 strong, which General Chateauneuf-Randon was sending hither. Add to this number the 10th battalion of the Ain, 500 strong, which is at Nice; this makes 900 men of the 6000 whom that general ought to send.

Renew the orders to General Chateauneuf-Randon; order the departure of the 40th, which is at Lyons, and of the 87th, which is at Marseilles; let 15,000 men of those that are within reach be despatched to us; but calculate that, out of 4000 men whom you send, not more than half will arrive.

Consider that, in order to maintain your ground in Italy during the winter, you must have 35,000 infantry in the army of observation and 18,000 infantry in the besieging army, to make head against the emperor. These two forces together make 53,000 men; there are at this moment 27,000. Suppose that, the season being better, 3000 sick come back to us, though the autumnal rains generally give us a great number, there would remain 23,000 men to send us.

If by extraordinary couriers you confirm my orders and my requisitions, I hope to have in less than a month 8000 men drawn from the garrisons of the South. We shall still want 15,000 men. If you despatch them from Paris or the environs, they will be able to get hither in the course of December; but they must have their orders immediately. If you have dépôts, send them as well, to be incorporated in our corps.

We should still want 1500 light cavalry or dragoons: for example, the 14th regiment of chasseurs. We must have 800 artillerymen for the siege of Mantua, 10 officers of engineers, and some superior officers of artillery for this siege.

We must further have 1500 drivers [*charretiers*] organized into brigades, having their officers — I have none but Italians, who rob us—two battalions of sappers, and seven companies of miners.

If the preservation of Italy is dear to you, citizens directors, send me all these succours. I want also 20,000

muskets: but these things must arrive, and not be like all that is promised to this army but never comes. We have a great quantity of muskets, but they are Austrian; they are too heavy, and our soldiers cannot use them. We have here powder manufactories which we employ, and which can supply us with thirty thousand [pounds] per month; that will probably be sufficient.

I recommend to you to give orders that the 8000 men whom I expect at the end of October shall arrive: this alone may enable me yet to give some hard blows to the Imperialists. If 3000 men are to reach me from General Chateauneuf-Randon, 6 or 7000 must be sent off.

I am endeavouring to raise here a legion armed with Austrian muskets, and clothed in the uniform of the national guard of the country: the complement of this legion is to be 3500 men; it is possible that the plan may succeed.

The advanced posts of General Vaubois have fallen in with the Austrian division defending the Tyrol: it has taken 110 prisoners from the enemy.

Whatever circumstances occur, I beg you not to doubt for a moment the zeal and determination of the army of Italy to support the honour of the arms of the Republic.

BONAPARTE.

To the Chief of the Staff.

Head-quarters, Milan, 10 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 1, 1796].

You will give orders to General Kilmaine for the disarming of the Mantuan and for obtaining the restitution of all the horses which have been bought of the soldiers. You will direct that there be paid for each horse the sum that it cost, but it must not exceed 120 francs apiece. You will form three moveable columns commanded by intelligent and upright men, which shall scour, the first, that part of the Mantuan comprised between the Po, the Mincio, and the Oglio; the second, that part comprised between the Mincio, the Po, and the Adige; the third, all that is situated beyond the Po. I should think that 150 infantry and half the number of cavalry will be sufficient for each of these columns.

These columns will repair to the three chief towns, Castiglione, Roverbello, and Gonzaga, to proceed to the disarming, to the search after every thing that belongs to the

Austrians, to the apprehension of such turbulent men as have excited the people to take arms against the army, and to the recovery of the horses sold by the soldiers.

I recommend to you, in particular, to obtain information respecting the conduct of the monks of San Benedetto; in that village horrors have been perpetrated: I had ordered an extraordinary imposition upon it, which must be levied immediately. Apply to the *commissaire ordonnateur* for a copy of my order.

I recommend to you also to put an end to those perpetual requisitions which desolate the conquered countries, with scarcely any profit to the Republic.

Concert with the *commissaire ordonnateur* Aubernon, so that a parcel of knaves, upon pretext of supplying the army, may no longer despoil the villages for their own profit. You are the first agent of the Republic in the Mantuan; you ought, therefore, to exercise your vigilance over every thing that can interest public order. There is at Castiglione an administrative commission charged with the levy of impositions; lend it the aid of the armed force and any other assistance that is in your power.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 11 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 2, 1796].

The republic of Venice is afraid; it is plotting with the King of Naples and the pope; it is fortifying and entrenching itself in Venice. Of all the populations of Italy, the Venetian is the one that hates us most cordially: they are all armed, and there are districts the inhabitants of which are brave. Their minister in Paris writes to them to arm, or all will be lost. We shall do nothing with all these people, if Mantua is not taken.

The King of Naples has on foot 60,000 men; he cannot be attacked and dethroned by fewer than 18,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry. It is possible that, in concert with Austria and Rome, he might push a corps upon Rome, and afterwards upon Bologna and Leghorn: this corps might be of about 15,000 men, and would considerably annoy the French army. The grand-duke of Tuscany is an absolute cipher in all respects. The Duke of Parma behaves well enough: he is a cipher, too, in every respect.

Rome is strong in its fanaticism ; if it shows itself against us, it may considerably increase the strength of the King of Naples, and oblige me to keep 3000 more men on my rear, by the irritation which it may excite in the minds of these people : singly, without Naples, it would require 10,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry to subdue it. If it arms, fanaticism will give it some strength ; there would be bloodshed : one cannot march to Rome united with Naples with fewer than 20,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry ; and if one were to go to Naples after having been at Rome, one would need an army of 24,000 infantry and 3500 cavalry. I think that 6000 infantry and 500 cavalry would be sufficient to keep the States of the pope in awe, if, when once master of them, a man were to conduct himself with address and firmness.

The King of Sardinia foment the rebellion of the Bar-bets. If Naples and Rome act against us, 3000 more men will be required in the fortresses of Piedmont.

Genoa—On the 16th of this month, the minister Fay-poult will present a note to the senate, and we shall make our operation, agreeably to your orders : if it succeeds, we may rely upon the government.

If you persist in making war upon Rome and Naples, there will be required a reinforcement of 25,000 men, which, added to the 20,000 necessary for making head against the emperor, form a reinforcement of 45,000 men that will be needed. If you make peace with Naples, and Rome only is left, it would be possible, with the mere force destined to make head against the emperor, to take advantage of a favourable moment for crushing it : one must reckon, nevertheless, on an increase of 3000 men.

In the present position of the Republic, I think that you cannot make war at once upon Naples and the emperor. Peace with Naples is of the utmost necessity : continue in a state of negociation or armistice with Rome till the moment for marching upon that proud city. Rome would become very strong by its union with Naples. If we are beaten on the Rhine, it will be advisable for us to make peace with Rome and with Naples.

There is another negociation which becomes indispensable ; that is, a treaty of alliance with Piedmont and Genoa. I should give Massa and Carrara and the im-

perial fiefs to Genoa, and make it declare against the coalition.

If you continue the war against Naples, it appears necessary to me to take Lucca and put a garrison into it: that place is strong and well armed; it covers the territories of Genoa, and affords a retreat to the garrison of Leghorn.

This and the accompanying letters will make you thoroughly acquainted with our position. I never calculated that, after destroying two armies of the emperor's in one campaign, there would be a more powerful one, and that the two armies of the Republic would winter far from the Danube: the project of Trieste and Naples was founded on suppositions.

I have written to Vienna, and this evening the courier will set out at the same time that the army marches for the Brenta.

I am fortifying the Adda, but it is a weak barrier. Speedy succours, I repeat to you; for the emperor is already setting his troops in motion.

The negotiation with Rome has been mismanaged: before it was commenced, Rome ought to have fulfilled the conditions of the armistice; one might at least have waited a few days, and one might easily have had the 5,000,000 of the second payment, part of which had already arrived at Rimini. The whole treaty was shown to the pope at once: he ought, on the contrary, to have been obliged to decide previously on the first article; but, above all, one ought not to have chosen the moment when the army was in the Tyrol, and one ought to have had as a support a corps of troops at Bologna, which fame would have increased. This costs us 10,000,000, five in kind, and all the masterpieces of Italy, which a delay of a few days would have given us.

All these countries are so populous, the situation of our forces is so well known, all this is so hackneyed by the emperor and by England, that the scene changes every fortnight.

If we do not succeed in all we undertake, I beg you to believe that it will not be for want of zeal and assiduity.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 17 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 8, 1796].

Mantua cannot be taken before the month of February, as I must have already informed you: by this you perceive that our position in Italy is uncertain, and our political system very bad.

We commenced negotiations with Rome, when the armistice was not fulfilled, when 10,000,000 worth in pictures, and 5,000,000 in kind were on the point of being delivered to us. Rome is arming, is kindling the fanaticism of the people: they are coalescing on all sides against us; they are awaiting the moment for acting; they will act with success, if the emperor's army is at all reinforced.

Trieste is as near to Vienna as Lyons is to Paris: in fifteen days troops arrive there. The emperor has already an army in that quarter.

You will find herewith all the papers necessary to enable you to judge of our position and of the state of people's minds.

I think peace with Naples most essential, and an alliance with Genoa or the court of Turin necessary. Make peace with Parma, and a declaration, taking under the protection of France the people of Lombardy, Modena, Reggio, Bologna, and Ferrara, and, above all things, send troops. It is absolutely necessary, at the conclusion of such a campaign as this, to send 15,000 recruits. The emperor has sent them thrice over in his campaign.

In Italy all is spoiled: the spell of our force is broken; they count our number. I think it time, and high time, that you should take into consideration the state of your army in Italy, that you adopt a system which can give you friends as well among princes as among the people. Lessen the number of your enemies. The influence of Rome is incalculable. It was very impolitic to break with that power; all this turns to its advantage. Had I been consulted upon all this, I should have delayed the negotiation with Rome, like that with Genoa and Venice. Whenever your general in Italy is not the centre of the whole, you will run great risks. This language will not be attributed to ambition; I have but too much honour, and my health is so impaired that I feel myself obliged to apply to you for a

successor. I am unable to ride ; nothing but courage is left me, but that is not sufficient in a post like this.

All was ready for the business of Genoa ; but citizen Faypoult thought that it would be advisable to procrastinate. Surrounded by fermenting populations, prudence commands us to conciliate that of Genoa till the new order of things. I have sent citizen Poussielgue to sound the court of Turin. I am continuing this negociation. Troops, troops, if you would preserve Italy.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 17 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 8, 1796].

One hundred and fifty men of the garrison of Mantua, leaving the place on the 8th at ten in the morning, crossed the Po at Borgo-Forte in quest of forage. However, at five in the afternoon, we completed the blockade of Mantua by possessing ourselves of the Pradella gate and that of Ceresa, as I had the honour to inform you by my last courier. This detachment, finding itself thereby cut off from Mantua, attempted to retire to Florence. On reaching Reggio, the inhabitants, apprized of the circumstance, ran to arms, and prevented them from passing, which obliged them to retire to the castle of Monte Chiragolo, in the territories of the Duke of Parma. The brave inhabitants of Reggio pursued them, invested them, and made them prisoners by capitulation. In the firing which took place, the national guards of Reggio had two men killed. These are the first that have shed their blood for the liberty of their country.

The brave inhabitants of Reggio have shaken off the yoke of tyranny, from their own impulse, and without so much as ascertaining whether they should be supported by us.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 17 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 8, 1796].

You will find annexed, citizens directors, a proclamation relative to Modena. These petty rulers take it into their heads to conspire ; I have been beforehand with them.

Why had I not a couple of brigades to do the same at Rome! But I have no disposable troops, and there is Naples, which would oblige us to fall back. The affair of Modena somewhat improves our position.

I am surrounded by thieves here; I have already three commissaries of war, two administrators, and officers, before the council of war.

BONAPARTE.

To the Executive Directory.

Head-quarters, Milan, 20 Vendemiaire, year 5 [October 11, 1796].

The Modena business, citizens directors, has been completely successful: this country is content and happy to find itself delivered from the yoke that oppressed it. The patriots are numerous and in office. You will find here-with different printed papers which will enable you to judge of the turn that I am giving to the public mind, in order to oppose fanaticism by fanaticism, and to make friends of people who otherwise would become our implacable foes. You will there find the organization of the Lombard legion. The national colours which they have adopted are green, white, and red.

Among the officers, there are many French; the others are Italian officers, who have for several years been fighting with us in the army of Italy. The chief of brigade, named Lahoz, is a Milanese: he was aide-de-camp to General Laharpe. I had taken him with me; he is known to the representatives, who have been with the army of Italy, and particularly to citizen Ritter.

You will find annexed, in manuscript, the organization which I intend to give to the first Italian legion. To this end, I have written to the commissioners of the government, in order that the governing persons of Bologna, Modena, Reggio, and Ferrara may meet in congress: this will take place on the 23rd. I shall neglect nothing that is capable of imparting energy to this immense population and turning minds in our favour. The Lombard legion will be paid, clothed, and equipped by the Milanese. To defray this expense, they must be authorized to take the plate of the churches, which will produce nearly a million.

You will find different letters and different notes from citizen Cacault. Every thing indicates that in less than a

month great blows will be struck in Italy. Between this and then, we must have concluded an alliance with Genoa or with the King of Sardinia. Perhaps it would be highly advisable to make peace with the King of Naples also.

I have sent back citizen Poussielgue to Turin, to continue his negociation; I have told him to inform you direct from Turin of the issue of this second interview. Let me know, above all, our present position in regard to Naples. You are aware that I have 2400 Neapolitan cavalry, whom I keep closely watched, and whom it would be necessary to get the start of, if we had stronger reasons for mistrusting Naples: if they were to act on their part at the same time as the Austrians and the other powers, that could not fail to increase our embarrassment. In the month of Thermidor, when I was falling back upon Brescia, I thought of having them secured, but durst not venture.


General Serrurier writes to me from Leghorn that the grand-duke is arming also.

Believe that, if my health will in any way permit, I will spare no pains for the preservation of Italy.

You will find annexed a letter from citizen Faypoult. It appears to me, according to this, that the Genoa business is negociating in Paris, and that we have done quite right not to intermeddle in it. This conduct excites distrust in the Genoese government. I revert to my principle, exhorting you to treat before a month's end with Genoa and Turin.

BONAPARTE.


END OF VOL. I.




FREDERICK SHOBERL, JUNIOR,
PRINTER TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE ALBERT,
51, RUPERT STREET, HAYMARKET, LONDON.

78

24
40
90
91
278







Napoleon

The Napoleon letters and despatches, secret, confidential and official
from the originals in his private cabinet

Bd.: 1

London (1846)

Gall.rev. 104 f-1

urn:nbn:de:bvb:12-bsb10421011-4